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PREFACE 
The Second Conference on Pacific Trade and Development 
was held at the East-West Center from 8th through 11th January 
1969 both to follow-up the results of the first conference held in 
Tokyo, January 1968, on the Pacific Free Trade Area scheme and 
also to discuss the trade and aid relationships of the Asian devel-
oping countries with the advanced Pacific countries. Contained in 
this book are the papers and proceedings of the conference. 
International trade and monetary policies in the Post-Kennedy 
Round world and the Nixon Government era are in a fluid state 
groping towards a new direction. Also the results of the Second 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development last spring 
point to the conclusion that a new design for expanding trade and 
for accelerating economic development both within and between ad-
vanced Pacific countries and Asian developing countries must be 
put into practice. 
Really, the expansion of trade and the promotion of economic 
development with closer cooperation in this Pacific and Asian re-
gion which has a huge potential should be a critical focus for the 
world which finds itself in a trade and monetary turmoil. A number 
of useful proposals to meet these ends were thrashed out in the 
conference. Several difficulties in realizing them were also envis-
aged and everyone was well aware that further studies would have 
to be undertaken. 
As indicated in the communique issued by the conference, our 
study should be continued. Our academic studies, I am confident, 
will throw light, gradually but steadily, upon pragmatic policies of 
the governments and business circles concerned. 
I am deeply grateful to all the participants and the Hawaii 
Committee who have worked so hard and who have created a new 
design for the economic development of the Pacific/ Asia region. 
Kiyoshi Kojima 
Chairman o! the Steering Committee 
for "Pacific Trade and Development" 
Professor, Hitotsubashi University, 
Tokyo 
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CO MM UNIQUE 
The Second Conference on Pacific Trade and Development was 
held at the East-West Center, from 8-11 th January 1969 to discuss 
alternative trade policies for advanced Pacific countries, the aid 
and trade needs of less developed countries, and the scope for in-
creased economic cooperation within the Asian-Pacific region. 
Sponsored by the State of Hawaii, the Japan Economic Research 
Center, the United States 1 Agency for International Development, 
the A sia Foundation, the Australian National University and the 
Standard Oil Company of California with support from the East-
·west Center, the Conference developed the theme of discussion at 
the first Conference held in Tokyo last January. E conomists from 
Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philip-
pines, Republic of Korea, Republic of China, the United Kingdom ; 
and the United States participated in the Confereµce. 
Governor John A. Burns addressed the opening of the Con-
ference. He emphasized the role of the Conference in broadening 
the dialogue on questions relating to the establishment of a Pacific 
Community of Nations . 
Discussion ranged over a large number of important trade 
a nd aid issues. These included the limited success of the Second 
United Na tions Conference on Trade and Development in dealing 
with the major issues in the economic development problem • .. The 
Conference stressed the importance of providing freer access for 
exports from less developed countries to advanced country mar-
kets. Special studies of trade and development in Taiwan and 
Korea highlighted these issues. But the Conference also recog-
nized the fact that not all less developed countries could benefit 
substantially in the near future from trade concessions alone. 
This was clearly evident in a study of the Indonesian development 
problem. Considerable emphasis was therefore given to the impor-
tance of increased aid effort designed to improve agricultural 
productivity, promote new industrial development, and provide the 
infrastructure necessary to a successful development program. 
The Conference also discussed proposals for a Pacific Free 
Trade Area in the context of possible changes in world trade poli-
cies. It recognized the gains from a free trade area. But it also 
recognized that there are difficulties which prevent the adoption of 
any such proposal in the near future. Alternative policies for 
closer economic integration in the Asian-Pacific region were con-
sidered. In particular, the Conference examined the possibilities 
for promoting closer ec anomic cooperation among ,Japan, Australia, 
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and New Zealand, short of the formation of a comprehensive free 
trade area. 
Any trade arrangement among advanced Pacific countries 
should be coupled with more extensive trade concessions for ex-
oorts from less developed countries and more cooperation in aid-
gi ving . It was suggest-ed that the establishment of an Organization 
for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development might effectively promote 
these objectives . 
The Conference also considered the prospect for internation-
al monetary cooperation within the ECAFE region , particularly 
proposals for a clearing and/or reserve union among ECAFE coun-
tries . Further study of such arrangements appeared especially 
urgent in view of the constraint that continued international mone-
tary crises might p ut upon regional development a i ms . 
P articipants at the Conference stressed the need in their 
count ries both for continued public discussion of these important 
problems and for their regular consideration by governments. 
They will confer on arrangements for a further conference to di s -
cuss some of the more specific issues that were rai sed . 
January 11 , 1 969 
Honolulu, Hawaii 
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Part I 
FUTURE WORLD TRADE POLICY 
Chapter 1 
THE NORTH-SOUTH PROBLEM IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
AND THE IMPLICA TIONS OF UNCTAD 1968 
Harry G. JOHNSON 
"The North-South problem in the World Economy" is a term 
convenient for distinguishing the problem of economic relations 
betw:een the developed and the developing countries from the prob-
lem of international relations between the centrally-planned and 
the free-market economies--the so- called "East-West Problem." 
Neither description is of course geographically accurate, as the 
presence of Australia and New Zealand among the developed 
countries and of Japan as a country traditionally regarded as 
"Eastern", but now also an industrially advanced and predominantly 
market-oriented economy, testifys. But the terminology is suffici-
ently defensible to serve its purpose. 
More concretely, the North-South problem derives from the 
wide gap between the average incomes of the developed industrial-
ized nations and the poor nations anxious for development, and also 
between their normal rates of economic growth, especially of growth 
in per capita incomes. This latter gap is aggravating the existing 
disparities of living standards between the tw o groups of countries. 
The problem is to narrow the gaps by the adoption of appropriate 
policies by the developed countries, designed to accelerate the 
development of the less developed and poorer nations. Recognition 
of and concern about this problem on the part of the developed 
nations has always been the outcome of a mixture of motivations--
humanitarian concern about the relief of poverty, economic concern 
about the development of markets for exports and about securing 
favourable treatment of foreign investments by nationals, and, 
particularly at the outset, politico-military concern about the 
attraction and adhesion of allies in the cold war and the establish-
ment of economic conditions conducive to political stability in the 
poorer nations. These motivations do not necessarily lead to the 
same kind of economic policies for promoting economic development. 
On the contrary, some of them have led to policies contrary to that 
end, at least in the judgment of some experts-- for example the 
preservation of ruling oligarchies and the support of substantial 
military capabilities by lavish economic assistance. 
3 
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Confusion about the objectives of economic assistance of various 
kinds generally lumped together as "development assistance" is in 
fact largely responsible for the current state of wide-spread 
disillusionment in the developed countries about the effectiveness 
and usefulness of development assistance . A contributory factor 
to this disillusionment was the initial illusion on the part of the 
United States that the development problem could be solved in the 
same way as the problem of European economic recovery, by 
modest pump- priming with American capital and technical assist-
ance over a short period of economies that otherwise possessed 
the prerequisites of industrial competence. In fact, the poor 
countries were and are poor in all senses, not just that of shortage 
of capital to co-operate with the other factors of production, and 
much capital was wasted in the process of learning that develop-
ment requires much more than an addition to the stock of capital 
equipment and will take a much longer and more sustained effect 
than the Marshall Plan. 
In addition to the disillusionment with development assistance 
just mentioned, other more objective tendencies in the world econ-
omy have been operating to attenuate the concern of the developed 
countries with the poor countries and to reduce their willingness 
to provide such assistance . Politically, the attainment of a modus 
vivendi between the United S tates and the Soviet Union, s ignalized 
notably by the outcome of the Cuban crisis of 1962, has greatly 
reduced the pressure to compete for political allies by generosity 
of assistance-- a compet ition which in any case was proving it-
self to be self-defeating. Militarily , the development of new 
technologies of offense and defense has greatly reduced the depen-
dence of the major powers on far-flung strategic bases, and there-
fore the need both to spend on the maintenance of these bases and 
to purchase political acceptance of them . On the economic s ide, 
two of the major aid donors, the United States and the United 
Kingdom, have been in chronic balance-of-payments deficit, and 
hence under mouting pressure to reduce their foreign aid contri-
butions , while--as a consequence of the growing malaise of the 
international monetary system--surplus countries have been re-
luctant to increase their aid donations unilaterally for fear of the 
balance-of-payments consequences. Finally, on the side of 
humanitarian concern for the relief of poverty, that concern has 
in the United States been shifted by domestic disorders from the 
relief of foreign poverty to the relief of domestic poverty and the 
provision of greater opportunities for the minority to share in the 
general affluence. Other developed countries have in various 
way been subjected to mounting internal pressures and discontents, 
which can only be relieved by substantial increases in public 
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expenditure. Hence these problems lower the political priority of 
assistance to the economic development of the poor countries. 
In short the motives for concern in the North about acceler-
' ating development in the South have been gradually whittled down 
by the general trend of international economic and political rela-
tions to the primarily humanitarian; and the humanitarian motive 
has been increasingly preoccupied with pressing domestic problems 
of poverty amid affluence. In these circumstances there is a need 
for a reaffirmation of the moral commitment of the developed coun-
tries to help promote the development of the poor countries, a reaf-
firmation which presumably Mr. MacNamara is seeking through his 
recent appointment of Mr. Lester B. Pearson to chair a prestigious 
Commission on International Development, to conduct a 11 grand 
assize" into the whole question of economic development policy. 
There is also a need to explore new policy techniques that might be 
employed by the developed countries to foster the growth of the 
poor nations, and the arguments for so employing them. 
The prospective inadequacy of foreign aid to cover the net 
foreign exchange requirements of the development plans of the less 
developed countries became increasingly apparent towards the end 
of the 1 950' s, and naturally directed attention towards the alterna-
tive of expanding opportunities for earning foreign exchange by 
means of exports, and also towards ways of increasing the real 
contribution of existing aid flows. In addition to the foreign ex-
change motivation of interest in expanding export opportunities, the 
experience of some of the more industrialized developing countries 
with industrialization based on protection in the domestic market 
("inward-looking industrialization") had convinced their experts 
that such industrialization was highly inefficient and prone to be 
self-limiting if not self-defeating, and that what was required was 
access to larger, foreign, markets, both in the advanced countries 
and among the other developing countries. Moreover, experience of 
attempting to develop exports of their manufactures had disclosed 
t he existence of substantial barriers placed in their way by the 
t rade policies of the developed countries. Finally, there were 
l ong-standing grievances over the prices and the price-instability 
of the primary products that formed the mainstay of their exports--
chaxacteristics of the trade in these products partly attributable to 
the agricultura l protectionist policies of the advanced industrial 
countries. 
This was the background of the first United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, held in Geneva from March to June 1964 . 
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In the back ground document for that Conference, 1 its Secretary-
. General, Dr. Raul Prebisch, presented a powerful argument for a 
new trade strategy for development, based on an appeal for equity 
and parity of treatment of producers in less developed countries in 
competition with those in developed countries. Specifically, he 
called for international commodity agreements to give less devel-
oped producers of primary products the same sort of price-
support and price-stabilization assistance as were enjoyed by the 
farmers of the developed countries; for preferential access for 
exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures from developing 
countries to the markets of the developed countries, to enable them 
to compete on equal terms with the manufacturers of those coun-
tries, their preferential advantage over other advanced-country 
manufactur ers in that market compensating for the competitive 
disadvantages of under-development ; and for preferential arrange-
ments among developing countries, falling short of the free inter-
nal trade arrangements which are the only exception allowed to the 
GP.TT rule of non-discrimination, to permit them to gain the advan-
tage s of specialization in a larger market. 
As I have argued in my study of the issues r aise d at the 1964 
UNCTAD, 2 the developing countries had valid and weighty grounds 
for complaining that the trade policies of the developed countries, 
and the system of regulating international trade within the frame-
work of GA TT, were biased against their exporting interests . 
These included the de facto exemption from G.ATT of domestic 
price support schemes for agricultural products, implemented by 
quotas, which both narrowed export markets and accentuated the 
instability of prices; the tariff bargaining procedure of GATT, 
which until the Kennedy Round concentrated the reductions of tar-
iffs to manufactures of prime interest to the large developed coun-
tries (and even in the Kennedy R ound retained vestiges of such 
concentration through the exemptions lists); the typical escalation 
of tariff rates in national tariff structures by stage of production, 
which discriminated in favour of imports of raw materials and 
1. Raul Prebisch, Towards A New Trade Policy for Development 
(United Nations, 1 Q64 . 
2 Harry G. Johnson, Economic Policies Toward Less Developed 
Countries (Vfa shington , D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967) ; 
see also idem, The World E conomy at the C rossroads (Oxford: 
The C la.rendon Press, 1965), Chapter 5 . 
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against imports of manufactures, and hence impeded the industrial-
izs.tion of the developing countries; and the application within 
GA.TT of quota restrictions on the exports of cotton textiles from 
the less developed countries, A further point, to which I should 
have given more attention in my study, was that the formation of 
the European Economic Community and subsequently of the Europe-
an Free Trade Association greatly extended the market area of 
protection of manufacturers in developed countries from their com-
petitors in the developing countries, by giving members of these 
arrangements free entry to the mrkets of other members. 3 
While the developing countries had cogent grounds for com-
plaint against the existing system of national and international 
economic policies, and for demanding sweeping changes in that 
system designed to improve its equity and promote their own eco-
nomic development, the changes they demanded, or at least the two 
most important of them (commodity agreements and manufacturing 
preferences), were in my judgment poorly considered, for a varie-
ty of reasons . First, the ideal solution in principle would be to 
eliminate the discriminatory protectionist barriers to free inter-
national trade, and to seek to promote world economic development 
on a basis of dynamic comparative advantage ; 4 the inversion of 
existing protectionism in favour of the producers of the developing 
countries is economically a second or third best solution to the 
problem. Second, the very political forces which generate and 
maintain protectionism in the advanced countries are likely either 
to resist strongly the resulting exposure of domestic producers to 
competition from the developing countries, or to accept it only in 
return for safeguards which might actually worsen the market op-
3 It is true that some developing countries--the Associated Over-
seas Territories of the Common Market--also obtained this pre-
ferential entry, without having to reciprocate. But the effect 
wa s to accentuate the discriminatory effect against other devel-
oping countries not included in the Associated Overseas Terri-
tories. 
4 By this is meant the gradual transfer of production from ad-
vanced to less developed countries in response to wage dif-
ferentials and the gradual standardization of new technologies 
of production. For a fuller statement of a dynamic theory of 
comparative advantage, see my Wicksell Lectures, Compara-
tive Cost and Commercial Policy Theory For a Developing 
World E conomy (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968) 
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portunities of the developing countries in the longer run. Third , 
a great deal of prewar and postwar experience with international 
commodity agreements has shown them to be extremely difficult to 
negotiate and to operate. More over , the probable effect of pre-
ferences on the exports of the developing countries is an empiri-
cally unknown quantity, while theory indicates that the net real 
resources for development contributed by additional exports could 
only be a fraction of the increase in the quantum of exports itself. 
Thus there are strong reasons in both cases for doubting whether 
the contribution to foreign exchange earnings and to development 
resources that would result would justify the complex changes in 
t:rade policy that would be required to bring them about. 
Be that as it may, the 1964 UNCTAD was a substantial suc-
cess in calling the manifold grievances of the developing coun-
tries in the field of international trade policy, and to a lesser ex-
tent aid policy, forcibly to the attention of the developed countries. 
f,;lost notably, from the standpoint of the basic principles for the 
conduct of international trade and trade policy, the United States, 
vv-hich at Geneva had stood firm on the principle of non-discrimina-
tion in opr,>0sition to the demands of the developing countries for 
trade preferences, reversed its stand in April 1967 and subse-
quently co-operated with the other members of the Organisation 
for Ec onomic Co-operation and Development in preparing an agreed 
set of principles for a preference scheme in manufactures for pre-
sentation at the 1968 UNCTAD. More recently, GA TT has agreed 
to the establishment of partial preference schemes among develop-
ing countries. 
The second UNCTAD was originally projected to be held in 
1966, but was delayed until March 1 968 by organizational difficul-
ties, both in setting up and staffing the institution itself and in 
preparing for the Conference . This delay was extremely unfortu-
nate, from the point of view of the interests of the South, because 
during the interim occurred the events mentioned above as sapping 
the commitment of the developed countries to the assistance of the 
developing countries--the rapid worsening of the United States 
balance-of-payments position, the deterioration of the British 
p osition culminating in the devaluation of 1967 (a particularly 
serious blow since in the 1 964 Conference Britain had exerted 
considerable moral leadership), an increasingly unstable inter-
nRtional monetary situation, and increasing preoccupation of the 
developed countries with their internal affairs . As a result of 
these developme nts, and also of the emergence of conflicts of 
interest among the developing countries which had been successfully 
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papered over at the 1964 Conference, and the eclipsing of the Con-
ference by the international monetary disturbances of the autumn and 
winter of 1967- 68, which culminated in the gold crisis of March 1968, 
UNCT AD was a virtually unrelieved failure . 
A significant contributory factor to this outcome was the so-
called "group system" of arriving at decisions and resolutions at 
the Conference. A great deal of the success of UNCTAD 1964 as 
a forum for effective expression of the grievances of the develop-
ing countries about the trade and aid policies of the developed 
countries was due to the fact that the developing countries, under 
the leadership and inspiration of Dr. Pre bi sch, had welded them-
selves into a majority voting bloc, whereas the minority of devel-
oped countries arrived at the Conference with diverse positions 
that reflected their different national situations and approaches 
to policy and also the divisions among them that had arisen during 
the preparatory stages of the Kennedy Round negotiations and in-
deed had their roots in the complex diplomacy of postwar European 
economic integration . The developed countries were therefore 
taken by surprise, and the differences among them exploited to the 
disadvantage of their public img,ges . The developing countries 
("the group of 77") sought to repeat this political success--
necessary to assert the maximum moral pressure on the developed 
countries to grant concessions that could not be extracted from 
them by majority voting along--at the 1968 UNCTAD by drawing up 
. an agreed set of demands (the "Charter of Algiers") at a prepara-
tory meeting in Algiers . But the natural response of the developed 
countries, after the experience of Geneva, was similarly to group 
themselves into a bloc ( 11Group B" ) and concert their positions in 
advance. Moreover, given the a symmetrical relationship between 
the "Group of 77" as demanders and "Group B" as suppliers of 
concessions, it was equally natural--though highly unconducive 
to successful negotiation--that the "Group of 77" should tend to 
achieve unanimity on the basis of the most extravagant demands of 
some members, and that "Group B" should correspondingly tend to 
achieve unanimity on the basis of the least generous concessions 
individual members were prepared to offer. This polarization, 
and other organizational weaknesses inherent in large Conferences, 
tended both to encumber or paralyze negotiations, and to divert 
the proceedings from negotiations to declamations and confronta-
tions. 
The central objective of the 1968 UNCTA D, as a sequel to the 
1964 UNCTAD, was to contribute t o the formulation of a develop-
ment policy for the second Development Decade "by approving a 
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series of concrete measures to accelerate the rate of economic 
and social growth of developing countries and by inserting these 
measures into the basic framework of a broad strategy for devel-
opment, as encouraged by the General Assembly. 11 5 The prime 
emphasis was on the production of an agreed strategy, which the 
Secretariat had prepared but which it withheld "before it became 
clear whether fundamental positive results would emerge; and they 
did not. A global strategy without concrete measures would have 
been another document of pious declarations without any practical 
consequences. 11 6 
The Conference thus failed in its longer-range aim of pro-
ducing a global development strategy, because it failed in its pro-
ximate aim of producing concrete solutions to sufficient important 
problems of promoting development. For this the group system, 
and more specifically the insistence of the developing countries so 
expressed in the Charter of Algiers on the need for special meas-
ures for the least developed countries so that all the developing 
countries would derive comparable gains, was largely responsible 
--because the way in which the subjects for discussion were 
divided up ensured that equality of benefit would be impossible to 
ci,ttain. is had become clear from the 1964 UNCTAD, the individ-
ual developing countries have widely divergent interests: most 
obviously, the more developed are interested in exports of manu-
factures, and the less developed in exports of primary products; 
in addition, they are divided among those in the Commonwealth 
Preference System, those associated with the European Common 
Market, and those excluded from either preferential system. Thus 
while, as had been cynically remarked of them at the 1964 UNCTAD, 
it was easy enough for them to agree on the highest common denom-
inator of demands on the developed countries, it was also--as had 
been predicted by some analysts of the first UNCTAD, and as 
proved the case at the second UNCTAD--very unlikely that they 
could find any common interest in practical proposals for trade 
policy change, and therefore agree to them without extensive 
wrangling, if at all. 
This probability was verified, most surprisingly to the Group 
B countries, with respect to the proposal for a preference scheme 
in manufactures and semi- manufactures for the exports of the 
developing countries . As recorded above, this was the most hotly-
5 Raul Prebisch, "The Significance of the Second Session of 
UNCTAD," UNCTAD, TD/96, 7 May, 1968, p.2. 
6 Ibid. , p. 8. 
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contended proposal to emerge from the 1964 UN CT AD, and one with 
respect to which the United States reversed its original opposition 
and- co-operated with the other OECO countries in the production 
of an ag;eed plan for a general preferences scheme for presenta-
tion to the Conference. That plan was a collection of principles 
and elements rather than a concrete scheme, and it left unresolved 
the question of abolition of "reverse preferences" (preferences for 
developed countries in the markets of developing countries under 
Commonwealth Preferences 3.nd Association of Overseas Territo-
ries with the European Common Market); but it did represent a 
major concession of principle, and the developed countries expect-
ed it to be warmly welcomed. The welcome was indeed warm, but 
in a quite contrary sense. Developing members of an existing 
preference area were worried lest they should lose more by 
sharing their existing preferences with other developing countries 
than they would gain from access to the markets of the developed 
members of the other preference area and the United States. More 
important, preferences in the manufactured items envisaged for in-
clusion in the scheme were of interest only to a minority of the 
developing countries, these with a manufacturing capability. To 
extend the range of beneficiaries in accordance with the principle 
of equitable sharing of benefits, the "group of 77" insisted to the 
last possible minute that the general preferences scheme must in-
clude processed and semi-processed agricultural and other primary 
products from the beginning, in place of these products being dealt 
with as proposed on a case-by-case basis as the scheme evolved. 
fa consequence, instead of positive adoption of the proposal, a 
special committee was set up to continue work on the details of the 
scheme, with the objective of having a definite scheme ready by 
late 1969. This objective is in all probability too optimistic, 
though it may be considered a longer-run achievement that some 
sort of preference scheme is on its way. 
With respect to other major areas of discussion, significant 
positive results failed to emerge for a variety of reasons, involving 
both the unwieldiness of the group system, the balance-of-payments 
difficulties of the United Kingdom and the United States, and funda-
mental economic problems. The work on commodities schemes ad-
vanced little beyond the recommendation that existing efforts to 
negotiate such schemes on certain eligible commodites, and a varie-
ty of research programmes, should be continued. Nothing was 
accomplished with respect to improved access of developing coun-
try exports of primary products to the markets of develoned coun-
tries. The proposal prepared by the World Bank for a s~pplemen­
tary financing scheme to enable countries suffering shortfalls in 
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export earnings below projected levels to continue their develop-
ment plans was sent back for further study, because the countries 
that would have had to supply the required resources were unwilling 
to do so for balance-of-payments reasons. 
The only 1'.)0tentially significant concession from the developed 
countries to the developing (the general preferences proposal 
apart) was in the field of finance, where it was agreed to change 
the denominator used in applying the "one per cent of national in-
come" principle for financial resource transfers from the former 
to the latter from net national income at factor cost to gross nation-
al product at market prices. This would raise the required aid 
volume by about 25 per cent of existing levels. The value of this 
concession, however, remains problematical owing to the unwilling-
ness of most developed countries to specify a target date by which 
the change would be implemented. As the international monetary 
situation and the positions of the United Kingdom and the United 
States have been evolving over the past three years, it appears 
extremely unlikely that present aid levels will be maintained, let 
alone the new targets be implemented. 
The 1968 UNCTAD was therefore a virtually unqualified fail-
ure. Of its two noteworthy positive accomplishments, the increase 
in targeted aid levels is a very doubtful promise rather than a firm 
commitment, while the general preferences proposal remains to be 
worked out in detail and its outlines themselves are rather nebu-
lous. Moreover, with the increase in international monetary un-
certainty that commenced before the date of UNCTAD 1968 and has 
heightened appreciably since then, work on the proposal may be 
indefinitely suspended, or else what emerges may turn out to be a 
protectionist and trade-restrictive scheme rather than the hope 
for opening out of large export opportunities in manufactured goods 
for the developing countries. 
The failure of UNCTA D 1968 raises two important questions. 
The first is whether UNCTAD in its present form has ceased to 
serve a useful purpose. UNCTAD 1964 caught the developed coun-
tries by surprise, and enabled the developing countries to drama-
tize their grievances sufficiently to change the thinking and ap-
proach of the developed countries, notably on the issue of trade 
preferences (including preferences among the developing countries). 
But the developed countries learned from the experience, and at 
UNCTAD 1968 were able to let the divisions of interest among the 
developing countries themselves prevent much of importance from 
happening, and at the same time to shed some of the burden of re-
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sponsibility for the ills of the developing countries that had been 
heaped upon them at UNCTAD 1964. It therefore seems that the 
process of confrontation of the two groups at time-consuming mon-
ster meetings has lost its moral shock power, and that its expense, 
inefficiency, and irrelevance to the solution of concrete issues are 
no longer justified by its possibilities of making progress. On the 
other hand, it is clear that understanding of the real issues has 
been furthered by the research that has been stimulated and carried 
out, both inside and outside the UNCTAD organization, as a result 
of the 1964 confrontation. Perhaps UNCTAD would be well advised 
to eschew monster international rallies in future, and to emphasize 
research and discussion by small expert groups, in co-operation 
with other established international institutions. 
The second and more important question is how, if at all, ef-
forts to promote the economic development of the South by increases 
in development assistance can be intensified, given that the 
UNCTA D route has probably reached its limits, and may even have 
passed them, in the sense that the failure of UNCT AD 1968 may give 
the developed countries the feeling that they have done everything 
reasonable for the developing countries. 
As mentioned earlier, there is an obvious need for a renewal 
of the moral commitment of the developed countries to help the devel-
oping, a commitment that was long accepted without much thought as 
requiring only contributions of development assitance, and which 
was gradually withering under the pressures of changing circum-
stances. This commitment was stirred up again by the challenge 
of UNCTAD 1964, and is in all probability subsiding again. 
It seems unlikely that the efforts to renew the commitment now being 
mounted by religious, intellectual and social leaders, and by the 
institutions of the United Nations, notably the \iVo rld Bank, will be 
very effective in persuading the political leaders and governments 
of the major industrial countries collectively to become suddenly 
rnore generous in their aid and trade policies towards the develop-
ing nations as a group .. 
That being so, there would seem to be several avenues worth 
exploring. One, of course, would be for individual smaller ad-
vanced nations feeling the obligation to assist the poor nations 
particularly strongly to press ahead on their own rather than wait 
for the large nations to set a more generous example for them to 
follow. This has been happening to some extent, for example in 
the case of Canada. Another would be for governments to provide 
more incentives or opportunity for individuals to make contribu-
tions to the growth of the developing nations. Tax incentives for 
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private corporations to invest in such countries have frequently 
been suggested, and might become a major instrument of U.S. 
development assistance policy as official foreign aid is whittled 
away by Congress. But something substantial might be accomplished 
also to encourage donations of cash by individual citizens, for ex-
ample by making such donations deductible from income for tax 
purposes, or even going further and making them directly deduct -
ible from taxes due. (This would amount to letting private citizens 
rather than government determine how much of their taxes should 
be allocated to the purposes of development assistance.) 
Another alternative, which is in line with the theme of this 
Conference, would be for the advanced nations to assume special 
resnonsibility for development assistance to developing nations with 
which they have special historical or geographical links. This has 
been a major factor in French and British development assistance 
in the past. The chief drawback of this approach is that, as it 
operates between single large nations and groups of small countries, 
it tends to create dependency and facilitate political and economic 
exploitation. For this reason, an arrangement between a grouping 
of advanced nations and a fairly numerous group of developing 
nations would be superior. Group co-operation of the advanced to 
promote the development of the less developed, however, would 
probably have little impetus unless such co-operation were also 
providing fairly direct benefits for the co-operating advanced nations. 
Thus the notion of linking co-operation in promoting development 
with co-operation in the liberalization of trade among the advanced 
nations and between them and the less developed nations makes 
political and economic sense. This notion is incorporated in both 
the NAFTA and the PAFTA proposals , and the proposal for a 
Multilateral Free Trade Association that would embrace them both . 7 
7 F or more detailed argument on this point, see David Vfall, 
The Third Vforld Challenge, (London: The Atlantic Trade Study, 
1967). 
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COMMENTS ON HARRY JOHNSON'S PAPER BY HIROSHI 
KITAMURA 
1 5 
Professor ,Jchnson' s paper reflects the sense of crisis that 
nrevailed over the North-South problem after the failure of 
UNCT p. D Il. I am not quite sure whether UNCT AD II was the vir-
tually unqualified failure," Professor Johnson appears to believe 
it was. 
Let me first put Professor Johnson's conclusions into the 
perspective chosen by the author. Although he recognizes the 
need for linking development assistance with trade liberalization, 
the impression is that his hopes for solutions to the North-South 
problem hinge on economic aid rather than on trade policies. If 
this correctly describes Professor Johnson's position, we seem 
to have experienced a complete circle in the change of views over 
the course of the past 20 years, whereby policy deliberations at 
international forums appear to have followed the academic discus-
sions of economists with a certain time lag. P.fter the war, devel-
opment aid became an integral ~'art of the world economic policy, 
mainly because changes in trade policy involving far-reaching ad-
justments in the structure of production met with greater resist-
ance in the industrially advanced countries ; aid was conceived of 
as a convenient substitute for trade concessions. Towards the end 
of the 1 Q50' s, economists' thinking was increasingly directed to 
the position formulated in terms of t1Not aid, but trade ," or "Not 
aid alone, but aid and trade." When the attempts of the two 
UNCT PD conferences to tackle the problerns of trade adjustment 
frontally failed to produce immediate results, the swing has now 
turned back again towards emphasising aid . Should we expect, 
then, that forthcoming international deliberations will mainly re-
volve around the questions of aid, avoiding the more difficult 
problems of trade adjustment? 
It is, indeed, within the framework of the second United Na-
tions Development Decade that what Dr. Prebisch termed "a global 
d evelopment strategy't will be formulated. UNCTf D II may have 
failed to produce "concrete solutions to the important problems of 
promoting development" (p.10), but, as Professor Johnson is well 
aware, to produce a broad strategy for development was beyond 
the confine of UNCTP..D' s original assignments. It was obvious 
that development, being <t multi-dimensional problem, cannot be 
approached effectively from the trade a ngle alone. What we could 
now legitimately say is at least that the international deliberations 
of the past were not sufficiently focussed on the core of the devel-
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opment problem. 'I/Ve cannot expect a global development strategy 
to be formulated without a comprehensive attach on the world de-
velopment problem, and it would be difficult to have the mutual 
committments of both of the developed and the developing nations to 
the cause of world development effectively established without such 
a strategy. 
This is precisely what the "Development Charter," as pro-
posed by the Government of the Netherlands, or the concept of a 
Development Decade is aimed at. The elements of such a global 
strategy will be a set of targets covering all the major determi-
nants of development, with specification of the policies and meas-
ures conducive to the realization of these targets. Adequate 
stress will have to be given to the acceptance by the developing 
countries of the basic discipline of development efforts, including 
full mobilization of domestic resources, material and human. 
Equally important will be clear commitments on the part of the de-
veloped countries to facilitate the establishment of favourable 
trade conditions, along with the timely and continuous inflow of 
adequate development assistance. Now, a new idea of great im-
portance has been introduced into the international discussion to 
give more effect to the moral commitments for development: · the 
global strategy will not be merely a plan of action, but a continuing 
function with machinery for "international surveillance." If ac-
cepted by majority vote in the General .Assembly, this may mean 
that the world community moves one step forwards in establishing 
an implementing authority for what Professor Tinbergen calls 
"international economic policy." Thus, the North-South problem 
may be brought closer to solution. While recognizing many diffi-
culties lying ahead, I would be inclined to be a little more hopeful 
about the prospect of joint commitments for world development than 
Professor Johnson appears to be. 
With regard to the analysis of the background which gave 
birth to UNCT/' D, I am largely in agreement with Professor 
J ohnson. He writes: "the developing countries had valid and 
weighty grounds for complaining that the trade policies of the de-
veloped countries, and the system of regulating international trade 
within the framework of GA TT, were biased against their export-
ing interests." (p .6) But, if the GA TT system of multilateral free 
t r a de, based on the principles of nondiscrimination and reciprocity, 
was biased against the development needs of the poor nations, that 
is, if conditions for "the ideal solution" (p . 7) of free trade were 
not fulfilled, a partial approach towards freer trade would not 
necessarily represent a second-best solution. In these circum-
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stances, "the inversion of existing protectionism in favour of the 
producers of the developing countries" (p.7) should not be rejected 
~-s "economically a second or third best solution to the problem. 11 
(p.7) It stands to reason that, if there is built-in discrimination 
against the developing countries' trade position, it must be offset 
by deliberate discrimination of the opposite sign. This is the basic 
justification for the general preferences scheme for exports from 
the developing countries . Such a scheme should legitimately in-
clude processed and semi-processed primary products from the 
beginning, as the processing of primary products is an inevitable 
phase of industrialization. 
UNCTP. D H amply demonstrated how inefficient world-wide 
negotiations can be in reaching agreement on the rights and obli-
gations of all nations in detail . But, Professor Johnson's well-
intentioned advice that UNCTAD should "emphasize research and 
discussion (p. 14) in the future is likely to meet with strong objec-
tions on the part of the developing countries. It was after all the 
demand for active decision- making that brought UNCTAD into ex-
istence . 
A ssuming that joint responsibility of the world community for 
development is unlikely to be established in the form of moral or 
legal commitments, Professor J ohnson suggests that a group of ad-
vanced nations may "assume special responsibility for development 
assistance to developing nations with which they have special his -
torical and geographical links . " (p . 14) The implicit assumption is 
that a system of group co-operation would be efficient enough to 
avoid the danger of dependence and exploitation. In so far as pre-
sent bilateral aid relations can be multilateralized, the proposal 
de serves favourable consideration. The idea is also in line with 
the growing importance of economic regionalism . In designing 
such a development strategy at the level of regional or other group-
ings, however, it is important to maintain the general principles of 
a global strategy as closely a s possible. Commitments and joint 
surveillance may be organized more intensively at the regional lev-
el than at the world-wide level. But, "special responsibility" will 
primarily apply to the provision of development assistance. In the 
field of trade cooperation, the preferences should be provided on 
the basis of non-reciprocity so as to avoid so called "reverse pref-
erences"; it i s highly desirable that the special preferences given 
to a particular group of developing countries are generalized to 
other developing countries in the cour se of time. The creation of 
exclusive " s phe re s of intere s t " on the basis of spe cial historical 
or geographical links should not be part of such a strategy. 
Chapter 2 
THE FUTURE SHAPE OF U . S. TRPDE POLICY : 
MULTILJ\ TERJ..L OR FREE TRADE .APPROACHES? 
Sperry LE.A 
INTRODUCTION 
The assignment for this pa per was to offer a view of the 
probable "future directions of U . S. trade policy" over a five-year 
period. Special emphasis was to be given to one particular ques-
tion: whether , and if so when, the United States might shift its 
approach to moving ahead from that of multilateral negotiations in 
the GA TT to that of developing some form of free trade arrange-
ment with other countries willing and able to join. 
Vv'ith no information on Ni:xonian trade policy thin1cing, nor 
even as to who will be charged with directing that thinking, the 
!'.la per was forced to speculate. (J-.ccordingly, the word "direc-
tions" in its a ssigned title was shifted to 11 s hape," as being more 
de scriptive of what one sees in a crystal ball.) 
This s peculation centers on two aspects of the future: 
Section I deals broadly with the immediate, attempting to de-
scribe the environment in which Nixonian trade policy will be 
formulated . 
Section Il concentrates on but one of the many considerations 
that will arise during this gestation period: the "if and when" 
question of a p ossibl e shift of U.S. trade policy from its 
traditional approach to participation in a free trade arrange-
ment. 
I. TH8 GEST.!'TION PERIOD OF FUTURE U.S. T RI.DE P OLICY 
\Ve should not expect the outlines of a new U.S. tra de rolicy 
to emerge from P resident Nixon 1 s inaugural speech , just eleven 
days from now . Nor will we see even the tip of an iceberg, for the 
s imple rea son that the iceberg itself is far from being crystallized . 
18 
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What January 20, 1 969, will mark is the start of a year of 
gestation on trade policy roughly comparable to that which began 
when President Kennedy took office just eight years ago. Some 
aspects of the formative process may occur in public view through 
the operations of hearings or commissions. The Johnson Adminis-
tration 1 s broad trade policy study (the Roth Report) should be re -
leased soon, though its influence on the new Administration's as-
sessment is problematic2.l. 1 But, in any event, it is unlikely that 
we shall know the full design and rationale of a Nixonian trade 
policy initiative before this time next year, when it may be unveiled 
in the President 1 s Second State of the Union Message. 
1 969 VS. 1 961 
In seeking clues as to what may emerge a year from now, we 
have amazingly little to go on. The President-elect has set up no 
special task forces on trade policy, nor has he announced his new 
Special ~epresentative for Trade Policy to follow Ambassador 
Roth. Vife are embarking on a certain odyssey without, as yet, 
Odysseus. 
Perhaps we can gain some insight by noting in what ways the 
present situation differs from that of eight years ago, when trade 
policy was last reassessed by a new Administration. There appear 
to be at least three areas of basic contrast between 1961 and 1969. 
A. First of all, the gestation of U.S. trade policy during 1961 
was relatively free to concentrate on a single task of determining 
how best to move ahead. In 1969, however, such forward thinking 
stands to be severely distracted by several threats to past accom-
plishment, each claiming immediate attention: 
1 In March 1967 the President directed the Special Representa-
tive for Trade Negotiations (Ambassador Roth) to conduct a 
comprehensive study of future U.S. foreign trade policy and to 
recommend such legislative and other measures as might be re-
quired. Public hearings were held during the spring of 1968 
and a final report has been prepared with the participation of a 
public advisory Committee. The topic, "Participation in free 
trade areas" was one of six listed at the outset under the heading 
of "Future Trade Negotiations." (The Roth Report was released 
on January 14, 1969, a few days after this paper was presented.) 
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1 . For the first time in 75 years, the U.S. trade surplus 
threatened, in 1968, to disappear. (It ended up at an estimated + 
0. 5 $billion.) f! n immediate task for trade policy planners will be 
to raise the trade surplus from this level to the more usual $4 - $5 
billion. To be actively considered are a variety of stimulants to 
exports and more determined efforts to neutralize the subsidies 
given to some foreign exports in violation of U.S. law. Perhaps 
the most effective way to improve the trade balance under present 
circumstances is to moderate inflationary growth by fiscal and 
::nonetary action plus, horefully, to curtail Vietnam expenditures. 
This means that trade policy strategy, at least in the short run, 
will be closely coordinated with domestic economic decision-
making at the highest levels. 
Such preoccupations did not intrude on trade policy planning 
to any comparable degree eight years ago, following a trade sur-
plus of $4. 8 billion in 1 960. 
2 . Protectionist pressures offer another threat that is 
greater in 1969 than in 1961. Since the end of the Kennedy Round, 
a wide range of U.S. domestic industries, sometimes joined by as-
sociated trade unions, believe themselves threatened by increasing 
imports. The remedy usually advocated has been quotas which 
would limit the growth of import penetration to some "fair share" 
of the U.S. market. The extent of quota proposals and their Con-
gressional sponsorship has been imposing, as the following table 
shows. 
l. s a result of strong counter-pressures, none of these pro-
posals were passed by the Congress during 1968, and had they 
been, it is unlikely that the President would have signed them into 
la.w. Nevertheless, the prospects are for a renewed campaign in 
1969, probably concentrating on a few key products -- man-made 
textiles is a leading candidate -- and justifying itself more than 
12,st year on balance-of-payments grounds. The first occasion for 
the new Administration to show its hand on trade policy will prob-
ably come when it responds to the 1969 crop of quota bills. 3 
3 Johnson Administration officials have recently outlined a four-
point program to deal with the protectionist drive: (1) making 
it easier for firms and worl<:ers under competitive pressure from 
imports to get adjustment assistance; (2) equivalently liberaliz-
ing escape clause rules to permitting recourse to protection, 
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3. The accomplishments of past trade agreements are also 
threatened by the national practice -- not present in 1961 -- of 
manipulating trade barriers as a means of dealing with balance-of-
payments crises and/ or defending currencies against devaluation 
(or, in the case of Germany, revaluation). This situation calls for 
an internal decision by the new Administration on whether to join 
this trend, for instance by adopting U.S. border taxes. l t some 
point there may also have to be international attention to a funda-
mental question: Is it to be the destiny of the world trading system 
to become the international adjustment mechanism of first recourse 
so that other international economic rules can remain undisturbed 
in times of crisis? 
4. The GJ: TT now faces challenges to its letter and spirit 
far graver than any that existed in 1961. These come from all 
its weightiest members. European countries are now rroposing a 
partial free trade link among EEC and EFT A countries that clearly 
violates Gt TT rules; so do Japanese quotas retained past their 
justification on balance-of-payments grounds. Strictly speaking, 
the import tariff surcharges temporarily applied by Canada, the 
U. K. , and France (and considered by the United States a year ago) 
violate GJ'.TT rules for emergency action for balance-of-payments 
reeisons. Other practices, while technically legal under the GATT, 
are widely considered to challenge its purposes. Examples include 
the increase in European border tax adjustments, and the retention 
of U.S. agricultural restrictions (the latter practice having been 
legalized through a waiver). All this forecasts for 1969 more at-
tention to conflicts between national practice and GJ\TT rules than 
wa s necessary eight years ago. 
(3 cont'd) but only provided such emergency action would be tem-
porary and for highly selected products; (3) persuading the 
major foreign suppliers of a particular commodity to exercise 
voluntary restraint; and (4) making it clear that if any U.S. 
quotas are applied, equivalent compensation will have to be 
granted to the injured country and that if such a quota was retain-
ed, some mechanism would have to be considered for varying it 
in relation to domestic price movements. (See J\ddress by the 
Honorable Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Economic Affairs, to the 'v\T orld f ff airs Council of Northern 
California, November 1 2, 1968.) 
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B. Secondly, to the extent that Nixonian trade policy thinking will 
still find itself free to focus on moving ahead, several factors make 
the forward vista more confused and obscured today than it was at 
this point eight years ago. 
1 • In early 1961 , the traditional overall goals and appraoch 
-- namely, further trade liberalization using multilateral negotia-
tiins in the GATT -- appeared adequate for the next push. (What 
were considered inappropriate, and thus changed accordingly, 
were the small scope for U.S. tariff cuts, the item-by-item tech-
nique of negotiating, etc.) But in 1 969, the traditional goal and 
approach are both of questionable relevance. The old words have 
new meanings, often ones that signal new pressures and tasks more 
serious than those that confronted Kennedy's planners. 
2. Take the phrase "International Trade." Purely domestic 
U.S. producers are now more likely to see in international trade 
the threat of foreign competition than the opportunities to serve 
foreign markets. A number of trade unions are having a similar 
shift in view. A n indication is the array of quota proposals listed 
above. By contrast, the growing number of multinational corpora-
tions takes a more positive view of international trade . For trade 
is essential to the operations of such a firm, enabling a complex 
c horeography of global shipments both of finished products and of 
in:~:mts that include components and subassemblies as well as raw 
materials . Such operations have created an associated interest 
in freer international movement of non-material inputs of capital 
and management skills. 
These broader and conflicting meanings of "International 
Trade" for domestic U. S, producers and trade unions on one hand, 
and multinational corporations on the other, promise to make for a 
wider diversity of pressures in 1969 than in 1961 on the issue of 
whether the United States should "move ahead" at all. We should 
also expect more interest than before in making some link between 
international trade policy and international investment policy. 
3. Then, as we all know, the principal meaning of "Trade 
Barriers" has shifted from tariffs and, to some extent, quotas, to 
what are usually called non-tariff barriers of NTBs. ("Non-tariff 
distortions of competition 11 or "non-tariff measures" are really 
better terms since we are talking about not merely techniques of 
restricting imports, but ways of artificially stimulating the produc-
tion and export of domestic goods to enable them to meet foreign 
competition at home and abroad.) 
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It is the new meaning of "Trade Barriers" that raises the 
most important new problem that must be surmounted if the United 
States is to be able to move ahead . The shift in emphasis from 
tariffs and quotas to non-tariff measures means a corresponding 
shift out of the traditional domain of trade regulations into that of 
domestic legislation and private practice. This raises serious 
Constitutional and political questions . Does the President have the 
authority to offer concessions on other than normal U.S. trade 
barriers? And even if - - as the present Administration maintains 
-- he does have this authority, would such a U.S . concession be 
ratified by the Congress when taken to it? We must keep in mind 
Senate Resolution 100 of 1966 expressly opposing this procedure, 
and the present Congressional disinclination for the United States 
to make concessions on its own non- tariff barriers . 4 As matters 
stand, we cannot see the way clear for the United States to enter 
meaningful international negotiations on what the phrase "Trade · 
Barriers" has now come to mean. Undoubtedly a breakthrough v,vill 
eventually occur, probably in the form of an understanding that the 
J\ dministration can negotiate U.S. concessions on non- tariff mat-
ters on an ad referendum basis,. that is, subject to later Congres-
sional ratification. But reaching' such an understanding looms as a 
pol itical task greater than any comparable one faced in 1961 . 
4 . In 1961 the idea of 11 U . S. Participation in Free Trade 
Areas," indeed any alternative to the traditional multilateral ap-
proach, wa s unthinkable. Now this topic, phrased as just quoted , 
is a mong those considered by the Roth Report for the Johnson Ad-
ministration. And, as discussed below, forward planning in 1969 
will probably devote some effort to comparing both approaches. 
4 Senate Concurrent Resolution #100 was passed by the .Senate 
(but not by the House) in 1 966, stating that was the sense of 
the Congress that the President should negotiate no agreement 
in the Kennedy Round outside the authority granted by the 
Trade E xpansion Act. It was meant to foreclose U . S . offers 
to make concessions on i ts own non- tariff measures . Notwith-
standing this, both the American Selling Price Agreement and 
the·. International Anti- Dumping Code were negotiated . Partly 
animating the R esolution was Congressional pique at having 
been presented by the Administration the Canadian- CT . S. A uto-
rn otive P- gr e e rrient of 1 q65 as a fait a cc omr'li , in violation of 
Congressional preroga tives on setting trade policy as this body 
understa nds them . 
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5. The forward vista now lac ks the sense of an epic historic 
movement, such as that of the Grand Design for the Atlantic nations 
which animated forward trade policy planning in 1961. Nor has 
there surfaced, as yet, a person corresponding to George Ball, 
who eight years ago gave a strong and coherent sense of purpose 
and direction to that year of gestation. 
C. Finally, we may question whether the formulation and enact-
ment of a new U.S. trade policy initiative will have the priority in 
1969 that it had in 1961. 
The supply of forensic energy available in any U.S. Adminis-
tration to argue new policy into fact is large, but it is finite. 
Generally it will not be expended equally over what matters much, 
but focused on what matters most. And nowadays, what matters 
most i s that issue possessing the greatest predicament content. 
Among international economic questions, monetary and balance-of-
payments issues appear clearly to outrank new trade policy initia-
tives on this score. 5 
This is not to suggest that a new U . S. foreign trade policy 
will not receive official attention during 1969 . But, given greater 
concern over other issues, plus the need to resolve the political 
problems with the Congress before the United States can see its 
way clear to negotiating non-tariff matters, it is conceivable that 
a new trade initiative would not be ready for announcement in a 
year's time. Or, if so , it might not be given to the Congress as 
"must legislation," as was the Trade Expansion Act at the begin-
ning of 1 962 . 
5 Let us not forget, also, that Kennedy's trade bill was presented 
with a clear sense of predicament . The first paragraph of its 
announcement in his Second State of the Union Message, January 
1962, reads:. 
"But the greatest challenge of all is posed by the growth of the 
European Common Market. .P.ssuming the accession of the 
United Kingdom, there will arise across the Atlantic a trading 
partner behind a single external tariff similar to ours with an 
economy which nearly equals our own. Will we in this country 
adapt our thinking to these new prospects and patterns, or 
will we wait until events have passed us by? etc ." 
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.A Unifying Theme for Action? 
Last winter, a private committee of U.S. and Canadian busi-
ness, labor, and professional leaders i ssued a Policy Statement 
Constructive Alternatives to Proposals to U.S. Import Quotas. 6 
This expressed the view that what was needed was not simply meas-
u:res to thwart the proposals, but "new attitudes and actions for 
dealing with the new competitive challenges signalled by their ad-
vocacy." Is given in summary form, the Committee's ultimate 
"new action" reads: 
Vie recognize the need to attend not merely to the consequ-
ences of today's international competition but to its nature . 
Protectionist pressures in the United States and elsewhere 
largely reflect the conviction that foreign competition is not 
fair competition and that restrictive countermeasures are 
therefore justified . Concern centers on the artificial com-
petitive advantages felt to be granted by special governmental 
policies and business practices, as distinguished from such 
inherent competitive advantages as low- cost labor, resources, 
capital , or technology . This calls for going beyond non-tariff 
barriers, essential though it is to deal with them right now. 
It requires coming to grips with techniques by which govern-
ments -- our own included -- may in effect subsidize manu-
facturing or exporting in ways that do not trigger antidumping 
laws or countervailing duties . These may include governmen-
tal sanction or even encouragement of industrial expansion in 
a key sector to the point of obvious overcapacity, followed, 
quite understandably, by direct or indirect aids to exports. 
Vile recognize the challenges facing fruitful study of such as -
pects of international competition . It will encounter obscure 
but powerful forces and unavoidable disrutes over how the 
word "fair" applies to competition. Yet the issue both in-
volves and concerns many countries, and inaction will oren 
the way for justifiable threats of trade restriction s . These 
facts suggest that the time is ripe for all industrialized na-
tions to work together toward some international "code of 
competition." To some extent the European Free Trade f , s -
sociation (EFT.A) may offer a useful precedent, its own 
"rules of competition" having established a modest beachhead, 
but one that is operational and growing. 
6 Cited in footnote 2 above . 
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Perhaps rules of competition merit more than mere inclusion 
among the next tasks for what we call "International Trade 
Policy." 'Ne may well find that our greatest immediate con-
cern is no longer the degree to which international trade can 
be made free, but the degree to which the resulting competi-
tion can be made both real and acceptably fair. This might 
even suggest that "International Trade Policy" would be sup-
plemented by, if not incorporated within, "International Com-
petition Policy, 11 a phrase that explicitly identifies the nature 
of our goals, rather than merely the means by which we have 
traditionally sought to reach them . 
We end this discussion of the gestation period for U.S. trade 
policy with these paragraphs for two reasons. First, working for 
"rules of fair competition," as distinguished from negotiating away 
non-tariff measures, is relevant to defending ground that has been 
won as well as to covering new ground. It thus offers a unifying 
theme for action on the two major tasks confronting trade policy 
making in 1969. 
Secondly -- and more important -- there are indications that 
this concept is being considered seriously . The ideas contained in 
the quoted paragraphs were taken up by other private groups (most 
notably the Emergency Committee for American Trade), by the plat-
form drafters of both parties, and to some extent by Congressional 
and Administration leaders. As the gestation period progresses, 
we may reasonably expect to hear more about "codes of internation-
al competition." 
Il. WHICH APPROACH TO THE NEXT U . S. TRADE POLICY 
INITIATIVE ? 
As mentioned above (I- B-4), U . S. participation in a Free 
Trade Area appears to be a new possibility that will be considered 
by the new Administration . This secti on will compare the tradi-
tional multilateral approach to trade liberalization with that of a 
Free T r ade 1\rea, noting the present status of the latter in U.S . 
thinking and the likely characteristics of such an arrangement if the 
United States participated . It will then speculate about a compara-
tive evaluation of the two approaches, and end with a personal view 
28 SPERRY LEA 
of eventualities. 7 
The Multilateral Approach 
Since V\!orld War Il, the United States has channeled its ef-
forts to liberalize trade solely through the multilateral approach. 
This has involved six rounds of negotiations held under GA TT 
auspices , the most far-reaching being the Kennedy Round. The 
principle of these multilateral negotiations is universality and non-
discrimination . All GATT members exchange concessions accord-
ing to unconditional application of the most-favored-nation (MFN) 
principle, which dictates that concessions granted to one country 
be automatically extended to all. 
The multilateral approach -- unlike that of a formal free 
trade arrangement -- does not commit participants to a defined goal 
and a fixed program for reaching it. The extent of concessions 
made and t h e breadth of products covered are settled ad hoc by the 
participating countries as key elements in the negotiation~ Indeed, 
negotiating how to negotiate has become the major activity of the 
n;ultilateral approach, and the cause of its deepest agonies . 
Although the six postwar GATT rounds have made substantial 
progress toward freer trade, the outcome of a given round has, 
for these reasons, been unpredictable. Negotiations have been 
prodded by the more eager countries -- notably, the United States 
-- and by the GA. TT secretariat. But, ultimately, the pace has 
been set by those major trading nations least able or willing to of-
fer meaningful concessions. Like a wartime convoy, multilateral 
negotiations have proceeded at the speed of their least active major 
participant. Otherwise , unconditional application of the MFN 
principle would give such a country a "free ride . " 
The successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round has partial-
ly dispelled the premonition, nurtured during its years of frustra-
tion, that the multilateral approach had become fatally vulnerable 
to the presence of laggards among the major trading countries. 
But, as we scrutinize the next range of tasks, the prospect for ad-
equate progress is far from assured. When the meaning of "trade 
7 Portions of this section borrow from the author's contribution 
to "The Free Trade Area Concept as Applied to the United 
States," co-authored by Theodore Geiger and published in 
Lool<ing Ahead, the National Planning A ssociation, October, 1967. 
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barriers" shifts into non-tariff measures, problems of negotiating 
how to negotiate arise that far exceed the traditional types of im-
passes experienced during the Kennedy Round. 
For instance, it is difficult to assess the restrictive effect of 
many non-tariff measures. This encourages exaggerated claims of 
injury of "unfair competition" and correspondingly exaggerated 
disclaimers. As a consequence, the sacred concept of reciprocity 
of concessions for better or worse the guiding principle of past 
multilateral negotiations, is practically impossible to apply. 
Then, a s discussed under I-B-3, the new array of trade bar-
riers to be negotiated are typically embedded in domestic legisla-
tion. We have noted the serious Constitutional and political prob-
lems this raises in the United States. Problems of comparable 
difficulty, though different nature, appear to exist in other nations, 
and it is safe to say that few are presently willing and able to make 
sub stantial concessions in their non-tariff barriers. 
Thus, until the efforts within and among governments open up 
an area in which nations will agree on how to negotiate their non-
tariff measures, the multilateral approach is not so much a convoy 
stuck by a dead s hip as one whose every member finds it difficult 
to leave port. 
The Approach of an "Advance Base" in a Free Trade Arrangement 
The uncertainty over the ability of the multilateral aprroach, 
fi:ccst to complete the Kennedy R ound and now to break difficult new 
gTound, has been a major factor prompting increasing interest in 
an .'3.lternative approach to moving ahead, establishing a formal free 
tr2,de arrangement under GP TT rules. 
While in the multilateral approach all trading partners move 
as far and a s fast as they can together , a formal free trade ar-
r2.ngement would involve -- at least initially -- a more limited group 
of countries sprinting ahead to establish an "advance base" of com-
pletely free trade for virtually all products. In terms of the con-
cepts suggested at the end of the previous section, such a scheme 
might soon be renamed a "Fair Competition Arrangement," of which 
the most likely form would be the "Fair Competition Area." (But 
we shall retain the traditional nomenclature.) 
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The Present Status of the Concept 
In the United States, the official view to date has been that 
free trade arrangements -- until now all of regional scope -- are 
desirable to support growth and political integration in Europe and 
economic development in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. But the 
they have not been considered preferable to the multilateral ap-
proach for the United States itself. 8 However, a small but in-
creasing number of prominent private individuals and groups in the 
United States have proposed over the past four years that the 
United States consider participating with other countries in some 
form of free trade arrangement. 9 The reasoning behind this inter-
est has been varied. As noted above, a major theme has been dis-
couragement with the prospects for the multilateral approach, 
8 Baek in 1 948, before this policy had hardened into doctrine, 
the United States and Canada are reported to have explored the 
possibility of a free trade area. 
9 Published proposals for one or another type of free trade ar-
rangement as an appropriate approach for U.S. trade policy 
include: "After the Kennedy Round, What?", a Speech by 
Howard S . Piquet, Senior Economist, Library of Congress, 
January 1965; "The United States Should Adopt a Free Trade 
Strategy," a private paper is sued in July 1965 by David J. 
Steinberg, Chief Economist of the Committee for a National 
Trade Policy ; "The U.S. Role in Britain's Economic Crisis," 
a speech by Senator Jacob K . Javits at the Savoy Hotel, 
London, November 1965; A New Trade Strategy for Canada and 
the United States, a Policy Statement by the Canadian-Ameri-
can Committee of the National Planning Association (U.S.A . ) 
and the Private Planning Association of Canada (Washington , 
D . C., and Montreal: May 1966); "A Reassessment of Trade 
Policies," one of the recommendations in The United States 
Balance of Payments: An Appraisal of U.S. Economic Strategy 
by the International Economic Policy Association (Washington, 
D. C .: 1966), pages 146-1 51; Ralph I Strauss, "A Proposal for 
New foitiatives in U.S. Foreign Trade Policy," Orbis, Vol. XI, 
No. 1 (Spring 1967); T h omas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, 
Eds. , A Free Trade Association (New York: New York Univ. 
Press, 1968). 
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first provoked during the six- months' paralysis of the Kennedy 
Round negotiations in 1965. The free trade approach is also seen 
by some Americans as a desirable new policy if the United Kingdom, 
having come to feel that it can no longer wait on the doorstep of 
Europe, shows official interest in such an arrangement . 10 So far, 
no private study programs in the United States have undertaken 
such extensive and serious studies of the implications of the Free 
Trade Area approach as those being completed by the Atlantic 
Trade Study in England or the _,Atlantic Economic Studies Program 
in Canada, though there is talk of the need for such work to be 
done . 
Before we explore whether the Free Trade Area approach 
will grow from its present modest status in the United States to 
the point of being adopted as official policy, let us develop some 
idea of what we are talking about. 
The Probable Characteristics of a Free Trade Arrangement 
Involving the U . S. 
The starting noint for all formal free trade arrangements is 
the Gl TT rules permitting member countries to form such organi-
zations in violation of its basic princinle of non-di scrimination . 
Nrticle XXIV reconciles this seeming conflict. Srecifically, it 
allows a grour of G :'TT members to form either a Free Trade 
.t rea or a Customs Union but only if they meet four strict standards 
designed to T'revent them from becoming loose ::ireference systems 
(a la Commonwealth) or a protectionist trade bloc : 1) complete, 
not partial, elimination of "duties and other restrictive regulations" 
a.mong its members; 2) commodity coverage accounting for "sub-
stantially all the trade" among participants; 3) no increase in 
restrictiveness of trade barriers against nonmembers; and 4) full 
development "within a reasonable length of time ." 
Once respecting these rules , the participants have a wide 
scope for choices as to specific characteristics. ,\ n illustrative 
checklist of options, grouped by "decision areas," is given in the 
10 This view was exnressed by Senator ,Jacob .Javits in the Savoy 
Hotel (London) s:-eech cited immediately above . 
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first column of the chart on the following page .11 Only the outcome 
of actual negotiations would, of course, reveal how these questions 
would be decided . The choices suggested in the second column ap-
pear reasonable, however, for a free trade arrangement in which 
the United States would participate . 
This is not the place to explain all the choices in the right-
hand column, but certain salient features deserve a further word . 
The Free Trade Area form is clearly preferable to the 
Customs Union. It is the more appropriate for countries 
that wish to limit the degree of policy integration to the bare 
minimu, and it would be the only form acceptable to the United 
States . (The Congress finds it difficult enough to share its 
prerogatives in setting U . S. trade policy with the Executive 
Branch. One can imagine its reaction to the prospects of 
sharing them with a number of foreign governments!) 
The United States will probably remain uninterested in any 
"regional arrangement," as this phrase has been understood. It 
would shun a scheme that would be fulfilled within a geographic 
area or among a limited "club" of members wherever located . It 
would consider joining a Free Trade Area only if this step were 
clearly understood to be the most promising means available for a 
general trading system encompassing all developed countries and 
with the association of the developing countries on appropriate 
terms . All countries would be invited to participate, but since 
some are unlikely to be in a position to do so immediately, the Free 
Trade Area might well start among countries within a broad region . 
But this would be merely an "advance base "with every prospect of 
growing . For this reason, such words as "Atlantic," "Pacific ," etc. 
are not used here. Among the several present shorthand names for 
such an arrangement, the most appropriate from the U . S . point of 
view would probably by MUFTA (Multilateral Free Trade Area) . 12 
We will thus use this designation for the remainder of the paper . 
11 This reprinted from Theodore Geiger and Sperry Lea, "The 
Free Trade J\ rea Concept as Applied to the United States," 
National Planning Association, Looking Ahead, October 
1967. 
12 Another appropriate name that has been used is IFTA (Inter-
national Free Trade .fTea). 
* POSSIBLE CHARACTERISTICS OF A FREE TRADE AREA INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES 
Major Questions DECISION AREA 
1. BASIC FORM 
Possible Choices 
a. Choice between Customs Union or Free Trade Area as each is 
defined in the GATT. 
b. If Customs Union: determining the Common External Tariff; 
if Free Trade Area: handling the "origin problem." 
The Free Trade Area form appears clearly pre-
ferable for the United States. Rules of Origin 
would probably be patterned after those used suc-
cessfully by EFTA. 
. 2. MEMBERSHIP 
a. Composition of the initial membership. 
b. Provisions for the accession of additional members. 
c. Treatment of territories or countries having special t~ad­
ing relationships with member countries (such as the Com-
monweal th countries have with the United Kingdom). 
d. Whether or not the arrangement should be open to additional 
fully participating members, and to linking with established 
free trade arrangements. 
e. Whether the arrangement should grant to developing countries 
associate membership with preferential long-term tra~sition­
al provisions (such as Greece and Turkey have i n the EEC). 
Geographic scope would be global rather than 
regional. Thus, the arrangement would be open 
ended, envisaging the inclusion, sooner or later, 
of all developed countries as ful ly participating 
members. It might be expected that for various 
reasons the EEC, Japan, Australia, and New Zea-
land would not be in a position to participate at 
the outset. In that case, the charter members 
would be the United States, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom and other EFTA countries (assuming that 
they did not enter the EEC). Also in line with 
i.ts global intent, the arrangement would offer to 
developing countries associate status under which 
the full members would open their markets very 
much sooner to the exports of the associate mem-
bers than vice versa . The periods of such con-
cessions might vary with the level of development 
of the associate members. 
3. COMMODITY COVERAGE 
a. Extent of coverage among nonagricultural products (manufac- Following the precedents of Benelux, the EEC, 
tures and industrial raw materials). This could be all-in- and the EFTA, the Free Trade Area would probably 
elusive (EEC and EFTA) or under a doctrine of "maximum pos- cover all industrial products and raw materials 
sible coverage," permitting exemptions (Australia-New Zea- (with possibly special provisions for petroleum). 
land Free Trade Area). As an indispensable adjunct to free trade with 
b. Handling of nonagricultural products with special situa- blanket coverage, we could expect the arrangement 
tions (most obviously, petroleum). to provide various measures~such as adjustment 
c. Extent of coverage among agricultural products and close assistance and prolonged timing---to help particu-
derivatives. If covered, guidelines for. common agricultur- lar industries and producers meet the threats and 
al policies. realize the opportunities of a wider and more 
d. Various forms of adjustment assistance, seen as an alterna- competitive market. Unless the participants were 
tive to exemption from commodity coverage of products with prepared to harmonize their agricultural policies, 
acute problems. howev·er, they would exclude this sector, at least 
at the outset, as did the EFTA. 
4. STEPS TOWARD CLOSER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
a. Purpose of such provisions: limited to providing meaningful We could expect the arrangement to shun explic-
free trade (EFTA) , or undertaken for its own sake, or even it steps toward closer economic integration. It 
to lead to political integration (original EEC purpose,lat- would, however, probably find some "Rules of Com-
er opposed by de Gaulle). petition" to be indispensable to prevent frustra-
b. Approach to "Rules of Competition": tion of the benefits expected from free trade by 
Handling of government aids to export, production, trans- nontariff barriers and by national policies and 
port, procurement, etc. business practices with preferential effects. 
Restrictive business practices. Recognizing the need to ensure permanence of the 
c. Approach to policy coordination: free trade situation, the arrangement might also 
That concerned wi th growth and stability (monetary policy, coordinate certain policies and provide certain 
responses to balance-of-payments problems, etc.) facilities to ensure that internal and external 
that related to redefinition of "domestic producer," "ex- imbalances would not be remedied by abrogating 
port market," etc. in laws affecting dumping, antitrust, free trade. 
and pooled export legislation. 
5. COMMON INSTITUTIONS 
a. Basic purpose: limited to serving free trade arrangement 
(EFTA), or as means to "institutional integration" with po-
litical overtones (most especially ECSC, but also EEC). 
b. Approach to institution building: fully defined in basic 
treaty (EEC), or left to be created by the central organ as 
it deems necessary (EFTA). 
c. Powers: voting formulae, possibility of supranat'ional ele-
ments. 
d. Distribution of powers: single central body (EFTA Council) 
or in diffErent bodies holding balance of powers (EEC). 
e. Techniques for settling disputes. 
f. Location of common institutions. 
We may assume that the purpose of the common 
institutions would be limited to the tasks re-
quired to operate a simple Free Trade Area. 
Thus, they would avoid supranational elements and 
in other ways resemble those of EFTA more than 
those of the EEC. 
6. TIMING ARRANGEMENTS 
a. Timetable for abolishing trade barriers among the member The timing arrangements incorporated in the 
countries, including possibility of recognizing special ad- agreement would provide for a transitional period 
justment problems by prolonged or staggered transitional to enable reinvestment and restruc.turing of af~ 
periods. fected industries. The period should be short 
b. In a Customs Union only: timetable for forming the common enough to prompt everyone concerned to get on with 
external tariff. the job, but long enough to allow resources to 
c. Timing the entry-into-force of other aspects of the agree- shif t adequately and deliberately. Timing arrange-
ment. ments should also be flexible enough to recognize 
d. Provisions for accelerating or delaying the basic timing ar- special adjustment problems in certain industries 
rangements. and countries. Indeed, one effective supplement 
e. The duration of the free trade agreements a definite expira- to adjustment assistance programs would be pro-
tion or renewal date, or indeterminate. longed transitional periods in certain cases. 
* These decision areas and major questions are explored in detail in two publications of the Canadian-American 
Committee of the National Planning Association (U.S.A.) and the Private Planning Association of Canada: Sperry 
Lee, A Canada-u.s. Free Trade Arrangement: Survey of Feasible Characteristics (1963) and the Staff Study, A Pos-
sible Plan for a Canada-U .S. Free Trade Area (1965). The choices offered here reflect to some extent those de-
veloped in Chapter II of the latter publication. 
Glossary: ECSC=European Coal and Steel Community; EEC=European Economic Community; EFTA=European Free Trade As-
sociation. 
Source: Looking Ahead, National Planning Association, October 167. 
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We presume the purposes of MUFTA would be basically 
economic and not (as in the EEC) economic integration for its 
own sake. Thus, MUFT.P:.. would (like the EFT A ) lean over 
backwards to avoid any step toward closer policy coordination 
that did not prove necessary to prevent frustration of its pur-
poses • 
.1\t the same time, experience has shown that, to prevent 
such frustration, a free trade arrangement among developed 
countries must go considerably beyond merely abolishing 
tariffs and quotas under Article XXIV of the G l\ TT. The 
free trade situation must (1) provide for fair competition among 
the freely traded products, and (2) be a permanent state of 
affairs. With respect to the first requirement, participants 
would have to take steps to control the discriminatory effects 
-- sometimes inadvertent -- of regulations and practice af-
fecting freely traded products. 'Ne should therefore expect 
as a central program of MUFT1\ some form of "rules of com-
petition" to deal with non-tariff measures . With respect to 
ensuring the permanence of free trade , members may have to 
devise mechanisms for harmonizing their domestic economic 
conditions to enable them to avoid severe problems of inter-
nal and external imbalance, or at least to deal jointly with them 
by means other than the re imposition of trade restrictions. 
To summarize by offering a rough working definition of what 
we are talking about: /\ free trade arrangement involving the 
United States would have to take the form of a nonregional, ulti-
mate ly universal, Free Trade Area in which participating coun-
trie s would, over a specified time period, completely abolish bar-
riers affecting virtually all mutually traded products, and . set such 
othe r rules to coordinate p olicies as may be found necessary to 
provide fair competition for the freely traded commodities and to 
preserve the free trade situa t i on despite the changing internal and 
external conditions of its members . 
The Cnmna:ra.tive E valua t ion of the Twc A;Trcache s 
We may expec t that during the gestation of a new U.S . trade 
policy some attention will be given to comparing.the advantages and 
disadvantages of the multilateral and the MUFTJ~ approaches to 
moving ahead . 
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Are Both Choices Available? 
But, before discussing some of these, are there really two 
options? Some Americans concerned with future trade policy be-
lieve not. On the one hand are some MUFTA supporters who see 
the multilateral approach clearly unable to function on the new 
range of tasks. Indeed, their argument typically opens with a short 
obituary for the multilateral approach, which clears the way for 
presenting MUFTA as the only means for moving forward. 
On the other hand are the more numerous "traditionalists," 
often veterans of previous negotiations and now involved in future 
planning. They regard U.S. participation in a Free Trade Area 
with a limited number of countries as involving it in hostile blocs 
and so definitely "second best" as to merit no serious considera-
tion at this time. Such persons are well aware of the new difficul-
ties faced by the multilateral approach. But they see in the cur-
rent focus on non-tariff measures within and among governments an 
agonizing but ultimately successful means to a breakthrough, an 
e ff ort that should not be distracted by an exciting, but undesirable, 
alternative. 
Interestingly enough, those who reject the Free Trade Area 
approach out of hand frequently do so as a reaction to the manner 
of its past advocacy. Frequently presented with a geographic la-
bel (most usually as NAFTA, but sometimes as PAFTA or a Hemi-
spheric Free Trade Area), the concept is seen as one satisfied to 
remain within a region, or among a small group of scattered na-
tions. This impression was encouraged by the original British 
rationale for NA.FTP. wherein the U. K., excluded from one region 
-- Europe -- would join an alternative one of North Arlantic coun-
tries. But when the Free Trade Area approach is presented as an 
alternative means for reaching the traditional U.S. goal of a global 
trading system, it becomes more generally acceptable by the tradi-
tionalists as a possible option for U.S. trade policy. Progress in 
this direction may be expected now that the British NAFTf, support-
ers are clarifying the global intention of their concept and belated-
ly exchanging 11 NAFTA" for "MUFTA . 11 
Are Others Interested? 
Another viewpoint states that the multilateral approach may be 
all that is available to the United States because it is doubtful that 
any of the candidates for the MUFTA nucleus would wish to take the 
commercial -- or political -- risks of participating with the United 
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States in such a arrangement. 
The origin of this view is such to suggest that an early move 
in any serious consideration of the MUFTA approach would be 
quiet intergovernmental discussions with the principal candidates. 
If this reconnaisance found most such governments opposed to the 
MUFTA idea, even in the event that the multilateral approach were 
to prove incapable of proceeding, we may question whether much 
more thought to it would be given during the gestation period. 
If, however, a potential nucleus group of sufficient number 
would prove to be interested in pursuing the MUFT A idea with the 
United States -- if only in the contingency that the multilateral 
approach failed -- we should expect comparative study of the two 
approaches to proceed on a number of issues, including the fol-
lowing: 
The Effects on Those Countries Not Members at the Outset 
Probably no other consequence of MUFTA would be weighed 
so carefully in the United States as the effects of its formation on 
those countries unable or unwilling to participate at the outset. If 
the apparent prospects were that these countries would welcome 
the open offer of membership and work towards being able to accept 
it, much of present qualms about MUFTA would disappear. But if it 
appeared likely that MUFTA would incubate rival blocs with over-
tones of alienation, the United States would probably shun this ap-
proach, even if it promised clear advantages on other counts, un-
less all other alternatives seemed even less desirable. 
Thus, we might expect that the advance reconnaissance, al-
luded to above, would explore with those nations not likely to join 
MUFTA initially the prospects for their eventually doing so and 
their general reactions to the project. 
Appropriateness to the U.S. Trade Policy Goals and 
Principles 
While multilateral negotiations and a MUFTJ. "advance base" 
may be considered alternative apnroaches to the same eventual 
goal, they represent initially very different commitments for the 
United States. MUFTJI would commit the United States to totally 
f:ree trade by an early date , albeit with a small group of countries 
at the out set . It would also require a switch in the underlying 
principle of U.S. trade policy from that of non- discrimination to 
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th~,t of reciprocity. For, in a Free Trade J\ rea, U.S. concessions 
would not be extended to all countries, but only to those making 
identical ones to the United States. MUFTA would thus represent 
changes from traditional U.S. goals and principles to new ones, 
but ones that A mericans ha ve been approaching. Since 1930, the 
U.S. drive for freer trade has carried the developed countries to 
within hailing distance of free trade. 1\nd recently there has aris -
en in business circles and in the Congress some question as to the 
relevance of a relentless U.S. commitment to non-discrimination 
under the doctrine of unconditional MFN. (One Congressman ex-
pressing this sentiment was Robert Ellsworth, recently named by 
Mr . Nixon to be one of his senior assistants 1 3). 
The key question, of course, is what fundamental rrecepts the 
Nixon Administration will adopt on the two pairs of questions : freer 
trade or free trade as the ultimate objective of U.S. trade policy, 
and non-discrimination or reciprocity as the operational principle 
for getting there . Choice of the first alternative of each pair would 
favor the decision to stay with the multilateral approach; choice of 
the latter would heighten interest in the MUFTA. 
But we should recognize this as a chicken- and-egg matter. 
It might well be that a shift to the objective of free trade and the 
princ iple of reciprocity would follow the prior conclusion that 
IvlUFTA clearly offered the best way to move forward. 
Ability to Handle Non-Tariff Measures. 
Getting down to practical criteria, this stands to be a key test. 
Indeed , the strongest case for the MUFTA on practical grounds 
might arise if it appeared clearly to be the more promising way to 
make substantial progress in dealing with non-tariff measures. 
1 3 A shift of the U.S. MFN commitment from unconditional to con-
ditional (upon reciprocity of concessions) was a dvoc a ted as a 
move of last resort by Henry S. Reuss and Robert F. Ellsworth 
in Off Dead Center: Some Proposals to Strengthen Free World 
E conomic Cooperation, Joint Economic Committee , 89th Con-
gress , 1st session (December 1965) pp. 1-7. The reciprocity 
principle, when expressed in the conditional MFN, is illegal 
under the G.ATT, But GA TT does permit r eciprocity in the 
form of formal free trade arrangements set up unde r its specific 
conditions, summarized on page 10 above . 
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It is easy to see why such a conclusion might emerge from 
closer study. By abolishing tariffs, MUFTA would eliminate con-
troversy over methods of valuing and classifying imports for the 
purpose of setting duties. For barriers unrelated to tariffs, as 
well as for artificial subsidies to production and transport, the 
institutional mechanisms of a formally organized Free Trade Area 
like MUFT A would seem to offer better means for formulating and 
implementing, solutions than do the ad hoc procedures hitherto 
ch~racteristic of the multilateral approach. 
The experience of EFT A appears to support this view. Its 
"rules of competition" (Articles 13-17 of the Stockholm Convention) 
are enforceable agreements to exclude certain "government aids" 
outright and provide for the prohibition of any others that prove, 
whether by design or quite inadvertently, to frustrate the benefits 
expected from the A.ssociation. 
A counter-argument might be: MUFTA' s admitted ability to 
develop workable and enforceable rules of competition would have 
no effect on the policies and practices of nonmembers, which stand 
to include those countries employing many of the most troublesome 
non-tariff measures. This challenge may be answered by the as-
sumption that MUFTA would grow to include all major trading coun-
tries in time. But it still raises the nice distinction between effec-
tive policy-making and making effective policy, and it emphasizes 
practical reasons -- to supplement more political ones given above 
-- for MUFTA 's necessity to expand to universal membership. 
Effect on North-South Trading Relations 
Of critical importance in a U.S. viewpoint would be the com-
parative implications of the two approaches for North-South trade 
relations. On this score, the MUF TA would appear to have cer-
tain advantages flowing from its common policy base. This would 
permit its members to act more decisively and concertedly than 
they would as individual countries. A probable outcome would be 
to grant "associate status" to all developing countries from the out-
set. The industrialized members would then open their markets 
very much sooner -- perhaps immediately -- to the exports of the 
associates than vice versa. In recognition of the quite different 
economic levels among the developing countries, there might be 
some variation in the amount or duration of such special provisions. 
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E conomic Effects on the United States 
Studies thus far completed by Balassa, Kreinin and Hawkins 14 
show no significant overall economic impact on the United States of 
participating in a Free Trade Area of the r-.1!UFTA kind. But we 
would expect that certain detailed studies would be made before a 
decision could be reached as to its domestic acceptability. 
/\ close look would have to be given to the comparative effects 
of the two approaches on import sensitive industries. P.. ttentions 
should also be given to appraising the opportunities for the United 
States to increase its exports of certain products that are sensi-
tive in the markets of potential members. What would be the 
chances, for instance, for higher U.S. exports of computers? 
l\nd would U.S. coal move to the U. K., where it i s now excluded, 
and to Canada, where domestic coal benefits from a sizable produc-
tion and transportation subsidies? The North American endowment 
of basic raw materials and fuels raises problems not encountered 
in the European free trade groupings. 
7/hat Are the Prospects? 
As a result of the evaluation that might take place, along 
such lines, what future does the MUFTA concept have in U.S. pol-
icy? The question is really two fold: whether the United States 
will shift to it from its traditional multilateral approach, and, if 
so, when. What follows is, of course, only a personal view. 
For the first time now "U.S. Participation in Free Trade 
.Areas" has in the Roth Report been officially considered. And, 
despite the reluctance of some traditionalists, we may expect it to 
be examined during the gestation period of Nixonian trade policy. 
H is not impossible that the MUFTA concept would be chosen as the 
14 Bela Balassa, Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries: 
Objectives and .Alternatives (New York: Council on Foreign Re-
lations, June 1 967). 
Mordechai E. Kreinin, "Effects of an Atlantic Free Trade Area 
on the American Economy," Southern Economic Journal (July 
1 966)' pp. 96-111 • 
Robert G. Hawkins, "The Economic Impact on the United States 
of a U . K. -Canada-CT. S. Free Trade A ssociation," in Franck 
and Vleisband, op. cit., pp. 53 ff. 
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form of the next U.S. initiative, but probably only if it proved un-
mistakably to be the only way of moving forward. But I would ex-
pect, rather, the decision to stay with the multilateral approach 
if it appeared that the governments could reach agreement in ad-
vance on how to negotiate over an adequately large agenda. 
Vfould such a U.S. decision signal permanent U.S. rejection 
of the Free Trade Area approach? Probably not. Indeed, it might 
well mean just the opposite. 
One eventuality would be that the new round of multilateral 
negotiations would fail. Perhaps the participants could never 
reach the point of agreement on how to negotiate. Or, at a later 
stage, one or more of them might prove unwilling or unable to re -
ciprocate for concessions offered by the others. Such a situation 
would confront those countries willing and able to move ahead (in-
cluding, we must always presume, the United States) with the 
choices of: (1) giving the laggard nation(s) a "free ride"; (2) seek-
ing progress in areas not involving them; (3) shifting their MFN 
coI!lmitments to a conditional basis; or (4) proceeding themselves 
to form a free trade arrangement under the GATT rules. 
Of these options, #1 would require an indifference to the 
principle of reciprocal concessions that is difficult to envisage, 
particularly during the heat of negotiations; #2 would promise very 
little progress unless the reluctant participant(s) were minor trad-
ers; #3 would probably mean the end of the GA TT as we know it 
and the onset of a trade war. Only option #4 would offer those 
wishing to move ahead a means for doing so legally and would prob-
ably be taken by the United States unless it were reconciled to 
seeing the attempt at multilateral negotiations end with failure, and 
forward movement toward trade liberalization lose steerageway. 1 5 
15 During the week following the presentation of this paper, the 
R oth Report was released to the public with the following 
conclusion to its discussion of "U.S. Participation in Free 
Trade .. Areas": 
The United States should not jeopardize the chance of a 
further reduction of trade barriers on an MFN basis by 
proposing or encouraging plans for participation in a 
new free trade area. It should be prepared to re-
examine this position, however, if circumstance should 
c hange so as to make it unlikely that a liberal trade poli-
cy based on MFN can succeed . 
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But what if the next round of multilateral negotiations suc-
ceeded? In that case, the major trading nations would be so close 
to free trade that the question "Where do we go from here?" would 
inevitably assert itself. Many GA TT countries would be likely to 
feel the need to set some specific target date and timetable for com-
pleting the process. Moreover -- and probably more important --
the closer the GA TT countries came to free trade, the stronger 
would be their desire to ensure that their accomplishments would 
be irreversible and they would experience fair competition over the 
resulting, greatly enlarged, market area. At this point they might 
all decide to move forthwith to a formally organized Free Trade 
i\rea. But, perhaps more likely, we might expect most trading 
countries to want to undertake a variety of commitments, and to es-
tablish the common institutions to implement them, that would dupli-
cate most of the characteristics of one. The participants in a fu-
ture successful multilateral negotiation might, therefore, come in 
time to form what amounted to a Free Trade Area through a pro-
cess of adaptive mutation without having initially launched it, fully 
rigged, according to the rules and rites of the GA TT. 
Summary of PrJspects for the Free Trade Area Approach 
Thus, if you will permit a look to the future that carries to 
events two jumps ahead -- and, therefore, probably a good deal 
beyond the five-ye;;.r outlook assigned to this parer -- I foresee the 
MUFTA concept as becoming relevant to U.S. trade policy. But 
this must assume that the United States, joined by a sufficient num-
ber of other major trading partners, were determined to move ahead 
toward a more meaningfully competitive situation. The qualifica-
tion deserves emphasis, for future trade policy initiatives surely 
face rough sailing and the irresolute will find more than adequate 
excuse to give up the quest. 
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COMMENT ON SPERRY LEA'S PAPER BY BRUCE W. WILKINSGN 
Sperry Lea's paper is a thoughtful discussion of first the dif-
ficulties to be faced by the incoming United States' administration 
in defining its future trade policy, and second, the possibilities for 
greater freeing of world trade if clear, bold thinking and action in 
the face of perplexities becomes the overriding policy of that ad-
ministration. 
Since the paper consists essentially of informed guesses 
based on an ear-to-the-ground technique, I shall not attempt to 
comment specifically on the possible realism of these guesses --
except to ask whether the optimism breaking through towards the 
end of the paper is warranted at this time. My greater concern is 
to draw attention to two or three issues that are skimmed over too 
lightly in the paper and to ask Mr. Lea to comment on them if he 
will. 
First, the early pages of the paper are quite pessimistic 
about new trade liberalization based on U.S. initiatives. Yet there 
is one possible bright spot that should be noted. Reference is made 
to the large U.S. corporations operating on an international scale. 
This paper, as well as a number of others in this conference give 
all too small a place to these large corporations and their actual 
and potential impact on world trade and investment. Much of world 
trade is controlled by these giants. It is in their interests to keep 
the trade lanes open . Surely they do not want trade policy used as 
the first line international adjustment mechanism. I would like to 
a s k how much weight Lea would give to the pressures these firms 
may bring to bear on Congress and the E xecutive Branch of the 
U.S. Government and what other implications for world trade re-
lations that he sees from them wishing to pursue their own inter-
ests. Will their influence successfully combat protectionist fires 
fed by the smaller U.S. domestic corporations facing increased 
imports? .Also, what about the influence that these corporations 
may have on freeing capital investment regulations by other coun-
tries? 
My second point relates to the statement of the committee of 
business leaders which i s quoted by Lea and which was, apparent-
ly, adopted by a number of influencial groups in the U.S.A. It 
involves a certain fuzziness. It speaks of inherent competitive ad-
vantages due to low-labor cost, resources, capital or technology 
-- as distinguished from artificial competitive advantages granted 
by government policies and business practices. Yet, technology 
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is a consequence of research and development -- largely subsidized 
by governments directly or through universities. That is, even 
though it may lead to a comparative advantage and the product cycle, 
initially government subsidies are often involved. Therefore, how 
can we speak of technology as being a non-artificial advantage? 
Thirdly, in view of the interest shown by Japan in free trade 
involving the U.S. it is not clear to me why Japan is specifically 
excluded in the free trade area proposal that Lea refers to. In 
answer to Lea 1 s question, "Is anyone else interested in free trade" 
th e answer must presumably be a cautious yes for Japan . I would 
suggest that the Canadian response might be similar. 
Finally, his free trade proposal pretty well eschews agricul-
ture. This is a question raised in one or two subsequent papers so 
tha t perhaps discussion of the general issue may be delayed. But 
it seems to me that the time has come for some bold thinking on this 
topic too. 
COMMENT ON SPERR Y LEI .. ' S P A PER BY KUO-SHU LU.NG 
Mr. Lea 1 s paper is com posed of two main parts: 
The first part draws out the basic contract between 1961 and 
1969, and points out that we may reasonably expect to hear more 
about "rules of international competition" during the gestation 
period for future U.S. trade policy . 
The second part compares and evaluates the Free Trade J\ rea 
w i th the tra ditional multilateral approach and concludes that the 
Free Trade J\ rea a pproach may be presented as an alternative 
me a ns for reaching the traditional U.S . goal of a global trading 
system . 
IV:'r. Lea 1 s discussion of the Free Trade P.rea approa ch is illumi-
na tive . JV!y comments will be confined to the following two points: 
Firstly, Mr . L ea emphasized that a free trad e agreement in-
volving the United States would have to take the form of a non-
regional, ultimately universal, Free T rade Area (p . 35) . However, 
h e is of the opinion that for various rea sons the EEC, Japan , 
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J_ustralia, and New Zealand would not be in a position to partici-
pate at the outset (p. 34). I would rather like Mr . Lea to explain 
the reasons why these countries would have to be excluded at the 
outset. 
Secondly, Mr. Lea stressed that some "rules of fair compe-
titi on" have to be worked out. However, it seems to me that the 
rules of fair competition will be assured only if internal as well as 
external balance can be attained. The chronic trade-balance weak-
ness of the United States has much to do with inflation in the U.S. 
economy. If the nation has the self-discipline to bring its inflation-
bent economy under control, most of its difficulties with foreign 
competition and pressure for protection should gradually diminish. 
Otherwise, I am afraid that claims of injury through "unfair compe-
tition" will be exaggerated, and what emerges may turn out to be a 
protectionist scheme rather than a free trade system . 
DISCUSSION OF PAPERS BY H. G. JOHNSON AND S . LEA 
In reply to comments on his paper, Professor Johnson said 
that elsewhere he had given emphasis to the role of trade policy as 
a long run means of permitting the less developed countries to get 
integrated into the world market structure. In this parer he had 
been concerned to bring out the role of aid a s the major source of 
external fund s for development investment in the shorter run. He 
said that the net gain from the conversion of domestic resources 
into foreign resources through trade is much smaller than the total 
value of the trade. .A.id, if it is honest aid, represents net re -
sources. ]\Jonetheless, Professor Johnson agreed with Dr. 
Kitamura t hat t he role of trade is very important in the structural 
sense: there has been a tendency to pursue the development prob-
l em on the basis of national markets and individual national terri-
tories and most of them are far too small to be economically effici-
ent. So that trade is important in setting a structure within which 
development can be efficient. 
Turning to the question of moral commitment and private 
c harity in t he aid business, Professor Johnson said that it was 
true that there was always confusion in Christian charity, which is 
the major chari table force in the world, between the direct relief 
of poverty and t h e overcoming of roverty through establishing peo-
ple a s self- reliant. P rofessor Johnson felt, however, that just as 
t he United States' poverty programme had come to concentrate 
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rr..ore on education, training, and so on, as a means cf enabling 
pecple to be self-sufficient, those whc are concerned on humani-
tarian grounds with the problems of devekpment have mcved on 
somewhat from the idea that "here are these starving neople, we must 
give them food," to the idea that "here are these economies which 
can generate enough resources to enable reorle to live decently 
and we must change those economies so that they are capable of 
doing thaL" It was on that kind of basis that Professor Johnson 
said that he had envisaged incentives for private aid contributions. 
This would involve the establishment of United Nations' agencies of 
various kinds to mobilize private contributions for development ex-
penditure, and it would represent a more ambitious programme for 
private aid-giving than that to which we have been used. Professor 
.Johnson said that his main concern was that whilst in the past, gov-
ernments had probably gone beyond what the consensus of opinion 
was in aid-giving countries about how much money should be con-
tributed, the danger now is thci.t governments will restrict aid be-
low what people would be willing to contribute on the basis of un-
derstanding and knowledge of what the problems are. 
Finally, Professor Johnson agreed that the real problem for 
the world economy, unon which the adequate provision of develor.~­
ment assistance - both through trade and aid r)olicy - rests is 
rrecise ly the international monetary problem. Until the monetary 
problem is solved both trade nolicy and aid policy will be secondary 
factors, and regarded as means of adjustment in the balance of pay-
ments rather than policy objectives in their own right. 
In reply to comments on his . narer, Mr. Lea said that there 
was no doubt in his mind that the international corf'Orations would 
r rove a major force against protectionism. Already, a new group, 
the E mergency Committee for American Trade (ECA T) has been 
formed by them to counter protectionist lobbies in Washington. The 
real question is who will Nixon listen to: the blue ribbon firms 
backing ECAT or the small domestic producers who are numerous 
and have close connections with an awful lot of members of the 
House of Representatives? He said that he, too, was of the opin-
ion that the international corrorations would try to lin1c pursuit of 
liberal trade policies with investment policy, and that there was no 
country they had more in mind, in the latter connection, than ,Japan 
where they had thus far been prevented from extending their opera-
tions. 
Mr. Lea agreed that in practice the differences between in-
herent and artificial competitive advantage would be extremely dif-
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ficult to define . Very few competitive advantages are natural. 
l'.fost are the result of acquired technology. However, he believed 
that most of the technological advantage possessed by various in-
dustrial producers was probably not subsidized by governments. 
Mr. Lea said that he had not meant to suggest that .Japan , or 
any other country, would be excluded from participation in 
MUFTA. 'What he had suggested was that it could be expected that 
c.lfa11an, the EEC, Australia, and New Zealand would not wish to 
r::articipate. That is the feeling in the United States, because 
Ja".'an still appears concerned to protect its own sheltered markets. 
If Japan was interested in joining she would have to take two major 
steps. She would have to dismantle her own tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade and she would probably have to ease restrictions 
on the establishment of foreign firms. He said that others present 
could better judge the prospects for Japanese, Australian, and 
New Zealand participation. 
Mr . Lea argued that agriculture was protected not so much 
against imports as against the normal forces of supply and demand. 
Agricultural support policy is distinct from trade policy . Most of 
agricultural policy is designed to protect the farmer. The agonies 
the EEC went through to devise its Common Agricultural Policy in-
dicate the difficulties of including agriculture in any free trade 
agreement, unless a Common Agricultural Policy could be devised. 
Mr. Lea went on to suggest that boldness was probably one 
of the important advantages of the MUFTA approach. There are 
those in Washington who feel that whatever we do in trade policy we 
have to be bold. There is just so much pressure going the other 
way that if you once stand still the wolves will descend. 
Finally, Mr. Lea argued that a country cannot subscribe to 
rules of fair competition when its economy is sick. The experience 
of the response to British surcharges within EFTA emphasizes the 
responsibilities of members of free trade areas in keeping their 
economies in order so as to avoid resort to protectionist measures 
for balance of payments reasons. 
Discussion of Professor Johnson's paper centered on the 
respective roles of aid and trade policies in development assistance. 
Discussion of Mr. Lea's paper returned to the question of agricul-
tural protectionism and the likelihood of forward-looking trade poli-
cies emerging from the United States within the next few years. 
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Some participants felt that the part to be played by trade pol-
icy for an important group of developing countries had been under-
stressed in the earlier discussion. One said that whilst he agreed 
that the short run payoff from trade growth in terms of the net con-
tribution of foreign resources was likely to be small in general, in 
the l onger run it would be very important. It seemed advisable, 
therefore, to push the granting of concessions now, when they ap-
peared relatively costless, since in the longer run resistance 
would be set up to the development of a desirable trade structure. 
It was further argued that, whilst trade policy might not appear 
helpful for all developing countries, there were a number of de-
veloping countries, among them Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, India, and Pakistan, who were all expanding manufac-
tured exports rather rapidly and for whom concessions would be 
very helpful. Others pointed out that not all develoring countires 
were at the same stage of development and that they therefore re-
quired different kinds of assistance. 
Some participants thought that concentration on efforts to 
increase agricultural productivity through development assistance 
would prove of most help to most countries. One said that the em-
phasis on the granting of trade concessions might even have a dis-
incentive effect on export promotion . But most felt that UNCT AD 
had served a useful purpose, for developed and developing coun-
tries alike, in focussing on the considerable scope for trade ex-
pansion and for the provision of improved trading opportunities; 
and that aid and trade policies were both important and complemen-
tary activities. 
Asked to comment on the possibilities of graduation from 
South to North, Professor Johnson said that basically there is an 
advancing technology in the world economy, and that investments 
in advancing it are made in those countries where they pay off in 
one way or another . For most of the world, the question is how 
close can you get to the most advanced technology. This is rart-
ly a matter of knowledge, education, research and the like, and 
partly a matter of being able to accumulate enough capital or at 
least get the capital inside your territory through foreign invest-
ment. In that context, it is rossible to catch up, at least to the 
level that a lot of advanced countries have caught up, there be-
ing, of course, tremendous differences among the advanced coun-
tries themselves. Catching-up requires the adoption of the right 
kinds of policies, but very often that is not always easy . The 
simrlest way to get modern technology is to allow the foreigner to 
come in and bring it to you with his investment. But that is resent-
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ed because the foreigner then owns the business. Similarly, re-
sources have to be invested in education . That is not always 
fav oured because it means a change in the whole social structure -
for example, a change from a property or land based society to one 
based on educational attainment. If a country is prepared to pursue 
policies of this kind - to welcome foreign investment, to lay itself 
open to learn modern technology, to forget ideas of society based 
on individual family and so on - then graduation from South to 
North is perfectly possible. 
Mr. Leas' s reply to comments on his paper invited comments 
from other participants. A Japanese participant said that he was 
unconvinced of the benefits of direct foreign investment for Japan. 
He suggested that the theory of foreign investment was not very 
helpful in providing the answers on this issue. For example, what 
are the implications of the non-equal footing on which United 
States and Japanese firms face each other? In Japan's case, a 
high growth rate had been maintained without large direct foreign 
investment. Indeed, large foreign investment might have produced 
more serious inflationary effects in a fast-growing economy. 
Australian participants said that the distinction Mr. Lea 
wanted to make between trade policy and farm policy illustrated the 
difficulties of the GATT approach to world trade policy for coun-
tries lilce Australia and New Zealand, as well as for many of the 
developing countries . It is precisely the emphasis on the freeing 
of trade in manufactures among the developed countries and the 
feeling that agricultural support schemes are not negotiable, in-
deed, lie outside the realm of trade policy , that has made it so ex-
tremely difficult for countries whose principal exports are primary 
commodities to take with any great enthusiasm trade liberalization 
along GA TT lines. A New Zealand participant, whilst he was un-
sure of the real significance of European Common Agricultural 
Policy for exports from his country, agreed that it would be quite 
impossible politically for New Zealand to enter into a freeing-of-
trade which did not allow concessions for trade in primary commod-
ities. 
Some participants wondered whether perhaps Mr. Lea had 
been a little over-optimistic about the possibilities for the emer-
gence of a forward-looking United States' trade policy in the near 
future. Mr. Lea agreed there were grounds for some pessimism. 
However, he did not feel that the general quotas that were being 
asked for by Congress would be adopted because of the potential 
boomerang effect. Other countries would not acquiesce to quotas 
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without recourse to the GA TT procedures for compensation. Com-
pensation could not be granted easily because all the fat had been cut 
out of the United States' tariff during the Kennedy R ound and there 
remains little to give away without hurting somebody. IL the forei.c~2 
government was not satisfied with the compensation offered, it cou::. ~~ 
take the second recourse under GATT and retaliate. Because of 
the boomerang effect, Mr. Lea thought it unlikely that quotas woulc: 
be adopted. He thought that it was much more likely that the major 
foreign suppliers of particular commodities would be subject to 
more persuasion to exercise voluntary restraint. United States' 
trade policy will probably not become more backward-looking than 
that. But Mr. Lea concluded that there is the real danger, ex-
plained above, that no forward-looking policies will be adopted , 
and that the momentum in trade policy will be lost. 
Part II 
TRADE COOPERATION AMONG THE ADVANCED 
PACIFIC COUNTRIES AND THEIR RELATIONS 
WITH NEIGHBORING REGIONS 
Chapter 3 
A RE-ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECTS 
OF THE FORMA TION 
OF A PACIFIC AREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
* Bruce W. WILKINSON 
Estimates of the impact of various free trade areas on the 
trade flows and balance of payments of participating nations are 
becoming trite. But my terms of reference ask for another look at 
the Pacific Area Free Trade Agreement from this point of view for 
the developed countries of the Pacific, so it is to this task that I 
confine myself. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first discusses 
two important adjustments to the data that were necessary before 
PAFTA e ffects could be considered. These adjustments were for 
the 1967 devaluations and the Kennedy R ound. The second section 
examines the static trade creation effects of PAFTA. Because of 
a somewhat different, and I thin~( more appropriate, interpretation 
of how the import demand elasticities should be applied, the results 
differ in s.erveral respects from earlier estimates . In the third 
section , trade dive r sion alone as well as the total impact of it and 
trade creation t ogether are assessed. The final section introduces 
a number of other consideration s, of both a static and dynamic na-
ture, which may alter the preceding results somewhat, but which 
are fifficult to quantify i n any meaningful way . 
][tis assumed that last year 1 s conference 1 has acquainted 
participants with the intensity of trade (and changes therein) among 
* I am indebted to Ken Tiedmann for preparing the trade statistics 
and tariff estimates used in this paper and to Alan Sharpe for 
all computor work required. 
See especially t he papers by K. K oj ima and Peter Drysdale en-
t itled "Japan's interest in Pacific Trade E xpans i on" and " P aci-
fic E conomic Integration : · An Australian View" respectively, in 
Pacific Trade and Development: Papers and Proceedings of a 
Conference h e ld by the Jaran Economic Research Centei:- (Janu-
ary, 1C)68)o 
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the PAFT A developed nations, both absolutely and relative to trade 
intensity with other regions of the world, so that srace need not be 
devoted to this topic. Apart from a few comments on agriculture , 
purely political issues are not given any attention in this paper. 2 
Also, for brevity, any assumptions used that are the same as those 
in my previous paper on PAFTA 3 will be given short shrift. 
I. ADJUSTMENTS 
Although the full Kennedy Round tariff reductions will not be 
comnleted until 1972, some measure of the relative changes in the 
flows of goods among PAFTA countries emanating from this source 
may be obtained by applying the usual static elasticities arnroach 
to the available trade data. The weaknesses in this anrroach are 
well lrnown,4 so that space need not be devoted to the~. But a few 
comrr:.ents on the particular data and assumptions emrloyed in these 
adjustments as well as in subsequent sections of this paper may be 
usefuL First, consider the data . Five major commodity divisions 
were used: 1) crude foodstuffs, 2) processed foodstuffs, 3) crude 
rnate:cials, 4) semi-manufactured non-foodstuffs, and 5) finished 
manufactures and c hemicals . Within these five divisions 1 25 SITC 
grow•s were distinguished, some at the four digit level where such 
detail was warranted. 5 ,6 Neither agricultural goods nor fuels 
were excluded . Although there are numerous non-tariff restric-
tions affecting these two groups, there are also many such restric-
tions upon trade in manufactured goods ranging from government 
buy-at-home policies to subsidization of research and development. 
Consequently, it seemed inappropriate to arbitrarily exclude the 
forme.r commodities. 
2 For more politically oriented discussions, see the series enti-
tled The Atlantic Trade Study (London: England). 
3 Canadian Trade, The Kennedy Round and a Pacific Free Trade 
Area, in Pacific Trade ••• pp. 30-71. 
4 Eg. 1\1. Kreinan, Alternative Commercial Policies--Their Effect 
on the American Economy (East Lansing, Michigan : Graduate 
School of Business Administration 1967), pp . 40-42. 
5 See Appendix for the list of SITA groups. 
6 All trade data is from the import s tatistics of each country as 
shown in U. N. commodity trade reports for 1966. 
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GA TT tariff rates and where appropriate, British preferen-
tial rates 7 for both prior to and after the Kennedy Round were ' ~ 
estimated for each group by unweighted averaging of the individual 
aoolicable rates. 8, 9 Rates for Australia, Canada and the United 
s"t~tes were adjusted downward 1 0 percent to allow for imports be-
ing recorded f. o.b. rather than c.i.f. Other adjustments were 
also made for the American selling price regulation and the Canada-
United States auto pact. 10 Nominal, not effective, tariffs were 
used throughout these and all following computations . This is ap-
propriate when using the direct method of applying elasticities of 
demand for imports to the tariff changes--as was done here. 11 
Apart from the Ball-1\!larwah 1 2 estimates of import demand 
7 In some instances the rates prevailing among Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada as a result of bilateral agreements between 
these nation s d iffe r from their British preferential rates . How-
ever, for simplicity the British P referential rates were used 
throughout. 
8 Rates were taken from the International Customs Journal and 
the GATT reports on the Kennedy l=(ound reductions. r,'!y com-
putations fer last year's conference were of necessity based 
on sketchy and incomplete information. 
o Peter Drys dale and Harold Cowie were kind enough to let me 
have the tariff rates that they had derived for a number of the 
nations relevent to this study, but as I was not certain of r e-
ceiving them I had, in the meantime, set my research assistant 
to the task of developing the ones used in this !,'aper. 
10 See B. ~.:v'ilkinson in Pacific Trade . ... , p, 4 3. 
11 Balassa found that the difference s i n trade c hanges resulting 
fro".!1 u sing the a bove method as opposed to the indirect approach 
involving domestic elasticities of demand for importables and 
supply of value added of importables as well as both nominal and 
e ffective rates were generally small and never in excess of 1 O 
per cent ; see Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries: 
Objectives and Alternative s (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), 
np. 77. More over, the assumptions required in arriving at effec-
tive rates make it extremely questionable that they can be used 
with any precision or confidence in estimating effects of tariff 
reductions; see J. Melvin and B. Y/ . \'!ilkinson, Effective Pro-
tection in the Canadian Economy, for the Economic Council of 
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elasticities for the United States, estimates of these elasticities 
for the developed nations of PAFTA for recent years are either not 
available or at least do not conveniently fit the commodity classifi-
cation employed. To provide some idea of the sensitivity of the 
results to the elasticities used, three sets of elasticities were thus 
assumed for each country. For the United States the Ball-Marwah 
estimates were taken as the medium elasticities; these plus two 
standard errors were used as the high set and when divided by two 
comprised the low set, Japan's elasticities were assumed to be 
three-quarters those of the United States, whereas those of Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand were assumed to be one-half the 
American ones. These relations among the elasticities for the 
PAFTA countries are largely in accord with Balassa and 
Kreinan' s 13 approach. Table 1 summarizes these assumptions and 
indicates the weighted average elasticities of demand for total im-
port by each country implied by them. The weights used were the 
shares of the commodity divisions in total imports for the country 
concerned. 
One or two comments about the weighted averages are neces-
sary. First, because of the high proportion (about 75 percent) of 
crude and semi-processed materials in Japanese imports, the 
averages for Japan are less than for New Zealand, Australia and 
Canada even though, for any one set of elasticities the individual 
elasticities used for each Japanese commodity group are higher. 
Second, for the United States, the Ball-Marwah average for what I 
have called medium elasticities was -1.3, substantially less than 
our number of -2. 02. The difference seems to occur partly be-
cause they placed fewer commodity groups in the highly manufac -
tured (high elasticity) commodity division than has been done here, 
and partly because their weights are based on trade over the years 
1 q48-1958 whereas I used 1966 imports, involving a greater pro-
portion of highly manufactured goods . Finally, regarding New 
Zealand, recent evidence suggests that the third, low set of elas-
ticities are the most appropriate. Stephen Turnovsky' s work, 14 
(11 cont 1 d) Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968) . 
12 "The U.S. Demand for Imports, 1948-1958", Review of E conom-
ics and Statistics, 44 (November, 1962), pp. 394-401. 
13 "Trade Liberalization Under the 'Kennedy Round': The Static 
Effects", Review of Economic s and Statistics, 49, (May, 1967) 
11p. 1 26-1 28' 
14 "International Trading Relationships for a Small Country: The 
Case of New Zealand 11 , Canadian Journal of Economics, I 
Nove 1'1ber, 1968), pp. 772-790 . See espec . p.788. 
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covering the years 194 7-1963, gives a price elasticity of demand 
for imi:::orts varying between -.08 and -.51. Such low numbers 
seem reasonable when it is recalled that about 50 percent of New 
Zealand 1 s imports are producers' materials for use in manufactur-
ing, another 25 percent is capital equipment and 7 percent is fuels. 1 5 
The foregoing comments are relevant for subsequent sections 
of this paper as well as the present one . But there are a few addi-
tional remarks that are particularly relevant when estimating the 
trade impact of the Kennedy Round. 
Since few of Canada's British Preferential tariffs were re -
duced compared with the number of her GA TT rates that were re-
duced, it will mean a lowering of the margins of preference in the 
Canadian market formerly enjoyed by the United Kingdom on a wide 
range of commodities. The trade diversion effect of the preferen-
tial system will to this extent be reduced. But since only about 6 
percent of Canadian imports at present come from the U. K . the 
expansion of Canadian imports from the other members of PAFTA 
from this cause is not likely to be very great in either absolute or 
relative terms . No adjustment has been attempted at this juncture. 
The number of SITC commodity groups on which Australian 
GA TT tariffs were reduced was · small (about 1 7) and the tariff 
changes for these groups generally averaged but a fraction of a 
percentage point. The changes in British preferential rates were 
similarly minor and some were even increases from the previously 
published rates. Consequently, no adjustment was made in Austra-
lian imports for the Kennedy Round . 
New Zealand lowered her GA TT tariffs on a larger number of 
SITC groups than did Australia (Nearly 40) . On less than one-half 
of these her British preferential rates were reduced too. It was 
assumed that any increase in imports from Australia and Canada 
that might be stimulated by the lowered BP rates would be roughly 
offset by the reduction in trade diversion that would now occur be-
cause of a lowering of substantially more GA TT rate s than BP 
rates. Hence, net changes in imports of New Zealand from Canada 
and Australia were assumed to be negligible . New Zealand import 
15 fan A. McDougall, "The Prospects of the Economic Integration 
of Japan, Australia and New Zealand", in Pacific Trade • •• , 
Table III, p. 137. 
A RE-ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECTS 59 
quotas were also ignored at this stage. By disregarding their in-
hibiting effect, we may have overstated the rise in New Zealand 
imports emanating from the Kennedy Round. 
The formula used for the computations is well-known. 16 In 
applying it, perfectly elastic supplies of export goods by each na-
tion are assumed. 17 
Summill'.y results of the static effects of the Kennedy Round on 
the trade flows among the PAFTA countries 18 are presented in 
Table 2. Japan will enjoy the largest absolute and relative expan-
sion of exports within PAFTA and the largest net improvement in 
her trade balance with the PAFTA countries. United States is at 
the other extreme and would face the greatest absolute and rela-
tive growth of imports. It is also the only one of the five nations 
that would experience a worsening of her trade balance with the 
PAFTA group. The average expansion of trade among the PAFTA 
nations is about 7-1 /2 percent, 5 percent and 2-1 /2 percent if the 
high, medium and low elasticities respectively are used by all coun-
tries. 
U is also possible to see from the table how the results would 
be altered if the most unfavourable (favourable) circumstances 
were faced by any one country. If, for example, the highest import 
demand elasticities applied to the United States, yet its exports 
faced the lowest elasticities by the other four nations, its trade ba-
lance with PAFTA could worsen by about $US 900 millions. If the 
converse were true, its trade balance would improve by about 
16 i.e. t-t' dM = Em.M. 1+t; where dM = change in imports 
Em= the importing country's re-
lative price elasticity of 
demand for imports, 
t and t '=the pre- and post- Kennedy 
ad valorem tariff rates. 
1 7 It is convenient to leave the discussion of this assumption until 
the following section. 
18 As the results are not of as much interest at this juncture, 
changes in trade with non-PAFTA countries are not reported 
here. V\Te have estimated, however, the increases in imports by 
PAFTA nat ions from the U.K. and the .rest-of-the-world as a 
consequence of the Kennedy Round as these are required when 
computing the trade diversion effects of PAFTA. 
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TABLE 2 
STATIC EFFECTS OF KENNEDY ROUND ON TRADE 
AMONG PAFTA COUNTRIES 
Increase in Exports Increase in Import Net Change in 
to PAFTA from PAFTA Trade Balance 
Country Millions Millions 
of $ US % of $ US % Millions of $US 
(A) HIGH ELASTICITY ESTIMATES 
New Zealand 30 . 2 8.57 2.9 o.68 + 27 .3 
Australia 39,7 3.03 0.0 0.0 + 39,7 
Canada 372.9 5.83 321.5 4.85 + 51.4 
Japan 678.2 19.39 244,7 6 .29 +422.5 
United States 519.4 5.24 1071.3 11.55 -551.9 
TOTAL 1640.4 7.65 1640.4 7.65 
(B) MEDIUM ELASTICITY ESTIMATES 
New Zealand 18.2 5.16 2.0 0.47 + 16.2 
Australia 21.8 1.67 0.0 o.o + 21.8 
Canada 237.6 3,71 209.3 3.16 + 28.3 
Japan 446.7 12 .77 155 .6 4.00 +291.l 
United States 337.0 3.41 694.4 7.49 -357.4 
TOTAL 1061.3 4.94 1061.3 4.94 
(C) LOW ELASTICITY ESTIMATES 
New Zealand 9.1 2.58 1.0 0.23 + 8.1 
Australia 10.9 0.83 0.0 0.0 + 10.9 
Canada ll8.8 1.86 105.3 1.59 + 13.3 
Japan 224.2 6.41 77.6 1.99 +146 .6 
United States 169.2 1. 71 348.l 4.14 -178 .9 
TOTAL 532.2 2.48 532.2 2.48 
NOTE: Totals in this and all subsequent tables may not add due to 
rounding. 
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$US 170 millions. The average of these extremes is not far re -
moved from the results obtained by using medium elasticities for 
all nations. 
61 
The New Zealand devaluation of 19.4 percent must be allowed 
for as well. Using the same level of detail as before, the same 
elasticities and basic methods and the computed post-Kennedy trade 
flows, the changes in New Zealand imports and exports, valued in 
$US, were estimated . These changes, insofar as they relate to 
trade with PAFTA countries, are presented in Table 3 .1 9 As indi-
cated earlier, the lowest New Zealand import elasticities are like-
ly the most realistic. And if the medium set of elasticities are most 
appropriate for the remaining nations, then New Zealand's trade 
balance with PAFTA countries would improve by a modest $US 90 
millions. Imports from PAFTA would have diminished by 14 percent 
and exports would have risen by 8 percent. 
JI. TRADE CREATION EFFECTS OF PAFTA 
Previous estimates20 of the trade generated by PAFTA have 
been derived by applying elasticities somewhat s imilar to those 
assumed in this paper to the tariff reductions and trade flows within 
the PAFTA countries. The results are a first approximation to the 
trade creation effects of PAFTA. But ignored in these earlier cal-
culations is the fact that the elasticities employed are estimates of 
\ each country 1 s elasticities of demand for total imports, in the com-
modity group or division concerned, from the rest of the world, not 
19 The alterations in New Zealand imports from U, K. and the rest-
of-the-world were also estimated as the result s are necessary 
for trade diversion estimates. The U. K. devaluation of 14. 3 
percent was allowed for in the se computations as well . More-
over, the effects of the U. K. devaluation on imports by the other 
four PAFTA nations from the U .K. were also computed as these 
results too are needed in the trade diversion calculations . 
20 See espec . K. Kojima, "A Pacific Economic Community and 
Asian Developing Countries", Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 
(June, 1966), rp. : also "Japan's Interest in the Pacific 
Trade Expansion", in Pacific Trade ... , pp. 163-167. See 
also P. Drysdale, "Pacific Economic Integration, An Australian 
View", in Pacific Trade ... , pr. 205-207 and B. Wilkinson, 
"Canadian Trade, The Kennedy Round and a Pacific Free Trade 
A:rea", also in Pacific Trade ... , rP. 48-54 . 
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just from PAFTA nations. 21 Elasticities of demand for imports 
from PAFTA nations alone will therefore be higher than these esti-
mates and accordingly trade creation will be greater. 22 
If we had detailed import price elasticities for each commodity 
division for each PAFTA nation from each of the other PAFTA na-
tions, these would be the logical values to use. Only a few of these 
are available so that to take this approach would require a new set 
of "guestimates". Rather than doing this, I first apply the elastici-
ties for imports from the world by each PAFTA country to PAFTA 
trade alone. This provides a first approximation to trade creation 
comparable with earlier such calculations. Then, using the same 
elasticities I consider what the extra potential increment in imports 
by each country would have been had its tariff reduction been vis-
a-vis the rest-of-the world as well. It is assumed that because of 
product differentiation (English bone china, Danish furniture, / 
French wines etc.), a portion of this extra increment is not avail-
able from other PAFTA countries and therefore cannot form a part 
of the total trade creation effect . This has the same effect as 
assuming perfectly inelastic supply of these goods within PAFTA 
and no substitutability between them and products available within 
PAFTA. The remaining proportion of imports is assumed to be in 
perfectly elastic supply in the other PAFTA countries and is allo-
cated among them in proportion to their share of imports in each of 
the five commodity divisions for the country concerned. 23 
For the United States, one-half of the extra potential increment 
in imports for each commodity division are assumed not available 
within PAFTA. Therefore the total net increment in imports by the 
United States from PAFTA is assumed to consist of the first ap-
proximation effect resulting from applying the import demand elas-
21 This is not a problem with respect to the Kennedy Round adjust-
ments because trade with most of the world was involved. 
22 Neglecting- the possible complications of product differentiation 
and less than perfectly elastic export supplies, it can easily be 
shown that the import demand elasticity for any one PAFT A 
nation for imports from the rest of PAFTA is greater than 
that country's elasticity of demand for imports from the world 
by the ratio of the import volume from the total world to import 
volume from PAFT A. Or, in other words, it will be large enough 
that the increment in imports that that country would absorb from 
the rest of PAFTA would equal the total increment that it would 
hav_e absorbed if it had lowered its tariffs on imports from the 
entire world. 
23 See Appendix Table A - 4 for these shares. 
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ticities in Table 1 to the tariff removal and trade flows within 
PAFTA, plus 50 percent of the extra potential trade creation ef-
fects. 
For countries other than the United States, which can thus 
import from the large, diverse and technologically advanced 
American market, it is assumed that only 25 percent of the extra 
increases in imports that may arise will not be obtainable from 
within PAFTA. 
The assumption of perfectly elastic supply of exports by 
PAFTA nations deserves comment. Because exports, and the 
changes in exports , due to PAFTA that United States will face, 
comprise such a small percentage of total U .S. output, it seems 
very appropriate to assume perfectly elastic export supplies for 
that country. As for Australia, New Zealand and Canada, these 
countries hope to achieve economies of scale and greater productiv-
ity through production for export. This result, if obtained, would 
give a downward bias to prices. Only if bottlenecks arose or a 
general factor price rise occurred because of full employment and 
inflation generated by much improved trade balances, would the 
tendency be for export prices to rise noticeably. But to anticipate 
the results, such pressures are very unlikely for Australia (who 
faces a substantial worsening of her trade balance) and New Zea-
land (who will probably have but a small improvement in her trade 
balance). Although Canada will enjoy some net improvement, its 
extent is modest, particularly when compared with the much larger 
expansion of net exports to United States resulting from the auto 
pact alone and accompanied by a decline in Canadian export and 
dome s tic prices as a consequence of the improved productivity. 
Moreover, labour force growth rates in Canada are expected to 
continue high in relation to such growth rates in other developed 
countries. For Japan, the assumption of constant export prices in 
the presence of a large net expansion in exports may seem some-
what unrealistic. But as I shall repeat again later, the net ex-
pansion would be less and the numbers of people available for work 
in manufacturing would be greater if the easing of import restric-
tions on agricultural products were undertaken as a valid part 
of any free trade agreement that may be negotiated. Hence I re-
tain the as s umption of perfectly elastic export supplies for that 
country too. 
One or two final remarks about the computations are neces-
sary before turning to the results. First, notice that no provision 
has been made for the Australian-New Zealand Free Trade Agree-
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ment. The impression gained from the assessments of this agree-
ment to date are that apart from the pulp and paper, the impact is 
not exoected to be large. But my omission nevertheless means that 
the effects of PAFTA are overstated insofar as trade between these 
two countries i s concerned . Second, no allowance has been made 
for the reduction in trade diversion which might have existed prior 
to PAFTA because of British Preferential tariffs existing among 
the three Commonwealth countri~s in P AFTA . The very modest 
increases in imports by each of these three nations from the United 
States and Japan that would result from the elimination of British 
Preference are ignored. 
Summary results for the first approximation static trade 
creation effects of PAFTA are shown in Table 4 . Kojima' s esti-
mates for PAFTA, Drysdale' s for Australia and my own earlier 
one's for Canada (all based on 1965 trade) are also shown . Vari-
ations between the earlier values and those from this paper can be 
explained largely by the different adjustments made and elasticities 
employed . For example, my more favourable results than Kojima' s 
for New Zealand as well as for Australia and Canada owe much to 
the preliminary adjustment made for devaluation with respect to the 
first country and to lower assumed import demand elasticities for 
the latter two nations. The greater improvement in trade balance 
for Japan that is shown by Kojima undoubtedly can be attributed, to 
a large extent , to the Kennedy Round benefits included in his cal-
culations but excluded from ours . 
The total expansion of PAFTA trade from these first approx-
imations is $4 .5 billions, $2.8 billions, or $1.3 billions depending 
upon whether the high, medium or low elasticities are accepted . 
The percentage increases in trade represented by these numbers 
are 19, 12 and 6 respectively . These are fairly modest static 
effects, especially when considered in relation to the average rates 
of increase in world trade over the past 7 or 8 years of about 8 
percent. 
Total static trade creation effec ts of PAFTA are set out in 
summary form in Tables 5(a), (b) and (c). Consider the situation 
for the five countries in turn~ 
For New Zealand, the net trade balances for the different 
elasticities are little changed from the first approximations. These 
figures conceal , however, that New Zealand's imports from PAFTA 
rise more rapidly than do those of any of the other countries except 
Australia, and that its export rate of increase is second only to that 
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TABLE 4 
FIRST APPROXIMATION TO STATIC TRADE CREATION EFFECTS OF PAFTA 
ON THE BALANCE OF TRADE OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
(Millions of $ US) 
Elasticities New Australia Canada Japan United Zealand States 
High +64 . 5 - 455 . 1 - 552 . 5 +1024 . 3 -81 . 2 
Medium +5.8 - 309 . l - 378 . 2 +658 . 2 +23.3 . 
Low -10 . 3 - 153 . 4 - 190 . 5 +307 . 7 +46 . 5 
Kojima -117 . 6 - 586 . 1 - 625 . 4 +1312 . 4 +18 . 5 
Drysdale - 564 . 0 
Wilkinson - 439 . 0 
Sources : 
First 3 rows : see Appendix Table A - 5 . 
Row 4 : see "Japan's Interest in the Pacific Trade Expansion", 
in Pacific Trade and Development : Papers and Proceedings 
of a Conference held by the Japan ~conomic Research Center 
in January, 1968 , Table 9, p . 186 . The import demand 
elasticities he used were essentially between our medium 
and high elasticities for the United States and Japan 
and above our high elasticities for the other three 
countries . 
Row 5 : "Pacific Economic Integration : .An Australian View", in 
Pacific Trade ..• Table 2, p . 207 . The elas t icities used 
were the same as Kojima ' s with some adjustments based 
upon particular studies for Australian export s. 
Row 6 : "Canadian Trade, The Kennedy Round and A Pacifi c Free 
Trade Area", in Pacific Trade •••• , Table 4, p . 53 . The 
elasticities used were the same as Kojima ' s for United 
States and Japan and jus t slightly above the medium ones 
in this present paper for the t hree other countries . 
A RE-ESTil\ilATION OF THE EFFECTS 
TABLE 5 
TOTAL STATIC :rRADE-CREATIO~ E:..<i'FECTS OF PAFTA 
(a) On the Balance of Trade of the Developed Countries 
New Australia Canada Japan United Elasticities Zealand States 
High +62.0 -851.0 +376.0 +1587.5 -1174.5 
Medium -11.9 -563.6 +160.4 +1015.6 -600.5 
Low -25.5 -273.9 +54 -9 +474.1 -229.7 
Source: Appendix Table A - 7 
(b) On the Exports and Imports of PAFTA Countries, Percentage Increases 
Based on Adjustedl 1966 Trade 
Elasti-
cities 
New 
Zealand Australia Canada Japan 
United 
States 
x M x M x M x x M 
High 40.0 60.1 20.3 89.3 26.9 20.7 64.6 25.7 29.0 40.1 
Medium 24 .2 38 . 2 11. 7 57. 7 16.3 13.4 42.1 15.4 18.6 25.0 
Low 11. 7 18.9 6.2 28.5 7.7 6.7 20.8 7.3 9.2 12.0 
Source: Appendix Table A - 6 
Notes: 1Adjusted for the Kennedy Round and New Zealand devaluation. 
( c) On Trade by Major Commodity Divisions (High Elasticities) 
Commodity Division Trade Creation Millions of $ us % 
Crude Foodstuffs 194-5 13.7 
Processed Foodstuffs 443.0 42.4 
Crude Materials 113.5 3.3 
Semi Manufactures 414.8 14.9 
Finished Manufactures 
6781.5 47.4 and Chemicals 
Total 7947.3 34.5 
Source: Appendix Table A - 8 
Total 
PAFTA 
34.5 
21.5 
10.5 
67 
68 BRUCE W. WILKINSON 
of Japan. Flexibility will be required in the conomy if resources 
are to shift as required by these trade increases. More important 
is that even though prior adjustment was made for the New Zealand 
devaluation, the country probably stands to lose--in static balance 
of trade terms--from PAFTA. And if the devaluation was not suf-
ficient to permit removal of the extensive imJrnrt quotas (which have 
been ignored in the foregoing calculations)2 then a free trade 
arrangement which requires their elimination too, might make the 
New Zealand position even more unfavourable. 
From a balance of trade viewpoint, Australia comes off the 
worst, at least relative to the size of its existing trade flows. It 
has th e highest rate of increase in imports and the lowest rate of 
increase in exports (58 percent and 12 percent respectively for the 
medium elasticities) . These increases are the result of the com-
modity and area composition of Australian trade . Of the five devel-
oped PAFTA countries it has the largest proportion of its imports 
from PAFTA (about 85 percent) in the highly manufactured group 
(which has the highest import demand e lasticity), and the largest 
proportion of its exports to PAFTA (about 60 percent) in crude 
foodstuffs and crude materials (which have the lowest elasticities). 25 
Australia s upplies only 2. 5 percent of Japanese imports from 
PAFTA of highly manufactured goods and only • 5 percent of US 
imports from PAFTA i n the same category. Hence she gains rela-
tively s mall amounts from the extra trade creation of PAFTA which 
are largely concentrated in the highly manufactured goods division. 
Yet her imports rise substantially, so that her trade balance with 
PAFTA may become worse by over one-half a billion $US--if the 
medium elasticities apply. 
The Canadian position is quite different from that presented 
under the initial approximation to PAFTA. Her trade balance now 
improves (rather than worsens), primarily because she supplies 60 
percent of all U.S. imports from PAFTA countries and 50 percent 
24 If, in fact, the devaluation was sufficient to correct New Zea-
land's overvalued currency and permit discontinuance of the quo-
ta system without any great net worsening of New Zealand's 
trade balance, then it is quite correct to disregard these quotas 
in the PAFTA discussion. A s for the dynamic issues involved, 
see the final section of this paper. 
25 See Appendix Tables A-2 and 3. 
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of all U.S. imports from PAFTA of finished manufactures and chem-
icals. Hence ~he is a main beneficiary of the extra increments in 
U.S. imports. At the same time, because 75 percent of her imports 
are from PAFTA nations, the major rise in her imports resulting 
from PAFTA was already picked-up in the first approximation effects. 
Japan has by far the most to gain from the static trade creation 
effects of PAFTA. Its exports will enjoy the highest rate of growth 
of any of the PAFT A countries and its import growth will be the 
second lowest. (It has the highest proportion of its exports to PAFTA 
in the finished manufactures and chemicals category--88 percent--
and the lowest proportion of its imports from PAFT A in this category 
--24 percent--of any of the PAFTA countries). 26. 
For the United States a substantial worsening of her trade 
balance with the PAFTA countries is the result--primarily because 
of the sizeable net expansion in imports of finished manufactures 
and chemicals from Japan and Canada. And if it had been assumed 
that even more than 50 percent of the "extra" potential U.S. imports 
were available within PAFTA, the U. S, position would be even 
more unfavourable than here presented. 
In terms of commodity divisions, finished manufactures and 
chemicals will, as expected, experience the greatest increase both 
in absolute and relative terms. Using the high elasticities, for ex-
ample, 8 5 percent of the trade creation impact of PA FT A will be in 
this category of products. The rate of increase would be over 4 7 
percent. (Table 5(c)) For all products the trade expansion would 
be $US 7.9 billions, $US4.9 billions or $US2.3 billions depending 
upon whether the high, medium or low elasticities are appropriate. 
The percentage rises in trade corresponding to these magnitudes 
are 35
2
'7' 22 and 11 respectively. (See Appendix Tables A-6 and 
A-7 .) 
Ill. TRADE DIVERSION 
To the above estimates must be added the amounts by which 
imports that have been from outside PAFT A will now emanate from 
26 See Appendix Tables A-2 and 3. 
27 Changes in trade balances between individual countries are also 
to be found in the Appendix tables. 
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other PAFTA nations as a consequence of the tariff removal. To 
allow for these changes an elasticity of substitution has been ap-
rlied for each PAFTA country with respect to imports from the 
remaining PAFTA countries as opposed to imrorts from the rest-
of-the-world. The diversion effect has then been allocated among 
these remaining countries, according to the shares of these nations, 
by commodity group, in the imports of the country under considera-
tion prior to PAFTA trade creation effects being estimated. The 
computations have been made using, first, an elasticity of substi-
tution of unity and then of two . 28 · 
Summary trade diversion effects are presented by country 
and commodity in Tables 6(I) and (II). The total impact amounts to 
$U.S. 790 millions, or 3 . 4% of adjusted 1966 intra-PAFTA trade 
if the elasticity of substitution is unity and nearly $U . S. 1600 
millions or 7% if the elasticity equals two. These diversion effects 
contribute to the improvement in trade balance for those countries 
--Ja pan and Canada particularly--that ended up with a net increase 
in exports over imports because of the trade creation effects. 
They also reduce to some extent the unfavourable changes occur-
ring in the balance of trade of the remaining countries. These 
benefits are shown in the "increase in exports to PAFTA" columns 
of Table 6. (The "imports" columns merely show the extent to 
which the individual countries divert their imports from abroad to 
intra-PAFT A sources of supply . ) Finished manufactures and 
chemicals account for about 70% of the diversion in absolute terms. 
Diversion is greatest relative to trade flows in crude foodstuffs 
where it equals 4 . 9% of P AFTA imports of such goods when the 
elasticity of substitution is assumed to be unity and 9. 5% when the 
elasticity is two. 
Total trade creation and trade diversion effects of PAFTA 
are summarized in Tables 7(I) and (II) . The total rise in exports 
of P AFTA countries to one another may reach as high as 38 to 41 %29 
if the high elasticities were applicable. (For the medium and low 
elasticities the percentages would be about 25-29 and 14- 17 respec-
tively . ) The greatest gain in exports is registered by Japan-72 to 
28 S ee Appendix B for derivation of the formula for the trade 
diversion effect using an elasticity of substitution . 
2q Depending upon whether the elasticity of substitution were 1 or 
2 respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
SUMMARY TRADE DIVERSION EFFECTS OF PAFTA 
(I) Elasticity of Substitution 1 and Based upon High Import Demand 
Elasticities
1 
(A) By Country 
Country 
New Zealand 
Australia 
Canada 
Japan 
United States 
Total 
Increase In 
Exports To 
PAFTA 
MILLIONS 
%2 OF$ US 
24 .8 4.6 
42.3 3.3 
161.1 2.4 
241.4 5.9 
319.6 3.1 
789 . 3 3.4 
(B) By Major Commodity Division 
Increase In 
Imports From 
PAFTA 
MILLIONS 
%2 OF$ US 
23 . 3 9.4 
110 .3 13 .7 
119 .7 1. 7 
125 .9 3.0 
350 .1 3.4 
789 .3 3. 4 
TRADE DIVERSION 
MILLIONS 
%2 Commodity Division OF $ US 
Crude Foodstuffs 69.6 4. 9 
Processed Foodstuffs 46 .4 4.4 
Crude Materials 53.2 1.5 
Semi-Manufactures 60 .2 2.1 
Finished Manufactures 
559 .6 3.9 and Chemicals 
Total 789 .3 3.4 
Net Change In 
Trade Balance 
With PAFTA 
+1.5 
-128.0 
+41 .4 
+115 . 5 
- 30 .5 
0 
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TABLE 6 (concluded) 
SUll'IMARY TRADE DIVERSION EFFECTS OF PAFTA 
(II ) Elasticity of Substitution = 2 and Based upon High Import Demand 
Elasticities. 1 
(A) By Country 
Increase in Export 
to PAF·:rA 
Country 
%2 Millions 
of $US 
New Zeala.l'ld 50.4 9.4 
Australia 86.6 6.8 
Canada 324.4 4.8 
Japan 492.7 12.0 
United States 639.1 6.2 
TOTAL 1,593.2 6.9 
(B) By Major Commodity Group 
Commodity Division 
Crude Foodstuffs 
Processed Foodstuffs 
Crude Materials 
Semi Manufactures 
Finished Manufactures and 
Chemicals 
TOTAL 
Source: Appendix Tables A-9 and 11. 
Increase in Import Net Change in 
from PAFTA Trade Balance 
%2 
with PAFTA 
Millions 
of $US 
48.l 19.4 + 2.3 
354.0 28 .5 -267.4 
233.6 3.4 + 90.8 
248.5 6.0 +244.2 
708.9 6.8 - 69.8 
1,593.2 6.9 0 
Trade Diversion 
Million of $US 
135.2 
93.8 
107.4 
122.4 
1,134.3 
1,593.1 
9.5 
9 .0 
3.1 
4.4 
7.9 
Notes : (1) For results based on medium and low elasticities see 
Appendix Table A-10. 
(2) Based on 1966 trade after adjustment for Kennedy Round 
and New Zealand devaluatioR. 
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TABLE 7 
TOTAL TRADE CREATION .AND TRADE DIVERSION EFFECTS OF PAFTA 
(I) Elasticity of Substitution 1 and Based upon High Import Demand 
Elasticities 
(A) By Country 
Increase In Increase In 
Country Exports Of Imports Of 
PAFTA PAFTA 
Millions % Millions % Of $ US Of $ US 
New Zealand 235.8 44.2 172 . 3 69 . 2 
Australia 298. 8 23 . 5 1277.8 103.0 
Canada 1978. 6 29 . 3 1561. 2 22 . 4 
Japan 2894 . 8 72.3 ll91.8 28.7 
United States 3329 . 4 32 . 1 4534 . 4 43 . 5 
Total 8737.4 38.0 8737 . 5 38 .0 
(B) By Major Commodity Division 
Commodity Division 
Crude Foodstuffs 
Processed Foodstuffs 
Crude Materials 
Semi-Manufactures 
Finished Manufactures 
and Chemicals 
Total 
Millions Of $ US 
264 . 1 
489 . 4 
166 . 7 
475 . 0 
7342 . 2 
8737 . 4 
Net Change 
In Trade 
Balance 
With PAFTA 
+63 . 5 
-979 . 0 
+417 . 4 
+1703 . 0 
- 1205 . 0 
18 . 6 
46 . 8 
4. 8 
16 . 9 
51.4 
38 . 0 
0 
Net Change 
In Trade 
Balance 
With World 
+86 . 8 
-808.7 
+537 . 1 
+1828 . 9 
-854 . 9 
+789 . 3 
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TABLE 7 (concluded) 
TOTAL TRADE CREATION ANTI TRADE DIVERSION EFFECTS OF PAFTA 
(II) Elasticity of Substitution 2 and Based Upon High Import Demand 
Elasticities 
(A) By Country 
Increase In Increase In Net Change Net Change Country Exports Of Imports Of In Trade In Trade PAFTA PAFTA Balance Balance 
Millions % Millions % With PAFTA With World Of $ US Of $ US 
New Zealand 261.4 49 . 0 197 . 1 79 . 4 +64.3 +ll2.4 
Australia 343.1 27.1 1461.5 ll7.8 - lll8.4 -764.4 
Canada 2141. 9 31. 7 1675 . 1 24.1 +466.8 +700.4 
Japan 3146 . 1 76 . 6 1314.4 31. 7 +1831. 7 +2080 . 2 
United States 3648.9 35 . 2 4893.2 46.9 -1244,3 -535°4 
Total 9541.4 41.4 9541.4 41.4 0 +1593.2 
(B) By Major Commodity Division 
Commodity Division Millions of $ US % 
Crude Foodstuffs 329.6 23.2 
Processed Foodstuffs 536.7 51.3 
Crude Materials 220 . 8 5.8 
Semi-Manufactures 537.2 19.1 
Finished Manufactures and Chemicals 7916.8 55.3 
TOTAL 9541.1 41.4 
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77% for high elasticities or about 50% and 28% for the medium and 
low elasticities respectively. Australia has the least export gain, 
it being only about 25% even if the high elasticities were applicable. 
And as seen before, finished manufactures and chemicals are the 
most important source of increased trade. 
It is of some interest to compare the changes in exports, im-
ports and net trade balance with the GNP of the five countries. 
This is done in Table 8. The most striking thing to observe is that 
the rise in Australian imports from PAFTA if based on the high 
elasticities, could amoun.t to 5. 6% of .GNP(O and the net deteriora-
tion in its trade balance with the world could be as high as 3. 6% of 
GNP. Although the U.S. would experience a somewhat greater 
absolute deterioration in its trade balance with the world, the 
change, relative to its GNP would be only . 1 % at a maximum. 
N. OTHER CONSIDERATION 
A number of other factors, both static and dynamic, would 
alter the outcome of any free trade area from that shown above. 
\flost of these have been discussed more thoroughly elaswhere31 
than there is space to do here, and to attempt assigning quantita-
tive values to them is of questionable worth. But it may be useful 
to summarize the more important of them with particular reference 
to their impact on the individual PAFTA nations. 
Consider Japan first. The freeing of trade as conceived of 
so far in this paper suggests a sizeable benefit to the Japanese 
balance of trade. On the one hand, the benefit might be greater if 
some allowance were made for the reduction in pre-PAFTA trade 
diversion stemming from the British preferential system and for 
the elimination of import quotas, actual or defacto, by the United 
States, Canada and New Zealand on Japanese products. On the 
other hand, preferences extended to the less developed nations 
30 The rise in Australian ~imports (i.e. excluding reductions 
in imports from the rest of-the-world due to trade diversion 
effects) would be 4. 9% of GNP. 
'31 See the papers from the First Conference on Pacific Trade and 
Development, especially those by Cooper, Drysdale, McDougall, 
Kojima and Willdnson. See also the Atlantic Trade Study series 
and Balassa, Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries, 
Chapter V. 
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TABLE 8 
TOTAL INCREASE IN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS1 
FROM A PACIFIC AREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
AS PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS 1966 
Percentages of GNP 
Net Improvement 
Exports Imports in Trade Balance 
with World3 
New Zealand 2.2 1 • 6 + .8 
Australia 1 • 3 5.6 -3 .• 6 
Canada 3.7 2.9 + 1 • 0 
Japan 3.0 1 . 2 +1. 9 
United States . 4 .6 - • 1 
Based on high import demand elasticities and elasticity of sub-
stitution of unity. 
2 These are based on increases in imports from PAFT A and_ 
therefore include the trade diversion effects. 
3 These are based on the expansions in exports less the net rises 
in imports from the total world. That is, those increases in 
imports from PAFT A which are offset by reduced imports from 
the rest-of-the-world are excluded in arriving at these percent-
ages. 
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within the Pacific area by the developed PAFTA nations would 
probably be more to Japan's disadvantage than to the other devel-
oped nations. Like the other PAFTA developed countries, she 
would face increased imports of mostly labour intensive manufac-
tures which would be offset by increased exports to the LDC' s only 
to the extent that they spent their increased foreign exchange re-
ceipts on her products . But in addition, Japan would also face re-
duced exports of her own labour intensive products to the other 
PAFTA nations. It is difficult to say what the net effect of these 
diverse influences might be. But they would be unlikely to reduce 
very substantially the favourable Japanese position resulting from 
PAFTA. It is not difficult to understand the Japanese interest in 
a Pacific Area Free Trade Agreement. 
In view of the benefit that Japan stands to reap it seems 
unreasonable for them to refuse to touch their domestic agriculture, 
and still expect Australia and New Zealand to be enthusiastic par-
ticipants in a free trade -proposal. 
Suppose, for a moment, that over the time period in which 
tariffs were to be eliminated in PAFTA Japan did reduce agricul-
tural subsidies and permitted increased agricultural imports of $US. 
1 billion (more than sufficient to offset any Australian deficit) . 
Given an average income of about $US 400 per year for agricul-
tural workers in Japan, these expanded irrports would displace 
2-1/2 million workers or about 5% of the Japanese labour force. 
This displacement is not unduly large considering the extent of the 
removal of farm workers into the industrial labour force over re-
cent years. Moreover it would still leave a larger proportion of 
the Japanese labour force in agriculture than in any other developed 
nation. 
The advantages to the Japanese from this easing of agricul-
tural import restrictions include higher average income per head 
through workers having higher productivity in manufacturing than 
in agriculture, increased farm productivity through having more 
efficient sized units and more mechanization, and lower food prices 
resulting from the improved farm productivity and availability of 
cheaper imported foodstuffs . Indeed, if Japan is not to suffer 
greater inflationary pressures and sharply rising export supply 
prices stemming from her stronger trade balance in PAFTA re-
leasing of more agricultural workers for manufacturing and irneping 
food prices down through cheaper imports and higher domestic farm 
productivity may be the only answer . 
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Notice too that the arguments for lower Japanese agricultural 
protection are very similar to those which will have to be used by 
the governments of New Zealand and Australia if they are to sell 
free trade to their respective manufacturers: there are economies 
of scal e and lower prices to be reaped by the alert and more capa-
ble of them. The main difference is that the manufacturing sectors 
in New Zealand and Australia that must be convinced of this argu-
ment involve a larger share of each nation's labour force than 
does the agricultural sector in Japan. 
In general, I would digress to suggest that politicians, and 
economists too, tend to overestimate the political strength and 
importance of the "preserve- the- agricultural-community- at-all 
consts" argument. This in turn stems from an underestimate of the 
economic rationality of farmers. Certainly, for example, in the 
important grain-growing areas of Vvestern Canada the farmers 
themselves realize that it is only the efficient, large-acreage 
farmer that is going to survive and that those who do not adjust to 
changing conditions will not. They, and their offspring and bro-
thers who have migrated to the cities, are often more incensed by 
the abuses that they must face as consumers than the adjustments 
that must be made on the farms to altered circumstances there . 
The foregoing comments regarding Japan are also relevant to 
some extent to the United States. She too would benefit somewhat 
from the removal of the British preferential system insofar as it 
affected trade among Australia, New Zealand, and Canada and be...: 
tween these countries and the United Kingdom. She would also ex-
perience some adverse effect upon her trade balance by the exten-
sion of preferences to the LDC 1 s. And her imports would increase 
to the extent that quotas on Japanese products and agricultural 
protectionism in all its forms were eliminated . Her trade balance 
might worsen slightly if these factors were allowed for quantitative-
ly. Only if there were reduced capital outflows would she avoid 
adding to her present balance of payments difficulties . While some 
reduction of capital outflows might occur vis-a-vis Canada, out-
flows to Japan and possibly Australia or New Zealand would un-
doubtedly expand; so little net gain could be expected from this 
source. The domestic adjustment required by the adverse trade 
balance resulting from PAFTA, relative to total production, is of 
course pretty insignificant. Internationally, a worsened trade 
picture by several hundred millions, while small in relative terms, 
would be viewed with more apprehension. Hence no free trade 
agreement promising such results is likely to be greeted with much 
zeal by the U.S. authorities. They are likely to have interest only 
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in some larger agreement consisting of their other important mar-
kets-- EFTA and/or the EEc.32 
Australia and New Zealand would be the main beneficiaries 
of the reduction in agricultural protectionism in Japan and the 
United States. Also, New Zealand would benefit by lowered govern-
ment assistance to the Australian dairy industry. If the devalua-
tion has not been sufficient, she might in turn find her manufacturing 
facing important new challenges from the removal of the present im-
port quotas as well as tariffs. But presumably her citizens, and 
those of Australia too, will be better off, both as consumers and as 
producers, from the spur to improved productivity that would come 
through the elimination of protected markets at home. A shakedown 
in management and economies of scale could hopefully be realized. 
More aggressive selling abroad will also be necessary, however, 
not only for manufactures but also for agricultural goods. 33 
Canada 1 s position appears unequivocally better than under 
any previous estimates of PAFTA, primarily because of the inter-
pretation given to trade creation effects in this paper. But the 
improved trade balance may be reduced a little as preferences are 
extended to the LDC' s in PAFT A and de facto quotas on imports 
from J apan and Hong Kong are eliminated. Also her full balance of 
payments position may not be as favourable as intimated by pure 
trade effects. She probably will face some reduction in capital 
inflows from the United States as free trade permits servicing of 
the Canadian market from U.S. plants. 
A final comment is necessary regarding the new dynamic 
theories of trade in relation to the impact o: any free trade pro-
posal for the Pacific area . In addition to the possibility of achiev-
ing economies of scale in production, there are other economies 
often important in the location of production and hence in the direc-
tion of trade flows. V\lhere research and development into new 
products and processes is a vital source of trade advantage, such 
32 This is subject to the qualification in the final paragraph of this 
paper. 
33 To illustrate, of the 150 pounds of meats consumed per capita 
in Canada in 1 967, only 3 pounds were lamb and mutton. In 
fact, it is only on rare occasions that one can buy lamb or mut-
ton in the stores, and then it is generally of very low quality. 
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worl{ frequently can be undertaken only by the most financially 
powerful firms--frequently American owned. Production will gen-
erally take place, at least initially, in the large home market a reas 
where there is an abundance of specialized services. 34 Even if in 
the course of a product cycle low wage trade were to replace tech-
nological gap trade, New Zealand, Australia and Canada likely 
would not be the new production locations. Rather, Japan or a 
less developed nation would be favoured. Also, regardless of 
which country innovates or which one has slightly favourable pro-
duction cost advantages, the pull of the large concentrated markets 
may often be the deciding factor in production location. There are 
advantages to locating production near the centres where purchases 
are greatest both so that quick overnight deliveries are possible 
and so that follow-up consulting or repair services may be rendered 
easily. These dynamic considerations then, would tend to make the 
U . S. position, and possibly the Japanese one too, more favoun:_'.)~2 
in the event of free trade than the above static computations sug-
gest. T he benefits to New Zealand, Australia and Canada might 
accordingly be reduced. 
34 The important reference on these ideas is R. Vernon, "Inter-
national Investment and International Trade in the Product 
Cycle", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXX (May , 
1966) pp. 190-207. 
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APPENDIX A 
STANDARD INTERNATIONAL TRADE CLASSIFICATION 
COMMODITY DIVISIONS, 
GROUPS AND SUBGROUPS DISTINGUISHED 
1) Crude Foodstuffs and Feed: 
oo, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 121. 
2) Processed Foodstuffs and Feed: 
01 ' 02, 03, 111 , 11 2, 1 22. 
3) Crude Materials: 
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21 , 22, 231 • 1 ' 231. 3' 231 • 4, 24 1 , 244, 26' 27' 28' 29' 
32, 331, 34, 35, 41. 
4) Semi-Manufactures (non-food): 
242, 243, 251' 42, 43, 61, 62, 631-633, 661-664, 671 
672, 681-689. 
5) Finished-Manufactures and Chemicals: 
231.2, 332, 51..:59, 641.1, 641.2-641.9, 642, 651-657, 
665-667, 673-679, 691-698, 711-899. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A-4 
SHARES OF IMPORTS OF EACH PAFTA COUNTRY COMING FROM THE OTHER PAFTA 
COUNTRIES, BY COMMODITY DIVISION, AFTER USING ADJUSTMENT FOR THE l 
KENNEDY ROUND AND NEW ZEALAND DEVALUATIONS, USING MEDIUM ELASTICITIES 
FOR 1966 
Importing 
Source of Imports 
Division New United Total Country Zealand Australia Canada Javan States PAFTA 
New 1 75 .0 0 0 25 . 0 100.0 
Zealand 2 13 , 9 58.8 22.8 4.4 100 .0 
3 28 . 4 17 . 7 4.2 49,7 100 .0 
4 54 . 2 28.0 2.1 15 . 6 100.0 
5 42 . 6 8 . 6 18 . 9 29 . 9 100 .0 
AVERAGE 44 . 9 11.3 14 . 1 29.6 100 .0 
Australia 1 14 . 5 2. 5 3 . 5 79 . 5 100.0 
2 12.3 16.8 50.4 20.5 100 .0 
3 8 . 7 28 . 4 9 , 7 53 . 2 100 . 0 
4 11.1 23 . 3 24 .0 41.5 100 .0 
5 2.7 6 . 8 . 24 . 7 65 . 8 100 .0 
AVERAGE 4.0 8 . 9 23 . 8 63 . 3 100 .0 
Canada 1 o.o 5 , 7 1.1 93 . 2 100 . 0 
2 5.0 20 . 2 6 . 3 68 . 5 100 .0 
3 1.8 2. 1 . 4 95 . 7 100 .0 
4 .o . 2 3 . 8 96 .0 100. 0 
5 .o .0 3, 9 96 .0 100 . 0 
AVERAGE . 2 . 8 3 . 4 95 , 5 100 .0 
Japan 1 . 2 9 .0 15 . 9 74 , 9 100 .0 
2 35 . 9 35 , 5 5 , 5 23 . 1 100 .0 
3 2. 8 32 . 7 11.3 53 . 3 100 . 0 
4 3. 6 4. 6 21.1 70 . 6 100 . 0 
5 1.1 2.4 4 . 1 92 . 4 100 .0 
AVERAGE 2. 8 16 . 9 11.3 69 . 0 100 . 0 
United 1 . • 7 12 . 3 75 . 0 12 . l 100 .0 
States 2 13 . 7 27 . 4 46 . 4 12 . 4 100 .0 
3 6 . 3 8 . 2 81.6 3,9 100 . 0 
4 .o 1.8 85 . 7 12 . 5 100 .0 
5 1.5 . 6 49 . 8 48 . 1 100 .0 
AVERAGE 2. 7 4 .0 60 . 2 . 33.1 100. 0 
Notes : 1 Percentages are. roughly similar before adjustment for 
Kennedy Round and New Zealand devaluations . 
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APPENDIX TABLE A-5 
FIRST APPROXIMATION TO STATIC TRADE- CREATION EFFECTS OF PAFTA, IN 
VALUE TERMS 
(millions of S US) 
(A) HIGH ELASTICITIES 
New United 
Zealand Australia Canada Japan States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 4.0 .3 24.6 96.8 125. 7 
M 16.9 3.8 15 . 2 25.3 61.2 
X-M -12.9 "~·5 +9-4 +71.5 +64.5 
Australia x 16.9 2.9 41.2 63.1 124.1 
M 4.0 22 . 4 160.3 392.5 579.2 
X-M +12.9 -19.5 -119.1 - 329.4 - 455.1 
Canada x 3.8 22.4 34.6 574 . 0 634.8 
M .3 2.9 75 .1 1109.0 1187 .3 
X-M +3.5 +19.5 -40.5 -535.0 - 552. 5 
Japan x 15.2 160 . 3 75.1 1363 . 5 1614 . 1 
M 24.6 41.2 34.6 499 .4 589.8 
X-M -9-4 +119.1 +40.5 +874 . 1 +1024. 3 
United States X 25.3 392.5 1109.0 489.4 2016.2 
M 96.8 63.1 574.0 1363.5 2097 .4 
X-M - 71.5 +329-4 +535°0 - 874.1 -81.2 
PAFTA x 4515 .0 
(B) MEDIUM ELASTICITIES 
New United 
Zealand Australia Canada Japan States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 2.2 .2 11.0 45.5 59.9 
M 14.5 3.2 13.5 21.9 53.1 
X-M -12.3 -3.0 -2.5 +23 . 6 +5.8 
Australia x 14.5 1.6 21.6 34.8 72.5 
M 2.2 14. 7 105 . 8 259.9 381.6 
X-M +12.3 -13. 1 - 84.2 -224.1 -309.1 
Canada x 3.2 14. 7 19.5 340.4 377 .8 
M .2 1.6 48.4 706 . 2 756.4 
X-M +3.0 +13.1 -28 . 9 - 365 .4 - 378.6 
Japan x 13.5 105 .8 48 . 4 836.4 1004.1 
M 11.0 21.6 19.5 293.8 345.9 
X-M +2.5 +84.2 +28.9 +542.6 +658.2 
United States X 21.9 258.9 706.2 293.8 1280.8 
M 45 . 5 34.8 340 . 4 836.4 1257 .1 
X-M -23 . 6 +224.1 +365.A -542 .6 +23. 7 
PAFTA 2795 . 0 
(c) LOW ELASTICITIES 
New United 
Zealand Australia Canada Japan States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 1.0 .1 4.7 16.9 22.7 
M 9.0 2.0 8.4 13 . 6 33.0 
X-M -8.0 -1.9 -3· 7 +3 . 3 -10.3 
Australia x 9.0 .8 10.6 11.1 37 .5 
M 1.0 7.4 52.2 130.3 190.9 
X-M +8.0 -6.6 -41.6 -113.2 -153.4 
Canada x 2.0 7.4 9.6 160.9 179.9 
M . 1 .8 23.7 345.8 370.4 
X-M +1.9 +6.6 -14.1 -184.9 -190. 5 
Japan x 8.4 52.2 23. 7 387.6 471.9 
M 4. 7 10.6 9.6 139-3 164.2 
X-M +3. 7 +41.6 +14.1 +307. 7 
United States X 13.6 130.3 345.8 139°3 629 . 0 
M 16.9 17.1 160.9 397.6 582.5 
X-M -3.3 +113. 2 +184.9 -248-3 +46.5 
PAFTA 1340.0 
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APPENDIX TABLE A-6 
TOTAL STATIC TRADE CREATION EFFECTS OF PAFTA, IN PERCENTAGE 
RATES OF INCREASE BASED ON ADJUSTED1 1966 TRADE 
(A) HIGH ELASTICITIES 
New United 
Zealand Australia Canada Japan States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 38.4 6. 7 34.2 43.2 40.0 
M 48.1 46.2 94.3 68.4 60.1 
Australia x 48.l 9.4 10.9 29,7 20.3 
M 38.4 56. 7 99.3 93.6 89.3 
Canada x 46.2 56. 7 14.9 27 .2 26 . 9 
M 6.7 9.4 34.5 20.3 20. 7 
Japan x 94 . 3 99.3 34.5 63.5 64.6 
M 34 . 2 10.9 14.9 30.6 25. 7 
United States X 68.4 93.6 20.3 30.6 29.0 
M 43.2 29. 7 27 .2 63.5 40.1 
PAFTA 34,5 
(B) MEDIUM ELASTICITIES 
New United 
Zealand Australia Canada Japan States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 25.8 3.8 19.3 27 .o 24.2 
M 30.3 28.4 58 .l 44,5 38.2 
Australia x 30.3 5.0 5 .8 16 .2 11. 7 
M 25.8 35.8 64.0 60.4 57. 7 
Canada x 28 . 4 35.8 8.5 16.4 16.3 
M 3.8 5.0 22.8 13 . 2 13. 4 
Japan x 58.1 64.0 22.8 41.4 42.1 
M 19. 3 5.8 8.5 18.7 15.4 
United States X 44.5 60.4 13.2 18. 7 18.6 
M 27 .o 16.2 16-.4 41.4 25.0 
PAFTA 21.5 
(c) LOW ELASTICITIES 
New United 
Zealand Australia Canada Japan States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 13. 7 1.5 8.9 13.2 11. 7 
M 14.8 14. 2 28.0 22.2 18.9 
Australia x 14.8 2.4 2.8 7.9 6.2 
M 13. 7 17 .6 31.2 29.8 28.5 
Canada x 14.2 17 .6 4.1 7 .8 7.7 
M 1.5 2.4 11.4 6.5 6.7 
Japan x 28.0 31.2 11.4 20.4 20.8 
M 8.9 2.8 4.1 8.9 7 .3 
United States X 22 .2 29.8 6.5 8.9 9.2 
M 13.2 7.9 7.8 20.4 12.0 
PAFTA l0.5 
Notes : 1. Adjusted for Kennedy Round and New Zealand Devaluation. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A-7 
TOTAL STATIC TRADE CREATION EFFECTS OF PAFTA, BY COUNTRY 
(Millions on us) 
(A) HIGH ELASTICITIES 
New Zealand Australia Canada Japan United States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 21.0 .9 44.9 144 .2 211.0 
M 53.9 13.4 31.2 50.5 149.0 
X-M -32 .9 -12.5 +13 .7 +93-7 +62.0 
Australia x 53 . 9 5.1 75.3 122.2 256.5 
M 21.0 62.4 292.4 731. 7 1107 .5 
X-M +32.9 -57·3 -217 .1 -609.5 -851.0 
Canada x 13 . 4 62.4 68. 7 1673 .0 1817 .5 
M .9 5~1 a4.9 1350. 6 1441.5 
X-M +12.5 +57°3 -16.2 +322.4 +376.0 
Japan x 31.2 292.4 84.9 2244.9 2653 .4 
M 44.9 75,3 68. 7 a77.o 1065.9 
X-M -13.7 +217 .1 +16 . 2 +1367 .9 +1587 . 5 
United States X 50.5 731. 7 1350.6 877 .0 3009.a 
M 144.2 122 .2 1673.0 2244.9 4194,3 
X-M -93· 7 +609.5 -322.4 -1367 .9 -1174-5 
PAFTA 794a .o 
(B) MEDIUM ELASTICITIES 
New Zealand Australia Canada Japan United States PAFTA 
New Zealand x .5 21.8 71. 7 106.6 
M lo;o 25.5 40.9 118 .5 
X-M -9-5 -3· 7 +30.8 ·-11.9 
Australia x 42.2 2. 7 39.3 64.9 149.1 
M 12.6 39.3 188.4 472.4 712.7 
X-M +29.6 -36.6 -149.1 -407 .5 -563. 6 
Canada x 10.0 39.3 38.8 989.8 1077 .9 
M . 5 2 . 7 54.6 959. 7 917 .5 
X-M +9 °5 +36 . 6 -15.8 +130 . 1 +160.4 
Japan x 25.5 188.4 54.6 1368.0 1636.5 
M 21.8 39.3 38.8 521.0 620 . 9 
X-M +3°7 +149 . 1 +15.s +847 .0 +1015 .6 
United States X 40 . 9 472.4 959. 7 521.0 1894 .0 
M 71. 7 64.9 989.8 1368.0 2494.5 
X-M -30.8 +407 .5 -130.1 -847 .0 -600.5 
PAFTA 4864.1 
(c) LOW ELASTICITIES 
New Zealand Australia Canada Japan United States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 6.0 .2 9.1 29.0 44.3 
M 24.5 5.a 15 .2 24.2 69.s 
X-M -18 .5 -5 .6 -6.1 +4.8 -25.5 
Australia x 24.5 1.3 19 . 1 31.2 76 .1 
M 6.0 19.3 91.9 232.8 350.0 
X-M +18.5 -18.0 -72 . 8 -201.6 -273.9 
Canada x 5.s 19.3 18.8. . 460.0 503 . 9 
M .2 1. 3 26. 7 420.s 449.0 
X-M +5.6 +18 .0 -7 .9 +39.2 +54 -9 
Japan x 15.2 91.9 26. 7 630.6 764.4 
M 9.1 19 . 1 18.8 243.3 290.3 
X-M +6.1 +72.8 +1 .9 +387 .3 +474.1 
United States X 24.2 232.8 420.a 243.3 921.1 
M 29.0 31.2 460.0 630.6 1150.a 
X-M -4.8 +201.6 -39.2 -387. 3 -229. 7 
PAFTA 2309.B 
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APPENDIX TABLE A-9 
TRADE DIVERSION EFFECTS OF PAFTA BY COUNTRY 
(millions of $ us) 
(I) Elasticity of Subs ti tut ion = 1 
(A) High Import Demand Elasticities 
New Zealand Australia Canada Japan United States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 3.3 .1 2.8 18.6 24.0 
M 9.4 2.0 4.2 7.7 23.3 
X-M -6.1 -1.9 -1.4 +10.9 +1.5 
Australia x 9.4 1.1 16 . 2 15.6 42.3 
M 3.3 12.0 46.1 108.9 170.3 
X-M +6.1 -10.9 -29.9 -93 -3 -128.0 
Canada x 2.0 12 .0 11.7 135-4 161.l 
M .1 1.1 10.6 107.0 119.7 
X-M +l.9 +10.9 +1.1 +27.6 +41.4 
Japan x 4.2 46 . 1 10 . 6 180.5 241.4 
M 2.8 16.2 11.7 95.2 125.9 
X-M +l.4 +29.9 -1.1 +a5.3 +115 . 5 
United States X 7.7 108.9 107 .8 95.2 319.6 
M 18.6 15.6 135-4 180.5 350.1 
X-M -10.9 +93-3 -27.6 -85.3 -30.5 
PAFTA 709.3 
(B) Medium Import Demand Elasticities 
New Zealand Australia Canada Japan United States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 3.0 .1 2.4 15.1 20.6 
M 11.3 2.4 5.2 9.3 20.3 
X-M -8.3 -2.3 -2.8 +5 .8 -1.1 
Australia x 11.3 1.1 16.1 15.4 43.9 
M 3.0 11. 7 44.9 105.9 165.5 
X-M +8.3 -10.6 -28.8 -90.5 -121.6 
Canada x 2.4 11. 7 11.6 128.0 153- 7 
M .1 1.1 10.3 103 . 9 115.4 
X-M +2.3 +10.6 +1.3 +24 . 1 +38.3 
Japan x 5.2 44.9 l0.3 165.8 226.2 
M 2.4 16.1 11.6 91.4 121.5 
X-M +2.8 +28.8 -1.3 +14:4 +104. 7 
United States X 9.3 105.9 103.9 91.4 310.5 
M 15.1 15.4 128 .0 165.0 324.3 
X-M -5.8 +90.5 -24.1 - 74 -4 -13.8 
PAFTA 754.9 
(c) Low Import Demand Elasticities 
New Zealand Australia Canada Japan United States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 2.8 . 1 2.1 12.4 17.4 
M 13 .1 2. 7 6.2 10.8 32. 7 
X-M -10.3 -2.6 -4.1 +1.6 -15.3 
Australia x 13.1 1.1 16 .o 15.3 45.5 
M 2.8 11.4 43. 7 102.8 160.6 
X-M +10.3 -10.3 -27. 7 -87-5 -115.1 
Canada x 2.7 11.4 11.5 121.3 146.9 
M .1 1.1 9.9 100.2 111.3 
X-M +2.6 +10.3 +1.6 +21.l +35.6 
Japan x 6.2 43. 7 9.9 151. 7 211.5 
M 2.1 16.0 11.5 87 .9 117.5 
X-M +4.1 +27. 7 -1.6 +6).8 +94.0 
United States X 10 .8 102 . 8 100.2 07.9 301. 7 
M 12.4 15. 3 121.3 151. 7 300.7 
X-M -1.6 +87 .5 -21.l -63.0 +1.0 
PAFTA 723.0 
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APPENDIX TABLE A-9 (continued) 
(II) Elasticity of Subs ti tut ion = 2 
(A) High Import Demand Elasticities 
New Zealand Australia Canada Japan United States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 6.9 .2 5.5 37 .8 50.4 
M 19.4 4.1 8.8 15.8 48.1 
X-M -12.5 -3-9 -3. 3 +22 . 0 +2.3 
Australia x 19.4 2.3 33. 5 31.4 86.6 
M 6.9 24 . 8 95.4 226.9 354.0 
X-M +12.5 -22.5 -61.9 -195.5 -267 .4 
Canada x 4.1 24.8 23.1 272 . 4 324.4 
M .2 2 . 3 21.2 210.0 233.6 
X-M +3 .9 +22.5 +1.9 +62.4 +90.8 
Japan x 8.8 95.4 21.2 367 .3 492. 7 
M 5 .5 33. 5 23.1 186.4 248.5 
X-M +3. 3 +61.9 -1.9 +180.9 +244.2 
United States X 15 .8 226.9 210 . 0 186.4 639.1 
M 37 .8 31.4 272 . 4 367 . 3 708.9 
X-M -22.0 +195. 5 -62 . 4 -180.9 -69.8 
PAFTA 1593 .0 
(B) Medium Import Demand Elasticities 
New Zealand Australia Canada Japan United States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 6.2 .2 4. 7 30.9 42.0 
M 23.3 4.8 11.0 19.0 58.0 
X-l: -17 .1 -4.6 -6.3 +11.9 -16.0 
Australia x 23.3 2. 3 33.3 31.1 90.0 
M 6.2 24.1 92.6 219.s 342. 7 
X-M +17 .1 -21.8 -59 -3 -188. 7 -252. 7 
Canada x 4.8 24.1 22.8 257 .6 309,3 
M .2 2 . 3 20.5 202.2 225.2 
X-M +4.6 +21.8 +2.3 +55-4 +84.1 
Japan x 11.0 92 . 6 20.5 337 .2 461.3 
M 4. 7 33 . 3 22.8 178.8 239.6 
X-M +6.3 +59.3 -2.3 +158.4 +221. 7 
United States X 19.0 219.8 202.2 178.8 619.8 
M 30.9 31.1 257 .6 337 .2 656.8 
X-M -11.9 +188. 7 -55 . 4 +158.4 -37 .0 
PAFTA 1522 .4 
(c) Low Import Demand Elasticities 
New Zealand Australia Canada Japan United States PAFTA 
New Zealand x 
~ 
5.7 .2 4.2 25.4 35. 3 
M 26. 7 5.4 12.9 21.9 66.9 
X-M -21.0 -5. 2 -8. 7 +3.5 -31.6 
Australia x 26. 7 2.3 33.2 31.0 93.2 
M 5.7 23. 3 89 . 7 212 .4 331.1 
X-M +21.0 -21.0 -56.5 -181.4 -237 , 9 
Canada x 5.4 23 . 3 22 .6 244.6 295,9 
M .2 2.3 19.8 195.0 217. 3 
X-M +5.2 +21.0 +2 . 8 +49.6 +78.6 
Japan x 12.9 89. 7 19.8 308.5 430.9 
M 4.2 33.2 22.6 171.6 231. 6 
X-M +8. 7 +56.5 -2.8 +136.9 +199.3 
United States X 21.9 212.4 195.0 171.6 600.9 
M 25.4 31. 0 244.6 308.5 609.4 
X-M -3. 5 +181.4 -49.6 -136 .9 -8.5 
PAFTA 1456. 3 
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.APPENDIX TABLE A-10 
SUMMARY OF TRADE DIVERSION EFFECTS OF PAFTA 
(I) Elasticity of Substitutes 1 
Import N.ZEALAND AUSTRALIA CAi."JADA JAPAN USA PAF'TA 
Deman.d 
Elasticities x Ml x2 M x M x M x M x 
A. High 24.8 23.3 42.3 170.3 161.1 119 . 7 241.4 125 . 9 319 . 6 350 . 1 789 . 3 
B.Medium 20.6 28.7 43,9 165.5 153.7 115.4 226.2 121.5 310 . 5 324 . 3 754.9 
C.Low 17 . 4 32.7 45,5 160.6 146. 9 111. 3 211.5 117 . 5 301. 7 300 . 7 723 . 0 
(II) Elasticity of Substitution 2 
A.High 50 . 4 48 . 1 86 . 6 354 . 0 324 . 4 233 . 6 492 . 7 24s . 5 639.1 708.9 1593.l 
B.Medium 42 . 0 58 . 0 90 . 0 342.7 309 . 3 225.2 461.3 239 . 6 619 . 8 656.8 1522.4 
C.Low 35,3 66.9 93.2 331.1 295 . 9 217.3 430 . 9 231.6 600 . 9 609 . 4 1456.3 
Notes: 1. Trade diversion effects are greater. when the medium and low import 
demand elasticities are used because with these elasticities the 
impact of the New Zealand devaluation on that country's imports is 
less and hence the trade diversion computed using the formula in 
Appendix B is less. 
2. Trade diversion effects are greater for the medium and.low import 
demand elasticities because with these elasticities Australian 
exports to New Zealand are reduced less owing to the New Zealand 
devaluation than they are under the higher elasticity. The impact 
is sufficiently great that when carried through all the computations 
it produces the results indicated above . 
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APPENDIX TABLE A-11 
TRADE DIVERSION EFFECTS OF PAFTA BY COMMODITY GROUPS 
(Millions of $ US) 
(I) Elasticity of substitution = 1 and High Import Demand ·Elasticities 
Commodity Groups 
Country Crude Processed Crude Semi - Finished Total 
Foodstuffs Foodstuffs Materials Manufactures Manufactures & Chemicals 
New x .9 7.0 4 . 0 . 8 12.0 24.8 
Zealand M 2.2 . 3 . 8 1. 8 18.2 23.3 
X-M -1.3 +6.7 +3.2 -1.0 -6.2 +1.5 
Australia · x 11. 7 8.4 7.5 4.6 9 . 9 42.1 
M 3.5 3.1 3.3 8. 6 151. 8 170.3 
X-M +8.2 +5°3 +4.2 -4.0 - 141. 9 -128.2 
Canada x 11.1 18.3 26.1 26.8 78.8 161.1 
M 5 . 3 1.8 .9 5.8 105.9 119 . 7 
X-M +5.8 +16.5 +25 . 2 +21.0 -27 .1 +41.4 
Japan x 2.5 6.0 2.3 12 .2 218.0 241.0 
M 48.3 7 . 1 17 .8 9. 7 43.0 125,9 
X-M -45 · 8 -1.1 -15 . 5 +2 .5 +175.0 +115 .1 
United x 43.4 6 . 7 13. 3 15 . 8 240.9 320.1 
States M 10 . 3 33.8 30.6 34 .s 240 . 7 350.1 
X-M +33.1 - 27 . 1 -17 . 3 -19.0 +.2 -30.0 
PAFTA x 69.6 46.4 53.2 60 . 2 559 . 6 789 . 1 
(2) Elasticity of Substitution = 2 and High Import Demand Elasticities 
Commodity Groups 
Country 
Crude Processed Crude Semi- Finished Total 
Foodstuffs Foodstuffs Materials Manufactures Manufactures 
& Chemicals 
New x 1.9 14.1 8.1 l. 8 24.6 50.5 
Zealand M 4.2 • 7 1. 7 3,5 37.9 48.1 
·x-M -2 . 3 +13.4 +6 . 4 -1. 7 -13 .3 +2.4 
Australia x 24.7 17 .1 15.1 9.4 20 . 3 86.6 
M 6.8 6.7 6.6 17. 7 316.1 353 . 9 
X-M +17.9 +10.4 +8 . 5 -8.3 -295. 8 -267. 3 
Canada x 22.2 36.9 52. 7 53.9 158.6 324.3 
M 10.6 3. 7 1. 7 11.4 206.3 233.6 
X-M +11.6 +33.2 +51.0 +42.5 -47 .7 +90. 7 
Japan x 5.3 11.9 4.7 25 . 5 445 . 3 492. 7 
M 92 .3 14.6 35.8 19. 7 86.1 248.5 
X-M -87 .o -2. 7 -31.1 +5.8 +359 . 2 +244.2 
United x 81.0 13. 7 26 . 7 31.8 485 . 5 638. 7 
States M 21.3 68.1 61.6 70.1 487 .9 708.9 
X-!1! +59 · 7 -54.4 -34 . 9 -38.3 -2 .4 -70.2 
PAFTA x 135.1 93. 7 107 .3 122.4 1134 . 3 1592. 8 
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APPENDIX B 
DERIVATION OF FORMULA FOR TRADE DIVERSION EFFECT 
To determine the trade diversion represented by any elastici-
ty of substitution the following derivation was used: For any im-
porting country assume a common world price of imports exclusive 
of the tariff = 1 . Thus the pre-PAFT A domestic price of imports 
from P AFT A countries inclusive of the tariff, or pT' , = 1 + t, where 
t = the ad valorem tariff. The rre- and post-PA FT A domestic 
price of imports from the rest-of-the-world inclusive of the tariff, 
or PR , also = 1 + t . 
Thus PP 1 + t 1 
d(-)=~---
PR I + t 1 + t 
1 + t 
and .PP 'i"'+t + 1+t 
Thus 
PR = 2 
'""'p~-= 
-'- p 
PR 
2 t 
2+t ( 1 ) 
Also, let qp = quantity and also the value of imrorts (since 
Pp = 1) of pre-P AFT A imports from P AFTA nations, 
Thus 
qR = quantity and value of pre-PAFTA imports from non 
PAFTA nations 
and r = the amount by which the quantity of imports from 
PAFTA increase and from the rest-of-the-world 
decrease owing to PAFTA. 
A RE- ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECTS 
and 
T hus 
qp + r qp 
- --+--
qp qR - r qR 
qR = 2 
d(qp) 
·qR 
qp 
qR 
2qPqR + r(qR - qp) 
= 2(qR - r) qR 
(2) 
and substituting (1) and (2) into the formula for the elasticity of 
substitution, d( qp) 
qR 
e = 
qp 
qR 
and solving for r, we obtain 
2etqPqR 
r = qR(2 + t - et) + qp/2 + t +et) (3) 
95 
P:resumably a formu la something l ike this is what H . Cowie and M. 
Stamp used in their study, The Free Trade Area Option : Opportu-
nity for Britai n , The Atlantic Trade Study, (London: Moor House, 
1967) , although it i s not made clear what was done. Certainly it is 
not valid to u se an e lasticity of substitution as though it were an im-
port p rice elasticity as Kreinan appears to do in Alternative Com-
mercial Policies ... , pp . 60- 61 . 
96 BRUCE W. WILKINSON 
COMlVlENT ON PROFESSOR WILKINSON'S PAPER BY PROFES-
SOR McDOUGALL 
It is my pleasure to comment on Dr. Wilkinson's paper. I 
should like to start by complimenting him on the workmanlike way 
he has set about an arduous research project. He has set out his 
assumptions clearly and in an admirable manner returns to his as-
sumptions and to their limitations when interpretating his results. 
I want to comment briefly on some of these assumptions. In 
my O!.)inion he has achieved a considerable improvement upon ear-
lier estimates of trade creation and trade diversion by recognizing 
that the values of the total import demand elasticities used pre-
viously understated the values of the elasticities which are relevant 
to the analysis of tariff changes which occur only within the PAFTA 
group of countries. 
In making allowance for this fact, however, he is forced to 
make somewhat arbitrary estimates of those imports of a country 
which as a result of product differentiation would not be available 
from other countries within the PAFTA group. In the case of these 
imports the elasticity of supply of the PAFTA countries is assumed 
to be zero. But he needs also assume that the remaining imrorts of 
the country concerned are in perfectly elastic supply in the open 
PAFTA countries. These are severe assumptions. I am not happy 
that sui:;ply elasticities should be zero for one group of imports and 
infinitely elastic for all others. There may be some justification 
for this assumption in the case of the U.S.A. - less so in the cas_e 
of countries such as Australia and New Zealand. Dr. Wilkinson is, 
of course, well aware of the limitations these assumptions place 
u-r.on his analysis. 
Imrort demand elasticities are, of course, best used in com-
puting reactions to small price changes. In this case where the 
magnitude of the changes in imports and exports is so large I cannot 
but feel that the result of free trade would be to alter considerably 
the cost structure, particularly of countries such as Australia and 
New Zealand. To this extent both the resulting rattern of trade and 
the 'nagnitude of effects would be modified. 
Care also needs be exercised in making use of elasticities 
derived f rom U.S.A. experience and in applying these elasticities, 
which hold fo:r broadly aggregated groups of commodities in the 
U.S. , to the same broadly aggr egated but differently weighted 
groul_'.)s in other countries. For instance, Dr. Wilkinson gives a 
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range of estimates for the Japanese import demand for crude mate-
rials which range between -0.48 - 0.1. Yet wool, a crude material, 
is the major export of both Australia and New Zealand and a number 
of studies have shown the elasticity of demand for it to be consider-
ably in excess of unity. 
Bearing the limitations of these assumptions in mind - and 
Dr. Vvilkinson has performed exceedingly well within the constraints 
imrosed by them - several points can be made. 
First, the results in Table 7 indicate that the gains from trade 
creation would considerably exceed losses due to trade diversion 
not only for the area as a whole but for each of its individual mem-
bers. Although these results hold only for the high elasticity 
estimates other results not included in the paper indicate that a 
similar conclusion holds in the case of the medium and low elastic-
ity cases, 
A9art, however, from subsequent dynamic reactions to the 
establishment of free trade, the possible cost of necessary balance 
of payments adjustments needs also be considered. In the case of 
Australia the projected 6% deficit is a large one - equal as a pro-
portion to 3 . 6% of G. N. P. The possible deterioration in Australia's 
terms of trade required to eliminate this deficit could involve a 
substantial real income loss. 
Dr. Wilkinson's paper also emphasizes the difficulty of pre-
dicting with accuracy the likely impact of free trade upon the 
various members of the PAFTA group . Apart from other factors 
the range of elasticity coefficients used yield estimates of trade 
creation effects which vary by several hundred percent in the case 
of all countries. In these circumstances, it is unlfa:ely that the 
governments concerned would accept the establishment of free 
trade when so l ittle is known about the likely consequences of it 
upon income d i stribution; employment and real income in their re-
spective economies. 
Let me close with a number of minor observations. I would 
query the estimated effects of New Zealand's devaluation upon her 
1 q66 trade figures . Casual observation of the subsequent -reac-
tions to the devaluation suggests that the elasticity estimates ap-
plied by Dr . Wilkinson to the New Zealand case are much too low . 
I fully agree with Professor Wilkinson's remarks on Japanese 
agriculture but with the Chairman and Dr . Wilkinson's permission 
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discussion of this issue may be best left until the next session as 
it is discussed in my own and Professor Castle's papers. 
A related point is that he sees the problem of manufacturing 
industry in New Zealand and Australia as a more intractable one 
than that posed by Japanese agriculture. He argues that the manu-
facturing sections in New Zealand and Australia involve a larger 
share of each nation 1 s labour force and a larger share of their 
voting population than does the agricultural section in Japan. I 
would l ike to make two comments. First, only a small portion of 
manufacturing industry in Australia and New Zealand is protected . 
Secondly, the proportion of the workforce engaged in manufacturing 
in these countries is only slightly larger than is the proportion of 
the workforece engaged in agriculture in Japan. 
Finally, ][ would argue that Dr. Wilkinson underestimates the 
social and political factors involved in the agricultural problem in 
a number of communities when he contends that "politicians and 
economists too, tend to overestimate the political strength and im-
portance of the agricultural sector." 
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COMMENT ON PROFESSOR VvILKINSON' S P APER BY PROFES-
SOR JOHNSON 
H is always a pleasure for an economic theorist like myself to 
read a piece of empirical research that has been carefully executed 
in detail, and guided at every step by critical knowledge of the re-
levant theory . Professor Vvilkinson' s past work has established 
him as an expert in t his line of business, and the present paper 
conforms to that high s tandard; it is both a contribution to our un-
derstanding of the likely effects of PAFTA on trade volumes and 
pattern s, and a contribution to the technology of estimates of this 
kind. 
Let me take the technical contribution first. Estimates of 
this kind, relying on the empirical work that has been done in es-
timating elasticities of various kinds in international trade, typi-
cally proceed in two steps . First, an overall demand elasticity is 
used to determine the trade creation effect . As Professor 
Wilkinson implies, this procedure has frequently been followed 
blindly, without thinking through its theoretical implications. Spe-
cifically, he notes that the overall elasticity of world demand for 
exports is usually assumed to apply to the exports of an individual 
country, whereas elementary theory tells us that the elasticity of 
demand for an individual producer is overall elasticity divided by 
his share of the market. (This is on the assumption that quantities 
supplied by other producers remain constant.) Professor Vvilkinson' s 
new contribution is to notice this discrepancy between theory and 
practice, and to attempt to make a reasonable approximation for 
that part of the increased world demand for the product class as a 
whole, consequent on a price fall, that might be supplied by the 
individual supplier country when the tariff on its exports is elimi-
nated in one market. In addition, I should remark, he has clari-
fied the concept and application of elasticity of substitution in the 
context of the trade diversion effect. 
][n my view, Professor Wilkinson has called our attention to 
a real problem in our techniques of estimation, which arises from 
our assumption that in aggregate world trade a commodity classifi-
cation supplied by several countries can be treated as homogeneous, 
for purposes of demand analysis, but that in the analysis of devalu-
ation and discriminatory tariff reduction, national suppliers should 
be treated as imperfect competitors, an assumption embodied in a 
non-infinite elasticity of substitution . 
Professor V\!ilkinson 1 s procedure involves taking the homo-
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geneity assumption seriously, by assuming that the price reduction 
implicit in a preferential tariff elimination generates the same in-
crease in demand as an across-the-board price reduction, and then 
correcting this assumption in the light of the second assumption 
mentioned, that countries cannot supply perfect substitutes for all 
of each other's products. This is a defensible solution to the prob-
lem, though it poses another problem of consistency between the 
assumption of modified homogeneity used in this part of the estima-
tion procedure and the assumption of heterogeneity used in the esti ... 
mation of trade diversion. But I am not entirely satisfied with it, 
and would like to venture two remarks in that connection . 
The first is that there is a need to rethink from first princi-
ples, without regard to the form that existing estimates in inter-
national trade have taken, what the relevant elasticities should be .. 
For this purpose, it woul:d seem to me most appropriate to regard 
each country 1 s goods as differentiated from those of the others, 
and to consider the substitution part of the elasticity of demand for 
them in a particular market to be made up of a sum of substitutions 
against domestic goods and against foreign rivals, the former ex-
pressing trade creation and the latter expressing trade diversion 
possibilities. 
The second remark is an attempt to recapture something I 
worked out in connection with a review, written in 1963 and pub-
lished in 1964 in the Review of Economics and Statistics and not to 
hand now, of the Brookings group's study of the U. S. balance of 
payments in 1968. If we assume that the aggregates of commodity 
classifications are meaningful, we should treat their components 
not as homogeneous but as a bundle of complements, the demand for 
which depends on the average price of the bundle . On this basis, 
a reduction in the price of the supply from one source, due to 
devaluation or preferential tariff reduction, will reduce the average 
price of the bundle by the proportional price reduction of the com-
ponent multiplied by the share of the component in the total. If we 
then multiply the average pric·e reduction by the elasticity of de-
mand for the component (overall elasticity divided by component 
share) we arrive back at the overall elasticity multiplied by the 
proportional price reduction of the component as the correct meas-
ure of the trade-creating increase in demand for the supply from 
the component . In other words, the overall demand elasticity, not 
the elasticity of demand for the component only, is the correct 
parameter to use, and the standard pre- Wilkinson procedure is the 
correct one to apply on the trade-creation side. However, the 
assumption of complementarity then is inconsistent with the assump-
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tion of substitutability employed on the trade diversion side. Con-
sequently, the matter cannot be left as it stands. As already men-
tioned, I am not satisfied that our procedures of aggregating na-
tional supplies for purposes of demand elasticity analysis, and dis-
aggregating again for purposes of substitution analysis, reflect 
basic economic behavioural relationships rather than mere statis-
tical response to the way the data are presented to us. 
Turning to Professor Wilkinson 1 s specific estimates, these 
turn out in broad terms more or less as expected: the countries 
which are in a position to export manufactures to the United States 
(Canada and Japan) are predicted to gain trade on balance substan-
tially while those with protected high-wage manufacturing (the 
U.S.A. and Australia) are predicted to lose trade on balance 
("gain" and "loss" referring to the overall trade balance), these 
predictions reflect in large part the much higher elasticities of de-
mend assumed for manufactures than for other categories of traded 
goods; the use of elasticity estimates to predict the effects of major 
changes in trade policy may be suspect, for example because free 
trade might enable producers of primary products to extend into the 
production of manufactures based on those products as inputs. In 
this connection an analysis in terms of effective rather than nominal 
protection might be useful, though as research has shown the meas-
urement of effective protection is extremely difficult to carry 
through with reasonable accuracy. 
Jin his final section Professor Wilkinson deals with some qual-
itative considerations, and particularly the dynamics of industrial 
location and the exploitation of technology. These considerations 
suggest that Canada, Australia and :New Zealand will do less well 
than the static analysis indicates, since industry in the area will 
tend to agglomerate in the largest industrial complexes. In the 
case of Canada, the argument is somewhat inconsistent with the 
findings of R. J. and Paul Wonnacott, in their study of the c onsequ-
ences of free trade between Canada and the United States, that the 
Niagara peninsula has substantial locational advantages in relation 
to the United States market. Of course, how far the agglomerative 
tendencies in industry associated with the production and marketing 
of new technologically based products would operate in a Pacific 
Free Trade Area would depend in part on how far the agreement 
dealt effectively with non-tariff interventions in international trade 
and on how firmly the agreement was expected to endure. 
Chapter 4 
ASIAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND PAFTA: 
DEVELOPMENT, AID AND TRADE PREFERENCES 
Kiyoshi Kojima 
I. A New Stage in the North-South Problems 
The second United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD) at New Delhi in February-March, 1968, ended 
with frustration and disappointment for the developing countries. 1 
This was not surprising since it was held at a very unfavourable 
time when the developed countries were involved in difficulties of 
their own such as the devaluation of sterling, the gold crisis, and 
a rising tide of restrictive and protectionist foreign trade and aid 
policies in the United States. The main positive achievement of 
the conference was an agreement to proceed with the establishment 
of a "General System of Preferences" for developing country ex-
ports of manufactures, to be worked out in the course of 1968-69 
and, hopefully , implemented in 1 970. 
P_n important question arises. How effective is a global ap-
proach to the North-South problem likely to be? It is doubtful 
whether a multi-country meeting of this scale can substitute for 
more intensive negotiations between a small number of countries. 
The problems raised by the persistence of the basic cleavages of 
interests both within and between the two groups of developed and 
less developed countries are multiplied by more than the number of 
countries involved. 2 
Even if agreement could be reached, concessions are likely to be 
severely limited and of nominal value. It is urgently necessary to 
formulate a more effective and constructive approach to the prob-
lem. A regional approach in which like-minded countries, from 
both the developed and less developed group, endeavour to foster 
trade and development among themselves seems more promissing. 
UNCTAD, The Si nificance of the Second Session of UNCTAD, 
report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, TD 96, 
7 May 1968. 
2 See, for example, David Howell, "Failure at UNCTAD Il," 
The Round Table, July 1968, pp . 249-253. 
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However, a regional approach can not be a substitute for a global 
approach to development problems. Rather, it represents an ef-
fective step towards the global approach. 
Currently, the North-South problem seems to be facing a 
turning point: there is a shift in emphasis from aid and trade ex-
pansion of a "vent- for-surplus" type to that of a "structural adjust-
ment" type. 
In the last decade, less developed countries sought as much 
aid as possible from the developed countries. This aid was mainly 
used to provide social overhead capital and to fill in the gap in the 
trade balance incurred by accelerated imports of capital equipment. 
In short, it was not really directed towards increasing exports. 
However, foreign substantial debts have accumulated in.many de -
veloping countries and repayments and service charges surpass 
new borrowings. Thus, in addition to increased aid and a softening 
of terms of aid, the expansion of exports from developing countries 
is an urgent task . 
Since economic development in many developing countries has 
been confined to investment of the "infrastructural" type and the 
establishment of import- substituting industries, exports have con-
tinued to consist mainly of traditional primary products . These 
exnorts have suffered from a declining importance i n total world 
trade a nd also from severe fluctuation in their prices . Prospects 
for these exports look even worse because of the rapid growth in 
the supply of synthetic substitutes and the world-wide tendency 
towards trade l iberalisation both of which make things even harder 
for t he low- quality, high- cost type of exports of the developing 
countries . 
Thus, developing countries must turn to the expansion of ex-
port- oriented productive activi ties . The expansion of exports , not 
only in speciality tropical goods but also in certain labour-inten-
sive manufactured and semi- manufactured goods , appropriate to 
the factor endowment ratio in developing countries, now seems the 
most promising line of economic development . Developing coun-
tries have to shift the emphasis from receiving aid to the expansion 
of exports, and from agricultur al exports to a structural trans-
formati on of their economies towards the export of manufactures . 
Developed countries should take appropriate measures to 
facilit ate struc t u r a l transformati on in developing countries . 
However, i n t he last decade , developed countri es have confined 
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themselves significantly to providing the vent-for-surplus type aid. 
U.S. aid in the form of surplus agricultural products under Public 
Law 480 is one good example. To take another example, Japanese 
aid has so far been provided mainly for the purpose of increasing 
her own exports of heavy manufactures and chemicals. Japanese 
reparations to Asian countries up to about 1960 were directed to-
wards stimulating the expansion of newly established heavy indus-
tries and at the same time absorbing a large amount of unemployed 
labour. Aid from developed countries has been provided partly 
because there has been surplus produce or surplus capacity in 
resources, and aid has served as the vent for these surpluses. 
Since about 1960, developed countries, including Japan, have 
been subject to more inflationary pressure. Aid of the vent-for-
surplus type could not be continued easily. A new concept of aid 
and new aid policies have become necessary. 
New types of aid and access for the exports of the developing 
countries to the markets of the developed countries should be pro-
vided by means of the structural adjustment of industries in devel-
oped countries. The developed countries would be better off sub-
stituting the production of a number of domestic industries for 
imports from the developing countries. There are certainly some 
"declining" industries in the developed countries which are so old 
and inefficient that, from all the criteria of comparative advantage 
and efficiency in resource allocation, it would be better to 
phase out of existence. Productive resources thus released 
should then be transferred to promising growth industries, effec-
tive demand for the products of which would be increased as a re-
sult of the successful economic development in less developed coun-
tries. Given that full employment is maintained, this sort of struc-
tural adjustment in the developed countries is the only real way to 
increase national incomes. Moreover, only this kind of structural 
adjustment in developed countries could create room for expanding 
exports from developing countries. Structural adjustment on both 
sides is required in order to achieve a "new international division 
of labour" and the better utilization of world resources. 
Recently it was convincingly demonstrated by Hal B. Lary 
that "the ranking of industries by factor intensities is much the 
same from country to country, even from the most developed to the 
least developed. That is to say, the phenomenon of 'factor-inten-
sity reversals 1 seems to be much less common, at least in manu-
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facturing, than some other empirical studies would suggest. 11 3 I 
also have verified the validity of the factor-proportions theorem 
as regards exports of manufactures (74 commodities) from the 
U.S., Canada, Sweden, the U.K., EEC and Japan.4 These 
studies lead to support the conclusion that the potential manufac -
tured exports from less developed countries is promissing, provid-
ed that a receptive and cooperative attitude is adopted by the im-
porting countries and an appropriate export-oriented industrializa-
tion policies suited to their factor endowment s are pursued by the 
less developed countries themselves . "A readiness on both sides 
to share in the international division of labor among countries at 
varying levels of economic development 11 5 would assure success-
ful growth in trade from less-developed to developed countries . 
One of the most important consequences of the validity of the 
factor-proportions theorem is that trade in manufactured goods 
throughout the world should be liberaliZed. This liberalization is 
necessary to maximize world productivity by providing increased 
opportunities for international division of labour in manufacturing 
industries among countries at different stages of economic devel-
opment and pressing factor endowments. This means that advanced 
countries should abolish the protection given to their declining 
labour-intensive industries, as rapidly as possible, transferring 
the production of these goods to less developed countries . To 
achieve "a new international division of labour"6 the growth of 
promising manufacturing industries suited to the factor-proportions 
3 Hal B. Lary, Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed 
Countries, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 
1 968, p. 19. Total value added per employe~ which 
are taken to represent the difference in capital-intensity in 1 3 
industry groups are compared among 9 countries (the U.S . , 
Canada, Australia, Sweden, the U . K., Japan, Brazil, Mexico 
and India) and both Kendall's coefficient of concordance (0 . 853) 
and chi- square test (92.12) are very significant (Ibid., p . 71) 
4 Kiyoshi Kojima, "Comparative Advantage among Industrial 
Countries: A Verification of the Factor-Proportions Theorem, 11 
(forthcoming) . 
5 Hal B . Lary, Ibid . , Preface, p.xv. 
6 Harry G . Johnson, Economic Policies Toward Less Developed . 
Countries . Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C . , 1967, 
pp. 201-204 . 
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of the less developed countries should be assisted by capital and 
technological aid and by the extension of tariff preferences. 
Structural adjustment in developed countries is an essential 
element if new development policies are to be successful. Struc-
tural adjustment is also a key factor in the liberalization of trade 
and the establishment of a free trade area among the advanced 
countries. H ow can this structural adjustment be undertaken 
effectively? Strong resistance both economic and political, can be 
expected. Various steps will have to be taken to assist the adjust-
ment, along the lines of those under the U.S. Trade Expansion Act 
of 1 962 and the amended act of 1968. 
There are two measures that would assist the adjustments 
desired. First, a fund for assisting structural adjustment should 
be established in every advanced country. This should become an 
international obligation similar to the one per cent of national in-
come foreign aid target. A certain per cent (say, a quarter of one 
per cent) of national income could be collected through taxation for 
this purpose. The fund should be used for bringing about the grad-
ual elimination of uneconomic industries and the transfer of factors 
of production to more productive activities where the advanced 
country enjoys a comparative advantage. The optimum policy would 
be a "package" of subsidies to allow uncompetitive production to 
continue over the retirement period and of cash grants to finance 
the closing down of capacity. Facilities should be provided, in 
addition, for the retraining and movement of redundant labour. 
This fund would be more efficient than direct aid to developing 
countries for it could be used in the advanced countries for econom-
ic rationalization and thus raise national welfare in their own in-
terests. In many advanced countries, slum clearance has been 
widely undertaken by governments. Why should not the reclamation 
of uneconomic industries be undertaken also? 
Secondly, some safeguards for gradual running down of in-
efficient, heavily protected industries in the developed countries 
should be devised. A Tariff Board should be established in each 
developed country or preferably as an international institution, 
which obliged industries to justify their claim for continued protec-
tion by tariffs and quantitative controls. The subsidies noted on an 
annual basis should replace tariff protection for uncompetitive pro-
duction. Each year subsidised producers could be required to make 
out a case as to why they should continue to receive cost-reducing 
subsidies rather than grants designed to facilitate the running down 
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of their productive capacity. 7 
In this way the burden of maintaining protected industries 
would fall on the consumers and taxpayers of the developed countries 
concerned rather than on the less developed countries and other 
exporters. Consumers in the developed countries would thus be 
more clearly aware of their interest in seeing uneconomic industries 
closed down and the harmful effects of tariffs and quantitative re-
strictions than they seem to be at present. 
Careful investigation should be made as to how best to provide 
aid and preferences for the purpose of facilitating structural adjust-
ment with the least friction and greatest incentives in the advanced 
and less developed countries alike. 
II. Directly Productive Aid 
][have advocated closer economic integration among the Pacif-
ic· basin countries, preferably the formation of Pacific Free Trade 
Area (PAFTA) but, as a first step, the establishmenf of an Organi-
zation for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD). Trade liber-
alization among the five advanced countries of the Pacific, the 
U.S.A., Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, would bring 
about a large expansion of intra-areal trade (as large as $US5, 000 
millions or 28 per cent of intra-areal trade in 1965) which would be 
more significant than what can be expected through the Kennedy 
Round tariff reductions. Complete regional trade liberalization 
would appear to have considerable advantages over partial trade 
liberalization in world markets. Since another major round of 
global tariff reductions is not feasible within the foreseeable future, 
7 David Wall, The Third World Challenge, Preferences for Devel-
opment, Atlantic Trade Studies, London, January 1968, pp. IT-62 . 
Kiyoshi Kojima, "A Pacific Economic Community and Asian Devel-
oping Countries," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, June 1966, 
and "Japan 1 s Interest in the Pacific Trade Expansion," Kiyoshi 
Kojima (ed . ), Pacific Trade and Development , Japan 'Economic 
Research Center, February 1968 (reprinted in Hitotsubashi 
Journal of Economics, June 1968) . cf. G . C . Allen , Japan's 
Place in Trade Strategy, Larger Role in Pacific Region, The 
Atlantic Trade Study , London , September 1 Q68 • . 
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the formation of a free trade area would seem to be an effective al-
ternative for, and the only remaining practial road to, fostering 
world trade liberalization. 
Moreover, the formation of PAFTA or some such alternative 
is particularly desirable from the viewpoint of developing well 
harmonized and efficient trade and aid policies2 towards the less 
developed countries in the Pacific basin. If a PAFTA arrangement 
were established, the group of developed countries could (and 
should) offer associate membership to the less-developed countries 
of the Pacific and provide the latter with aid, investment and 
trading privileges. To increase aid and trade with less developed 
countries, what is most needed is, structural adjustment of indus-
tries in the developed countries as explained above. 
The creation orPAFTA would imply that each member would 
be prepared eventually to adjust to full competition from the other 
member countries. This would certainly provide developed coun-
tries with a great impetus to undertake structural reorganization 
and, if this could be started , it would not be difficult to include 
structural adjustments required to provide the less developed coun-
tries vvith wider markets. Each advanced country in isolation 
might be reluctant to grant aid and trading preferences to less 
developed countries on the scale required, either because of its 
lack of resources, or because it could not face alone the structural 
consequences for its own economy. Only harmonized and coordi-
nated efforts among the advanced countries would make aid and 
trade expansion with less developed countries possible. The in-
creased prosperity and higher incomes which the advanced Pacific 
countries would gain through PAFTA would provide them with 
additional resources which they could share with less developed 
countries of the Pacific. Only the process of rapid economic 
growth within the developed countries, stimulated to some extent by 
trade liberalization, makes possible structural adjustment. 
Aid and trade preferences should be provided from advanced 
to less developed countries of the Pacific in a direction which would 
accelerate most the structural adjustment needed on both sides most. 
With this aim, it is strongly recommended that international econom-
2 See, David Wall, The Third World Challenge, Preferences for 
Development, The Atlantic Trade Study, London, January 1968, 
and "Markets for the Underdeveloped," The Round Table, 
October 1968, pp . 406-407. 
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ic aid should be increasingly provided to Asian (and Latin American) 
developing countires by the advanced Pacific countries in the form 
of machinery, equipment, fertilizer, and other capital goods for 
directly productive (preferably export-oriented) activities in the com-
ing <iecade. Both humanitarian and infrastructural aid which were 
the main form of aid in the past can continue to make an important 
contribution in the·future, but in addition to these types of aid 
directly productive aid i s more -urgently required now . .As mentioned 
above, it can be expected that an increase in directly productive aid 
will have several beneficial effects not only for the developing 
countries but also for the donor countries. 3 
Suppose there was an outright grant of $US 1 , 000 millions 
annually for the coming ten years, in addition to the current level 
of aid, to the Asian developing countries from the five advanced 
countries of the Pacific, specifically for the purpose of the impor-
tation of machinery, equipment, fertilizers, and other capital 
goods. This would certainly stimulate the expansion of heavy and 
chemical industries in advanced countries, and many other such 
indirect effects could be anticipated . 
Private capital investment in the developing countries should 
also increase, if the capital requirements of new manufacturing 
industries, which need such large and risky investments that 
private firms sometimes hesitate to undertake the investment, are 
met by international grants and, in addition, if preferential treat-
ment of their exports by the advanced countries is assured. 
Private capital would assist in establishing a series of ancillary, 
interrelated, or higher-stage processing industries. For example, 
a big cotton spinning mill could be established by international 
grants; then the weaving and clothing industries might be supple-
mented by foreign private as well as local capital. The mill would 
produce yarn cheaply , owing to low capital costs, and ancillary 
and interrelated industries would become profitable. 
Private capital investment from advanced countries would be 
stimulated . Increases both in the directly productive aid and in the 
3 A more detailed explanation is presented in Kiyoshi Kojima, "A 
Proposal for International Aid," The Developing Economies , 
The Institute of Asian· Economic Affairs, Tokyo, December 1964, 
pp. 337-357. 
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orivate capital investment would create directly, and in addition 
through the "acceleration effect" indirectly, a new demand for 
heavy and chemical industries in the advanced countries. 
Moreover, the expansion of those industries would have multiplied 
income effects resulting in further additional demand. 
A substantial expansion of heavy and chemical industries in 
the advanced countries could provide a stimulus large enough to 
reallocate resources in such a way as to expedite a rapid transfer 
of labour and capital (with the aid of adjustment assistance, if 
necessary) from agriculture and light manufactures of a labour-
intensive type to heavy and chemical industries, that is, from 
comparatively disadvantageous to advantageous industries. Both 
the structural adjustments and increased national income in the 
advanced countries would enlarge the scope for importing certain 
kinds of agricultural products and light manufactures of a labour-
intensive type from developing countries. Thus, if both the neces-
sary capital goods, including technical know-how and managerial 
skill, and markets are provided, the expansion of export-oriented 
activities in the developing countries will be assured of success. 
To sum up, my proposal for increasing international econom-
ic aid towards the provision of directly productive capital goods 
would have three distinct advantages. (1) It would provide the 
developing countries with the means necessary to expand export-
oriented activities. (2) In the advanced countries, it .would lead to 
a reallocation of resources towards heavy and chemical industries 
in which they possess a comparative advantage. (3) The expan-
sion of heavy industries stimulated, in the advanced countries, by 
the increase in demand for capital goods in the developing nations, 
would provide the markets necessary for growing export industries 
in the latter. Thus, the international division of labour would move 
closer towards an optimum. 
ill. Agricultural Development in Asian Developing Countries 
A lthough the expansion of the exports of manufactures suited 
to their abundant supply of labour is becoming the most promising 
path to long-term development for Asian developing countries, 
agricultural development is an even more urgent task in order to 
economize foreign exchange, to increase export earnings and to 
feed their people better and elevate their will to work. Pacific ad-
vanced countries (PAC) should provide directly productive aid to 
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facilitate agricultural development in Asian developing countries. 
(i) A Scheme for Fertilizer Aid 
Although the countries of Southeast Asia, such as India, 
Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, are agricultural 
countries they suffer from severe food-shortages and import food-
stuffs to the approximate annual value of $US 1 ,000 millions from 
advanced countries in the Pacific area such as America, Australia 
and Canada. Although some of these imports are available in the 
form of American surplus agricultural aid, this is exercising a 
serious pressure on their already unfavourable balance-of-payments 
position. What is more, when future increases in population and 
per-capita consumption are taken into consideration, these coun-
tries will require a large increase in production, equivalent ap-
proximately $US 3, 500 millions per annum, and foodstuffs to the 
value of approximately $US 1, 000 millions will have to be pro-
cured in addition to the plans for increased production already 
tabled by the governments concerned. There is an urgent need to 
improve the food-producing capacity of those Asian countries in 
order to cover the $US 2, 000 millions deficit in foodstuffs--the 
$US 1 ,000 millions already being imported from the advanced coun-
tries plus the $US 1 ,000 millions worth of additional production. 
The provision of chemical fertilizer aid and the construction of 
fertilizer factories, would seem the best method of attacking this 
problem. 
Advanced countries of the Pacific area should shift the em-
phasis in their agricultural assistance programs from the provision of 
foodstuffs themselves to the provision of fertilizer aid. While the 
supply of surplus agricultural products under the American PL480 
program is very useful for relief in times of famine, it has made 
little contribution to improving agricultural productivity in South-
east Asia. On the contrary, it has even tended to impair the 
morale of the local peasants. Fertilizer aid and the building of 
fertilizer factories involve much lower expenditure than assistance 
in foodstuffs. Today, now that America's stocks of surplus agri-
cultural products are beginning to dry up, a switch towards em-
phasis on fertilizer aid would be advantageous. 
A number of facts already testify that crop yields increase 
greatly if chemical fertilizers are applied appropriately. \Vhile 
product ion of rice per hectare. is more than four tons in Japan, and 
around three tons both in the R e public of Korea and Taiwan which 
follow Japan, in t he other countries of Southeast Asia yields are 
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only about 1 • 2 tons per hectare, the lowest being India with 0. 4 of 
a ton · per hectare. The yield per hectare is clearly related to the 
quantities of fertilizers used, low productivity being caused by the 
virtual non-application of fertilizer. To take another example, of 
the total increase in food production of 11 • 2 million tons provided 
for under the second Indian Five-Year Plan (1956-61), 4.6 million 
tons or almost half was estimated to be produced by the increased 
use of chemical fertilizers. 
For chemical fertilizer to be used effectively it is of course 
necessary that irrigation and drainage facilities should be provided 
in advance. Although not all Southeast Asia is ready to employ 
fertilizers, a fairly extensive area is. Increased production should 
be brought aboutby increased use of fertilizers, beginning in the 
regions in which the pre-conditions have been established. At the 
same time technical advice about the use of fertilizers, insecticide, 
and improving the seed strains should also be made available. It 
is an encouraging fact that superior seed strains such as IR-8 and 
ADT-27 have been developed and successfully used over a wide 
area. The diffusion of these modern agricultural inputs will take a 
long time and will need assiduous technical help and institutional 
reform, but they have already offered great hope for progress 
in Southeast Asia. 
The main features of the scheme for fertilizer aid are as 
follows: 
1) PAC should give a gift of fertilizers to the value of $US 60 
millions yearly, or a total value of $US 300 millions over a five-
year period to the countries of Southeast Asia which are in a 
position to use them. 
2) The countries which receive these gifts of fertilizer should 
sell it at appropriate price s to the farmers, and should accumulate 
the proceeds as counterpart funds. 
3) At an appropriate time factories for the production of 
fertilizers should be set up in the aid-receiving countries. When 
this is done the counterpart funds should be used to pay for such 
local expenses as acquisition of land, local labour costs, the re-
muneration of PAC personnel dispatched, etc. The equipment 
required in setting up these factories should be supplied from PAC 
on a long-term, deferred-payment basis. 
4) The counterpart funds should be used for the following 
purposes in addition to the construction of fertilizer factories: a) 
additional or supplementary irrigation works directly necessary for 
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fertilizer application; b) running expenses necessary for PAC 1 s 
agricultural technical cooperation activities (experimental centers, 
pilot or model farms, technical direction, extension work with 
improved strains of seed, etc; c) the purchase of agricultural ma-
chinery and implements, seeds, insecticide, etc; and d) the estab-
lishment of fertilizer storage and transportation facilities. 
In summary, this is an aid formula under which fertilizers 
(especially nitrogenous fertilizer) for which PAC has a surplus 
productive capacity are first given as gifts, followed by which 
fertilizers factories will be built for the aid-receiving countries 
with the help of their counterpart funds and capital supplied under 
deferred-payment arrangements. 
For example, if in the first year $US 60 millions worth of 
fertilizer aid were given to India and Pakistan respectively, in the 
second year two standard factories with a daily capacity of 600 tons 
of ammonium and 1, 000 tons of urea could be built in each country. 
The cost of building one of these factories is estimated at $US 25 
millions for the plant, and about $US 15 millions for local costs 
(to be met out of counterpart funds). In addition to this, during the 
second year both Indonesia and the Philippines should each be 
given gifts of fertilizers to the value of $US 30 millions. In the 
third year, two fertilizer factories should be built in each of these 
two countries. In the small countries of Southeast Asia, it would, 
of course, be proper to make the fertilizer factories small-scale 
ones of half, or quarter, of the capacity of the standard factories. 
It would also be possible to effect exchanges among the countries 
receiving fertilizers and countries building factories with their 
counterpart funds (e.g. by exchanging fertilizers produced in India 
for Burmese or Thai rice), a variety of flexible applications of the 
scheme being conceivable. 
Fertilizer aid at the rate of $US 60 millions yearly, or $US 
300 millions over five years, seems modest, both from the point of 
view of PAC 1 s ability to meet the burden and its surplus capacity 
in fertilizer production. This aid alone would be probably be suf-
ficient to make up the whole of the $US 2, 000 millions increase in 
food production required by Southeast Asia, which was mentioned 
above. It is to be hoped that other advanced countries in Western 
Europe would also participate in the fertilizer aid scheme. 
PAC would not only be enabled to carry through a meaningful 
aid programme aimed at the solution of the most urgent problem of 
food shortage in the countries of Southeast Asia, but the deferred-
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payments scheme would also enable PAC to export fertilizer plants 
and equipment valued at as much as $US 500 millions over a five-
year period. Once the farmers of Southeast Asia became thorough-
ly familiar with the use of fertilizers and conscious of their value, 
the demand for fertilizers could be expected to increase, and even 
the demand for commercial exports of fertilizers from PAC could 
be stimulated. 
(ii) A Program for Cash Crop Plantations 
There is a strong desire for industrialization in the countries 
of Southeast Asia, but as capital equipment imports for the pur-
poses of industrialization are costly developing countries commonly 
fall into serious balance-of-payments difficulties. If along with the 
above-mentioned increased food production, which reduces the 
demand for foreign exchange, it were possible to enlarge exports 
of such cash crops as raw cotton and sugar, their additional for-
eign exchange earnings would become available for the promotion of 
economic development. 
There is considerable scope for the Pacific advanced coun-
tries to switch the imports of raw materials and foodstuffs from 
other advanced countries in the Pacific or Europe to Asian devel-
oping countries for those primary products which can be produced 
in Asian developing countries competitively in terms of quality, 
price, delivery, etc. Between five and ten years should be allowed 
for the developing countries to improve productivity and to increase 
export capacity. For advanced countries too, some time will be 
required for adjusting their industrial and employment structures. 
The possibilities for switching sources of supply are espe-
cially great in Japan 1 s case. Japan will have to import increasing-
ly large quantities of raw materials, fuels and foodstuffs to sustain 
its expanding economy. In 1965, Japan imported two-thirds of its 
total consumption of energy -- mostly in the form of petroleum. 
Japan will continue to import most of the iron ore and non-ferrous 
metal ores it requires. 
Its imports of raw cotton and raw wool may decline somewhat, 
but Japan must continue to rely on imports for its entire consump-
tion of these raw materials. In 1966, lumber was Japan's second 
largest import, coming only after petroleum, and imports will fur-
ther increase in the years to come. Imports of animal feeds such 
as maize and kaoliang are rapidly increasing. In 1 966, Japan' s 
fodder imports amounted to 5. 7 million tons; and in the near future 
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they will exceed the 1 0 million ton mark . Imports of oil seeds , 
sugar, bananas, and marine products will also expand . If Asian 
developing countries can produce these products efficiently, they 
will be able to expand their exports to Japan greatly. 1 
For the U . S.A ., Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the 
possibility of increasing imports of raw materials and foodstuffs 
from Asian developing countries may be limited only to their tradi-
tional imports from these countries, but rapid economic growth and 
structural adjustments in these advanced countries will induce 
fairly large increases in imports from Asian developing countries 
for those traditional goods . It is hoped that those advanced coun-
tries are able to refrain from expanding competitive agricultural 
production through the abolition of support schemes and protection. 
For agricultural products which Japan is importing both from 
the advanced countries of the Pacific area and from Southeast Asia, 
possible increases in Japanese imports from Southeast Asia are 
expected to amount to about seven or eight hundred million dollars 
within the next five years, if one takes into account the possible 
trade diversion effects away from the advanced countries and to-
wards imports from the developing countries envisaged by our plan 
as well as the influence of the general increase in imports project-
ed for Japan during this five - year period. Increased demand for 
Asian agricultural products in other Pacific advanced countries 
will be approximately the same as in Japan, making a total of rough-
ly $US 1, 500 millions. 2 It is desirable to have this met by in-: : 
creased production in Southeast Asi a brought about by the efficient 
use of directly-productive aid . Although it is not easy to estimate 
the amount of aid required. The importation of investment goods to 
be used in the agricultural development projects backed by Pacif-
ic advanced countries (PAC) alone would require $US 240 millions, 
This figure is obtained from the estimates of the capital coefficient 
in Southeast Asia (1. 6) and the foreign exchange requirement rate, 
(0 . 1 ), together with the projected total increase in demand for the 
agricultural products of Southeast Asia of $US 1 , 500 millions. 
Saburo Okita and Akira Ohnishi, "Japan's Role in Asian Eco-
nomic Development," Kiyoshi Kojima, ed., Pacific Trade and 
Development, Japan Economic Research Center, Tokyo, 1 968, 
pp. 360- 361. 
2 Some estimates were attempted in Kiyoshi Kojima, "A Pacific 
Economic Community and Asian Developing Countries," Hitotsu-
bashi Journal of Economics 1 June 1966, pp. 30-37. 
116 KIYOSHI KOJIMA 
If this sum is provided over a five-year period about $US 50 mil-
lions annually would be sufficient . 
As an efficient aid formula would be to grant funds and tech-
nology for the e stablishment and operation of cash crop plantations . 
Possible cash crops to be grown on these plantations would be 
cotton , maize, sugar, soybeans and tobacco. Here, however, I 
should. like to consider a plan for a cotton plantation company as a 
representative of such undertakings. 
1) The PAC would disburse aid at an annual rate of, say, 
$US 30 millions or a total of $US 150 millions over five years in 
the form of technical cooperati on expenses, and would set up a 
parent cotton plantation company. It would probably be best to 
entrust the running of the company 1 s affairs to efficient private 
enterprise. 
2) The cotton plantation company would set up and run a num-
ber of cotton p lantation joint enterprises organized with the help of 
local capital in suitable areas of A sia . 
3) As well as exercising control over the joint enterprises 
in their various locations the parent company could provide techni-
cal assistance, and would send out technicians on an organized 
basis. At the same time it would carry on r esearch in marketing 
and technical questions of common interest, and would make joint 
purchases of fertilizers, machinery, agricultural implements, etc . 
4) The cotton plantation joint enterprises set up in various 
parts of A s ia would possess the following attributes: a) They would 
have at least one primary processing factory, i.e., a factory where 
the seed and waste are removed by ginning machines and the select-
ed material made up in bales , and then would possess plantations 
sufficient in size to make possible efficient use of the factory . 
b) They could carry out positive direction in relation to the cotton 
production carried on by peasant croppers in the vicinity of the 
plantation, buy up the raw cotton they produced, and carry out the 
primary processing. c) Vlhen a plurality of cotton plantation joint 
enterprises had been established in various areas in Asia, they 
would take steps to consider differentiating the varietie s of cotton 
grown by the various joint enterprises in response to the needs of 
the demand for r aw cotton in both PAC and Southeast Asia and with 
a vi ew to distributing risks. 
Japan imports most of her raw cotton from America at present , 
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but it is quite possible from the technical point of view to grow 
American cotton in almost all parts of Southeast Asia, and it is 
already being grown extensively i n Pakistan . '0/hat is needed is a 
switch in Southeast Asian cotton production to the superior variety 
of cotton, modern production management characterised by uniform 
quality, quality supervisi on, etc., and reduced costs . These should 
be the aims of the cotton plantation companies , and if they were 
achieved not only could PAC' s imports of cotton f rom Asian devel-
oping countries be increased but it would also be possible to meet 
the demand for raw cotton which is rapidly increasing within South-
east J\sia itself. 
H would be possible to disburse PAC aid by the same method 
for the purpose of fostering offer cash crop plantations such as 
growing sugar, maize, soybeans, tobacco and other such cash 
crops. All these industries would produce results quickly with 
comparatively little aid and contribute to the solution of Asian ba-
lance of payments problems. 
Concessions, and, positive support, by the advanced pro-
ducing countries of the Pacific area will all be necessary to enquire 
the expansion of cash crop exports from Southeast Asia. The ad-
vanced countries will have to refrain from artificially stimulating 
their own exports, and, better still, substitute imports from South-
east Asia for domestic production. What reaction will be forth-
coming from the American cotton producer is the chief worry. But 
it seems advisable for America to effect a gradual change-over from 
cotton production, which in that country is in process of losing its 
comparative advantage because of high wages and rising costs, to 
offer more profitable industrial activities, and further more that it 
might be more advantageous for American cotton growers to oper-
ate plantations in Southeast Asia where cheap labour is abundantly 
available. Thus, Southeast Asia should be given an appropriate 
role in changing the international division of labour. Similar 
adjustments are required in the production of American maize and 
soybeans and Australian sugar. 
"Fertilizer aid" and "cash crop plantations assistance" are 
two examples of aid which could be provided by the cooperative 
action of the Pacific advanced countries and implemented immediate~, 
ly perhaps with the help of the Asian Development Bank. These 
directly productive aid projects should be additional to aid already 
planned for other purposes since much aid is also required to equip 
a huge agricultural infrastructure comprising large scale irrigation 
works, transport and communications facilities, education, as well 
118 KIYOSHI KOJIMA 
as for undertaking land reform. The present scheme stresses the 
importance of complementary aid which allows the fruits of infra-
structural aid to be realized. 
The Pacific advanced countries should also assist with the 
development of mineral resources in Asian developing countries. 
This can be done best, however, mainly by private capital. 
Promising mineral resource developments in Asian developing 
countries are rather limited -- iron ore in India, petroleum in 
Indonesia, and copper in the Philippine. The development of 
mineral resources in Australia, Canada and Alaska presently ap-
pears less expensive and offers more stable supplies. 
N. Aid Trade-Preferences 
Great faith has been put in general trade preferences to less 
developed countries as means of increasing their export earnings 
and promoting their economic growth. Trade preferences for de-
veloping countries are justifiable if divergence from the principle 
of non- discrimination within GA TT is temporary and if they foster 
liberalization of world trade. They are positively desirable if 
they encourage transformation in the international division of la-
bour in such a way as to strengthen specialization in the export of 
labour intensive exports from developing countries. 
Will the general trade preferences bring about really sub-
stantial beneficial effects to developing countries as it is hoped 
they will? This question should be looked into. 
(i) The Trade Creation Effects: Increases in Japan's Imports 
!ncreases in Japan's imports due to the extension of general 
preferences to deve l oping countries are estimated1 according to 
the familiar model of tariff reductions, first neglecting the trade 
diversion effects which other developed countries might suffer. 
Attention i s focussed on the trade creation effects on Japanese 
imports. The estimate is attempted with regard to 12 sensitive 
A more detailed explanation is presented by Kiyoshi Kojima, 
"Trade Preferences for Developing Countries: A Japanese 
Assessment," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, February 
1969, pp. 1-1 2. 
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items2 of interest to developing countries on the basis of 1964 trade 
figures. 
In 1964, developing country exports of these twelve commodi-
ties to Japan were valued at $US 3. 69 millions which represented a 
1 O per cent share in the relevant Japanese markets. The estimates 
suggest that if tariffs were abolished on developing country exports 
to Japan, they would expand by $US 0. 91 millions, or 24. 7 per cent. 
Although the percentage increase appears large, the absolute size 
of the increase is relatively insignificant when compared with annual 
increases in Japanese exports of the order of $US 1 , 000 millions. 
The fact is that Japan still maintains a strong comparative advantage 
in traditional labour intensive manufacturing industries of the type 
most competitive with potential export industries in developing coun-
tries. 
J[t is true that in recent years, Japan's imports of manufac-
tured goods from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and India 
have been increasing rapidly, but they are still insignificant. 
However, taking this trend into account, and broadening the com-
modity coverage, it might be that around $US 50 millions worth of 
Japanese imports could be affected by the extension of trade pre-
ferences. If tariffs against developing country exports were com-
pletely eliminated, imports would increase by $US 1 3 millions only. 
A fifty per cent tariff cut is probably a more realistic possibility, 
and besides some commodities are likely to be excepted. On this 
basis, the increase in Japanese imports would be somewhat less 
than $US 6. 5 millions. There seem no strong grounds for Japan to 
oppose the provision of general trade preferences for fear of un-
manageable increases in her imports. 
(ii) · The Trade Diversion Effects: Decreases in Japan's Exports 
A more serious problem for Japan is that her exports, parti-
cularly to North American markets, might suffer from the trade 
diversion effects of trade preferences extended by other developed 
2 They are mostly labour-intensive manufactures: Plywood, cot-
ton yarn and thread, yarn and thread of synthetic fibres, cotton 
fabrics woven, floor coverings, clothing, footwear, articles of 
artificial plastic materials, travel goods and handbags, small-
wares and toilet articles, children's toys, and lighters. 
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countries to developing countries. A more complicated model is 
required in order to estimate the effects of both trade creation and 
trade diversion in a given developed country market, such as the 
United States. 
An estimate is attempted for nineteen manufactured commodi-
ties3 of importance to developing countries which compete with 
Japanese exports in the American market. In 1964, United States' 
imports of these commodities were valued at $US 1 , 600 millions . 
. Japan supplied $US 540 millions and developing countries supplied 
$US 465 millions. The nineteen items cover almost all the manu-
factured and semi-manufactured goods for which developing coun-
tries, as well as Japan, seek larger markets in the United States. 
Let us suppose that the U.S. abolishes tariffs preferentially 
on the imports coming from developing countries while she retains 
tariffs on the imports from other developed countries. It is esti-
mated according to our model that the developing countries would 
increase their exports to America by the amount of $US 176 mil-
lions or 37. 8 per cent over the total 19 items on 1964 trade figures 
and enjoy an average rise of ex9ort rrices of 18. 3 per cent. 
On the other hand, $US 22. 5 millions or 4. 1 per cent of 
.Japanese exports would be diverted to developing countries and 
.Jananese export prices would be forced down on average by 2. 0 
per cent. Thus, the United States would increase her imports by 
$US 153. 5 millions or about 10 per cent on 1964 figures -- the 
difference between the increase in developing countries' exports 
and the reduction in Japan's exports. The increase in American 
imports is the trade creation effect of preferences resulting from 
the average fall of 2. 0 per cent in American import prices iriclu-
sive of the tariff. 
The question is would the effect of trade diversion on Japa-
nese exports be really serious? Although there have been some 
exaggerated estimates for Japan, it is not likely that the effects 
would be nearly so serious as is widely feared, as far as the static 
effects of preferences are concerned. 
3 Cotton fabrics woven, yarn of wool, woolen fabrics woven, 
jute fabrics woven, floor coverings, clothing, manufactures of 
leather, footwear, sporting goods, children's toys, articles 
of rubber, plywood, cement, glass, glassware, soaps, sewing 
machines, bicycles, and radio broadcast receivers. 
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(iii) P references through an "Advance Cut" 
Two alternative preference schemes have been presented to 
OFCD countries: the advance cut plan advocated by the United 
States and the tariff quota plan supported by EEC countries . It 
has been suggested that the advance cut preference scheme could 
be aodied either by reducing tariffs on developing country products 
to th'~ full extent of concessions agreed under Kennedy Round ne go-
tiations or by reduc ing tariffs on developing country products under 
negotiations between developing countries and developed countries 
within GA TT, to be followed by a new round of negotiations among 
develo9ed countries designed to effect the staged reduction of MFN 
tariffs over 5 or 1 0 years. Either way, the advance cut plan en-
sures that general preferences are temporary and that they are 
consistent with progress towards global free trade . These are the 
the significant merits of the advance cut proposals . 
On the other hand, the tariff quota scheme appears more open 
to protectionist abuses, and unlikely to promote trade liberaliza-
tion in developed countries. Quotas on selected commodities from 
particular developing country sources would be subject to arbitrary 
alteration and MFN tariffs could even be raised to provide larger 
preference margins. Fundamentally, the tariff quota plan does not 
aim at progress towards global free trade but sets out to prevent 
"market disruption" by developing country products. From the 
standpoint of encouraging the expansion of world trade, the advance 
cut proposals seem preferable. 
Permanent preferences, i.e., general preferences with no 
limitation in duration, are certainly more favourable to less devel-
oped countries than the AC plan, but they will not be accorded by 
developed countries . It may be interesting, however, to illustrate 
the difference in effects of both schemes for the case of Japan. 
Let us suppose that (1) America imported in the initial year 
$US 600 millions from Japan and $US 400 millions from developing 
countries, following closely to the 1964 trade figures; (2) the 
American tariff level was 30 per cent ad valorem; (3) preferential 
margin equals 0 , 5 both under the AC plan and the permanent pre-
ferences plan; (4) tariffs are reduced by 10 per cent every year for 
five years under the AC plan but they are reduced by 50 per cent 
from the first year under the permanent preferences plan ; (5) the 
price elasticity of American import-demand is taken as 2 . 5 and the 
price elasticity of export-supply from Japan 2 . 2 throughout the 
five years; and ( 6) the price elasticity of export-supply from <level-
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oping countries will increase from 1. 1 in the first year to 1 • 65, 
2. 2, 2 . 75 and 3 . 3 in successive years. 
Under these assumptions, over the whole five year period, 
.Japanese exports would fall by $US 205 millions or 6. 8 per cent 
under the permanent preferences plan, whilst they would increase 
by $US 306 millions or 10.2 per cent under the AC plan. 
Exports of developing countries would increase by $US 671 
millions or 33 . 4 per cent in the case of the permanent preferences 
plan and by $US 514 millions or 23.7 per cent in the case of the 
AC plan. 
American imports would increase by $US 466 millions, i.e., 
net of increase from developing countries and decrease from Japan, 
in the case of the permanent preferences plan whilst they would 
increase by $US 820 millions, i.e. , the sum of increase both from 
developing countries and Japan, in the case of the AC plan . 
Thus, it appears that a permanent preferences plan, if it were 
accorded, would be most favourable to developing countries. It 
should be noted, however, the increases in American imports which 
designates the degree of liberalization of world trade would be far 
larger in the case of the AC plan than in the permanent preferences 
plan. The more favourable effects for developing countries in the 
case of the permanent preferences plan resulted from discrimina-
tion caused by trade diversion effects against Japan and not from 
the greater expansion of world trade. Japan has many interests in 
common with developing countries . She still depends heavily on 
the export of traditional labour intensive manufactures in competi-
tion with developing countries but, like them, she desires freer 
access to developed country markets for these exports . 
It is important to emphasise that for developing countries , 
too, the benefits of trade preference schemes derive not so much 
from discrimination in tariff treatment but more from the reduction 
of tariffs in developed countries and also from the increase in 
productive capacity and competitiveness of exportable products 
from developing countries. It is of the utmost urgency to the de-
ve loping countrie s that some jolt be administered to the high-wage 
economies of the advanced nations so that protectionism is broken 
down and also so that they be given more efficient assistance from 
the advanced countries to foste r their infant industries . These 
aims would be realized most practically through FT A aid and pre-
ferences. 
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(iv) PAFTA Aid~ Preference System 
·what this study and others have shown is that the static ef-
fects of nreference schemes are not likely to be substantial. 1 The 
prospect-s are generally discouraging for developing countries. 
The benefits for them may be even too small to justify the cost of 
carrying out the cumbersome administration of !-'referential treat-
ment. The increased earning power of developing countries which 
results from trade preference is certainly not li~rnly to fill their 
. h 2 huge foreign exc ange gap. 
Moreover, there are conflicting interests among the potential 
preference-receivers. The main interest of the less developed 
among the developing countries is not so much preferential tariff 
treatment on manufactured exports but , first, the expansion of 
traditional primary commodity exports and, second, the initiation 
of industrialization with heavy dependence on aid from developed 
countries. 
In fact, developed countries have been reluctantly lead to-
wards the provision of general trade preferences, not because they 
ex:pect any substantial benefits to flow to developing countries but 
because they recognize the political expedience of providing them. 
It may be true that if the effective rates of protection which 
are on average 1. 5 or 2 times over the nominal tariff rates, 3 and 
See, Gardner Patterson, Discrimination in International Trade, 
The Policy Issues, 1945-1965, Princeton, 1966, pp. 358-359, 
pp. 381-383. John Pincus, Trade, Aidand Development, Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations, 1967, Chap . 6. Pincus, ibid., p. 231, 
estimates that a general preference scheme could increase the 
export receipts of developing countries by the general order of 
$1 billion annually if processed products were included. This 
estimate is the largest at severa-1 estimates made. 
2 Grant L. Reuber, Canada's Interest in the Trade Problems of 
Less-Developed Countries, The Canadian Trade Committee and 
Private Planning Association of Canada, 1964, p. xii. 
3 See, Harry G. Johnson, "Trade Preferences and Developing 
Countries," Lloyds Bank Review, April 1966, pp. 13-17, and 
Bela Balassa, "The Structure of Protection in the Industrial 
Countries and its Effects on the Exports of Processed Goods 
f:;_~om Developing Countries," IBRD Report, No.EC-152a, Feb-
ruary 1968. 
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the dynamic effects of preferences are taken into account, the fa-
vourable effects of general preferences for less developed coun-
tries would be more substantial. But these effects depend heavily 
upon the developed countries assistance of capital, know-how and 
management for establishing and rationalizing production facilities 
in developing countries. 
An aid cum preference scheme could offer more benefits to 
developing countries. Aid, linked directly to preferential tariff 
treatment, appears consistent with the Prebisch report 1 s emphasis 
on the infant industry argument for preferences. 4 Firstly, as 
proposed in previous sections, directly productive aid in the form 
of capital goods, advanced techniques of production, managerial 
know-how, and worker training, should be provided to developing 
countries on an increasingly large scale if the efficiency of new 
export-oriented industries, primary as well as manufacturing, is 
to be improved to the point where they become increasingly compet-
itive in world markets. Secondly, developed countries should pro-
vide preferential treatment, say for five or ten years, to develop-
ing country exports launched with the help of directly productive 
aid. Preferences aimed at ensuring wider markets would serve as 
a sort of aid 'after-care', and might well be regarded as indispen-
sable to realizing the full benefits of aid. It is important that the 
provision of preferences should be closely linked with the provi-
sion of preferences should be closely linked with the provision of 
aid since either is likely to be ineffective and result in a waste of 
resources if applied independently. 
The aid cum preference scheme need not be confined to manu-
factured goodS:-It could also be useful for agricultural and miner-
al commodities of interest to developing countries. Commonly, 
however, developed country tariffs on these latter products are 
very low or non-existent and there is little margin for granting 
preferences. In such cases, governments of the developed coun-
tries could provide a subsidy on imports from the developing coun-
tries for some specific period, say five years, until competitive-
ness is sufficiently well established. 5 
4 United Nations, Towards a New Trade Policy for Development. 
New York, 1964. 
5 As a kind of aid, Japan has stressed "development investment 
for imports, 11 i.e., to assist the development of primary prod-
ucts in developing countries with the aim of importing raw 
materials and foodstuffs most needed for the Japanese economy 
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It is clear that a large-scale scheme of aid cum preference 
could be provided more efficiently and without much difficulty by a 
group of iike-minded advanced cou.ntries . This suggests the ad-
visability of a Free Trade Area Aid cum Preference System. 
The optimum arrangements for the less developed countries 
would be for as rapid as possible a reduction and elimination of 
barriers on their exports to FTA countries, combined with the 
slow and gradual elimination of barriers among FT A countries. It 
might be best to establish a FTA by eliminating tariffs gradually 
wit hin ten to fifteen years but to reduce tariffs on developing coun-
tries products from the first year to the full extent, following on 
the principle of an advance cut plan. At the same time, FTA go-
vernments could increase directly productive aid and encourage the 
flow of private investment to developing countries which would be 
stimulated by these trade measures. 
The FTA aid cum preference system has a number of advan-
tages, including gr~r feasbility, over the general preference 
system considered by UNCTAD. These have been excellently 
summarized by David Wall as follows: 6 
In the first place, the spirit behind the FTA movement is 
based on belief in the benefits to be gained from free trade and the 
concessions called for in the proposed preference system would 
represent a more extensive diffusion of this particular spirit. 
Secondly, if FTA was to be successfully established, its 
members would be better off and consequently able to bear the cost 
of the preference system more easily, which contrasts with the 
UNCT AD scheme that incorporates non quid pro quo for developed 
countries. 
Thirdly, the extension of preferences by FTA as a group 
would ensure that the burden of acc ommodating those preferences 
would be shared as broadly as possible. 
(5 cont 1 d) at a cheaper price and from a stable source. Thailand's 
export of maize to Japan is a good example. In order to promote 
this, an "Agency for Asian Trade and Development" will be es-
tablished under the support of the Japanese Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry. 
6 David Wall, The Third World Challenge Preferences for Devel-
opment, The Atlantic Trade Study, London 1967, p. 65. 
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In addition, such action would reverse the tendency for the 
world to break up into discriminatory trading blocs bent on protect-
ing the interests of producers within each bloc. 7 
It should be stressed again that the jolt to the economies of 
the developed countries which the provision of preferences to the 
less developed countries entails would be alleviated by the forma-
tion of FTA. The creation of FTA implies that each member would 
be prepared, eventually, to adjust to full competition from other 
member countries. Only with such commitments would FTA coun-
tries be ready to provide preferences to developing countries more 
widely and effectively . It is practically impossible under present 
world trade policies to abolish non-tariff restrictions. The aboli-
tion of non-tariff restrictions could be realized between FTA mem-
bers and the benefits extended to associated developing countries. 
Thus, the commodity coverage for reducing both tariffs and other 
trade barriers in favour of less developed countries would be much 
greater under FTA preference than under the UNCTAD scheme. 
Tariffs and other trade barriers for less developed countries would 
be completely e liminated by FTA preferences while only a fifty per 
cent reduction of tariffs mi ght be the largest feasible tariff cut 
under the UNCT AD scheme. In addition, greater assistance from 
FTA countries would be assured. Thus, the FTA aid cum prefer-
ence system would be more beneficial to less developed countries 
than a general system of preferences considered by UNCTAD . 8 
FTA preferences along the lines of the advance cut plan 
would aut omatically assure that the advantages to developing nation 
exporters would last as long as the period over which FTA members 
gradually removed barriers to trade among themselves, and also 
with respect to FTA imports from third party developed countries . 
On this point, it may appear to the less developed countries that 
FTA preferences would be les s beneficial than permanent general 
7 The UNCTAD scheme of general preferences creates new dis-
crimination, while FTA preference would prevent increased 
discrimination. 
8 H should be remembered why the British Commonwealth prefer-
ence has been beneficial to developing countries . · Beneficial 
effects have been brought about mainly from all-round assist-
ance in capital, management, marketing, etc . , but not so much 
from preference it self . See, Donald Mac Dougall and Rosemary 
Hutt, "Imperial P reference : A Quantitative Analysis," Ec onomic 
Journal, J une 1954, p.269. 
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n~references. It should be noted, however, that any preference 
~cheme should not be allowed to be permanent. The duration of the 
preference scheme s h ould be long enough to allow the successful 
establishment of some industries, but not so long as to encourage 
the establishment of industries in which developing nations have no 
prospects of long term comparative advantage. 
It might be claimed by the less developed countries that the 
FTA preference system is not general as regards countries which 
provide preferences, since the free trade area is unlikely cover 
the all developed countries. However, less developed countries 
may become associated with more than one FTA and receive pref-
erential treatment from all that were prepared to provide 
it. More over, advanced countries could belong to more than one 
FTA. This possibility arises from the characteristics of free 
trade areas, which differ from customs union or more solid politi-
cal unions. If more free trade areas provide non-discriminative 
preferences to any less developed countries generally, FTA pref-
erences would really become more general and effective than those 
intended under the UNCTAD scheme. 
V. Conclusion 
The establishment of Pacific Free Trade Area or an alterna-
tive organization has the twin objectives of providing a step to-
wards free world trade and of assisting more effectively the less 
developed economies particularly in Southeast Asia, in their efforts 
to develop. This paper has examined how the Pacific advanced 
countries can cooperate to increase directly productive aid for food-
production, cash-crop plantations , and manufacturing industries to 
the .Asian developing countries . It has also recommended that FTA 
preferences should be provided in close association with aid ef-
forts. 
To make those aid cum preference efforts fruitful both for the 
Pacific advanced countries and Asian developing countries, three 
steps are necessary. Firstly, trade liberalization among the 
Pacific advanced countries, preferably through the formation of a 
Pacific Free Trade Area, is a prerequisite for increasing thei r 
aid-giving capacity and for providing the necessary jolt to carry 
out structural adjustment which will allow the absorption of in-
creased imports from developing countries. Secondly, the struc-
tural adjustment of industries in advanced countries is a key factor 
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in the success of the entire PAFTA aid cum preference system. 
Thirdly, it goes without saying that efforts of self-help and 
considered policies for economic development in Asian develop-
ing countries are essential to the success of the scheme. 
Finally, improved financial arrangements in the Asian-Pacific 
region would facilitate the implementation of these trade and 
development policies. 
Supplement to Chapter 4 
AN ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF PAFTA 
PREFERENCES THROUGH AN "ADVANCE CUT" 
Ippei Yamazawa 
I 
The aim of this supplement is to illustrate the effects on the 
expansion of exports from Asian developing countries which the 
provision of PAFTA preferences along the lines of the "advance 
cut" plan proposed in Section IV (iii) of Professor Kojima 1 s paper 
would entail. Although trade figures are taken so as to repre-
sent the actual trade positions of the PAFT A countries in 1 965, 
the calculations are made on the basis of an extremely simplified 
model and should be regarded only as a numerical illustration 
of the effects of the scheme. 
II 
Total imports are classified into four commodity categories, 
food (F), raw materials (R), light manufactures (L), and heavy 
manufactures ( C). Domestic products of an importing country and 
imports from Asian developing countries, other PAFTA countries, 
and the rest of the world (ROW) are all assumed to be perfect sub-
stitutes for each other and are all sold at the same price in the 
market of the importing country. 
Thus once a PAFT A country reduces its tariffs preferentially 
towards Asian developing countries, the latter 1 s exports will 
expand in response to the increase in their export price (net of 
import duty), partly to fill the increase in the total import demand 
(the trade creation effect) and partly to replace imports from both 
other PAFTA countries and the ROW (the trade diversion effect). 
The increase in Asian developing country export earnings depends 
on export supply elasticities and the rate of increase in their 
export price, the latter being determined by the initial rate of 
tariffs and preferential tariff margin, import demand elasticities 
and export supply elasticities of the other two groups of exporters, 
and the initial shares of the three groups of exporters in the 
1 29 
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market. 1) 
Tariffs are reduced preferentially among PAFTA countries grad-
ually over the following ten years . As the tariff reduction proceeds, 
the other PAFTA countries will increase their shares in the markets 
of the member countries at the expense of domestic producers, the 
ROW and Asian developing exporters. Asian developing countries 
will suffer from a decrease in their exports through trade diver-
sion effects due to tariff reductions in PAFT A. Thereby the 
effects of a preferential tariff reduction through "advance cut" can 
be estimated approximately by subtracting these gradual decreases 
in their exports shares through the trade diversion effect from the 
impact effects which the initial preferential reduction in tariffs 
entails. · 
However, if we take into consideration the fact that the export 
supplies of Asian developing countries are initially relatively 
inelastic, and that these elasticities increase gradually partly as a 
result of the aid-cum-preference scheme, then the export gains for 
Asian developing countries from the initial preferential tariff reduc-
tion mainly take the form of higher export prices. Thus the trade 
diversion loss of exports by the PAFT A members may not be sub-
stantial. In the next stage, Asian developing exporters may continue 
to increase their shares in the market since the increase in the 
elasticities of their export supplies could more than offset their · 
trade diversion losses. In this way PAFTA preferences through 
an "advance cut" could provide an orderly path for export special-
ization both for Asian developing countries and for the PAFTA 
member countries . In addition, if the steady increase in total 
demand of importing countries over the ten year period is taken into 
consideration, the above scheme may be carried out more sucess -
fully. 
III 
Imports of the four commodity groups by each PAFTA country 
from Asian developing countries, other PAFTA countries and the 
ROW are given in Table 1 • Tariffs are taken from the pre-Kennedy 
The formulae for the estimation are given in "Trade Preferences 
for Developing Countries: A Japanese Kiyoshi Kojima Assess-
ment", Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, February 1969, p. 6 
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Round tariff table of each PAFTA country and are supposed to re-
present the average figures for the four commodity groups. Elas-
ticities of import demand ( YJ) are assumed to be - 1 • 0, - 0, 6, - 4. 0, 
and - 4. O for F R, L, and C respectively for the United States, -'- - -while they are assumed to be - 0.7, - 0.3, - 3.0, and - 3.0 for 
other PAFTA countries if we take into consideration of the excep-
tionally large size of the United States . Elasticities of export 
supply ( w) are assumed quite arbitrarily to be 1. 0 for£._ and_g_and 
3.0 for Land C both for PAFTA countries and the ROW, and for 
the developing countries two alternative sets of assumed values are 
used viz. the same export supply elasticities as above and those 
same values halved. The preferential margin is 100%, in other 
words a complete elimination of tariff barriers towards Asian 
developing countries. 
Table 2 summarizes the impact effects of the initial preferential 
tariff reduction by PAFTA countries for Asian developing countries 
with the two alternative sets of assumed values for elasticities of 
export supply . The rates of increase in the exports from Asian 
developing countries are substantial in L and C reflecting high 
elasticities both of import demand and export supply and relatively 
high levels of tariffs imposed on these commodity categories. The 
absolute amounts of their increases, however, are small in compari-
son with total imports of each country; both the rates of increase in 
total imports of PAFTA members (trade creation effects) and the 
rates of decrease in their exports (trade diversion effects) are 5-6% 
at most. 
Table 3 illustrates the effects of P.AFTA preferences through 
an "advance cut" by the United States: the level of her total 
imports, the exports of Asian developing countries and of other 
PAFT A members are given for the year 0 (before tariff reduction), 
1 (when tariffs are reduced by 100% for Asian developing countries 
and by 1 0% for other P AFTA members), 5 (when tariffs are reduced 
by another 40% for other PAFTA members), and 10 (when tariffs 
are eliminated for both groups). Two alternative assumptions are 
made as to the elasticities of export supplies of .Asian developing 
countries; (A) they are the same as those of other exporters and 
constant over ten years and (B) they are halved initially but in-
crease steadily over ten years and amount to the same as those of 
other exporters in the year 1 0. 
The two assumptions give two estimates for years 1 and 5 which 
illustrate two different sets of growth paths of the exports of Asian 
developing countries. With (A) constant elasticities of export 
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supplies, the exports of Asian developing countries increase greatly 
in the first year but decrease over the following years, while with 
(B) increasing elasticities, their exports increase steadily over the 
whole period . The exports of other PAFTA members increase 
more steadily under the assumption (B). These figures suggest 
that PAFTA preferences through "advance cut" will provide an 
orderly path for export specialization both for Asian developing 
countries and other P AFT A members if the increase in elasticities 
of export supply of Asian developing countries as a result of the 
aid-cum preference scheme is taken into consideration. 
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Total imports 
from Asia** 
PAFTA 
ROW 
Tariffs 
~ 
Total imports 
from Asia 
PAFTA 
ROW 
Tariffs 
Japan 
Total imports 
from Asia 
PAFTA 
ROW 
Tariffs 
Australia 
Total imports 
from Asia 
PAFTA 
ROW 
Tariffs 
New Zealand 
Total imports 
from Asia 
PAFTA 
ROW 
Tariffs 
Table 1 Imports of PAF·TA Countries 
F * R 1 c 
4010.8*** 4969.0 5578.7 6807.9 
364.5( 9.1) 469.7( 9.4) 683.5(12.3) 210.1( 3.l)**** 
759.7(18.9) 1500.8(30.2) 2057.4(36.9) 3259.2(47.9) 
2886.6(72.0) 2998.5(50.8) 2837.8(50.8) 3338.6(49.0) 
10.0 % 
692.2 
30.1( 4.3) 
479.9(69.2) 
182.2(26.5) 
10.0 
1470.2 
360.7(24.5) 
5.0 
1205.1 1799.3 4289.3 
27.5( 2.3) 62.6( 3.5) 19.2( 0.4) 
672.5(55.8) 1078.3(59.9) 3425.3(79.9) 
505.1(41.9) 658.4(36.6) 84~.8(19.7) 
5.0 19.0 12.0 
4761.4 389.7 1548.5 
947.3(19.9) 29.4( 7.5) 65.0(, 4.2) 
709.6(48.3) 1317.4(27.7) 138.9(35.6) 707.7(45.7) 
399.9(27.2) 2496.7(52.4) 221.4(56.9) 775.8(50.1) 
13.0 5.0 19.0 17.0 
163.0 491.0 957.4 1742.0 
34.8(21.3) 130.4(26.6) 76.4( 8.0) 9.2( 0.5) 
49.7(30.5) 94.7(19.3) ·334.3(34.9) 7 41.4(42. 6) 
78.5(48.2) 265.9(54.1) 546.7(57.1) 991.4(56.9) 
15.0 10.0 26.0 19.0 
76.0 134.8 252.3 581.6 
12.8(16.8) 6.7( 5.0) 26.7(10.5) 1.8( 0.3) 
26.8(35.3) 31.3(23.2) 86.3(34.2) 254.7(43.8) 
36.4(47.9) 96.8(71.8) 139,3(55.3) 325.1(55.9) 
15.0 10.0 23.0 17.0 
* F - Food, R - Raw materials, 1 - Light manufactures 
C - Heavy manufactures 
** Asian developing countries 
*** mil. US$ 
**** Shares in total imports. 
Source: U.N. Co:nmodity Trade Statistics 1965. 
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Table 2 The Impact Effects of Preferential Tariff Reduction 
for Asian Developing Countries* 
F R 1 c 
t* )** 398.2(45.3) l00.4(32.8) Increases in total (118.8 14.7 114.2(7.2) 
exports of Asia 150.7(18.7) 142.3(8.9) 621.5(70. 7) 161.4(52.8) 
to U. S.A. (48.7 33.1 311.0 67.0 
63.5 42.2 484.0 107.4 
Canada ( 4.0 1.9 24.8 5.0 
5.4 2.5 39.3 8.2 
Japan (47.4 62.5 11.5 23.2 
70.8 77 .6 18.2 39.0 
Australia 6. 3 15.7 38.5 3.6 
8.0 18.8 60.4 5.8 
New Zealand 2.4 1.0 12.4 0.7 
3.0 1.2 19.6 1.0 
Increases in total 
imports of 
U.S.A. (33.3( 0.8) 20.5( 0 . 4) 21i.4( 3.8) 45.5( 0.7) 
32.2( 0.8) 15.2( 0.3) 288.2( 5.2) 54.6( 0.8) 
Canada ( 2.5( 0.3) 0.9( 0.1) 14.8( 0.8) 3.1( 0.1) 
2.4( 0.3) 0.4( 0.03) 19 . 3( 1.1) 4.6( 0.1) 
Japan (37 .4( 2.5) 32.0( 0.7) 6.9( 1.8) 13.7( 0 .9 ) 
45.0( 3.1) 21.9( 0.5) 9.4( 2.4) 20. 7( 1.3) 
Australia ( 4.0( 2. 5) 8. 2( 1. 7) 24.0( 2.5) 2.2( 0.1) 
3.8( 2.3) 5.4( 1.1) '>1.4( 3.3) 3.0( 0.2) 
New Zealand ( 1.5( 2.0) 0.6( 0.4) 10 . 9( 4.3) 0 .6 ( 0.1) 
1.4( 1.8) 0.3( 0.2) 16.5( 6.5) 0.7( 0.1) 
Decreases in exports 
of 
U.S.A. (11.1( 1.1) 7.7( 0.5) 9.2( 0.8) 5.9( 0.1) 
15.0( 1.5) 14.4( 1.0) 18.4( 1.5) 6.3( 0.1) 
Canada ( 3.6( 0.6) 5.1( 0.3) 19.0( 2.0) 7.2( 0.3) 
6.0( 1.1) 10.5( 0.7) 37.7( 3.9) 6.1( 0.3) 
Japan ( 0.5( 0.4) 0.1( 0.2) 26.4( 1.8) 5.0( 0.3) 
1.0( 0.8) 0.3( 0.7) 52.4( 3.6) 10.0( 0.6) 
Australia ( 2.2( 0.8) 3.4( o.6 ) 0.5( 1.0) 0.1 ( 0.05) 
3.6( 1.3) 6.4( 1.2) 1.1( 1.9) 0.4( 0.2) 
New Zealand ( 0.5( o.6) 0.4( 0.4) 0.3( 1.5) 0 
0.9( 1.2) 1.0( 0.9 ) 0.6 ( 3.1) 0.1( 0.5) 
* Upper figure s indicat e the estimates with the same elasticities of 
expor t supplies of Asian developing countries as those of other 
expor ters and lower f igures indicate the estimates with these 
elasticities halved. 
** mil. US$ 
*** Rates of increases or decreases. (%) 
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Table 3 The Effects of P.AFTA Preferences through an 
"Advance Cut" the Case of the United States . 
year F R 1 c 
Exports of Asian develop-
364.5* 469 .7 683 .5 210 .3 ·ing Countries 0 
1 c421 .4** 511 .0 1159 .5 315 .4 412 .7 502 .1 989 .3 276 .8 
5 (427 .0 507.4 
1122 . 5 306 . 2 
417 .2 503 .0 1040 .0 ·279 .5 
10 421.5 503 .8 1085 .5 296 .5 
Exports of other PAFTA 
members 0 759 .7 1500 .8 2057 .4 3259 . 2 
1 {766 .0 1503 .8 2072 .9 3367 .3 769 .0 1508 .6 2144 .6 3382 .3 
5 (816 .7 1550 .3 
2627 .1 3806 .1 
819 .9 1554 .6 2645 . 6 3914 ~ 4 
10 878 .7 1609 .4 3270 .4 6049 .2 
Total imports of the 
United States 0 4010 .8 4969 .0 5578 .7 6807 .9 
1 (4049 .9 4989 .9 5954. 3 6958 .5 4051.0 4995 .3 5879 .3 6949 . 3 
5 (4081.3 5010 .7 6238 .9 7244 .0 4085 .6 5026 .3 6271.5 7334 .6 
10 4113.7 5041 .0 6735 .7 9314 .1 
* mil. US$ 
** Upper figures indicate t he es t imates with constant elasticities 
of export suppli es of Asian developing countries and lower 
figures i ndicate the es timates with increasing values of these 
elasticities . 
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COMMENT ON KIYOSHI KOJIMA' SAND IPPEI YAMAZ / L\VA' S 
PAPER BY SUBROTO 
I read Professor Kojima 1 s paper with great interest and I con-
gratulate him on his many original ideas. His paper falls into 
three sections: an appropriate strategy for dealing with the North-
South problem; the character, terms and direction of aid; and the 
aid cum trade preference suggestion, which is supplemented by the 
analysis in Mr. Yamazawa' s paper. 
I shall confine my comments principally to the first two of these 
three subjects. As I understand him, Professor Kojima favours a 
global approach to the North-South problem and recognizes the long 
term importance of the UNCTAD objectives, However, there is a 
key statement in his paper in which he opts for an intermediate 
regional approach towards the longer-run global objectives. The 
question that arises is what is the future of UNCTAD if Professor 
Kojima' s strategy is adopted? Much of our discussion yesterday 
was focussed on this issue. There appear to be two schools among 
us: the pessimists who stress the ineffectiveness and irrelevance 
of the UNCTAD discussions, and the optimists who emphasize that 
UNCTAD has focussed attention on an important set of problems 
whether or not it alone can solve them. There does, however, 
seem to be some presumption in favour of continuing efforts to 
obtain trade concessions through UNCTAD. For example, although 
this point was not mentioned in Profess or Kojima' s paper, there is 
some scope for narrowing discussion within UNCTAD through the 
Trade and Development Board. Discussion could also be focussed 
more effectively in smaller forums within the organization. There 
are the existing committees (on commodities, shipping, money and 
finance) which could serve more effectively as agencies through 
which issues of global importance, to developed and developing 
countries alike, could be probed. 
Perhaps a regional approach, however, ,offers more promise in 
the shorter run . There are two issues, in this connection, that 
appear important. There is the question of coverage and the ques-
tion of organization. What countries should be included in what 
regional effort? In our discussions yesterday, at least three possibili-
ties emerged - the advanced and developing countries in the Asian-
Pacific region might be included; the advanced countries of the 
Pacific, with some kind of associated membership for developing 
Asian countries, could get together; and the advanced countries of 
the Pacific region alone might constitute the group. The grouping 
would certainly not depend on strictly economic considerations alone, 
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but would also be determined in part by questions of politics and 
defense strategy. I, personally, see no objection to the advanced 
Pacific countries forming some such development and trade organiza-
tion but I would stress the importance of allowing for the possibility 
of continued dialogue between the advanced and developing countries 
in the region. The specific needs of developing countries can then 
be given more effective expression . In other words , some kind of 
association could serve a useful economic purp ose - and, of course, 
a useful political purpose . If we conc e ntrate on OPT AD, as a 
feasible proposition , the big question is whether t h e United S tates 
would participate . PAF TA , as the arguments put forward clearly 
by Dr. Drysdale and Professor McDougall yesterday suggested , is 
a very long term and uncertain proposition . As I said, I am not 
yet clear about the precise form of the or ganizat ion but it would 
seem that Dr . Drysdale' s idea of a nucleus membership of two or 
three countries inviti ng association if desired would be practicable . 
As to the character, terms, and direc tion of aid, Professor 
Kojima made a useful distinction between direct financial surplus aid 
and structural adjustment aid . In parti cular, I appreciate his way 
of looking at structural adjustment in advanced countries to accommo-
date the structural transformation of developing countries, and allow 
the growth of new or stronger export industries . Professor Kojima 
has clearly drawn on the lessons of Japanese experience in making 
these bold and imaginative point s . My concern is whether other 
advanced countries can be encouraged to think in the same way . 
There has always been strong resistance to this kind of thinking by 
them within UNCTAD . The first problem is to get governments 
committed to the idea . The next and most important problem is to 
get the private sectors in advanced countries to accept and engineer 
the adjustments involved. 
Professor Kojima proposed emphasis on three sectors in aid-
giving: manufacturing industry, fertilizer production, and cash 
crops for export. I think his emphasis on the connection between 
aid- giving and promoting trade expansion is qui te original. His 
recognition of the importance of using aid to encourage the process 
of structural adjustment towards more effective export competi tion 
is useful. 
I have very little to say about the trade preferences analysis 
carri ed further in Mr. Yamazawa' s paper . May I repeat that 
Professor Kojima' s paper is a most challengi ng exercise . It 
proceeds three or four steps ahead of policy and should encourage 
policy-makers to be thinking in the right direction . 
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COMMENTS ON KIYOSHI KOJIMA'S PAPER BY WILLIAM 
W.LOCKWOOD 
Once more we are indebted to Professor Kojima, our Conference 
"prime mover," for an imaginative, informative paper on trade, aid 
and development in the Asia-Pacific region. This time)he has com-
bined and up-dated the proposals of his earlier essays 1 in one 
sweeping Grand Design. If the top planners and administrators of 
the European Economic Community are known as "Zurocrats," per-
haps we may dub Professor K ojima our first "Pacificrat." 
His paper proposes sweeping international adjustments through 
which the developed countries would permit the displacement of their 
high-cost, labor-intensive industries with expanding imports from 
the developing countries . These new imports would be more than 
balanced with their own exports of equipment, chemicals and other 
products to the developing countries, massively financed for some 
years with grants and loans. Greater international division of labor 
along these lines of comparative advantage would raise world incomes 
and especially would accelerate the growth of the developing coun-
tries. 
To foster such growth and structural adjustment in the Asia-
Pacific region, Professor Kojima renews his proposal for a Pacific 
Area Free Trade Association (PAFTA) as a practical next step in 
world trade liberalization. He further urges that the five nations 
of the P AFT A -- Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the 
U. S .--not only reduce barriers in their own mutual trade but also 
a new set of trade and aid policies directed t o the developing 
countries of Asia. S pecifically he calls for trade preferences in 
favor of developing Asia in both primary products and manufactures , 
say for 5-1 0 years. The se would be accompanied by a program of 
loans and subsidies ove r a similar time period to push through as 
rapidly as possible the desired structural changes . 
In all developed countries government subsidies and controls 
would be employed to pace and cushion the shift away from uneconomic 
industries. In the developing countries of Asia, meanwhile, fer-
tilizer grants and equipment loans from the P A:t<'T A nations would be 
used to e xpand agriculture , with a view to wiping out Asia's food 
deficit (now $2 billions a year), and also enlarging cash-crop 
exports. Other sums would be made available to build new manufac-
1) K.Kojima, "Japan's Interest in the Pacific Trade Expansion", in 
K .Kojima ed . Pacific Trade and Development, Japan Economic 
research Center, 1 968 . 
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turing industries along lines of comparative advantage. 
Examining the pros and cons of trade preferences, Professor 
Kojima argues that they would be more feasible for the developed 
countries if combined with two other programs of action: (1) large-
scale outlays in foreign aid as suggested above that would serve to 
boost their exports of heavy equipment and chemicals, and (2) ad-
justments in the direction of free trade among themselves (within 
groupings like PAFT A) that would "Jolt" their structures of high-
wage protection and thus open the door more readily to new imports 
from the developing countries as well. Similarly, preferences 
would be more halpful to the developing countries if accompanied by 
such foreign aid to expand export capacity in appropriate lines. 
Without these concurrent programs, he concludes, tariff preferences 
alone are not likely to have any very substantial effect on the pro-
cesses of trade and economic development in the Pacific area. The 
essence of his proposal, then, is this combined approach to trade, 
aid and development in which the various elements all reinforce 
each other. 
As the Conference has already discussed trade liberalization 
and preference at some length, I shall pass over Professor Kojima' s 
treatrr.ent of this subject, interesting as it is. Let me only express 
skepticism on one point. Would tariff preferences for developing 
countries really be more easily achieved if linked with an additional 
"Joint 11 to protectionism in developed countries through simultaneous 
trade liberalization among the latter themselves? For example, 
would American and Japanese farmers already struggling with fresh 
competition from Australian and New Zealand farmers be there by 
more willing to accept low_;cost competion from Asia? Or would 
Australia take cheap manufactures more readily from Hongkong or 
Taiwan if already hard pressed by tariff reductions on Japanese 
goods? The reverse seems more likely; one can hear the argument: 
"one jolt is enough -- let's not add another." Fortunately, a co-
operative approach to Asian aid and trade by the advanced nations 
of the Pacific does not have to wait upon their adoption of free trade 
among themselves, itself an unlikely contingency. 
In reacting to Professor Kojima' s bold scheme for massive 
structural changes in the Asia-Pacific region I shall address myself 
mainly to the political feasibility of his proposals for aid. VVhat 
prospect is there that such sweeping technocratic plans might be 
related pragmatically to the goals and capabilities of aid donors 
today? Details aside, the key issues for practical purposes are 
political will and strategy, on the one hand, and technical and admin-
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istrative capacities, on the other. 
The most feasible component, no doubt, is fertilizer aid and 
other agricultural assistance to end Asia's food deficit and develop 
new export potentials in cash crops and minerals. In fact, a major 
drive to do just this in foodstuffs is already under way with support 
from major aid donors, further reinforced now by the Asian Devel-
opment Bank. India, for example, received $100 million in U.S. 
aid for fertilizer imports in FY 1 968, plus the foreign exchange 
costs of expanding the Trombay fertilizer plan to 500 , 000 tons 
capacity, plus loans and risk guarantees from the U.S . government 
for private plants adding another 360, 000 tons of output a year. 
All in all, India. will quadruple fertilizer production from 1 966 to 
1 970, and looks forward t o self-sufficiency in the early 70 's. 
A similar expansion is under way in Pakistan and several other 
countries . Meanwhile dramatic advances are beginning to appear 
in the field of population control as well. Here Taiwan is leading 
the way with a reduction in its rate of natural increase from 3 .O 
to 2. 5% in the last four years. 
One may hope, them, that substantial reduction of Asia's ;food 
deficit is already in progress. The most difficult cases probably 
are the very big nations, India, China and perhaps Indonesia. 
Here the sheer scale of the organizational effort required for the 
appropriate package of resource inputs and technical innovations 
poses exceptional difficulties . These difficulties are further in-
creased by the fact that foreign aid per capita tends characteristic-
ally to run at lower levels in the larger nations. Professor Kojima' s 
proposed $60 million a year in fertilizer aid to Asia over five years 
does not seem unduly large in this context. 
The total aid program in the Kojima proposal for Asia is much 
larger, however. It calls for one billion dollars a year in out-
right grants from donor nations for ten years, over and above 
present aid, and another $1 .5 billion a year in private investment 
to finance plant and equiprre nt in developing Asian industries. How 
much output or exports could result from outlays of this magnitude 
Professor Kojima does not say. In any case, these sums are quite 
fanciful, of course. No such scale of government grants is in 
sight; indeed, foreign aid is now falling even from its recent 
modest levels . And not even sweeping risk guarantees by PAFTA 
governments could possibly bring the quantum jump in foreign pri-
vate investment he proposes. In addition, domestic capital re-
quirements for infrastructure and supportive industries in recipient 
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countries would be enormous, as would be the foreign exchange 
needs for maintenance imports. One can only speculate as to 
the implications for inflation, balance of payments drains , and 
structural bottlenecks of all sorts. 
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Even then one suspects that the capital requirerre nts of the 
projected development might be the easiest to fulfill. Another big 
component not considered here is that of education, both general 
and technical. Some Ivfarshall Plan for educational aid far beyond 
the activities presently incorporated in aid programs seems im-
plicit. Still another implication of the scheme for the developing 
countries is sweeping new initiatives and controls on the part of 
government bureaucracies, may of which are already hard put to 
maintain tolerable levels of efficiency and integrity. Actually the 
Asian countries growing most rapidly today are those that are 
moving somewhat away from large-scale State intervention and 
towards greater reliance on the competitive forces of the market 
energized by private initiative. In the United States, as well, 
one wonders how Federal and state agencies could cope with the 
economic restructuring envisaged in the Kojima plan, on top of 
the urban decay and rural Appalachias that already afflict us. 
These misgivings, however, related mostly to the speed and 
scale of the transformation proposed by Professor Kojima, not to 
the goals themselves. They do not touch the validity of his long-
term targets of economic integration and growth . They argue 
only for a more gradual, piecemeal approach. 
Any realistic plan of action in foreign aid requires 
(1) a rational design, relating ends and means in some coher ent 
fashion, (2) a strategy of fulfillment that takes account of linkages 
and multipliers, and (3) the political motive power to move ahead . 
Good technocratic blueprints are essential, but so is a sound 
politico-economic strategy to implerre nt them . Are there political 
impulses and national-interest calculations that might move us 
towards the goal in question, even if much more modestly than is 
proposed here? 
On this issue I would dissent from some of the remarks in 
several Conference papers about the motivations of U.S . aid . 
If America has put $125 billion into foreign assistance, including 
$30 billion into Asia, it has not been mainly to dispose of surplus 
goods, nor to satisfy humanitarian impulses, nor even to reap the 
gains of international division of labor. These considerations 
have all been present, no doubt. But the driving compulsion has 
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been a concern for the political and military security of the United 
States . F oreign aid is an arm of foreign p olicy , directed however 
imperfectly at helping to build the kind of world in which America 
and other nations can live in peace and free d om from external 
threat. It is no accident, of course, nor any economic nor human-
itarian calculation , that has put the bulk of U . S • aid at the disposal 
of nations along the S ino- Soviet frontier. S uch allocations will 
change from year to year , along with the total sums , but the ration-
ale of aid remains geared to these political goals broadly conceived . 
For the same reason American aid has not been directed alone 
to the economic growth of recipient countries. Wider considera-
tions of nation- building enter in, i . e • , defense , internal order , 
social justice, education and other infrastructures of modern 
society . T he achievement is imperfect , of course ; there has 
been plenty of waste and miscalculation . And this has a good deal 
to do, in turn, with the rising popular mood of discouragement and 
frustration . T he worl d is intractable ; goals often conflict, long-
and short- term; and too many people -- in the words of one 
American business man in Tokyo -- regard the U.S . "as a bottom-
less pocketbook owned by someone with no problems of his own . 11 
Yet the international aid undertaking in Asia will surely con-
tinue, even if at reduced levels . Probably the U . S . and Japan 
will continue to carry the major burden . The practical task for 
econ0mic planners , then, is to grasp the opportunities that remain 
open and decide how best to shape policy towards the end of a more 
rational, peaceful world order . In agricultural development , as 
already noted, progress now under way can be accelerated by new 
agencies like the ADB . In industrial development several countries, 
notably South Korea and Taiwan , are at last acquiring potential s 
to attract substantial fore i gn private capital. In Indonesia the 
1 0- country aid program is setting a new precedent in multilateral 
action. With t he nat ions of t he P acific supplying the bulk of these 
resources, such ma t ters might usefully find a place on the agenda 
of a new Office of Pacific T rade and Development, as proposed by 
Professor K ojima . 
Finally , when the fighting stops in Vietnam, the time will come 
to embark on large- scale reconst ructi on of that war-torn country, 
and to broaden such action to embrace the whol e Mekong region . 
Already ambitious and optimi stic plans are taki ng shape in S outh 
Vietnam, as reported by David E. L ilienthal (" Post-war Develop-
ment in Vietnam, 11 F oreign Affairs , January , 1 969) . Here , too, 
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an OPT AD might help to break new ground in multilateral action, 
working through various regional institutions that are now em-
bryonic in Southeast Asia, 
To conclude, not only is progress being made, but one sees 
fresh leads that might be pursued in advancing towards the goals 
laid out by Professor Kojima. Perhaps another conference on 
Pacific trade and development is needed to explore more concrete-
ly the potentials of immediate joint action by the governments, 
international business corporations, and educational institutions 
of the Pacific • 
If so, may I add only that it should not overlook the technologi-
cal needs and political issues of that 40% of developing Asia omitted 
entirely from our discussion here. I refer especially to China, of 
course. Here is an intra-Asian gap, a North- South gap, and an 
East-West gap of crucial significance. Sooner or later China, 
and the Soviet Union as well, will need to be brought into the orbit 
of any planning for the future of the Pacific Basin. 
Chapter 5 
TRADE POLICY - THE CATALYST FOR DEVELOPMENT 
H. Edward English 
Apart from East-West relations, the most important external challen~ 
to the North Atlantic countries comes from the developing world. We arE 
at a very dangerous stage in the relationship between the developed and 
developing world. After twenty years of growing awareness of the 
difficulties of political and economic development, a feeling of frustration 
has arisen in most of the countries of Western Europe and North America 
This feeling has emerged from several features of our experience with 
development and development aid . 
In the first place, there is a general attitude arisrng out of what is 
called the ineffectiveness of aid, and in particular this is associated 
with the view that social institutions in the developing countries are 
not really compatible with the effective absorption of external aid . 
A second and related aspect is the experience of frustration of 
development through population explosion. Western countries have 
seen GNP rise in many countries of Asia and Latin America, but have 
seen also much of the benefits associated with this material progress 
used up in the rapidly rising population. 
A third aspect is the weakness or conflict in political regimes. 
In every part of the developing world, regimes have had difficulty in 
achieving sufficient political stability to guarantee the acceptance 
and administration of strong development programs; or even where 
there have been built up reasonably effective administration, where 
there has been some agreement on the nature of economic and social 
planning and a consensus on a particular plan, conflict has entered 
in to deplete the resources both of administrative talent and finances. 
Vietnam, Nigeria, the Middle East, India, Pakistan -- all these 
names are associated not only with efforts at development but with 
conflict as a major setback in the political and economic evolution of 
the particular country. Even the great success stories, such as 
those of South Korea and Taiwan, are regarded as situations of 
special circumstances. Small countries which have managed to 
"take off" -- to use the now rather hackneyed terminology -- but 
have taken off only with such massive aid that if one were to apply 
on a per capita or any other basis the same aid requirements for 
other, larger countries, one could not contemplate a real possibility 
of achieving sustained development by that means. 
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However, not all the signs are gloomy. There are opportuni-
ties for more hopeful development policies in the future. For 
example, we have learned that capital is not everything in economic 
and social development and that different kinds of technical assist-
ance are required to create the right conditions for the use 
of capital in the various developing countries . Often the demand 
for capital is not really present , because the motivation of people 
is not toward the effecti ve use of the capital instrument in the direc-
tion of economic growth. The most important requirement for many 
parts of the developing world is now seen to be an upgrading of 
resources -- improvement of the quality of labour through educatiom 
and health services and some a t tack upon those social institutions 
or aspects of social institutions which remove the motivation for 
economic growth. Of course, it i s still recognized that when one 
talks about attacking social institutions in order to achieYe economic 
growth, one immediately raises the question as to whether develop-
ment itself is not a serious intervention into the developing country's 
social preference patterns, and one must get down to the fundamental 
issue as to whether development is really wanted. Assuming , how-
ever, that it is wanted, technical assistance in all its varied forms 
has become the top priority. A second lesson has been learned 
largely by the developing countries themselves during the postwar 
world. This is their discovery that planning is not everything and 
that, indeed, the market economy can help to reduce the work of the 
planner--can not only discipline the planner himself, but serve as a 
discipline upon the private elements in the economy whic h enables 
the planner to devote his energies to top priority public interventi on. 
Related to the discovery that planning is something that should be 
used in small doses before it is used too comprehensively is the 
discovery that foreign private capital may bring a helpful package of 
aid to development. 
To tie together some of this thinking, I suppose one could con-
clude that there has been a growing recognition of the nature of the 
development program required for the future . A balanced program 
incorporating at least three main ingredients : first, appropriate 
policies by the recipient country. I mean by that a set of policies 
which will make the best use both of domestic resources and of any 
resources that can be made available from external sources. The 
recipient country should be able to choose its policy program without 
having to limit its growth projects on grounds that an inadequate 
amount of foreign capital is available. Of course, in any one year 
there are limits to the amount of foreign resources that a country can 
expect to obtain. But it should not have to place balance of payments 
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considerations at the top of its list of constraints upon development 
planning. Balance of payments considerations ought to be secondary 
to determination as to reasonable growth targets and the most 
appropriate allocations of resources to achieve these targets in areas 
with maximum growth potential. It is not, of course, easy to apply 
this kind of criterion, but it certainly must be hoped that we have 
come some distance from the simplistic view that the secret of 
development is in the movement of resources into manufacturing 
industries, out of agriculture, and that we have to give hostages at 
all points to status symbols such as airlines and steel mills. One 
of the greatest problems in this connection lies in the ability of 
political leaders of developing countries to carry with them the 
majorities in their population, when those majorities may not have 
the political sophistication to recognize the costliness of status 
symbols. And related to this challenge to the political l eadership 
is the problem of just how the donor countries can best contribute 
policy advice to the developing countries. Clearly, some of the 
aid programs of the past, especially the bilateral aid programs, 
have involved real difficulties so far as the giving of advice is 
concerned. Sensitivity on the part of developing countries when 
the donor country ties any string - or appears to tie any string -
t o aid is understandable, but it is a costly kind of sensitivity when 
and if the donor country could be giving useful advice as to the most 
efficient application of aid. This brings me to the second major 
component of a balanced development program, the opportunity for 
trade. 
One of the striking developments of the last four or five years 
has been the realization by the developing countries themselves that 
t rade can play a much bigger role in development . Of course, the 
issue this poses is how to reduce the trade barriers and stimulate 
the flow of exports from the developing country. Much of what I 
have to say in the rest of this talk relates to this question, so I will 
postpone further discussion until I have introduced at least the 
third element in a development program. 
The third element is, of course, aid itself . I put it last because 
I think the view of aid now is that aid is the residual factor -- the 
factor that must be brought in to provide the missing resources . 
Resources that are missing in the sense that without those resources 
development would be made more difficult, because development 
would generate the kind of fundamental balance of payments difficul-
ties which would make it much more expensive for a developing 
country to achieve the desired advance . To round out, then, the 
balanced development program requires a policy program for the 
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recipient country, an opportunity for trade, and aid programs to 
make possible the effective operation of the first two factors. 
I think that the question of trade has become important both 
economically and politically. We must recognize that, although it 
has been possible in the past and it might be possible in the future, 
at least on the lines of economic argument, to argue that massive 
aid would solve all problems (this is the position adopted by a few 
American economists), it is really unrealistic to think of aid being 
achieved by the "massive aid" route. Economically, the great 
importance of trade lies in the contribution it makes to efficiency in 
development. Not only does it enable the developing country to 
specialize, to assign the resources to lines of productive activity 
which are likely to produce the greatest returns, and also to import 
those goods which it is not economically wise for them to produce; 
but trade also introduces competitiveness into development, which 
can make an important contribution to the motivation and the 
managerial sharpness of those who are producing in the developing 
countries. And I might add that this should apply whether those 
producers and managers are operating in publicly owned or privately 
owned enterprises. On the political side, the contribution that trade 
opportunities can make to the development process arises out of the 
problem of efficiency also. If trade is contributing to a more 
efficient use of aid and investment activity, then the disillusionment 
which has arisen in the past out of the failures of aid and investment 
programs may begin to disappear. Furthermore, and this is a point 
that is seldom stressed, trade concessions on the part of developed 
countries give those countries a stronger bargaining position in 
respect to the developing countries. It is much easier for a trading 
partner who is making a concession to ask for changes on the part 
of the other trading partner in his domestic policies as well as in 
his trading policies than it is for the same trading partner to demand 
or expect concessi ons if he happens to be a donor of aid. I am 
convinced that we must begin to think big in trade policy; we in the 
developed world must contemplate a generalization of unilateral free 
access for the developing countries' exports. Unless we do this, 
I think we will not be able t o turn the tide in a favourable direction 
in respect of aid, and we will not be making the contribution expected 
of us to efficiency in development. 
So there are two necessary ingredients if a mass ive trade policy 
program is to have much chance of success. First, as I have already 
implied , if trade is to be effective as a contributor to the development 
process, it must be a part of a balanced program which I will, for 
the purposes of illustration, call "regional development schemes." 
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If I may be permitted to digress a moment, I think it is ironic 
that major countries such as the United States, who have always 
regarded the security question as appropriate for regional treatment, 
should have generally stayed away from the contemplation of regional-
ism in the trade field. It is not hard to see why, historically, because 
there might have been some concern about a regional approach to trade 
liberalization, but I think that a tendency to persist in the antipathy 
to regionalism in trade reflects rather a lack of willingness to con-
template new policies for new situations. 
The elements of any regional development scheme should, I 
believe, include the following. First, the less developed countries 
should be given free access to the markets of the developing countries, 
either generally, if that is possible, or, if it is impossible at first, 
on a regional basis. Secondly, the less developed countries should 
be encouraged to form free trade associations or, if they wish, 
customs unions in their regions. Third, the less developed coun-
tries should be encouraged to reduce their external tariff, or at 
least bind it against increases with an expression of intent to review 
and reduce it at some specified time in the future. The purpose 
of this is not merely to allow for the possibility that they will become 
developed and no longer need their protection, but also to ensure 
that they do not divert resources from their most effective uses by 
retaining ridiculously high levels of protection. Fourthly, the less 
developed countries should be encouraged to work out a domestic 
policy program which will assist the specialization of their indus-
tries in the direction implied by the free trade grouping and unilateral 
access to developed country markets. And finally, fifth, the 
developed countries should offer aid and guaranteed private invest-
ment on a basis which will help to ensure that balance of payments 
problems will not frustrate the working out of the benefits of the 
trade and development scheme. 
Now all these components of a regional development scheme 
should, of course, be working together. The thing that distinguishes 
this concept from previous development ideas is the stress given to 
the trade component. I want to emphasize that none of us who look 
at the economics of development should have any illusions about the 
rate at which the developing countries can become major exporters, 
particularly of manufactures, to the developed world. And I think 
very often the failure to place adequate importance on the trade ques-
tion has arisen from the feeling that trade would not greatly improve 
the balance of payments situation of the developing countries in the 
short run. Of course it won't. In economic terms, the supply 
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elasticities of these countries are not going to be high in the short 
run. But what is important is that the adoption of liberal trade 
policies by the developed countries and the encouragement of more 
attention to trading opportunities in the developing countries will 
direct the attention of those countries to their most promising 
development opportunities, assuming, of course, that domestic 
policy will not frustrate this international market discipline. 
I said a little while ago that there were two necessary ingredients 
for trade to make its most important contribution to econorr.ic develop-
ment. One of these is the need for a regional development scheme. 
The second, I think, is the need for joint action by the developed 
countries themselves. The developed countries -- in the largest 
sense -- the Atlantic community plus Japan, Australia, and New 
Zealand -- this group of countries can make progress toward 
unilateral free access needed by the developing world only if it is 
prepared to act in a coordinated and cooperative fashion. I think 
it very hard to imagine any one country, even a major country, 
offering free access alone. We see in the European experience the 
relationship of the EEC to the former French colonies in Africa an 
example of the way in which free access, of a limited sort to be sure, 
was given to a group of developing countries as a feature of the 
establishment of the Common Market. I think the politics and the 
situation of the world more generally suggest a similiar, though 
perhaps more ambitious, approach, using the same principles. 
There is a real opportunity for, let us say , the United States to 
initiate a regional development scheme by calling upon other members 
of the developed world to participate both in making these major 
trade concessions and aid contributions to the developing world. 
To be more specific , the formation of an open-ended free trade 
association amongst the developed countries could give them the kind 
of mutual exchange advantages which will increase their own income, 
and thus their ability to give aid. A number of the estimates of the 
benefits of complete free trade to developed countries have indicated 
that the size of the gains from free trade would be in the order of 
perhaps one percent of GNP (larger for certain countries, such as 
Canada, Australia, and possibly Japan). This one percent of GNP 
looks small, but it is, of course, the aim of the developing countries, 
the familiar measure of the aid contribution they wanted from the 
developed world. Surely it would be a significant factor, given the 
levels of aid already achieved, even if half of the gains from trade 
could be made available to the development process. In the long run, 
of course, the income implications for both developed and develping 
countries would be much larger than the initial a~d static measure-
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ment of gains from trade implied., 
Among the developed countr.ies, the larger countries such as 
the United States would, of course, have a primarily political motiva-
tion for initiating any development scheme based upon mutual coopera-
tion and free trade association amongst the developed countries . 
For the smaller countries, of course, the stimulus to participate 
would be greater. In Canada, for example, where there are much 
more benefits to be derived from trade liberalization -- more gains 
from trade to be realized -- the opportunity for participation in a 
free trade association involving the United States and other developed 
countries would present an exciting potential for the realization of 
more efficient industry and more specialized lines of economic 
development in manufacturing in this country . It is difficult to 
imagine any alternative trade policy which could produce -eql!ivalent 
benefits for the Canadian economy. ' 
The major responsibility of the developed countries is to mini-
mize discrimination in trade, while at the same time making as large 
as possible a contribution to economic development. The ways in 
which this can be done may be varied, but I find it difficult to 
contemplate any method more likely of success than the one I have 
indicated: namely, first an open-ended free trade association, open 
to all the developed countries; second, a wide application of the 
regional development scheme concept; and third, negotiations under 
GATT to bring down whatever barriers remain between regional 
groups . (I might also add that a fourth need i s to devise ways of 
increasing trade between the East and the West, insofar as it remains 
difficult for the Eastern European countries to participate in the 
free trade association approach . ) 
Now, finally, what are the prospects for this approach to trade 
and development? First of all, let me say that in Latin America 
and in Southeast Asia there are very real possibilities for this kind 
of approach. We must remember that the Latin American themselves 
have adopted in principle the concept of a free trade association, or 
even customs union, in the whole of Latin America . In Southeast 
Asia, while they have not proposed formally any such association, it 
is considered quite possible that regional development schemes based 
upon the existing regional institutions of that part of the world could 
be extended to trade policy arrangements. The Japanese have shown 
an interest in such an arrangement. The areas in which the applica-
tion of regional development schemes of the kind I have been talking 
about would prove more difficult are South Asia and Africa. In the 
case of South Asia, the size of the development problem in India and 
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Pakistan is such that it would certainly be necessary for a very large 
number of developed countries to cooperate. The ideal, at least 
before Czechoslovakia and Vietnam had interfered with detente, 
would have been a development scheme involving the United States 
and Japan and the Soviet Union, with such European cooperation as 
might have been forthcoming. The Soviet Union could participate 
in a South Asia development scheme by making generous commitments 
to import the kind of products exported to other developed countries. 
However, I will not speculate more now on this rather remote 
possibility. 
In Africa, the problem is of course quite different because the 
countries of Africa have so recently achieved political independence, 
and in so many cases still have to achieve a measure of political 
maturity that would enable them to accept such limitations on thier 
sovereignty as are implicit in the notion of regional free trade areas. 
But I am wondering how far away such projects really are from 
reality. In East Africa, for example, the regional free trade arrange-
ment between Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya has survived the difficul-
ties which closer integration efforts have experienced . And it 
should be, over the years, increasingly possible for the very small 
countries of West Africa to see that they could achieve economic 
benefits by integration, while at the same time retaining the essential 
element of their political independence. 
Well, these are very big, far-reaching, and we probably should 
also say presumptuous, ideas about the possible course of future 
development and the role that the Atlantic countries might play. One 
can conclude that it is all highly unrealistic and that the world is a 
much less promising place than these kinds of schemes imply it can 
be. I think I would have to end, however, by saying that unless we 
are prepared to make major steps, either as individual or small 
groups of Atlantic countries, or more hopefully as a whole, toward 
the solution of the great development problem, we are going to be 
confronted with the danger of conflict and of grass root chaos which 
would make the story of Biafra so general as to be terrifying. 
K. KOJIMA AND I. YAMAZAWA - H. E. ENGLISH 
DISCUSSION OF PAPERS PRESENTED BY B. W. WILKINSON, 
K . KOJIMA AND I. YAMI~ZAvVA, /\.ND H. E. ENGLISH 
In reply to comments on his paper, Professor Nilkinson thank-
ed Professor J ohnson not only for raising the important questions 
about the techniques of analysis he had used but also for providing 
many of the answers to those questions. He wondered whether it 
were true, as Professor r.-;c Dougall had suggested, that analysis 
of the effects of integration based upon existing trade patterns was 
largely an irrelevant exercise for countries like Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand, because of the overwhelming importance of other, 
dynamic, effects. He thought that the i mportant things in trade com-
petitiveness, and the established patterns of trading, were market 
connections and w h o had taken the initiative in international market-
ing. T his appeared true also where the possibility of scale econo-
mies exists. In that case, analysis based on existing trade struc-
tures might be more relevant than it seems at first sight. 
Professor 'Nilkinson said that in his elasticity estimates for 
agricultural exports from New Z ealand, he had relied heavily on 
work published recently by T urnovsky which sets the aggregate 
elasticity of demand for New Zealand's exports between 0. 6 and 
0 . 8 . 
Professor Vifilkinson went on to suggest that the terms of trade 
loss in real income for the increa sed-trade-deficit countries may 
not turn out to be the most important factor. On t his point, the 
Nonnacott study for Canada is illuminating . T he -Nonnacotts estimat-
ed that gains due to the realization of economies of scale, lower 
consumer prices, and productivity increases might amount to 10% 
of G.N.P. However, the Nonnacott study may have been a little 
too optimistic about the effects of free trade on inG.ustrial location . 
'Other studies by the Canadian government indicate that, despite 
certain cost advantages deriving from location in Canada, free 
trade in North America might induce American firms previously 
operat ing in Canada to re - locate closer to the final market in the 
States. T he effects on location in Australia and New Zealand 
could be expecte d t o be qu i te different because of the distance 
factor and other marketin g factors . 
In reply t o comments on hi.s paper, P rofessor Kojima confes-
s ed that he had taken a deliberately extreme positi on in putting 
fo r ward his proposals but pleaded academic privil ege. He argued 
that it was important to think about the ultimate structure of world 
trade , and to try to visualize the adjustments that would be neces-
sary if developing countries were to fit into it. He agreed that the 
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nature of structural adjustment, both from the viewpoints of govern-
ment planning and private business planning, requires future study. 
But he re-asserted that the jolt of structural adjustment resulting 
from reciprocated trade concessions among advanced countries 
should make it easier to make room in advanced country markets for 
imports from developing countries. 
Professor Kojima also agreed that UNCT AD had played a use-
ful propagandist role in encouraging a more positive approach to 
trade policies towards developing nations. But he believed that in 
order to solve the more urgent problems, it would be necessary to 
adopt a regional approach to tra<,le and development policy. Develop-
ing countries comprise a heterogeneous group, at different stages 
of development, with different interests in different places. Whilst 
fully recognising the dangers of being accused of excessive patern-
alism, of fostering over-dependence, or of neo-imperialism, he 
remained convinced that a regional approach was the most promis-
ing. He maintained that his proposals were feasible in principle . 
T he real question was who should start the ball rolling? The United 
States now appears hesitant. Why not Japan? It would, of course, 
be preferable if Japan could join with a group of advanced countries 
for the purpose of initiating these new development policies. 
Discussion of Professor Wilkinson's paper centered on cer-
tain technical aspects of his estimation procedures and the effect 
they had on his estimates . Discussion of Professor Kojima' s and 
Mr. Y d.mazawa 1 s paper centered on the question of whether it was 
wise to combine moves towards freer trade among advanced countries 
with the extension of trade concessions and economic assistance 
towards developing countries . 
Attention was drawn to two biases in Professor V/ilkinson' s 
estirm tion procedures, both of which adversely affected his measure -
ment of the export response from Australia and New Zealand. A 
New Zealand participant questioned the relevance of Turnovsky 1 s 
elasticity estimates, referring to estimates of the elasticity of de-
mand for Australian wool made by Horner. More recent studies by 
the Australian Bureau of Agricultural Economics also put the price 
elasticity of demand in excess of 1 .O. Another participant argued 
that the growth of competition from synthetics was likely to have in-
creased the price elasticity of demand for wool from Australia and 
New Zealand. An Australian participant pointed to the bias in 
estimation which resulted from no account having been taken of non-
tariff trade barriers, which were of special significance for agri-
cultural exports to Japan and the United States. For example, the 
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tariff on meat imports into Japan is 10%, but the tariff equivalent 
of import restrictions is probably in the order of 200 or 300% • 
This divergence is typical over the whole range of agricultural com-
modities of importance in the export structures of Australia and 
New Zealand. Incorporation of the effect of quantitative restrictions 
into the analysis would, it was suggested, make a tremendous dif-
ference to estimates of the balance of trade effects of a free trade 
area on these two countries . 
Another participant was concerned about the " neo-mercantilist " 
emphasis in estimates of the effects of the formation of a free trade 
area. He said that it was surely important to calculate the welfare 
effects of these changes in the aggregate value of trade in order to 
assess precisely the benefits of a free trade area. Professor 
Wilkinson accepted this comment as fair, and went on to point out 
that the exercise should really consist of three parts - calculation 
of the static trade effects, calculation of the welfare effects deriv-
ing from the static trade effects, and calculation of the welfare ef-
fects deriving from dynamic changes. He added that it was common 
to assume familiarity with the literature and go on from there -
although perhaps this assumption was unjustified in public discussion. 
There was also some discussion of the adjustment problem re-
sulting from the freeing of areal trade. Professor Johnson argued 
that it was reasonable to assume that the adjustments would take 
care of themselves since the changes in tariffs, etc. would be im-
plemented over a longish period of tirre .. Others were concerned 
about short-run balance of payments problems, or problems of 
structural unemployment, during the adjustment period. 
An American participant wondered whether transport costs 
across the Pacific contributed an obstacle to the free trade area. 
Others pointed out that it was generally cheaper to transport bulk 
commoditie s across the Pacific than across the American or European 
continents and that the trends in transport technology increasingly 
favored sea transport. 
In discussion of Professor Kojima' s paper, the logic of combin-
ing a move towards the establishment of a free trade area with the 
extension of trade preferences and economic assistance for develop-
ing countries was queried. One participant said that he understood 
that the reason for combining the two operations was that adjustment 
had to be made in both directions at the same time. But he said that 
this need not mean that a free trade area was a necessary prere-
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quisite for the extension of trade preferences. He was also con-
cerned about the possibility of over-dependence on, and charges of 
imperialism against, particular advanced countries. Participants 
from developing countries were not concerned about that problem, 
especially if there were associations between a group of advanced 
countries, and a group of developing countries. One referred to 
the growing maturity of developing country nationalism. A new 
generation of national leaders had now succeeded the old post-colo-
nial generation in Asia, and their attitude was more permissive of 
advanced country involvement in the economic development of their 
peoples. The danger of compartmentalisation, referred to in 
UNCT AD, might be overcome by regional in place of bilateral con-
nections between developed and less developed countries. 
Other participants stressed the role of technological transfer 
in the development process. It was felt that there might be some 
scope for the foundation of a regional institution, similar to the IRRI, 
which specialized in the adaptation and dissemination of technology 
for use in light manufacturing industries. 
Part III 
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
AMONG ADVANCED PACIFIC COUNTRIES AND ASIAN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Chapter 6 
Alternative Policies in Trade Cooperation of the 
Advanced Pacific Countries in the next Five Years 
L. V. Castle 
I Introduction 
At the first Conference on Pacific trade and development in 
Tokyo last January we ranged fairly widely over many of the issues 
that are involved in extending the degree of economic cooperation 
among the advanced countries of the Pacific Basin. Although our 
attention was focussed on this question and on its relationship to 
that of assisting the developing economies of the area there was a 
general consensus that Pacific economic cooperation even if confin-
ed to Japan, Australia and New Zealand could not logically be 
pursued in isolation from the main stream of thought and action in 
the world at large about trade and aid policies in general. 
Any discussion of alternative policies in trade cooperation 
among the advanced Pacific countries therefore really needs to be 
preceded by some view of these broader issues . These are, 
however, touched on only briefly in this paper because they are to 
be dealt with more fully in the papers by Dr. Sperry L ea and Pro-
fessor Johnson. In addition, during the past twelve months a 
number of important papers have been published, especially those 
under the auspices of the Atlantic Trade Study, which have con-
tributed much to thinking about the development of world trade and 
aid policies . Again since some of the alternatives in trade coop-
eration are the subject of separate papers I shall not attempt to 
cover the same ground but will approach the subject with a view 
primarily arriving at some assessment of what seems desirable 
directions of policy and of what seems politically possible to achieve 
or at least to set in train among some or all of the advanced Pacific 
countries in the next five years. 
In summary, the position taken in the paper is that it is unreali-
stic to envisage within that time the establishment of any trading 
regime among the five countries concerned which involves discrim-
nation against non-members; and further that even if conceived as 
a longer term, though intermediate, goal on the way to world free 
trade would need to follow rather than precede a free trade ar-
rangement centred on the North Atlantic where the more important 
economic i~1terests of two of the suggested members, Canada and the 
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United States, presently lie. This indeed amounts to no more than 
agreement with the view advanced
1 
cy Professor Johnson in his 
paper and summary of discussion ,1 J last year on which there 
appeared to be a general consensus among the participants. 
The main part of the paper is concerned with other sugges-
tions that have been made from time to time for the conclusion of 
special trading arrangements within the more limited circle of 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Again, the view taken is one 
of doubt about the desirability of such steps (especially as far as a 
customs union or free trade area of general or restricted scope is 
concerned) and that, even if desirable, a considerable amount of 
groundwork needs to be done before the parties are likely to be 
willing to come to the negotiating table. An alternative and less 
rigorous association is suggested as a practical step, building on 
the institutional arrangements which already exist, and providing 
a framework within which particular deliberate efforts might be 
made to remove obstacles to the development of more far-reaching 
arrangements in trade cooperation, such as a general free trade 
area. It is suggested too that United States and Canadian member-
ship would be possible in such a flexible type of association with-
out conflicting with their North Atlantic trade interests or the 
development of a global trade strategy . 
II ·Norld Trade Policy 
Although there remain important areas in which only a modest 
degree of liberalisation has been secured, or worse still where 
restrictions have been increased, the achievements over the past 
twenty years in reducing trade barriers are undoubtedly impressive. 
Much of this has occurred under the aegis of GATT through 
successive rounds of tariff negotiations and through the pressure 
brought to bear in that forum against non-tariff trade barriers • 
In addition, however, the past ten years has seen the formation of 
the E.E.C. and the E.F.T.A., both of which add substantially to 
the area over which free trade or virtually free trade i s a fact of 
life. . The tariff reductions negotiated in the Kennedy Round, 
although in many cases less than had earlier been hoped for, must 
(1) "Pacific Trade and Development" Papers and Proceedings, 
ed. K. Kojima, J .E .R .C. February, 1968. 
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be regarded as a major achievement, not simply as a general tariff-
cutting exercise, but, when the reductions come fully into force, as 
significantly weakening the discriminatory effects of European 
regional integration. 
All of these developments make it possible now to postulate 
world free trade as a major policy objective, whereas twenty years 
or even ten years ago this must have been dismissed as an idle 
dream. As an objective it is relevant, not only to the industrial-
ised countries of Europe, North America and Japan, but also to the 
developing economies in which there appears to be dawning realisa-
tion that policies of protectionism and of manufacturing development 
based on import substitution are likely to retard rather than 
promote their economic growth . This is true also of New Zealand, 
which in the past has made extensive use of import quotas as a 
means of fostering industrial development, but is now moving slowly 
towards a more liberal industrial policy in which the emphasis is 
on export development, international competitiveness and compara-
tive advantage rather than on import substitution in a small do-
mestic market and on manufacturing development almost for its own 
sake. 
Though a conceivable objective, world free trade is neverthe-
less a long way off; but it has a significance even at the present time 
as an organising principle or frame of reference in the development 
of new trade policy initiatives . The concept of a N.A.F.T.A. as 
an open-ended free trade area which any country might join is cer-
tainly consistent with that principle if the removal of tariffs is ac-
companied by a set rules designed to ensure reasonable equality of 
opportunity to benefit. But a NAFTA which excludes Japan or any 
deve loping country because of fears of strong competition in certain 
politically sensitive areas of manufacturing or excludes agricultural 
products (thus effectively denying Australia and New Zealand the 
opportunity of participation) is not consistent. Indeed, a NAFT A of 
this kind would not be addressing itse lf to its main rationale, namely 
as a means of handling the urgent problem of providing full opportuni-
ties for the developing countries to expand their exports of primary 
products and manufactured goods to the developed countries, an 
essential requirement, along with an adequate aid programe, if their 
economic growth is to be promoted. This the Kennedy Round failed 
to do. There is a danger that unless any initiative is viewed as 
a step toward the ultimate goal, the easier parth of ignorfog 
agriculture and the developing countries 1 problems would be 
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taken. Whatever justification that course might have in terms of 
strengthening the industrialised economies of the North Atlantic 
and the political cohesion of that part of the world, it would amount 
to turning aside from the main political problem of our time, rela-
tions between North and South. Thus, the approach suggested is 
that the focus of attention should be on these Kennedy Round re-
sidual problems - agriculture, market access for developing 
countries and non-tariff barriers - allowing a NAFTA or any 9f the 
other initiatives suggested for example by Professor Johnson l2) to 
emerge as instruments for dealing with them through a mutual shar-
ing of the burdens of readjustment that would be required of the 
industrialised nations. It is not of course suggested that any new 
approach to trade policy should be judged solely by the criterion of 
how effective it might be in dealing with the problems of the develop-
ing countries. One cannot reasonably expect altruism of such an 
order. But unless these problems are accepted as an integral part 
of any new negotiation, there is the danger that, as in the Kennedy 
Round, these difficult issues will go on being put to one side in 
spite of initial declarations that they would not. Compromise of 
this kind is virtual failure. No bread is sometimes better than half 
of the wrong loaf. 
The prospects of using a move toward North Atlantic free trade 
as a means of resolving these problems depends crucially upon the 
United States, although the policies of European countries are also 
relevant. There is no sign, however, that the United States is 
ready to contemplate a major initiative of this sort; indeed the signs 
all seem to point to a standstill for some years ahead. The Kennedy 
Round tariff reductions are to come into force over a period of five 
years. In the light of the resurgence of domestic protectionist 
forces it would not be unexpected if the new United States Admin-
istration were to prefer to delay any major new moves toward freer 
trade until the domestic political repercussions are more clearly 
seer.. Moreover, there are the pressing probleme of the United 
States balance of payments and the continued international stability 
of the dollar both of which place severe constraints on what the 
United States may be willing to contemplate. In any event a new 
initiative could not be taken except in concert with main trading 
partners - in particular Canada and the United Kingdom and probab-
(2) "World Trade Policy in the Post-Kennedy Round Era": 
Economic Record, June, 1968. 
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ly also the EEC. The United Kingdom position is still firmly that 
of joining the EEC and despite continuing rebuff, it does not seem 
likely that in the next few years she will reverse that policy and 
look across the Atlantic for an alternative to the wider trading 
partnership which, primarily for political reasons, she seeks in 
Europe. 
The political, military and economic interests of the United 
States being mainly Atlantic-centred impose an obvious further 
constraint on what policies can be adopted in other areas of the 
world. Given the difficulties that already exist about the level 
of some Japanese imports into the United States and comparing the 
relative importance of Japan, Australia and New Zealand as trade 
partners with the North Atlantic countries, it is hardly conceivable 
that the United States would be willing to enter into a free trade 
relationship in the Pacific while not prepared to do so in the North 
Atlantic. In addition, Pacific free trade would require discrimina-
tion against Europe, an outcome which would be contrary to the 
major policy of maintaining a strong political and military alliance 
with that region. On the other hand, it would not be in United 
States interests in the Pacific to have discrimination against Japan. 
Thus while new trade policy initiatives must be centred on the 
Atlantic, it would be important that Japan either be included in any 
negotiations - the most desirable course since the burden of adjust-
ment would not then rest solely with the United States - or a 
subsequent negotiation with Japan would be necessary to provide 
equal access with Euro~Je to the Unite~~ States market. 
III Japan-Australia-New Zealand Trade Co- operation 
The obstacles to any early establishment of a Pacific Area F ree 
Trade Agreement have re-awakened interest in the possibility of 
closer economic integration among Japan , Australia and New 
Zealand. Since this topic is the subject of papers by Dr . Drysdale 
and Professor McDougall only some general observations are made 
here. 
On the face of it the idea seems attractive . Trade between 
the three countries has in recent years grown faster than with any 
other trading partners • In the case of Australia, Japan is now 
that country's most important single market taking some 21 % of 
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Australian exports in 1 968 compared with 4% in 1 950. Exports to 
Japan consist overwhelmingly of wool, other agricultural raw 
materials, minerals and fuels and foodstuffs. On the import side, 
Japan is much less important as a source of supply , providing only 
1 0% in 1 968 although this was a marked change from the share of 
1 % in 1950. The composition of imports is almost the reverse of 
the export pattern, with metal manufactures, chemicals, machinery 
and transport equipment and textiles comprising 94% of the total. 
This high degree of complementarity is true also of Japan/New 
Zealand trade. Exports of New Zealand to Japan consist mainly of 
meat, wool, dairy products and forest products but like Australia 
imports are nearly all in the categories of machinery, textiles, 
manufacturers raw materials and components, chemicals and other 
heavy industrial goods. The importance of Japan as a trade partner 
is less marked than is the case with Australia, Japan taking 9% of 
exports and providing 6% of imports in the year ended September 
1968. The main reason lies in the different nature of the two coun-
tries export structure. Raw materials and minerals from Australia 
are not subject to import barriers in Japan whereas these have been 
a major handicap to the expansion of foodstuffs exports from New 
Zealand. Furthermore , Australia has pursued a policy of market 
diversification toward the Pacific much more vigorously than has 
New Zealand which retains (there is no real alternative at present) 
strong trading links with the United Kingdom. 
Two possible forms of economic integration between the three 
countries have been suggested, a customs union and a free trade 
area of general or limited scope i.e. sectoral integration. If 
anything, the free trade area approach is clearly preferable. A 
customs union requires agreement on a common external tariff which 
would be almost imposs ible to negotiate. The existence of a 
preferential tariff system in favour of the United Kingciom and other 
Commonwealth countries is a major difficulty; but a customs union 
also implies a much greater identity of cultural background, foreign 
policy objectives and external trade and economic relationships 
among other things , than exists among the three • A customs union 
between Australia and New Zealand on the other hand would be much 
more practicable, (indeed the idea of full political union between the 
two has been advocated from time to time) but there is as yet insuf-
ficient perceived identity of interest to make it a proposition worth 
pursuing. 
A free trade area on the other hand is a much more flexible 
instrument, with each party left free to determine its own relations 
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with non-members. Moreover, it can more readily accommodate 
new members or fit into any more comprehensive arrangement that 
might eventually be negotiated among other countries with which the 
members have strong trading links. The benefits and costs of a 
free trade area between the three countries have nevertheless yet 
to be adequately assessed . Given the nature of each of the three 
economies one might expect that Australia and New Zealand would 
benefit from a more rational and specialised development of their 
manufacturing industries and also from much better access to the 
Japanese market for agricultural products . Japan for her part 
would gain from the elimination of high cost agricultural production 
and from better access for(h~r industrial products to the Australian 
and New Zealand markets. 3) A free trade area would effectively 
require, however, the elimination of the present Commonwealth 
preferences which are bound to the United Kingdom in terms of trade 
agreements with that country . In addition to the contractual 
preferences accorded the United Kingdom, both countries accord 
non-contractual preferences which in the case of New Zealand com-
monly range around 1 2!% - 1 5% in addition to the average contrac-
tual margin of about 10% • In some important cases such as 
motorcars and machinery the non-contractual margin is in excess 
of 30% • Elimination of these contractual and non-contractual 
preferences would almost certainly result in a substantial diversion 
of import trade away from the United Kingdom, especially in the 
case of New Zealand. Both countries must therefore assume that 
the preferential treatment accorded their exports to the United 
Kingdom would be withdrawn. This might not be of great concern 
for most exports as regards preferential tariff treatment in the 
United Kingdom, but the withdrawal of the present guarantees of 
freedom of access for meat and dairy produce could open the way 
for the imposition of quotas by the United Kingdom for the protec-
tion of its farmers. Nor could New Zealand and Australia expect 
the United Kingdom to take or to maintain the present measures to 
protect their exports against dumping from other countries. The 
loss of these privileges would not follow automatically even if the 
trade agreements were to be abandoned since the United Kindom is 
unable to supply her own requirements. But it is to the United 
(3) For a fuller discussion see I .A .rv:cDougall, "The Prospects of 
the Economic Integration of Japan, Australia and New Zealand" 
in K .Kojima (ed.) "Papers and Proceedings of a Conference on 
Pacific Trade and Development n J.E. R. C. Tokyo, February 
1968. 
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Kingdom's advantage to accept the cheapest supplies offering, 
regardless of whether or not they are dumped or subsidised . 
Withdrawal of her preferential tariff advantages in Australia and 
New Zealand in favour of Japan would encourage her to do so. 
However, this problem only applies to dairy produce, which 
constitutes a very small part of Australia's exports and while a 
greater proportion in New Zealand's case are of declining impor-
tance. Also the current discussions in Geneva on the dairy produce 
problem seem likely to be successful in establishing some order in 
the trade under a system of minimum export prices coupled with a 
programme of food aid. For these reasons the withdrawal of 
British preferences may not entail unacceptable retaliation by 
Britain, which would at least retain preferential advantages over 
all non-Commonwealth countries other than Japan. 
But a free trade arrangement would also mean the elimination 
of the preferential position which Australia and New Zealand enjoy 
in each others 1 markets, both in terms of Commonwealth preference 
and in terms of the Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area 
Agreement concluded in 1965. If that were to happen (and a 
JANFTA would not make much sense unless it did), Australia would 
face serious competition from Japan in the New Zealand market. 
Although exports to New Zealand amount to only 6% of Australia's 
t otal exports, nearly all of these are manufactured goods. Indeed, 
New Zealand is Australia 1 s principal market for these products . 
The converse also applies. New Zealand has its main market for 
manufactured goods is Australia and would not relish the prospect 
of J apanese competition in that market under a free trade regime. 
Manufactured goods form only about 10% of New Zealand's total 
exports, but they have been growing very rapidly in the last few 
years - over 80% in the last twelve months • The target is that 
they should expand by nearly 450% between 1966/67 and 1 977 /78, 
as a necessary element in achieving a growth rate of 4% in Gross 
National Product and as part of the policy of reducing New 
Zealand's dependence on exports of agricultural produce • 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that Japanese free 
trade competition would seriously reduce Australia/New Zealand 
trade in manufactured goods. Many of the commodities exported 
by New Zealand such as carpets, processed foodstuffs, machinery 
and forest products , are exported to other markets as well, where 
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they do not receive preferential tariff advantages. T he same may 
be said of Australia. 
Other factors, Such as strong connections between Australian 
and New Z ealand business firms and the a vailability of regular . 
transport services, especially by a i r, would also act as non-tari ff 
advantages in favour of Australia and New Z e a land in this type of 
trade. Nevertheless, the possibility of trade diversion in this area 
as a result of the formation of a JANFTA requires to be examined in 
assessing the overall advantages and disadvantages of such a policy 
move. It may, of course, be argued that the present pattern of 
Australian and New Z ealand trade in manufactured goods is not 
immutable, and that with the re-structuring of Australian and New 
Zealand industry, the development of greater industrial specialisa-
tion, especially through a free trade area with Japan, would lead 
to a more firmly based structure of manufactured exports than is the 
case at present. But this is not an argument that is likely to have 
much appeal to policy makers a priori. 
A JANFT A would also discriminate strongly against the United 
States and Canada . The United States provides about 20% of 
New Zealand 1 s imports and about 26% of Australia 1 s, as compared 
with 9% and 1 O'J'~ respectively in the case of Japan. On the face 
of it, there would appear to be the likelihood of very serious trade 
diversion away from the United States towards Japan. This may 
be an important gain for Japan, but one may presume that since both 
countries now compete on equal terms tariff-wise in the Australian 
and New Zealand market, these latter countries are likely to lose 
through diversion to higher cost imports. This is also a problem 
requiring detailed study, in order to gain a view of their possible 
quantitative significance. Consideration of the above points raises 
a more general issue. Although the trade links between the three 
countries are yearly growing more important, each still retains 
major trade connections with third countries. In the case of both 
Australia and New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Western Europe (all of whom are likely to be affected by 
preferential treatment for Japan) are collectively more important 
as sources of imports and as export markets than is Japan, and in 
each of these markets export prospects are likely to depend in the 
future less on tariffs than on policy decisions about protection 
afforded to agriculture. So the question they must face is whether, 
by affording preferential treatment to Japan, they undermine the 
moves towards containing agricultural protection in Europe and 
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North America and effectively scotch the chances of bringing agri-
cultural products under an agreed and reasonable set of internation-
al trade rules. This point deserves more attention than it has so 
far received in our discussions on Pacific free trade. 
A free trade area between Japan, Australia and New Zealand 
is really justifiable only if it is conceived as a means of expanding 
trade, although in a limited area, in advance of a North Atlantic 
initiative, or as a means of making it easier in the longer run for 
Australia and New Zealand, still highly protectionist, to partici-
pate. (A subsidiary justification is as a response to their exclu-
sion from a NAFTA; but while it may be the best policy in those 
circumstances, it would certainly not be an ideal outcome, either for 
the three countries or for the members of an exclusive North Atlantic 
club). The interests of each of the three countries are in maximising 
their economic growth through trade and the efficient use of their re-
sources, and they can do this better by trading freely with the whole 
world rather than by channelling their trade to a few by means of 
discriminatory tariffs or other trade restrictions. This is es-
pecially relevant to New Zealand and Australia as major exporters 
of temperate agricultural products, because it is only within a 
world framework that the problems of trade in these products are 
likely to be capable of solution . Japan, too, would clearly prefer 
to have freedom of trade on a world basis . As Professor Kojima 
has noted, "the best choice for Japan is to expand and free mutual 
trade with every trading region . The present stage of her indus-
trialisation, her dual pattern of trade with developed and develop-
ing count:r;i~s, and her geographical location, dictate such a 
choice." ,4 J · 
The expansion of Japanese exports at a rate of about 10% per 
annum is essential if she is to maintain her present rate of economic 
growth . Thus, because of the increasing importance of Japan as 
a market for their foodstuffs, raw materials, and minerals, it is in the 
interests of Australia and New Zealand that through the freest possible 
access to overseas markets Japan is enabled to achieve t he desired 
rate of export expansion . According Japan an exclus ive position 
in the Australian and New Zealand markets, whil e it may lead to 
an increase in her exports to those countries at the expense of 
third parties, would weaken the incentive for those countries to 
(4) Kiyoshi Kojima: "Japan's Interest in the Pacific Trade 
Expansion" in K .Kojima (ed.) op. cit. p .169-170 
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reduce barriers to Japanese imports. 
The negotiability of a free trade area among the three countries 
faces two main problems. First, the existing Japanese policies of 
agricultural protection (the inclusion of agricultural products would 
be a sine qua non for any agreement, whether on a general or a 
sectoral basis), and secondly, Australian and New Zealand policies 
of protection for their manufacturing industries. 
The first is less of a difficulty than appears at first sight. 
Japanese import restrictions apply to a wide variety of raw and 
processed agricultural products, with tariffs on the latter ranging 
from 1 5% to 55% ad valorem. For Australia and New Zealand 
the restrictions on imports of beef and veal and dairy products and 
(for Australia) cereals and fruits, are those of special concern. 
In general, imports of these products are permitted only to the 
extent necessary to supplement domestic production when prices 
exceed certain limits . Agricultural policy in Japan is directed 
towards the objectives of assuring food supplies, of preventing 
rises in food prices, and of raising rural incomes to a level more 
in line with urban incomes. This is the familiar inconsistent set 
of objectives that is found in most industrialised countries, and, as 
in others also, agriculture is one of the most sensitive areas of 
domestic policy. Although criticism of agricultural production and 
import policy, with its consequent effects of high and rapidly rising 
food prices, is not absent in Japan , it is clear that given the present 
political strength of the rural interests, an alternative policy of 
free trade in agricultural products is not in prospect. Although 
Japanese production of both beef and dairy products has expanded 
considerably in the past eight years under the influence of various 
assistance measures, in neither case has the growth in production 
been sufficient to keep up with the growth in consumer demand. 
Thus, not only have prices risen, but Japan has been forced to 
increase import quotas for these products. In the future, it is 
more than likely that this import gap will continue to widen. (5) 
In these circumstances, and given that beef is a commodity for which 
there is an increasing world wide demand, one might ask whether 
Japanese policies of agricultural support plus import quotas 
really mater. In the case of dairy products, the situation is more 
(5) L. V. Castle: "New Zealand Trade and Aid Policies in Pacific 
Trade and development" (K .Kojima ed., JERC 
Tokyo February 1 968) 
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complicated, because world trade in these is very dependent on 
policies adopted by European countries, especially as regards the 
dumping of export surpluses. If Eruopean production is confined 
to self-sufficiency level s, and if the United Kingdom does not join 
the EEC, New Zealand and Australia would be the major sources 
from which J apanese import requirements could be met . The 
prospective increase in output of dairy products in both countries 
over the next ten years may not be sufficient t o meet export demands 
without a rise in prices . The trade possibilities with Japan in 
dairy products, · in spite of prote cti onist policies, could be such 
that these policies need not prove a significant barrier from the 
Australia/New Zealand side to a free trade arrangement which 
formally exclude d these commodities . 
Industrial protection in Australia and New Zealand is the more 
formidable obstacle . T his is a strongly entrenched part of 
economic policy- and many statements from Ministers of both 
Governments in recent years have made it clear that they do not 
intend to see industries in either country going to the wall under 
the influence of external competition. According to Professor 
Arndt in an article on the PAFTA (6), "Tariff free access to the 
Australian market for the manufacturers of the United States, 
Japan and Canada at the present exchange rate would wipe out 
considerable sections of Australian manufacturing industry", and 
later, (in a somewhat different context), 1'nothing even like this is 
acceptable in Australia, now or in any foreseeable circumstances. 
T he structural changes involved would be too formidable, even if 
the transition were spread out over a decade or two; and the end 
product insofar as its ooutlines are discernible would be an 
economy and society which most Australians would probably regard 
as a change for the worse". 
These are strong views, but would find much support at policy 
levels in both Australia and New Zealand. One only needs to 
consider the great difficulties that occurred in the negotiation of 
the parti al Free Trade Area Agreement between the two countries 
to realise the impossibility of contemplating within the next few 
years a general extension of free trade between the two countries, 
let alone to include Japan. 
(6) H. Arndt: "PAFTA: An Australian Assessment" , A.N.U. 
Canberra, July, 1 967. 
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Again, however, there are forces in operation which may 
modify these attitudes rather more rapidly than Professor Arndt 
believes . In the first place, given the present bilateral balance . 
of trade which is heavily in their favour, both countries may find it 
necessary to improve opportunities for Japanese exports to them if 
they wish to increase sales of agricultural products and raw materi-
als to Japan. This is a matter more of political than of economic 
content. Secondly, in both countries there is a growing realisation 
that their future industrial growth will have to proceed less on the 
basis of manufacture for a small local market but on the basis of 
specialisation and manufacture for export . This attitude was _ 
clearly at the base of the original New Zealand initiative for a free 
trade area with Australia in forest products. In New Zealand, 
too, it is now more clearly recognised that agricultural exports, 
even allowing for the most favourable developments in the Japanese 
market, are not going to be sufficient to provide even the low rate 
of economic growth of around 2% per caput now being planned. 
Manufactured exports are needed and therefore they must be com-
petitive in world markets; this depends on an efficient internal 
industrial structure and specialisation in those types of products 
in which New Zealand can create a comparative advantage. A more 
open economy is seen as essential to this restructuring of New 
Sealand industry. The full implications of this philosophy which 
pervades the work of the National Development Conference now 
operating in New Zealand have not yet been realised, and there are 
still many inconsistencies in policy with that attitude. But it 
points, nevertheless, to a gradually emerging change of direction 
in thinking about the country's economic development which implies 
a considerable modificatioh in protectionist policies in the next 
decade. Still, the emphasis is on a gradual approach to change, 
with nobody getting too badly hurt in the process, and thus it 
remains true for the next few years at least free trade in manu-
factures with Australia or with any other country is not in the 
cards . 
The doubts about a free trade area arrangement between 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand are thus of two kinds • First, 
there is the major policy issue of whether, having r egard in par-
ticular to the discrimination against third countries involved, with 
which there are even more important trade links, the best inter-
ests of the three would be served in the l ong run by s uch an 
arrangement rather than by working directly for a much wider as-
sociation (e . g . NAFT A) in which they would be included or alterna-
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tively by seeking to promote trade among themselves by multilateral 
non-discriminatory means. Secondly, there are the practical 
political issues of whether governments of the three countries would 
be willing to enter an association which necessarily requires the 
abandonment of agricultural protection in the one case and of manu-
facturing protection in the other. On this second point one may 
note that there are forces at work which may make the problems 
much easier to handle in the future than they have been in the past 
but in the light of existing attitudes of the three governments on 
these crucial points, we must concede that time is certainly well 
beyond the perspective of five years that we presently have in mind. 
An alternative and probably more fruitful approach for the 
immediate future, though less spectacular and less comprehensive, 
is to build pragmatically on what has already been accomplished in 
the past ten years in the establishment of institutions for trade co-
operation in the Pacific • lV2ention may be made first of the trade 
agreements between Japan and Australia and New Zealand first 
concluded in 1958 and 1 959. These agreements provided in general 
for the reciprocal application of most favoured nation treatment 
more or less in the spirit of the GATT and involved substantial 
reductions in Australian and New Zealand tariffs on Japanese goods . 
However, both Australia and New Zealand insisted on retaining 
rights to impose quantitative restrictions and underlined this by 
refusing to accept Japan's membership of the GA TT in terms of 
Article 3 5 of that Agreement. As it turned out Japan adopted a 
very cautious attitude toward the expansion of its exports to 
Australia and New Zealand in the first few years of the Agreements 
and none of the fears held by some in New Zealand about the market 
being flooded with cheap Japanese goods were realised. (Given 
the system of import licencing which strongly protected local 
industry, this could hardly have happened anyway). This discrimi-
natory aspect of the Agreements was always a source of irritation 
to Japan but by 1 962 the climate had sufficiently changed to make it 
possible for both countries to accept the GATT as the main basis of 
trade between them and Japan . Revised Agreements were con-
cluded in 1 962 and 1963 on this basis and providing for certain 
further tariff concessions on each side. 
The Agreements established a formal framework for regular 
bilateral discussions of trade and economic problems but more than 
this they gave a very important stimulus towards greatly extended 
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business, professional and cultural contacts which have been in-
strumental in breaking down long-standing prejudices against 
Japanese products. 
Outside government, a most useful innovation was the establish-
ment in 1963 of the Japan-Australia !,\usiness Co-operation Com-
mittee which as Drysdale points out(7) "proved valuable not only to 
Japanese businessmen in their understanding of the character and 
potential of the Australian economy, but also to Australian busi-
nessmen in their understanding of the mutual benefits to be derived 
from trade with Japan and their vision of the international economy, 
both of which have been considerably enhanced by the dialogue with 
their Japanese counterparts. To those who remember the chilly 
reception which Australian manufacturing interests gave the first 
trade agreement in 1 957, this development must rank among the 
most satisfying in the history of postwar Japanese-Australian 
relations". No such similar committee has yet been established 
between Japanese and New Zealand business interests, although 
this would appear to be a desirable development, judging by the 
Australian experience. A tentative step in this direction has been 
taken by the New Zealand Manufacturers' Federation in its recent 
decision, following a successful trade mission to J apan, to set up 
a committee of New Zealand businessmen having substantial business 
interests in Japan/New Zealand trade . Of much greater signifi-
cance and potential for increasing trade in the Pacific, however, 
is the establishment in 1 967 of the Pacific Basin Economic Coop-
eration Committee among business interests of Japan, Canada, the 
United States, Australia and New Zealand . T he inaugural meet-
ing was held in Sydney in May of this year, at which a covenant was 
adopted setting out the Committee's objectives . T hese include the 
promotion of trade, not only of the five countries , but also in the 
products of the developing countries of Asia and the Pacific. The 
Committee proposes to facilitate capital flows, the exchange of in-
dustrial technologies and the promotion of capital and technological 
cooperation with the developing countries in agriculture, mining 
and industry. The Committee will also engage in joint studies of 
problems hampering the growth of trade among members. So far the 
only practical step towards carrying out these objectives has been 
the proposal for a joint investment company with a capital of $20 
million to assist in the developing countries of the area, but the 
(7) P .Drysdale; "Japan and Australia: The Prospect for 
Closer Economic Integration" Address to ANZ 
Economic Society August, 1 968. 
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details of this and how it will operate have yet to be finally settled. 
The significance of the Committee lies primarily in the fact 
that it provides a collective forum in which leading businessmen 
from the five countries can make personal contact with each other, 
and thus reduce the lack of knowledge among them about trade 
opportunities and about the special problems confronted in estab-
lishing trade links. Even more important than knowledge of prod-
ucts is knowledge of technology, and it is perhaps in this area that 
personal business contacts through the Committee may prove most 
valuable. 
But all of these activities are bound sooner or later to come up 
against the constraints of official policies. Participation in the 
joint investment company will not be possible unless goverments 
give their approval for the capital outflow required. The trans-
fer of technology and the establishment of joint ventures among the 
members will raise the question of foreign participation, a delicate 
subject in Australia and New Zealand, Canada and Japan. In the 
trade field, while new contacts and better information may open 
up profitable new opportunities, sooner or later private business-
men must come up against the constraints of tariff and other trade 
policies. Such policies are, to a large extent, a political re-
sponse to business forces within each community; and while dis-
cussions of these problems among businessmen could result in 
mutually satisfactory modifications, this is rarely likely to be the 
case. In the final analysis, Governments must decide who is to 
lose and who is to gain by policy adjustments, and these are deci-
sions which essentially are going to be taken on internal political 
grounds . The express exclusion of Government representatives 
or even observers from the P. B .E. C. C. is justifiable in the sense 
that their presence would be likely to shift the centre of attention 
away from matters with which businessmen can properly deal within 
the framework of policy. Nevertheles s , a confrontation about 
policies cannot be avoided; to be fully effective, the P.B.E.C.C. 
really needs to be complemented by some similar organisation at 
Government level. The same also applies to the type of conference 
arranged among academics, such as this and the previous session 
in T okyo . Economic analysis, business enterprise need to be 
linked with Government policies to form a three pronged spear, 
with which to attack the problems of trade and development in this 
area. 
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The proposal advanced earlier by Professor Kojima and Dr. 
Drysdale for the formation of an Organisation for Pacific Trade 
and Development offers an immediate and practical way in which 
the five countries might promote trade cooperation among them-
selves, and would provide the essential third prong of the spear 
which is at present lacking. Professor Kojima has suggested that 
it be modelled on the O.E.C.D., with three committees on trade 
investment and aid, and presumably also a Ministerial Council, as 
well as a small Secretariat. The organisational details are , 
however, of less importance than is making clear the purposes and 
functions of an OPT AD and the way in which it would add to, rather 
than duplicate, the work of other inter-governmental organisations, 
such as A.S.P.A.C., of which some or all of the five countries 
are now members. Further, we need also to consider whether it 
fulfils needs which cannot at present be met through the normal bi-
lateral contacts between the different countries. 
A first point to make is that an OPTAD should be conceived 
from the standpoint of the general organising principle of eventual 
world' free trade. Whether that objective can or ever will be 
achieved does not matter. What is important is that OPT AD is con-
ceived not as a first tentative step towards a tight inward-looking 
group in the Pacific area, but as a means by which its members can 
be better enabled to participate in a world trading system, even 
though their interests may be primarily with their Pacific trading 
partners. Needless to say, this comment applies less to Japan and 
the United States than it does to Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. 
From this point of view, one of the major tasks of OPT AD and 
one which cannot properly be carried out on a bilateral basis, is 
the promotion of further studies of the likely effects of a PAFT A or 
more limited free trade arrangements between Australia, New 
Zealand and Japan. Again, one need not envisage these as even-
tually becoming reality, but such studies could be part of a more 
general programme of determining the precise nature of the com-
petitive disadvantages and weaknesses, real or imagined, which 
give rise to so much opposition to trade liberalisation. From this 
might flow proposals for a collective programme to eliminate such 
disadvantages and, if seen to be necessary, for a programme for the 
progressive elimination of industries which have no prospect of ever 
being economically viable. This may well involve compensating 
those who must be phased out, and this again is better approached 
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on a collective basis. 
This aspect of an OPT AD' s work would be relevant, not only 
to proposals advanced for sectoral integtration or free trade among 
some or all of the five, but also to the question of opening markets 
in the advanced countries for the products of the developing coun-
tries. Industrial development in the developing countries of Asia 
through, for example, aid programmes or the investment corpora-
tion proposed by the P. B .E. C . C. hardly makes much sense, unless 
it is accompanied by a willingness on the part of the advanced 
countries to accept the resultant products. What in effect one is 
suggesting is that we need internal aid programmes, so that exter-
nal aid can better achieve its purpose. 
The scope for joint action in structural readjustment exists not 
only in manufacturing but also in agriculture. In an earlier sec-
tion, Japanese agricultural protection was seen as one of the major 
handicaps in trade relations between Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand. (Australian agricultural protection is also a handicap to 
New Zealand). ~vVithout going into details, there are clear possi-
bilities of joint action by the three countries whereby, essentially 
through pooling arrangements , a different form of agricultural 
support and the provision of Australian and New Zealand technical 
assistance, relatively free trade in dairy products and meat with 
Japan could be established without conflicting with Japanese Gov-
ernment's desire to support their agricultural sector. A negotia-
tion within OPT AD could be linked to the removal by Australia and 
New Zealand of the non-contractual preferences still granted to the 
United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries . In terms of 
numbers of import items to which these apply, these are more wide-
spread in New Zealand' s case than in Australia's, but with a much 
smaller market their real significance in terms of trade volume is 
probably less. As I have suggested earlier, however, their 
removal could lead to important trade gains for Japan, but at the 
expense of the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia . 
Moreover, in order to accord with GA TT they would need to be 
removed on a multilateral basis so that any benefits would E>xtend 
beyond Japan to the United States, as well as to EEC and EFT A 
countries, indeed to all countries to which Aus tralia and New 
Z ealand accord most favoured nation treatment . Although New 
Zealand was prepared in the Kennedy Round to negotiate for the 
removal of the non-contractual margins , she was not prepared to 
do so unless in particular the European countries offered to liber-
alise their import policies for agricultural produce. This attitude 
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES IN TRADE COOPERATION 177 
may have been unrealistic, especially in assuming equality of 
bargaining strength and in ignoring the internal benefits that could 
ensue from a unilateral tariff reduction. But Governments prefer 
to operate in these matters on an "eye for an eye" basis. An 
exploration of the whole issue as an early task for OPT AD in the 
field of tariffs could disclose a better bargain than the one that has 
been sought till now. Although on this issue the emphasis is on 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand, the evolution of a workable 
agreement covering agriculture could act as a pilot project for 
similar approaches to the question of agricultural protection and 
import policies elsewhere. 
In the general field of tariff policy, OPT AD could explore the 
possibilities of further tariff reductions among the five on a multi-
lateral basis. It is unlikely that this would disclose any hitherto 
unobserved areas where tariff rer.luctions might be made, but rap-
idly changing patterns of trade and principal supplier positions 
suggest the need for a continued surveillance . Of perhaps more 
relevance is the suggestion that OPT AD members should initiate 
a code of good conduct in the field of trade policy "under which 
countries would relinquish the right to raise tariffs or impose other 
forms of trade restriction, and would gradually reduce these 
barriers, particularly on the import 9f agricultural products and 
labour intensive light manufactures" ~ 8) . 
A code of this kind obviously raises issues of industrial and 
\agricultural protection which have been touched on earlier. It 
~ould need to be complemented by a variety of non-tariff measures, 
d~signed to make it possible to eliminate both tariff and non- tariff 
barriers to trade. Similarly, agreement not to raise tariffs or 
to impose other restrictions goes beyond GATT obligations and 
places restrictions on a country's freedom of action in industrial 
development that simpliciter it would find impossible to accept . 
On the other hand, and in line with the suggested collective ap-
proach to structural adjustment, such a code might best provide 
for a country to consult other members of an OPT AD with a view to 
finding if it is agreed that a particular industrial development is 
justified, alternative measures to assist or to establish an industry 
which do not restrict trade. The Canadian-American Automotive 
Agreement and the joint industrial developments between Australia 
and New Zealand in terms of Article 3(7) of the Free Trade Agree -
ment indicate possible approaches. 
(8) K.Kojima, op . cit. p.176 
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The co-ordination of trade and aid policies of member countries 
has also been suggested as a function of an OPT AD. However, it 
is not very clear what co-ordination is supposed to mean in this 
context. If it means operational co-ordination between. aid-giving 
countries or organisations in relation to particular projects or 
programmes, intervention by OPT AD is probably superfluous, given 
the work of the Colombo Plan, the DAG and other organisations 
involved with aid problems . OPT AD' s functions might be of a 
different kind. First, as suggested earlier, in directly promoting 
aid projects which have as an integral part the provision of external 
markets when the project becomes established; secondly, in provid-
ing a quasi-multilateral intermediary between OPTAD members and 
developing countries recipients; and thirdly, as a means of giving 
"impetus and direction to the productive re-deployment of resources 
released through American de-escalation in Vietnam" (9). The 
latter, of course, depends entirely on the direction of United 
States policy after the Vietnam war, but OPT AD might provide a 
useful arms- length way in which the United States could increase 
its economic development assistance in the Asian and Pacific re-
gions, or, to put it more bluntly, of ensuring a continuing United 
States interest in Asia and the Pacific • As Drysdale notes ( 1 0) 
OPT AD could provide the same kind of stimulus to Pacific economic 
co-operation and growth as the OECD provided for European 
economic co-operation and growth 1i/. Whether this would be so 
would depend on the extent to which members felt a sense of com-
mitment and responsibility in the area. If that sense is for some 
at present weak, OPT AD would provide a focal point around which 
it might coalesce more strongly and securely. Membership of 
OPT AD would imply no more than a moral commitment to act col-
lectively in moving towards the more progressive policies that are 
now required. Accordingly, since commercial policy or aid policy 
commitments of the kind involved in a PAFTA are not required, 
the United States and Canada would find no inconsistency between 
OPT AD memebership and their primary trade policy interests in 
the Atlantic . OPT AD, indeed, provides a way in which the United 
States might suport the development of progressive trade and aid 
policies in the Pacific, and provide a desirable lead "without having 
to declare itself in favour of trade liberalisation in Pacific Free 
Trade Area . (1 1 ) . 
(9) Drysdale loc. cit p .1 5 
( 10) Idem p. 14 
(11) In K . Kojima (ed.) op. cit. p.392. 
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cor,1:MENT ON PROFESSOR CASTLE 1 s PAPER BY PROFESSOR 
SOON CHOUGH 
Professor Castle's clear and persuasive paper makes, I would 
surmise , three main points as regards alternative forms of trade co-
operation of the advanced Pacific countries; firstly, neither the 
Pacific Free Trade Area nor the North Atlantic Free T rade Area are 
desirable ( or feasi ble ) for the next several years; secondly, Japan-
Australia-New Zealand Free T rade Area or Customs Union ( JANFTA 
hereafter ) is not particularly desirable; thirdly, an alternative and 
less rigorous association of these three countries , in such form as 
an Organization for Pacific Trade and Development could be estab-
lished to study the means of free trade among all nations . 
Professor Castle 1 s paper is concerned mainly with the second 
and third questions; the possibility of a Japan-Australia-New 
Zealand Free Trade Area and an Organization for Pacific Trade 
and Development. Unl-cnowledgeable as I am about the economies of 
New Zealand and Australia, I would like to ma~ce a few comments 
on Castle's arguments about these two questions. 
The paper impresses me as putting a great deal of emphasis on 
the importance of political, cultural, as well as economic ties 
between New Zealand and Australia on the one hand and United 
Kingdom on the other hand. The importance of political and cultu-
ral ties is plainly obvious to everyone in considering such problems 
as formation of a free trade area, but it can easily be overemphasiz-
ed. It will be recalled that the fact that the United Kingdom is the 
leader of the British Commonwealth did not prevent her from apply-
ing for a membership at EEC. Indeed, if it were not for General de 
Gaulle, the United Kingdom would have joined EEC, and thereby 
would have discriminated against the exports of Australia and New 
Zealand. It may, of course, be true that the British interest in 
joining EEC is much more pronounced than the Australian and New 
Zealand interest in joining JANFTA, but to wait for the United 
Kingdom to take whatever initiative in this matter, in order for 
Australia and New Z ealand to try to find the best possible course 
of action that is left over, would not always insure the economic 
interest of the latter two countries. 
Professor Castle argues at length that the establishment of 
JANFT A would imperil the preferential tariff treatment accorded to 
the exports of New Z ealand and Australia in the United Kingdom, 
and also it will eliminate the preferential position which Australia 
and New Zealand enjoy in each other's markets. He envisages that 
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a consequence of JANFT A would be to expose Australian and New 
Zealand industries to severe competition from Japan, which pro-
spect Australia and New Zealand cannot relish. It ought to be ad-
mitted that the elimination of all this preferential treatment enjoyed 
by Australia and New Zealand could perhaps deal a blow to the 
growing industries of these countries, as Professor Castle seems 
afraid. But one can argue that this blow would be severe and real 
only given the existing structures of industry and trade, and that 
the merit of a free trade association in the Pacific region is pre-
cisely a change in the existing trade structure. As Professor 
Castle argues in the early part of his paper, the attempt to foster 
import-substitute industries by protective tariff is not always bene-
ficial to the long-run growth of industry. Given the small population 
of Australia and New :.:=ealand, I would say that there would be a 
limit to the potentiality of industrial growth, if it were based only 
on domestic demand, and therefore these two countries would have 
to emphasize the growth of export industries, directed particularly 
to Japan and other Asian countries . The Japanese market for 
Australia and New Zealand is gaining importance in recent years, 
and there is a definite possibility that other Asian countries would 
also prove substantial export markets for Australia and New Zealand. 
This mean$ that the opening up of Asian markets would benefit not 
only the agricultural sector of Australia and New Zealand, but also 
the non- agricultural sector. 
My last comment is on the Organization for Pacific 1 Trade and 
Development. Professor Castle maintains that OPTAD should not 
be a preliminary step towards JANFT A, but should rather be an 
organization purporting to free trade of the world . But one would 
say that, in reality, the pursuit of this purpose is, like the pursuit 
of virtue and happiness; it does not need an organization. OPT AD 
is envisaged to undertake various kinds of studies on free trade and 
economic aid to developing countries, and so on, but this can be 
done without OPTAD. Indeed, if OPTAD were formed on these 
bases, I would consider that delegates would find very little to talk 
about in their meetings. If OFT AD is to be useful, it ought to have 
a little more concrete objective than mere free trade. 
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COMMENT ON L. V. CASTLE'S PAPER BY SPERRY LEA 
The author should be complimented for his perceptive grasp 
of U. S . trade policy prospects. Iv:y comments on his paper fall 
under four topics: 
Firstly, I agree with the author's view in Section II that, in 
the eventuality of a MUFTA initiative, Japan must be included in the 
planning from the outset. l\/1ore than this, I wonder if Japan would 
not be ready to fully participate sooner than generally considered, 
and probably sooner than EEC, because of the size and structure of 
Japanese industrial units. 
Secondly, in the discussion of JANFT A, a major characteristic 
was clearly - and, in my view, correctly - identified . This is 
that it would take the form of a Free Trade Area rather than a 
Customs Union . But several essential characteristics were omitted . 
The most important such question i s membership. Is it Professor 
Castle's idea that JANFTA would be open ended to other Pacific or 
Asian countries, of which Taiwan and Korea would appear to be lead-
ing candidates? (Perhaps Conference participants from these 
countries would like to comment on the attractiveness of JANFTA 
to them.) 
A second basic characteristic of JANFT A deserving more 
clarification is commodity coverage • 
Thirdly, as the "most formidable obstacle" toJANFTA, Professor 
Castle gives industrial protection in Australia and New Zealand. He 
writes, ''This is a strongly entrenched part of economic policy, and 
many statements from Ministers of both Governments in recent years 
have made it clear that they do not intend to see industries in either 
country going to the wall under the influence of external competition ." 
A quotation from Professor Arndt' s assessment is then given to sup-
port this view . A few pages l ater, Professor Castle - referring 
to industrial protection in Australia and New Zealand, and looking 
to a future beyond five years - states 11 there are forces at work 
which may make the problems much easier to handle in the future than 
they have been in the past • 11 But the paper does not describe what 
these eventual forces are . Ne would like to know something about 
them because they would be a most important factor in enabling 
Australia and New Zealand to join not merely JANFT A, but also some 
form of broader free trade arrangement of the MUFTA variety. 
Finally, I have two questions about what Professor Castle con-
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siders the most fruitful approach to trade cooperation among de-
veloped Pacific countries, the OPT AD. (1) There is no mention 
of participation i sooner or later, of other Pacific nations than the 
five developed ones. (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and 
the United States). Again, where would Korea and Taiwan, to men-
tion two, stand? I wonder if the United States would wish to par-
ticipate in an organization that was restricted to the developed 
countries only. (2) Since the OPT AD has been described as a 
kind of OECD in the Pacific, how would Professor Castle regard 
the widening of OECD membership to include Australia and New 
Zealand? 
Chapter 7 
JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND: THE PROSPECT FOR 
WESTERN PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Peter D. Drysdale 
During the past year, the politico-economic environment in which 
Australia must ultimately shape her international economic policies 
has undergone dramatic change . First, the whole sequence of · 
international monetary distrubances, involving devaluation of sterl-
ing, speculation in gold against the dollar, and the need for the 
United States to impose restraints on private overseas investment, 
produced two significant shifts in American attitudes towards the 
conduct of international economic policy by the United States' Ad-· 
ministration. One was that the ups urge of protectionism in the 
United States, which followed the completion of the Kennedy Round 
of tariff negotiations in 1967, was increasingly re-inforced by appeal 
to concern about the balance of payments ( 11). The other was that 
the mood which had already induced substantial reductions in over-
seas defence and development assistance expeditures gathered 
strength so that, this financial year, aid was cut by Congress to a 
record-low figure of $US 1750 millions. Second, on top of all 
these events, there was the decision of President Johnson t o stand 
down, and the sudden realisation of eventual American military with-
drawal from the Asian mainland. That development has given the 
question of alternative economic and political strategies to ensure 
stability and progress in the Asian-Pacific region a new urgency. 
What direction United States' policies take is of interest to 
every nation involved through trade and commerce in the world 
economy, so large is the American economy in relation to the rest 
of the world and so great is her influence on its economic behaviour. 
But the direction that United States' policies take is of special 
concern to Australia, and to Japan, Australia 's largest trading 
partner. 
In postwar years, there has been a significant restructuring of 
Australia's economic relations with the rest of the world , largely 
through the remarkable shift in the geographic distribution of her 
commodity trade away from Britain and Europe towards the Pacific 
and Asia. Over 40 per cent of Australia's trade is now done with 
advanced Pacific countries - Japan, the United States, Canada , and 
t' 
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New Zealand. About 60 per cent of Australia's export trade and 
50 per cent of her import trade is with the Asian-Pacific region . 
Between 1950 and 1968, Japan's share in Australian exports alone 
rose from 4 per cent to 21 per cent, the United States 1 share rose 
from 8 to 13 per cent, New Zealand's share rose from 3 to 5 per 
cent, whilst the United Kingdom's share fell from 39 per cent to 14 
per cent. Throughout the same period, the United States 1 share 
in Australian imports rose from 10 per cent to 26 per cent, Japan 1 s 
share rose from 1to10 per cent, New Zealand's share rose from 
1 to 2 per cent, whilst the United Kingdom's share fell from 52 per 
cent to 22 per cent. Furthermore, the growth of trade between 
the United States and Australia was closely associated with the 
growth of large scale American investment in the development of 
Australian industrial capacity. Add to these developments the fact 
the Japanese economy remained even more closely involved through 
trade and commerce with the United States, which takes around 30 
per cent of her exports and provides a similar proportion of her 
import supplies, and the fact that much of the impetus to growth in 
the rest of Asia still derives from United States' trade and economic 
and military assistance, and there is evidence enough of Australia 1 s 
huge stake in the direction of American trade, aid , and investment 
policies as they affect the Pacific and Asian region. 
How should Australia's commercial diplomacy be cast in the 
light of both these longer-term and more recent developments in 
regional trade and international economic policies? What initiatives 
can Australia take to ensure that economic progress and stability 
in the region which most directly impinges upon her own prosperity 
is promoted? What restraint can Australia hope to exercise on the 
United States if she becomes more and more inward-looking and 
protectionist- minded? With these questions in mind, would closer 
economic int8gration among the three advanced western Pacific 
nations be a step in the right direction? 
The Structure of Trade in the Wes tern Pacific Region 
Elsewhere, the character of trade, and the prospect for integra-
tion, among the five advanced Pacific nations have been analysed in 
some detail ( 1 3). Here the focus of attention is Australia ' s interest 
in closer integration among the three advanced western Pacific 
nations - Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. In this context, the 
position of other Asian and South East Asian trading partners 
requires special consideration . 
Shifts in the structure of Australian trade with the western 
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Pacific resulted from three broad sets of factors: the relatively 
rapid growth of Japan's share in world trade; the underlying comple-
mentarity between the structure of Japanese and Australian trade 
and modest growth in the complementarity of Australia's export trade 
with New Zealand; and factors affecting the geographical, political, 
and historical closeness of Australia to both economies. 
Two countries trade more or less intensively with each other 
than they do with the rest of the world because of the particular 
commodity composition of their trade in relation to world trade -
this may be called the degree of complementarity in bilateral trade-
and because of their geographical proximity and special institutional 
and historical ties - this may be called the degree of special country 
bias in bilateral trade . The degree of complementarity and the 
degree of special country bias jointly determine the intensity of trade 
between two trading partners. 
The concept of 'complementarity' is often used loosely to 
describe the extent to which countries have dissimilar resource 
endowments and structures of production and are therefore likely 
to trade intensively with each other. Here the concept is defined 
in a very precise way. It is defined in a relative sense and measures 
the extent to which one country's export pattern matches another 
country's import pattern more closely than it matches the pattern of 
world imports. An index of the degree of complementarity in 
bilateral trade ( Cja) can be derived to measure exactly the extent to 
which country J's exports to country A are relatively large because 
the commodity composition of J' s exports matches that of A's imports 
more closely than it matches the commodity composition of world 
trade . It follows that for each pair of countries, in a many-country, 
many-commodity world, there are two measures of the degree of 
complementarity in bilateral trade - one is derived from the flow of 
J' s exports to A, and the other from the flow of A's exports to J. 
The concept of special country bias in bilaterial trade (Bja) is 
defined to measure the extent to which J's exports have more or 
less favourable access to A's import markets than might be expected 
from both bountries' shares of world trade in each commodity . 
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Table 1 
Complementary, Special Country Bias, and Intensity in Japan-
Australia-New Zealand Trade 1966a. 
Exports to New 
Exports 
Australia Japan Zealand 
from 
c 186 58 
Australia b 216 2104 
i 401 1220 
c 148 145 
Japan b 135 85 
i 200 123 
c 20 1 25 
New Zealand b 1400 119 
i 280 149 
a. Row i measures the intensity of trade. An index of 100 
indicates that one country exports (imports) exactly that 
proportion of its total exports to (imports from) another 
country as that country's share in world t rade. Row i 
equals row c, complementarity in trade, multiplied by row 
b, special country bias in trade, divided by 100. 
Source: Calculations based on data and procedures described 
in (7). 
Complementarity and special country bias together determine 
intensity of trade . T he i ntensity of trade (Ija) measures the extent 
to which country A's share in J's total exports is large or small 
in relation to A's share in world trade. 
The results of a detailed study of complementarity, special 
country bias, and intensity in western Pacific trade flows are 
presented in Table 1. The methods by which these i ndexes are 
calculated, and a brief description of the data upon which the calcu-
lations are based, were described in an earlier paper (7) . 
Row c records the degree of complementarity , row b records the 
degree of special country bias, and row i records the intensity of 
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trade index for each bilateral trade flow. Take Australia's export 
trade with Japan. The results of this study reveal that, simply 
because of the character of Australian export specialisation and 
Japanese import specialisation in world trade for 1966, Japan's share 
in Australia 1 s export trade should have been almost twice as large 
as her share in world imports; further, that Japan's share in Aus -
tralian exports was slightly more than twice as large as might be 
expected from both countries' shares i n world trade of each commodity ; 
and that, therefore, Japan's share in Australia ' s export trade was 
four times as large as might have been expected fr om her share in 
world imports . That is, the degree of complementarity in Australia's 
export trade with Japan was 186, the degree of s pecial country bias 
was 21 6, and the intensity of trade was 401 . 
The general picture which emerges from Table 1 is that trade 
among advanced western Pacific countries is highly int ensive . 
There is a high degree of complementarity in trade between Japan 
and Australia , and Japan and New Zealand . The degree of comple-
mentarit y in trade between New Zealand and Australia i s naturally 
quite low . The degree of special country bias is extremely high in 
trade between New Zealand and Aus t ralia 1 and Japan and Australia . 
It is also reasonably high in New Zealand 1 s export trade with Japan . 
But it is quite low in New Zealand 1 s import trade with Japan . The 
net result is that even where the degree of complementarity in trade 
·is relatively low, intensity in trade remains high . 
Among the three countries, Australia enjoys the highest intensity 
of trade with other advanced countries in the western Pacific region 
as a whole . The intensity of Australia's export trade with the other 
advanced western Pacific countries (472) is extremely high . The 
intensity of her import trade (202) is a l s o very high . New Zealand's 
trade with the region , and Japan ' s t oo , is more heavily concentrated 
on Australia alone . 
Australia's export trade with Japan reveals the highest degree 
of compl ementarity , whils t complementarity in her export t r ade with 
New ,zealand is still relatively low . A high degree of complement arity 
has long been a feature of Australia's export trade with Japan . 
During the postwar period, it was of major importance in caus i ng 
Japan ' s overall t r ade growth to stimula t e proportionately larger 
import purchases from Australia . In the earlier phases of postwar 
Japanese gr owth, increased i mport demand was heavily concent r ated 
on textile raw materials and provided new outlet s for e xports of 
Australian w ool. In later phases , a ccelerated heavy i ndustr ialis a-
t i on and new patterns of consumer demand associated wi t h hi gher 
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income levels strengthened Japanese import demand for fuels and 
minerals, such as coal, iron ore, copper, bauxite, and alumina, and 
footstuffs such as wheat, meat, and dairy products . Complemen--
tarity in Australia's export trade with New Zealand, whilst low, is 
perhaps larger than might have been expected from a superficial 
consideration of the broad structures of the two economies. The 
index of complementarity for this trade flow indicates Australia 1 s 
stronger export specialisation in manufactures, as well as New 
Zealand's strong import specialisation in wheat, sugar, and other 
foodstuffs in which Australia's export specialisation has always been 
strong. 
Special country bias in Australia's export trade with New Zealand 
is extremely high, and it is also very large in export trade with Japan. 
The extremely high degree of special country bias in export trade with 
New Zealand results from geographical nearness, preferred tariff 
arrangements under the Commonwealth Preference Scheme and the 
New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement, and market homo-
geneity and familiarity. Australia's manufactured exports are 
heavily concentrated in the New Zealand market. Much of the special 
country bias in Australia's export trade with Japan is accounted for 
by the special nature of Australia's trade with Japan in raw wool, 
and the influence of transport costs, these latter considerations 
being a major factor in encouraging the development of Australia's 
huge deposits of high quality and accessible coal, iron ore, and 
bauxite for export to Japanese buyers (5) . 
The degree of complementarity in Australia 1 s import trade with 
Japan is very high. On the other hand, it is extremely low for 
import trade with New Zealand. After a period of steady decline 
throughout the early sixties, complementarity in Australia 1 s import 
trade with Japan increased sharply from 118 to 148 between 1965 
and 1 966. The former trend became evident during an intermediate 
stage in the postwar transformation~ of Japanese export specialisa-
tion away from strong specialisation in light industrial exports 
towards stronger specialisation in heavy industrial exports . The 
predicted reversal has come rather dramatically ( 13, 5) . ln part, 
the higher degree of complementarity derived from stronger Japanese 
export specialisation in commodities across the whole range of 
machinery and equipment, but there were also special factors infLuenc-
ing Australia's import specialisation in 1966. Significantly, 
Australia imported three warships. The size of these imports 
distorted the normal strength of import specialisation for ships and 
boats in which commodity group, of course , Japan's export special-
isation is extremely strong . A large part of the sharp rise in 
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complementarity in Australia 1 s import trade with Japan during 1966 
is attributable to this special cause. Low complementarity in trade 
with New Zealand reflects the competitive nature of the two economies. 
Special country bias in import trade with Japan is quite high but 
somewhat lower in 1966 than it was for the previous year. The 
fall is almost entirely attributable to the effect of the purchases of 
warships from the United States on overall special country bias. 
More significantly, the breakdown of special institutional and policy 
biases against trade between the two countries has permitted 
a remarkable expansion in bilateral trade in recent years. The 
trend is for the index of special country bias in Australia's 
import trade with Japan to rise . As might be expected, there is 
extremely high special country bias in import trade with New Zealand, 
a product of the same institutional factors which are act to stimulate 
bilateral trade in the reverse direction . 
Trade links between Japan and New Zealand are less well 
developed . Although complementarity is high for both trade flows, 
special country biases are not very high . The re- orientation of 
New Zealand 1 s economic re lations away from traditional markets 
in the United Kingdom and Europe towards nearer growth markets 
i n the Pacific and Asia has proceeded at a much slower pace than 
for Australia . Partly this is explained by instituti onal factors 
and the greater stress placed on British ties in New Zealand ; partly 
it is a consequence of the fact that the structure of New Zealand ' s 
export specialisation, notably in coarse carpet wools and dairy 
products, was less obviously tuned to the growth of Asian- Pacific 
trade (15) . 
Alongside developments in Australia 1 s trade with the Pacific 
area has been the growing importance of Australia 1 s trade with 
Asia . Between 1950 and 1968, Australian exports destined for 
Asia rose from 11 to 18 per cent , partly because of large wheat 
sales to China, and partly because of i ncreased exports of manu-
factured goods t o the region . Exports to developing countries in 
Asi a and t he Pacific , excluding mainland China , compri sed 16 per 
cent of total Aust ralian e xports in 1968 . As observed i n an earlier 
paper , t he propinquity of A s ian marke t s a nd certai n s imilarities in 
the structur e of A ustralian and A sian demand for i ndus trial goods 
hav e faci litated this new trade . T rade i n manufac tures with Asi a 
and New Zealand a ssumed spe c i al import a nce i n p ol ici es designed to 
s trengt hen Aus tralia 1 s i ndu s t r i a l ba se through the expa ns i on of 
e xport marke t s (7) . 
Import s from devel oping countries in As i a a nd t he Pac ific , 
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excluding mainland China, fell from 13 per cent of total Aus-
tralian imports in 1950 to only 8 per cent of total Australian 
imports in 1968. The falling share of Asian imports largely 
resulted from reduced demand for raw materials . But the 
performance of Asian exporters in Australian markets was 
variable, Some Asian countries are increasingly competitive 
suppliers of textiles and light manufactures and their share in 
Australian markets for these products has tended to grow at 
the expense of the United Kingdom and Japan . 
A detailed study of complementarity, special country bias, 
and intensity in trade flows between advanced western Pacific 
countries and selected developing countries in Asia and the Pacific 
is presented in Table 2a and Table 2b. 
Both Australia's and Japan's export trade with these countries 
appears highly intensive. The intensity of New Zealand 1 s trade 
with the region is generally very low . 
Complementarity in Australia's export trade with Asian 
Pacific countries, with the exception of Indonesia, is probably 
higher than might have been anticipated. Complementarity in 
Japan's trade is mostly very high as might have been expected. 
Complementarity in New Zealand's export trade is l ower than in 
Australia's but not low enough to explain the exceptionally low 
intensities in her trade with the region . 
Special country bias in Australian and .Japanese export trade 
with the region is commonly very high. An interesting feature 
is the inverse variation in the high special country biases of 
these two countries, closely correlated as it is with the poli-
tical and institutional closeness of countries with British connec-
tions and the facts of geography. New Zealand has exceptional-
ly low special country bias in her export trade with the region. 
She has been slower to take advantage of the trading opportuni-
ties that e xist in Asian-Pacific market s , even for a country so 
heavily specialised in the export of temperate zone primary pro-
ducts. 
Intensities in Australian import trade with the region reveal 
considerable variation. The intensity of import trade with near-
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by suppliers of raw materials, such as Indonesia and New 
Guinea, is estremely high because of special country bias in 
trade. At the same time, the intensity of trade with exporters 
of light manufactures and processed raw materials, such as 
Hong Kong and Singapore, is quite high because of complementa-
rity in trade. Almost the reverse generalisations apply to 
Japan. Intensities in Japan 1 s import trade with the region are 
mostly very high both because of high degrees of complementa-
rity in trade with raw material exporters and high special 
country bias in trade with exporters of manufactures. With 
the exception of Hong Kong and Singapore, intensities in New 
Zealand 1 s import trade with the region are very low. 
This analysis of the structure of trade in the western 
Pacific region leads to two broad conclusions. First, the 
nature of intensity, complementarity, and special country bias 
in trade flows among advanced western Pacific nations suggests 
that policies designed to promote closer integration, especially 
between Japan on the one hand and Australia .and New Zealand 
on the other, would be beneficial. However, regional trade 
constitutes a very small proportion of each of these country 1 s 
trade, being largest for Australia which, in 1968, sent 26 per 
cent of her total exports to, and obtained 12 per cent of her 
total imports from, the other two advanced western Pacific 
partners. Thus, there is a strong presumption that complete 
intra-areal free trade is likely to be accompanied by more 
trade diversion than trade creation. It is nonetheless worth-
while investigating the trade creating effects of such a limited 
free trade area more closely, and this will be attempted in 
the next section. 
Second, linked by high complementarity in exports and 
imports with Japan, and high special country bias with both 
Australia and Japan, the developing countries in the Asian-
Pacific region are proportionately much more important to the 
trade of these two countries than they are to the world at 
large. Indeed, Japan and Australia have weighty political, as 
well as economic, interests in the region 1 s prosperity. Thus, 
there is a strong case for coupling any policy initiatives by 
advanced wes tern Pacific nations with the extension or adoption 
of trade policies specially designed t o accommodate the needs of 
developing countries in the Asian-Pacific region. 
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The Impact Effect of JANFTA on Australia 
The effects of a move towards free trade in the western 
Pacific area upon the Australian economy are impossible to cal-
culate precisely ( 1 5). But the likely nature and magnitude of 
the important direct gains, as well as the important costs of 
adjustment that would follow the establishment of a free trade 
area among Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, coupled with 
the non-reciprocated removal of tariffs by these countries against 
imports from developing countries in Eastern and Southern Asia, 
are worth trying to specify roughly. Moreover, it is useful to 
focus on the impact of the most radical proposals for integration 
and trade preferences, not because an immediate move towards 
the establishment of a Japan-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Area seems on the face of it either desirable or feasible, but 
because it represents a convenient means of analysing the effects 
of these and less radical alternatives on Australian trade and 
industry. Later , some of the important, but even less certain, 
dynamic effects can be considered. 
A detailed study, using national tariff data and three digit 
SITC commodity trade data for 1966, was made to estimate 
Australian import and export expansion in consequence of the 
trade creating effects of tariff elimination amongst advanced 
western Pacific countries and the elimination of Australian 
tariffs on imports from developing countries in Asia. 
The impact effect of tariff reductions on trade depends 
upon the height of the original tariff, changes in tariff rates, 
and the relevant price elasticities of demand and supply. 
Assuming infinite elasticities of export supply, the change in 
imports (and exports) can be measured using the formula: 
t 
J M = a 1 00+ t 1J M 
where JM is the change in imports due to tariff reduction, a is 
the rate of tariff reduction, t is the original tariff level, 1J is 
the price elasticity of import demand, and M is the original 
value of imports. 
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The price elasticities of import demand used in this study are 
those adopted in an earlier study. They incorporate estimates of 
price elasticities for agricultural commodities of importance in 
Australian exports superior to those used in earlier studies (7). 
Estimates of the effect of western Pacific area tariff elimina-
tion on Australian trade are presented in Table 3. As reported 
elsewhere, the height and structure of Australian tariffs and 
relatively high price elasticities of demand for Australian imports 
suggest that there would be a substantial percentage increase in 
imports on given trade volumes . On the other hand, lower tariffs 
and lower price elasticities of import demand for Australia's 
principal exports to Japan, in particular, restrains export expansion 
that would follow western Pacific area tariff elimination. However, 
initial Australian imports from the region are quite small whereas 
exports to the region are relatively large. Estimated trade 
expansion is therefore quite modest. Moreover, deterioration in 
the balance of payments would be i nsignificant . Trade expansion 
with western Pacific countries in consequence of tariff elimination 
may, for example , be compared with the expansion of trade that 
would follow the elimination of tariffs among the five advanced 
Pacific basin countries, together with the removal of tariffs on 
imports from developing countries in Asia. In the former event , 
Australian imports would increase 9 . 1 per cent and e;x:ports 3. 4 
per cent. In the latter event, Australian imports would increase 
28. 8 per cent and exports 7. 9 per cent on 1 966 trade figures. 
These estimates do, however, suggest a larger expansion of 
imports from developing countries (about $US 74 millions) than 
Kojima' s most recent estimates, The differences in estimation 
result from the use of slightly different price elasticities, the use 
of more detailed Australian tariff data, and the use of weighted 
and selected tariff rates rather than average nominal rates. 
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Table 3 
The Effect of Western Pacific Area Tariff 
Reductions on Australian Trade, 1966 
Trade with World 
Trade with Japan, New Zealand, 
and Other Asia 
Increase in Trade with Japan, 
New Zealand, and Other Asia 
Percentage Increase in Trade 
with World 
Merchandise 
Imports 
($USm) 
3197 
552 
291 
9.1% 
Merchandise 
Exports 
($USm) 
3074 
719 
104 
3.4% 
Source: Calculations are based on methods and data 
described in the text. 
A rough attempt was also made to guage the effect of import 
expansion on production and employment. The largest declines in 
production would be located in textiles ( 9-10 per cent), miscellaneous 
manufactures (9-1 0 per cent), metals and machinery (2- 3 per cent) , 
and chemicals (-1 - 2 per cent) . Motor vehicle production accounts 
for 33 per cent of the decline in metals and machinery , electronics 
and electrical apparatus account for 18 per cent, and miscellaneous 
metal manufactures account for 1 2 per cent. The fall in chemical 
product ion is probably underestimated since the prevalence of 
special protective measures makes it difficult t o measure the hei{ ht 
of the tariff satisfactorily . Thus, if estimated import expansion 
were the only effect of tariff elimination, the total decline in manu-
facturing production would be of the order of 2 or 3 per cent. 
The structure and size of these changes imply the necessity to re-
deploy about 40, 000 to 50, 000 industrial workers or about 3 to 4 
per cent of the manufacturing workforce in 1966. These adjust-
ments may be compared with the e ffect of including North America 
in the free trade arrangement. In that case , there would b e an 8 or 
9 per cent fall in manufacturing production, necessi tating the re-
d eployment of 9 or 10 per cent of the manufacturing workforce . 
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The effect of import expansion will not be the only effect on the 
manufacturing sector. Export expansion should also be taken into 
account. Export expansion would lead to a compensating expansion 
in production and employment, most significantly in the metal and 
machinery industries. Increased exports, for example, would 
compensate for half the increase in imports of motor vehicles. And 
no allowance has been made in this study for the effect of non- tariff 
restrictions on imports of motor vehicles into Japan and New Zealand. 
' Exports of pig iron; primary iron and steel; iron and steel bars, 
rods, angles, shapes, and sections; crude copper manufactures; 
crude aluminium manufactures; lead and zinc; wire products; non--
electric power generating machinery; agricultural machinery and 
equipment; and some types of domestic electrical equipment would 
all expand singnificantly more than imports. The bulk of machinery 
and equipment produced in Australia would remain competitive. Of 
course, the largest part of export expansion would derive from 
primary industries, but the 30-40 per cent contribution from manu-
factures in very large. 
These estimates are simply designed to illustrate the general 
magnitude of the adjustment problems in consequence of the static 
trade creating effects of the establishment of a comprehensive 
western Pacific free trade area. Other effects would also be 
important. In the first place, trade diversion would probably be 
substantial . One study hinted that Australian imports valued at 
about $US 170 millions might be diverted from the United Kingdom 
alone to new sources of supply in the western Pacific. About half 
of this shift would comprise pure trade diversion (13) . In the second 
place, the dynamic effects are likely to swamp the static effects of 
economic integration for relatively small economies such as Australia 
and New Zealand . They require more detailed study, not only in 
the context of a comprehensive free trade area but also under alter-
native arrangements . For Australia, realisation of dynamic gains 
is at once the most important and least certain objective of Pacific 
economic integration . Some of the uncertainties may be avoided and 
the gains preserved if a less comprehensive approach to integration 
were adopted. 
Dynamic Effects and the Scope for Sectoral Integration 
The calculations in the previous section serve two purposes . 
First, as already noted, they specify the impact of adjustment costs . 
Second, they point to some of the possibilities for· initiating larger 
dynamic changes through economic integration . They provide a 
useful background for analysing the important dynamic effects whether 
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integration is approached on a broad front or whether a sectoral 
approach is adopted. However, measurement of the impact of 
western Pacific free trade, based on existing supply and demand 
structures, presents an inadequate description of the total effect of 
integration. As each economy adjusted over time to new relative 
prices, changes in the basic structure of each national economy 
would occur. For example, integration would be associated with 
capital flows, both within the region and from beyond the region, as 
production for regional markets re-located to take advantage of 
economies of scale or cheaper natural resources, as businessmen 
and officials become more aware of market and investment opportuni-
ties, and as firms adjusted to a new dimension in competition. 
The dynamic effects are complex and difficult to predict 
accurately . Their general nature was discussed in a paper 
delivered in Tokyo last year and it is not necessary to cover that 
ground again (7). Rather, the discussion here can be confined to 
a preliminary assessment of the prospects for the integration of 
a few key industrial sectors within the framework of a complete 
western Pacific free trade area, a sectoral free trade agreement , 
or without any tariff re-arrangements at all. The three sectors -
motor vehicles, iron and steel and non ferrous metals - discussed 
below comprise at present about 25 per cent of Australian manufac -
turing output. 
Scope for benefits from sectoral integration exists because 
national policies or national business institutions can frustrate the 
optimal regional location of industry from the viewpoints of economies 
of scale, minimisation of transport costs, and intensive use of high 
quality resources specific to one part of the region. Tariffs and 
import restrictions are the most important national policies which 
have this effect . Autarkic business integration and purchase 
agreements are the most important business institutions which work 
in exactly the same direction. The latter are important in every 
country, but they are, perhaps, of special importance in Japan and 
advanced western Pacific countries. 
The three types of benefit which derive from sectoral integra-
tion are clear in principle. First, in industries with access to 
significant economies of scale, high protective barriers made secure 
by government support, can lead to the duplication of plants of sub-
optimal scale. The automobile industry in the advanced western 
Pacific countries typifies this situation. Second, protection of 
basic treatment processes that require large inputs of low value to 
weight raw materials prevents treatment closer to resource deposits, 
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and high transport costs are needlessly added to the cost of the 
product. Pig iron production is a good example of an industry which 
thrives on location close to sources of raw materials. Finally, 
protective barriers can lead to the establishment of industries out-
side countries with important advantages in the quality and costs of 
inputs. The aluminium smelting industry, which requires large 
volumes of electricity, is one such case. 
Wherever economies of scale are important, and wherever two 
or more countries are producing sub-optimal outputs at high costs, 
there is room for gain through more efficient international special-
isation. Most commonly this kind of inefficiency results from the 
imposition of protective tariffs, but it can arise quite independently 
of the existence of trade barriers ( 1 2). 
Economies of scale are important in motor vehicle production. 
It is usual for costs to fall sharply up to an output of about 50, 000 
units per annum, with a further 15 per cent saving when output is 
doubled to 100, 000 units, a 1 0 per cent saving with the doubling of 
output to 200, 000 units, and a further 5 per cent saving at 400, 000 
units (14). There are some economies , especially in pressing, to 
be realised at outputs above a million units, but an output of 400, 000 
should ensure the international competitiveness of a fully integrated 
plant. In fact, much lower outputs can be sustained competitively 
because motor vehicles are highly differentiable and because of the 
significance of transport costs. 
A fully integrated Australian motor car industry has been operat-
ing since the early fifties, first with the assistance of import restric-
tions, later protected by tariffs. The tariff on fully built- up vehicles 
was recently raised from 35 per cent t o 45 per cent m.f.n . in response 
to the growing competitiveness of some Japanese imports. High 
tariffs had earlier encouraged the entry of a number of low-volume 
competitors to the two well-established manufacturers . Until the 
early sixties total production of passenger cars in Australia was 
absolutely larger than in Japan, and Australian costs were generally 
lower . Japanese motor car production has grown remarkably since 
1 960 but large-scale production is concentrated in a few among many 
producers and the industry is still protected by a 40 per cent tariff, 
to be reduced under the Kennedy Round, and, more significantly , 
quantitative restrictions on imports of components and parts. 
At the end of 1967, Japanese passenger car production, at about 
1 , 400, 000 vehicles, was over four times the size of Australian out-
put. However, Japanese production was heavily concent rated in the 
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small car range, 82 per cent of output being cars of less than 1 500 
c . c. cylinder capacity, whereas Australian production was con-
centrated in the medium-large range, with 75 per cent of output 
being cars of 1400 c . c . and over, and 63 per cent of output in the 
range above 2, 200 c. c . Indeed, the absolute size of Australian 
output was still larger than that of the Japanese industry for cars 
of greater than 1 500 c. c . capacity. In other words, the Japanese 
industry could support several producers of small cars operating 
at optimal scale, and one producer of small-medium cars operating 
reasonably efficiently. Australian production could support one 
completely competitive fully integrated producer of medium sized 
cars operating close to optimal scale or two or three reasonably 
competitive producers operating at lower volumes . 
There appears considerable scope for more effective special-
isation in motor car production within the western Pacific region, 
with Japan specialising in the production and export of small and 
small-medium sized passenger cars, and Australia specialising in 
the production and export of medium- sized cars . Costs would fall 
in both industries and the competitive position of both industries 
would be strengthened in third country markets . Producers and 
consumers in both countries would share the benefits of lower cost 
production. As the structure of motor car demand changes with. 
increasing per capita incomes in both countries , paradoxically the 
scope for more competitive medium- sized car production will grow 
in Australia . Meanwhile, it appears quite irrational to subsidise 
the whole range of passenger car production in both countries where 
the viability of the important section of the industry in each country 
is well established. 
What kind of arrangement between the Japanese and Australian 
motor vehicle industries might be beneficial and acceptable? At 
various times, the reduction of m . f. n . tariffs and removal of other 
restrictions have been advocated in both Japan and Australia. How-
ever, it is very difficult to stage m .f. n . tariff reductions without 
giving rise to considerable and unpredictable dislocation in produc-
tion and employment, and without encouraging the encroachment of 
third country competitors . The only manageable arrangement would 
seem, therefore, to invdve preferred access for Australian medium-
large cars in Japanese markets and preferred access for Japanese 
small cars in Australian markets. There is the North American 
precedent of a GATT waiver for such an arrangement. But to effect 
yet another policy reversal on the motor vehicle industry of the 
kind that this would involve in Australia is wildly improbable unless 
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the Japanese industry were prepared to make substantial concessions. 
There are some circumstances under which this might eventuate. 
The Australian industry is American dominated. It would be quite 
rational for American firms to service penetration into the Japanese 
market from their Australian capacity, partly because of lower 
transport costs, partly because of the suitability of their Australian 
models for the Japanese market, and partly because of the high 
marginal gains from larger Australian production ( 6). To the 
Japanese industry, and Japanese government, this might appear 
infinitely preferable to fully integrated American production and 
investment within Japan itself. 
Raw materials are an important element in costs in the basic 
metal industries. · Raw materials account for around 60 per cent of 
the value of Japanese produced pig iron. Of these costs, between 
one third and one half, or 20 to 30 per cent of the total cost of 
pig iron, represents the cost of freight. The cheapest and most 
convenient raw materials used by the Japanese industry are 
imported from Australia. It would therefore appear that, provided 
auxiliary resources were available at comparable prices, large 
benefits would derive from re-locating in Australia pig iron capacity 
to serve the Japanese steel industry. 
In fact, comparis,on of Japanese and Australian pig iron price 
suggests that auxiliary resources are available as cheaply in 
Australia as in Japan. In 1967, the published price of Australian 
pig iron at SUS 55. 05 per ton was 27 per cent lower than that for 
Jaoanese pig iron at ius 75. 20 per ton. The Australian export 
prlce at about $US 42 per ton, is 40 per cent below the Japanese 
domestic price. The present cost of freight for large lots from 
Australia to Japan is $US 8. 40 per ton or around 20 per cent of 
the Australian export price. Freight costs on pig iron would 
probably be lowered if the volume of trade in pig iron grew. 
Since the 10-12 per cent Japanese tariff on pig iron does not 
raise the price of pig iron imported from Australia above the 
domestic price level, business institutions can be presumed to 
prevent effective competition in the Japanese market. The degree 
of autarkic business integration in the Japanese iron and steel 
industry is large. Moreover, the insitutional structure of the 
Australian industry has not, in the past, been conducive to pushing 
large scale export production, so that the opportunities for more 
efficient regional specialisation have not been realised. 
Although published data suggest that the Japanese iron and steel 
industry might have been slightly more efficient in the production of 
basic steel products than the Australi an industry, there is probably 
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.considerable scope for rationalisation in the production and trade of 
certain steel products too. This would tend to favour crude steel 
exports, with a high material input, from Australia, and specialised 
steel exports from Japan. 
What kind of arrangements for the Japanese and Australian iron 
and steel industries might be beneficial? No discriminatory arrange-
ments would be necessary since the highly efficient Australian basic 
iron and steel and Japanese steel industries would not be threatened 
by third country producers. In the longer run, m. f. n. tariff 
concessions by both countries would give rise to increased regional 
trade and improve the competitive position of western Pacific 
producers in other markets, not only in steel products but also in 
products for which steel is an important input. More significant 
than tariff concessions would be the initiation of moves to break down 
protective business institutions . In particular, investment in iron 
and steel capacity could be planned and encouraged from a regional 
rather than national point of view. This would be facilitated by 
joint business ventures and tie-ups, the freer flow of investment 
within the industry, and direct government intervention . 
Economies of scale are important at all stages of aluminium 
production. The region 1 s bauxite mining and alumina refining 
industries, both increasingly important suppliers of world markets, 
are already operating at efficient levels of output. However, in 
aluminium smelting, where economies of scale are obtained up to 
production of about 100, 000 tons per annum, and beyond if lumpy 
investments in electric power generation are required, there are 
plants of sub- optimal capacity operating . Transport costs for 
bauxite and alumina are an important element in the costs of the 
Japanese industry, and costs could be reduced by locating alumina 
production and smelting close to high quality Australian bauxite 
deposits. However, this discussion will b e confined to the third 
type of potential gain through regional integration: the more 
intensive use of high quality resources specific to one location 
within the region. 
In this case, the potential for generating electricity cheaply 
is the specific resource. Electric power is a major input in 
aluminium production - estimates place requirements at over 17, 000 
kolowatt hours per ton of metal ( 1). Thus, the price of electricity 
is extremely important in determining the cost of smelting . New 
Zealand, New Guinea, and perhaps other parts of South East Asia, 
have potential for generating hydro- electricity more cheaply than 
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electricity can be produced in Australia, and much more cheaply than 
it can be produced in Japan. Thus, the power costs of aluminium 
produced at the smelter planned for Bluff in New Zealand will 
possibly be in the vicinity of $US 38 per ton - compared with typical 
costs two and a half times as high in Australia and more than five 
times as high in Japan. The differential is significant, given a 
world aluminium price of about $US 560 per ton. Production in 
Japan is sustained only behind an effective rate of protection over 
40 per cent, and through high cost aluminium production being 
carried by efficient fabricating within integrated firms. Australian 
production is more efficient than Japanese, but even here there may 
be some scope for more effective specialisation. 
A prototype of the kind of development that is possible within 
the western Pacific region is provided by the Comalco-Showa Denko 
K.K. - Sumitomo Chemicals venture in New Zealand. Based on 
the Weipa, North Queensland, bauxite of Comalco, which is refined 
in Queensland Alumina 1 s Gladstone plant, a smelting industry is 
to be established at Bluff in New Zealand. A large investment in 
hydro-electric capacity will be undertaken by the New Zealand 
government at Lake Manapouri, and power will be supplied to the 
smelter at a cost around 0. 2 cents per kilowatt-hour. The avail-
ability of government capital and demand for electricity made 
Manapouri more attractive than sites in New Guinea. Part of the 
aluminium produced will be sold by Comalco in New Zealand and 
overseas and part will be taken by the Japanese parties for fabrica-
tion in Japan. 
What measures can be taken to stimulate more of this highly 
desirable rationalisation of the region's aluminium industry? Our 
conclusions are similar to those for the steel industry: the 
efficiency of Australian bauxite mining and refining, New Zealand 1 s 
electricity generation, and .Japan's fabricating industry would make 
m. f. n. tariff reductions by all parties on aluminium and aluminium 
products a sufficient condition for increased intra-regional trade 
and output. Again, the breakdown of autarkic business integration 
would be an important objective. The tripartite venture in New 
Zealand, and Furukawa' s agreement to purchase increased volumes 
of aluminium ingot from Alcoa's Australian capacity, give ground 
for optimism in this regard. 
The vision of greater economic progress through closer 
integration of some sectors of the advanced western Pacific economies 
that is the theme of this paper, has been expressed clearly by Sir 
Maurice Maw by, Chairman of Conzinc Riotinto of Australia, a major 
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shareholder in Comalco Industries: 
"The formation of the Bluff smelter project (based on Manapouri 
power) reflected the growing interdependence of countries such as 
New Zealand, Japan, and Australia. 
Our Japanese partners bring with them access to the numerous 
and growing aluminium markets in Japan, which gives us a base to 
build a smelter large enough to produce aluminium at competitive 
world prices . •.••• 
By welcoming our Japanese partners into this venture we have 
forged a link between the markets of Japan and the unrivalled re-
sources of hydro-electric power and bauxite of New Zealand and 
Australia - to the eventual benefit of all concerned." (10) 
A Strategy for Successful Asian-Pacific Integration 
Much progress has already been made in the improvement of 
communication between the private sectors of the three advanced 
western Pacific economies. But most significantly, government 
information and understanding have failed to keep abreast of Japan's 
economic relations with Australia and New Zealand in the past ten 
years. Thus, an important immediate concern of policy ought to be 
the establishment of an inter-governmental institution staffed by 
officials from the three countreis . A Japan-Australia-New Zealand 
Organisation for Trade, Aid, and Development could relay economic 
information among participating countries' undertake research and 
advise independently on questions of trade and aid directly affecting 
member countries. It could act as the prototype for a broader 
Organisation for Pacific Trade, Aid, and Development. To date, 
the Australian government has resisted involvement in the kind of 
official contact that the formation of JANOT AD or OPT AD implies. 
Maximising the benefits of intra-regional trade in the western 
Pacific, and of trade between the western Pacific and the rest of 
the world, now requires some such positive initiative. 
OPT AD' s first function would be to facilitate the discussi on of 
trade questions and grievances, real or imagined, in a rational and 
co-operative atmosphere calculated not to damage profitable national 
trading interests. In this role it would act as a constraint on ever-
present protectionist tendencies in partner countries. 
OPT AD could give a fillip to joint aid efforts and more generous 
trade arrangements towards developing countries in the Asian-
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Pacific region. The regional approach to the. granting of trade 
preferences to less developed countries has disadvantages . It 
will be more difficult to reach agreement on the diversion of imports 
from developed countries to sources of supply in developing 
countries. In particular, Japan is unlikely to be enthusiastic 
about preferences on a wide range of labour-intensive manufactures 
and Australia and New Zealand likewise about preference schemes 
for primary commodities. On the other hand, and more significantly, 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand have been shown to have a 
greater stake in Asian development than other advanced countries, 
and together feel most keenly the prevailing aid and trade cynicism. 
Political economic, and humanitarian benefits deriving from one 
country 1 s preferences flow in part to the other two developed 
countries. There is an important divergence between the 1 national 1 
and 'global 1 benefits to developed countreis of granting preferences 
to less developed countries . Decisions on the granting of preferences 
taken regionally would bring national benefits closer to global 
benefits and lead to a higher total level of concessions . 
In this context, a worthwhile immediate objective would be for 
OPT AD to work towards the implementation by all countries of an 
extension of the Australian preferences scheme. Several features 
of the Australian scheme are undesirable. One criterion for the 
inclusion of a commodity is that it is not produced in Australia, thus 
ensuring a maximum of trade diversion and a minimum of trade 
creation. The preferences on several items are less than unity . 
The right to exclude from preference "any developing country which 
is already competitive in Australia's imports of that product" has 
been invoked against Hong Kong and Taiwan (3) . Quotas are applied 
to all preference items with the exception of handicrafts, although 
the quotas have proved to be restrictive in very few cases . Finally , 
many commodities that are not produced in Australia have not yet 
been included in the scheme. 
However, modest but significant benefits could flow to les s 
developed countries from preferences granted by Japan, Australia, 
and New Zealand that were mainly (but not entirely) diversionist, 
and subject to quotas . Such preferences would find readier 
political assent and could be the precursor of a more comprehensive 
scheme . And many of the benefits are realised even if quotas are 
applied, provided quotas are sufficiently generous . The costs of 
opening a new export market can be high, and are accompanied by 
high risk and uncertainty . A preferential quota allows a new 
competitor a wider profit margin on initial sales . By the time the 
quota is restric tive, the exporter has greater knowledge and will be 
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in a better position to decide whether to expand output and compete 
over the usual tariff barrier. (9) This 'infant export industry' 
argument , can also be used to justify the 'non-competitive' countries 
provision of the Australian preference scheme , although this provi-
sion seems undesirable on other grounds and would not be necessary 
for the political acceptability of the scheme. 
One final question arises on policies towards regional preference 
giving: Should the preferences be granted only to countries in the 
Asian region, or should they be granted on a global basis? The 
GA TT waiver granted to the Australian preference scheme applied 
to general preferences . However , because of geographical close-
ness and existing economic and cultural ties, 87. 3 per cent of 
total preferenti al imports in 1 968 were from the member countries 
of ECAFE. The benefits of general preferences, including the 
greater moral pressure they would place on other developed countries 
in view of the s l ow progress through UNCTAD, seem to be consistent 
with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan's special interest in the 
western Pacific. 
OPT AD' s third major role would relate to the co-ordination 
of regional commercial policies. In this capacity it would exert 
pressure to counteract the effects of autarkic business integration 
which frustrates efficient regional specialisation . It would identify 
sectors in which intra-regional capital flows could bring gain and 
it would smooth the institutional channels for international capital 
movements. And it would, of course, play an important part in 
tariff discussions within the region and between the region and 
other countries . 
There is some scope for trading remaining British preferences 
on non-competitive imports against the relaxation of Japanese 
import controls on foodstuffs, including meat, dairy products, fruit, 
and less probably rice. The gains from these concessions would 
need to be weighed against the possible losses in trade with Common-
wealth countries . Investigation of these possibilities and formulat-
ing policy on the basis of the r esults could be an early task of 
OPT AD. 
There is some scope for trilateral bargaining on tariff and 
import controls, concessions to be granted on a m.f.n. basis. (4) 
This would certainly have advantages over the unilateral dismantling 
of high Australian protection on some manufactures that has been 
advocated. Maximum gain from any concessions would require 
participation by other countries and OPT AD would be in a stronger 
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position than any one of its members, to put pressure on the 
Canadian and United States governments for reciprocal concessions. 
In particular, consultation through OPTAD, with or without reciprocal 
tariff concessions, would be an efficient way of working towards the 
sectoral integration s uggested by the analysis in. the previous section. 
There would appear little scope for partial preferential tariff 
treatment without repediation of GA TT membership. Withdrawal 
from GATT certainly would not be in Japan 1 s best interest. How-
ever, as suggested in the discussion of the motor vehicle industry, 
the North American precedent may allow limited sectoral free trade 
of a trade creating kind. 
Whilst it is almost certinly true that some move towards freer 
trade would be in Australia 1 s interest at this stage of her economic 
development, it is extremely doubtful that participation in a limited 
free trade area would bring net economic benefits. The costs of 
trade diversion within JANFTA are likely to be high~ It would be 
more useful for the three countries to develop a negotiating bloc for 
obtaining concessions on a broader front, especially from the United 
States. 
Finally, OPTAD could seek closer contacts with other govern-
ments in the Asian-Pacific region. It would place pressure on 
American governments towards the formation of a broader organisa-
tion, just as the Japan-Australia Business Co-operation CommitteE" 
was a fore-runner to the Pacific Basin Business Co-operation 
Committee. A more broadly based OPTAD would have objectivef 
similar to those of the origanisation founded by Japan, Australia. 
and New Zealand. 
Whether or not a wider Pacific organisation proved possible, 
a three member OPTAD, with less developed country participation, 
could be an important ins trument for spelling out a positive, non-
military, alternative policy in Asia a nd the western Pacific for the 
United States. 
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Chapter 8 
JANFTA and Asian Developing Countries--Sectoral Analysis 
I .A. ~./icDougall 
I Introduction 
The three developed Pacific countries whose seaboards do not 
also front the Atlantic have for a variety of reasons shown interest 
in the development of regional trading blocs both in the north Atlan-
tic and the Pacific. Their interest involves political as well as 
economic motives. 
In the case of Japan regional developments could assist in pro-
moting the political stability and economic development of the coun-
tries of South East Asia and at the same time facilitate the expansion 
of the export markets of Japan. Australia and New Zealand also 
have a considerable stake in the political stability of the area but, 
in addition, the development of a regional trading bl oc is viewed as 
a means where by better market prospects may be secured for their 
temperate agricultural produce and as a way of better ensuring in-
dustrial development along the lines of comparative advantage. 
It is obvious, however, that the outcome of the recent propos-
als for the formation of regional free trade groups such as N. A. F. 
T.A. and P.A.F.T.A. depends upon the result of Britain's appli-
cation to join the European Economic Community and, much more 
importantly, upon the attitude of the United States to these propos-
als. At the moment the official attitude of the U .S .A. could be de-
scribed only as lukewarm. In the first place, the foreign trade of 
the U.S.A . is strongly influenced by political fe.ctors . However 
bleak the future of multilateral G. A. T. T. type negotiations may be, 
it appears that , as long as the U.S.A. retains global political in·· 
terests it is unlikely to become part of a regional trading group.* 
* This statement may be too strong . Providing a free trade area 
agreement were sufficiently open-ended arid provided that it extended 
t o sufficient countries, the U.S .A.' s interest could be aroused. 
For instance, in a recent paper D .Hobertson is of the opinion that 
"iNhilst no formal proposal has been made by the Administration the 
possibility of American interest in an Atlantic-based free trade area 
is not as unlikely as it would have appeared ten years ago" 
(1 ' 83 - 84). 
210 
SECTORAL ANALYSIS 211 
If anything the recent Czechoslovakian crisis must have hardened 
the resolve of the Americans to see established an E.E.C. which 
is politically as well as economically strong. As long as the par-
ticipation in the E .E. C. of the United Kingdom is deemed important 
to ensure this political stability, there seems little likelihood of the 
u .S .A. proceeding with alternative trade and political strategies. 
Finally, in contrast to its global political interests, the 
U.S.A. has special hemisphere interests which include Latin 
America. It is inconceivable that the U.S. A. would proceed with 
the development of a regional trading bloc which did not make spe-
cial provisions for the republics of South and Central America, 
Initially these special provisions could bo extremely difficult to 
negotiate unless the interests of other underdeveloped countries and 
of temperate zone agricultural producers were a l so considered . 
From the viewpoint of Australia, Japan and New Zealand there 
can be no doubt that their interests are best served the more open-
ended and extensive is the free trade area to which they attach them-
selves, provided always that adequate provision is made for their 
own special interests.* For this reason the three countries should 
do what they can to encourage the development of broadly conceived 
free trade measures both by ensuring adequate discussion of these 
ideas within their own national frontiers and by assisting in pro-
moting discussion and negotiation at an international level. But 
while their combined counsels are no douM important it remains 
true that any initiative towards th8 successful formation of a large 
regional trading bloc must come from the United States. In the 
meantime, while pressing the case for larger regional developments 
and for their own special interest within these developments, the 
three developed and non-American countries of the Pacific might 
well consider what initiatives they could themselves take to extend 
trade within the Pacific Basin. 
II J. A. N. F. T. A. - A Japan-Australian-New Zealand Free Trade 
Area 
In an earlier article (4) I argued that the establishment of a full 
free trade area between Japan, Australia and New Zealand was i m-
practical. A number of reasons were cited, such as the extremely 
sensitive problem of J apanese agriculture and the equally sensi t i ve 
problem of the protected manufacturing industries of Australia and 
* S ee ( 1 ; 2; 3) • 
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New Zealand. But even if a satisfactory solution to the delicate 
political aspects of these problems could be found, the remaining 
uncertainty about the effects of a movement towards full free trade 
upon the wage levels, unemployment, industrial structures and bal-
ance of payments of the member countries would continue to act as a 
major deterrent. F or instance, it is inconceivable that either . . 
Australia or New Zealand, who cannot at the moment agree to the 
full abolition of barriers to trade between themselves, would agree 
to submit their manufacturing industries to the full blast of Japanese 
competition whatever the alleged and actual economic benefits of 
such a move may be • 
At the same time there is evidence that the three countries are 
reappraising the benefits and costs which derive from the continued 
protection of the above sectors of their economies and that calculat-
ed self-interest as well as the tend of events may force them into a 
gradual, if only partial, abandonment of their protective attitudes. 
For this reason, I suggested in the paper referred to above that the 
three countries might consider a move towards free trade by inte-
grating various industries one at a time. This paper considers 
this proposition in greater detail. First, arguments for and against 
proceeding with economic integration upon a sectoral basis are 
discussed. Next, a number of industries are considered in which 
it is argued integration might well commence. The ~'.>aper concludes 
v.-ith a number of s uggestions about immediate policy. 
III Sectoral Integration Reconsidered 
The Case for: 
Arguments in favour · of sectoral integration assume that the re-
moval of distortions in the market for one product will lead to an 
improved allocation of resources within the area. Quite apart from 
trade diverting effects, however, there can be no apriori certainty 
about the effect of the removal of barriers to trade within the group 
of countries concerned. The problem of 'second best ' policies 
arises and each case must be appraised on its individual merits. 
But this is, of course, precisely what we are suggesting the three 
countries might proceed to do. Furthermore, if the long-term 
intention i s to continue to integrate individual industries until a 
situation of virtual free trade exists these 'second best' considera-
tions are important only in the short-run. 
The main argument in favour of integrating the three economies 
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industry by industry is that Governments are more likely to make 
limited decisions, the results of which can be foreseen with some 
. certainty, because these decisions are known to be acceptable to 
the respective electorates. Furthermore, the success of integra-
tion plans in one industry or group of industries may well provide 
the stimulus for integration to take place on a broader front. When 
the European Iron and Steel Community was first contemplated any 
attempt to bring its potential members into full economic union would 
have been doomed to failure. When the more narrowly conceived 
iron and steel agreement showed itself to be not only viable but 
successful it prepared the way for the formation of the E .E .C. 
More recently, there is the example of the Canada-United States 
Automotive Agreement which gave rise to agitation for the integra-
tion of other industries such as forest products and/ or the chemical 
industry (5, 2). 
The above argument is relevant for J.A.N.F.T.A . because of 
the particular difficulties involved in making a reasonable estimate 
of the net gains (or losses) which would follow the complete removal 
of trade barriers between the three countries . Moreover, one 
needs know with certainty not only that the area as a whole will 
benefit from the removal of trade barriers, but that each of the 
members will also gain. If trade barriers were to be eliminated 
among the member countries by planned stages substantial changes 
in the distribution, if not in the level of incomes, would be involved. 
Because no reasonably sure method exists for compensating any 
member whose real income may decline or who may be called upon 
to sustain an undue proportion of the structural changes required, 
governments might be reluctant to agree to a proposal for full inte-
gration. They may not baulk at the lesser proposal for integra-
tion upon a sectoral basis where they could bargain for adequate 
compensation. This then is an argument in favour of integrating 
more than one industry so that all parties should be seen to gain, 
but not all industries at the same time. In such a siti.iation the 
vested interests of one producer group could be played off against 
those of another group wit hi n the same industry or from another 
industry. Furthermore , each of the member governments would 
be reasonably s ure not only of the prospective net gains but of the 
likely transitional effects. They would as a result be able to give 
guarantees regarding compensation to those harmed by the transi-
tional process . 
It should be stressed that a proposal for sectoral integration 
does not imply that any country would cease producing within some 
industry classification (where this was likely to occur special pro-
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v1s1ons could be built into the agreement that would retain a share 
of the industry, if in different form, for the member country con-
cerned). If the E .E. C. has proved anything it is that the structure 
of modern industry involves extreme specialisation in the produc-
tion of inputs and outputs within each sector itself. Ideally, there-
fore, integration provides not merely a large market, but the oppor-
tunity to develop a high degree of input specialisation within the 
market area of the respective industry. 
Another advantage of sectoral integration is that trade diver-
sion and adverse terms of trade effects could be more accurately 
predicted and where necessary steps could be taken to minimize 
these effects. For instance, if it were the automobile industry 
which was being integrated harmful trade diversion effects could 
be prevented by reducing barriers to trade in automobiles with non-
member countries. 
So far we have been discussing established industries. Yet 
another attraction of the sectoral approach is that it would facili-
tate a more rational development of the science-based industries 
of the future whose location need not be left to historical accident. 
Iv:oreover, the capital outlay required to establish these industries 
is too large for any small or medium size country. There is much 
to be said, therefore, for a group of smaller countries pooling their 
resources for development purposes. 
Benefits which could be obtained from the formation of a full 
free trade area are to a greater or lesser extent also likely to be 
present if the three countries proceed with integration on a sectoral 
basis. Despite its faith in the multi-lateral principles of G .A. T. 
T. the U .S.A. has shown itself prepared to subordinate its trad-
ing principles to its political objectives. Without doubt one of its 
major political goals is to establish a group of non-communist 
countries in South East Asia which are stable politically and eco-
nomically strong. ,Japan, Australia and New Zealand share the 
same political goal. 
For this reason, the development of P.A. F. T .A. being block-
ed by the U.S.A. 's global commitments, and the establishment of 
a full free trade area between Japan, Australia and New Zealand 
being impractical for the reasons cited above, it would seem likely 
that the U.S.A. and indeed the U.K. for similar reasons might give 
enthusiastic encouragement to a more limited sectoral project pro-
viding it remained open-ended and providing it was meant to increase 
the effectiveness of aid and development programmes in South East 
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Asia. 7/e shall return to these points below. Here, we need 
merely reiterate that the extensive trade relations of the three 
potential member countries with the United States and with the 
United Kingdom make it essential that these two countries give any 
integration project their active backing in the diplomatic negotia-
tions which would precede an agreement . Enthusiasm for such a 
scheme is not considerable as yet in the potential member countries 
and not only would the gains need to be seen clearly but the bless-
ing of the two powers mentioned would be required if the scheme 
were to be implemented. All this, of course, presupposes that as 
far as the United Kingdom is concerned her application to join the 
Common Market remains unsuccessful. Should the United Kingdom 
enter the Common Market then her attitude to New Zealand and 
Australian participation in a free trade area project with Japan 
would not be of such importance because Commonwealth preferences 
would no longer be a live issue. 
There are other than political reasons why Japan, Australia 
and New Zealand should contemplate seriously any scheme which 
would augment economic growth in the underdeveloped nations of 
the South East Asian area. From Japan's point of view these 
countries provide a market for exports second only in importance 
to the United States. In 1967 the countries of South East Asia 
took 28 % of Japan's exports and were her most important customer 
for heavy industrial and chemical goods exports. But there are 
two problems which could jeopardise future Japanese exports to 
the area. The preponderence of heavy industrial and chemical 
goods partly reflects conditional aid and reparations payments made 
to these countries by Japan. This is becoming increasingly con-
cerned about the growing surplus in her balance of trade with these 
countries (in 1 967 they provided only 15 % of her imports). T he 
continuing success of Japanese exports to this area depends upon 
successful economic development and for this reason Japan must 
welcome any scheme which, among other things, would lead to the 
co-operation of the developed nations of the P acific Basin in pro-
moting economic growth in the area. 
Apart from political and humanitarian considerations, Australia 
and New Zealand are also interested in the economic development 
of South East Asia because the successful development of the area 
could provide important markets for the agricultural exports which 
dominate the export baskets of the two countries . Of late their 
attention has been turning increasingly to the area and they are 
mindful that countries such as South Korea and Taiwan , whose 
national incomes are growing so rapidly, could follow the Japanese 
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pattern of changing dietary habits and increased demand for western-
type foodstuffs. By themselves they are too small to do other than 
make a token gesture to assist development in the area but they 
would obviously welcome an opportunity to participate with other 
countries in a development programme .which made better use of 
their specialist resources and at the same time brought them into 
increasing contact with the commercial life of these areas . 
At present the allocation of' aid to South East Asia is low on a 
per capita basis. In 1 964 it was $2. 5 5U. S. per capita compared 
with $4. 20 for Latin America or $6 • 20 for Africa. Japan has made 
it abundantly clear that her own financial position is not sufficient-
ly strong to undertake more than a moderate share of the increased 
flow of aid that is required in the area and that she looks to other 
countries for their co-operation and assistance. 
A free trade area, commenced upon a sectoral basis between 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand, could assist in several ways. 
First, while the combined aid programme of the three countries 
would be quite inadequate ,in relation to the needs of the area, it 
would make for a more effective aid programme than if the three 
countries were to contin~e to act unilaterally. As an offshoot of 
the trade agreement a combined aid programme could be developed 
which could better combine the specialist resources of the three 
countries. For instance, in the field of agricultural development 
both Australia and New Zealand could make important contributions 
in the way of technical assistance and training and this could be 
combined with Japanese capital to establish agricultural research 
and training centres, model farm developments and food processing 
industries • 
While the U.S.A. and other countries such as Canada may 
decline to participate in a Pacific free trade area, they may be 
willing to formally associate themselves with or to at least co-
operate with any aid programme that developed along with the trad-
ing agreement . There would be nothing inconsi stent about this . 
A sectoral trade agreement between Japan , Australia and New 
Zealand could also facilitate the granting of trade preferences to 
the countries of the area. It could do this by extending preferen-
tial treatment in the industries integrated to the underdeveloped 
countries of the area. Combined with carefully conceived aid and 
inve stment (to which the Asian Development Bank might contribute) 
such a scheme would provide for a more rational industrial devel-
opment than that which is based upon a policy of import substitution. 
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In some circumstances preferential treatment could also be extended 
in industries in which integration had not occurred. 
An objection which could be made about such a regional (and 
sectoral) preference system is that it conflicts with schemes for the 
multi-lateral granting of privileges and that this would arouse the 
opposition of the United States. Two points should be noted. 
First, in lieu of international agreement about the granting of pref-
erences to the underdeveloped countries on a multi-lateral basis 
such a scheme as outlined above does provide an opportunity for 
those countries which can agree to proceed with a more limited pref-
erence scheme. Secondly, I am at a loss to understand why coun-
tries can agree to the giving of aid on a discriminatory basis (pre-
sumably for political or balance of payments reasons) but cannot 
agree to the granting of discriminatory trade preferences. If any-
thing, the two fit nicely together in that the aid may provide the 
capital equipment for industrial development while the granting of . 
trade preferences, if wisely done, will ensure a more rational 
choice of industries for development. 
The Case Against: 
A major objection to a proposal for sectoral integration is the 
incompatability of the proposal with the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs ( G. A. T. T.). The basic underlying principle of the 
GATT is the most favoured nation rule as a result of which tariff 
concessions granted to one country are passed on to all other GATT 
members. The well-known exception to this rule is where a group 
of countries form a customs union or free trade area and within 
which it is the intent of the members to remove substantially all 
barriers to trade within a specified time period. No provision 
whatever is made for a proposal which includes only a small number 
of products . GA TT being the cornerstone of Japan, Australia and 
New Zealand's international trading policy this would appear to be 
a major difficulty. 
In the past , however, GATT has made no fundamental objection 
to similar schemes and one can cite the instance of the E • C. S. C. 
and of the more recent Canada-United States Automotive Agreement 
for which both Canada and the United States successfully applied 
for a GATT waiver. There is also the New Zealand-Australia 
Free Trade Area Agreement which has been approved by GA TT but 
within which the two countries are moving slowly towards free trade 
on a sectoral basis. 
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In the lull which has followed the recent Kennedy Round negotia-
tions members of the GA TT are more kindly disposed towards alter-
native schemes for the freeing of international trade than they have 
been in the past. 'Nhat is important is the intent of any new propo-
sition. If it is open-ended so that other countries can later seek 
membership and if it is the intention merely to commence by freeing 
trade in one or two sectors before proceeding to other sectors then 
the suspicions of fellow GA TT members are likely to be allayed. 
In other words what matters is whether the scheme is envisaged from 
an international viewpoint as a trade creating one or as a thinly 
disguised proposal for regional discrimination against the goods of 
third parties • 
Possible GATT objections could be avoided if the three coun-
tries were prepared to adopt an M. F. N. rather than preferential 
basis in their approach to the sectoral freeing of trade. This, 
however, would require Japan, Australia and New Zealand to extend 
non-reciprocal free trade privileges in the sectors concerned to all 
third parties and it is unlikely that the three countries would agree 
to this proposal. In the first place, whatever the economic argu-
ments may be, it would be difficult politically to win acceptance for 
the idea that a 'free ride' should be given to third parties. 
Secondly, it would make it more difficult to provide !or a pattern of 
industrial development other than that determined by market forces. 
For instance, the recent Canada-United States Automotive Agree-
ment contained provisions about market shares which ensure that 
Canada will continue (in fact will increase) its share in automobile 
production for the North American market. It is extremely unlikely 
that either Japan, Australia or. New Zealand would proceed with an 
integration project unless, at least for an initial period, similar 
guarantees were made .. This last objection would not hold if indus-
tries could be found in which, even with virtual free trade, the 
contribution of third parties to the market area was negligible. 
However, with the possible exception of meat and dairy products, 
there are no such industries. 
Finally, we need consider a major criticism which is particular-
ly relevant when the rvI. F • N. proposal is considered. One basic 
condition for the success of free trade within selected industrial 
sectors would be to ensure fair competition in the production and 
marketing of the products concerned within the market area. 
Obviously, this requires the removal of restrictions in addition to 
tariffs and quotas. 
The problem of securing competitive conditions is accentuated 
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where a commodity is traded freely but when the principal inputs 
such as raw materials, component parts or capital equipment are 
protected. One example of this is to be found in the Canada-United 
States Automotive Agreement where Canadian automobile producers 
correctly pointed out that while their imports of capital equipment 
from the U .s .A were subject to Canadian import duties they could 
not be expected to compete adequately with their American competi-
tors in the United States market (5, 4). 
All this suggests that a proposal for free trade in the outputs 
of any industry or industries needs be extended to the various inputs 
of the sector concerned. Inevitably, this would widen the scope of 
any agreement and make it more difficult to secure the co-operation 
of the affected industries, some of which may be less than enthusi-
astic about the whole proposal. But the negotiating and adminis-
trative difficulties would be increased even further if the free trade 
area were to be formed along M .F .N. lines as suggested above. 
IVioreover, once inputs were included in the projected scheme it is 
certain that no industry could be found in which the contribution of 
third parties to the Japan-Australia-New Zealand market area was 
negligible • 
Even if reascnable progress could be made on a preferential 
basis towards removing fiscal and legel impediments to trade between 
the three countries there is further barrier to fair competition which 
needs consideration. Foreigners have often complained that 
business parctice and the high degree of concentration of business 
in Japan provide additional obstacles to the successful functioning 
of competitive forces. In part there is substance in this accusation 
in th.at the highly integrated nature of the Japanese economy does 
lead to a firm within particular groups of firms - such as Mitsui 
or Mitsubishi - being granted discriminatory treatment. In part 
these problems which confront a foreign competitor in Japan also 
arise from an inadequate understanding of business conventions in 
Japan. Thus, while not minimizing the difficulties raised by the 
high degree of integration of Japanese business, part of the remedy 
lies in an increased understanding of business practice in Japan 
and of the functioning of the Japanese economy. 
A further impediment to the success fo a sectoral free trade 
scheme is the attitude of the Japanese Government to foreign invest-
ment in Japan. To some extent the success of the proposal would 
depend also upon the free flow of capital within the industries 
selected for free trade. Of the three countries, Australia actively 
encourages foreign direct investment within Australia and 
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New Zealand's attitude is only slightly less liberal. Japan's re-
strictionist policy is based primarily on the fear that if a freer 
inflow of foreign capital were allowed a large part of Japanese 
industry would come under foreign control. 
Japan has been criticised strongly by her trading partners for 
her failure to remove the controls over foreign capital inflow. As 
a result some concessions have been made and for those industries 
in which the Japanese are technologically advanced or only slightly 
less so than their foreign competitors, foreign ownership can now 
range between 50 % and 1 00 % for any one firm (although it may not 
exceed 20 % for the industry as a whole). Where the industry 
concerned is deemed to be technologically backward, however, any 
inflow of foreign capital to a firm within the industry is carefully 
vetted. Yet it is precisely in these areas that foreign investment 
could be seen to do the most good both from the point of view of 
Japan and the foreign investor. For instance, Australia and New 
Zealand have an interest in the processing and distribution of 
temperate zone agricultural products. 
There is evidence that Japan intends to proceed further with 
her liberalisation policy (6; 2, 57) and that the process could be 
formally completed by 1 971 (2, 28). The problem is certainly not 
an intractable one as far as a proposal for free trade between 
Australia, Japan and New Zealand is concerned. Capital would be 
free to flow in a north-south direction and while it would no doubt 
retain its right to continue to vet foreign investment in 'sensitive' 
areas, Japan could be expected in time to facilitate a mutually satis-
factory two way capital flow. 
The establishment of preferential treatment among the three 
countries for the flow of capital, inputs and outputs of certain 
selected industries could provoke strong criticism from t:ie other 
trading partners of the three countries. Much would depend upon 
the industries selected for integration and upon the resulting trade-
diversion effects . As far as Japan is concerned, even if these were 
not large there might be strong opposition from United States business 
interests. At the present time United States busi ness is keenly 
aware of Japanese competition within the American market and 
resents the Japanese controls not only over foreign investment but 
also over free trade in such products as automobiles in which Japan 
is rapidly increasing export sales . In these circumstances prefer-
ential treatment e xtended to Australia and New Zealand could give 
rise to requests for discrimination against Japanese goods in the 
United States market. As noted above, however , the official 
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attitude of the United States may be that small economic losses (and 
these could be short-term if Japan continues to liberalise her trade 
relations) are a worthwhile price to pay for the chance of increased 
political stability in the South East Asian area. From Australia 
and New Zealand's point of view it is the attitude of the United 
Kingdom which would be most important and we have already com-
mented upon this problem. 
IV. The Need For Industry Studies 
There are a number of industries which could be considered 
for inclusion in a sectoral free trade agreement between Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand. In each case what is required is a 
detailed investigation of the likely impact of a freeing of trade upon 
the ownership, wage rates, productivity, employment and composi-
tion of output in the industry concerned. In no way can the present 
paper pretend to offer this type of exhaustive and quantitative en-
quiry. Instead a few suggestions are made about industries which 
might profitably be investigated in this manner. What is important 
is that the integration of the industries selected should be seen to 
offer obvious advantages for the three countries. 
The Automobile Industry 
The automobile industry is one which might be considered . 
Despite import duties levied on motor cars and despite the presence of 
other fiscal devices which discriminate in favour of the Japanese 
automobile producer, Japan is the second largest producer of motor 
vehicles in the world. Although the industry might be inclined to 
argue otherwise, there can be little doubt that this protection is 
today superfluous and that the Japanese car industry is fully compe-
titive by world standards. 
The same can be said for neither Australia nor New Zealand. 
Production of cars and commercial vehicles in Australia is running 
at approximately 400, 000 pe r annum and is expected to rise to 
500 ,000 per annum by 1 970 . At the present time domestic produc-
tion has a 60 % to 70 % share of the market in Australi a . A recent 
report on the Australian economy (7) showed that there were fourteen 
firms producing motor vehicles in Australia. Of these six were 
manufacturers and assemblers and eight were exclusively engaged 
b assembly . Government pol icy is to increase still further the 
Au s t ralian content i n motor vehicle built or assembled i n the countr y 
and the 1970 objective i s for an Aust rali an content of 95 % for pas-
senger-type vehicles . 
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To achieve this objective a high level of protection is accorded 
the industry. Complete vehicles are subject to a 35 % M.F.N. rate 
while the rate of duty levied on components varies from 35 % to 52f%. 
Despite a highly competitive situation as between different 
producers within Australia there can be no dount that extensive pro-
tection from overseas competition and the demand of the public for a 
wide range of motor vehicles has made it possible for a relatively 
large number of firms to survive • 
A much worse situation exists in New Zealand. There the in-
dustry is concerned only with assembly and assembles approximately 
80, 000 vehicles per annum of which the domestic content is about 40%. 
Current government policy is to increase the domestic content still 
further. 
At the moment there are ten firms operating seventeen plants 
which turn out forty to fifty different car models. Even if one 
excludes the smaller firms the average number of vehicles per firm 
is approximately 8, 000 vehicles. Needless to say this state of 
affairs is maintained in being by a mixture of import licencing controls 
and tariffs. The M.F.N. tariff rate on new vehicles is 55 % and 
on components 45 % • Rigidly applied import licencing controls make 
it difficult to assess what the real cost of protection is. A recent 
7forld Bank report, however, suggested that to increase the present 
domestic content from forty to fifty per cent would cost around 
300 % of the marginal savings of imports . 
In these circumstances the introduction of free trade with Japan 
would probably eliminate the New Zealand motor vehicle assembly 
industry and bring about a considerable re-structuring and consolida-
tion of the Australian industry. 
Whatever the economic benefits are alleged to be it is unlikely 
that either Australia or New Zealand would accept a proposal for 
the complete , if gradual, removal of barriers to trade in motor · 
vehicles. The political realities of the situation suggest that any 
free trade area proposal would initially need contain provisos 
regarding market shares if it were to have any chance of success. 
But even this type of proposal, which is similar to the Canada-
United States Automotive Agreement and which is a proposal for 
selective industrial integration rather than for free trade, has a 
great deal to commend it compared with the present situation. By 
the removal of margins of preference accorded Commonwealth imports 
it would direct demand to a cheaper source of supply for both finished 
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vehicles and for components. It would also lead to a restructuring 
of the automobile industry in both Australia and New Zealand in a 
manner that would result in a large reduction of firms and to ration-
alisation schemes whereby each country reduced the domestic con-
tent of the vehicles it assembled but increase or commenced the 
export of components to one another as well as to Japan. 
If this proposal were to be of benefit to Japan any agreement 
about the retention of market shares need increase Japan's share 
of the Australian market. To some extent this would occur at the 
expense of third parties, particularly if both Australia and New 
Zealand were to retain their present tariff levels with regard to the 
rest of the world. To some extent, however, it should be achieved 
by offering the domestic industry a guaranteed minimum share that 
was less than its current share. For instance, in 1 966, of the 
passenger cars supplied in the market area as a whole Japan sup-
plied 71 'f~, Australia 1 7 % , New Zealand 2 % and the remainder 
were supplied by third parties (9). An agreement which guaranteed 
New Zealand and Australia minimum shares of say 1 2 % and 1 ! % of 
the market would on 1966 figures have given Japan an opportunity 
to increase her sales of motor cars to Australasia by up to 1 84, 000 
vehicles. This would be equal to approximately 20 % of the produc-
tion of motor cars in Japan in 1 966 • 
The objections to such a scheme are many and obvious. To the 
extent that the increase in Japanese sales was at the expense of 
third parties (and to the extent that the trade of these third parties 
was not due to Commonwealth preference) Australasia would be 
purchasing from dearer sources of supply. There would also be 
the danger of retaliation on the part of the third parties affected 
but this is a difficulty which must be contended with i n forming a 
free trade area. 
Perhaps the most damaging criticism is that the huge negotiat-
ing and administrative effort which would be involved in initiating 
the scheme may outweigh the benefits to be derived from it. By 
itself such a scheme would have only a marginal effect on real in-
comes in the countries concerned and its justification must ultimately 
be its demonstration effect. If, as in the case of the European 
Coal and Steel Community, it gave rise to broader and bolder 
integration measures it may prove worthwhile . 
Coal, Iron and Steel Industries 
Japan and Australia are fully competitive by world standard s 
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in the production of iron and steel. In both countries the virtual ab-
sence of protection or of controls over capital flows suggests that 
free trade in this sector already exists • Japan is a major exporter 
of steel and Australia is a small net exporter; Australia is also a 
net exporter of iron ore and of coal while Japan relies heavily upon 
imports of both of these raw materials. 
It is probable, however, that there is scope for further ration-
alisation of the coal, iron and steel industries in the two countries . 
In Australia some fabricated items continue to receive protection . 
For instance, pipes and tubes are subject to an M . F . N . duty of 35% 
and for these and related products the elimination of barriers to 
trade would enable Japan to capture a larger share of the market . 
Furthermore, in what is an extremely capital-intensive industry, 
there would appear to be no reason why Japan s h ould not establish 
steel making plants within Australia . T his could not only i mprove 
competitive conditions within Australia where the industry i s dominat-
ed by one Australian owned firm and its subsidiaries but could also 
lead to a greater specialisation in production of steel in each of the 
two countries. 
From the viewpoint of New Zealand much could be gained from 
participation in some type of free trade area agreement for iron and 
steel products . At the moment New Z ealand is establishing an iron 
and steel industry which will make use of local coal and iron sand 
deposits. Recent technological break-throughs suggest that the 
industry could be competitive even on an international basis if it 
were not for the decision to attempt to produce a wide range of mer-
chant products in order to make New Z ealand vi rtually self- sufficient 
in steel production . The cost of such autonomy is certain to be short 
and extremely hi gh- cost production runs which in a few hours will 
provide a six mont hs supply of New Zealand domestic market 
requirements. 
In these circumstances there is much to commend a scheme whi ch 
may ensure the retention of a minimum market share fo r Ne w Z ealand 
but which would enable the industry to focus its attention on one or 
at most two basic types of merchant products, the s u r plus production 
of which over and above domesti c requirements it woul d export to 
Japan and/ or Australia . New Zealand would rely upon these two 
countries for the supply of her remaining domesti c requirements . 
Meat and Dairy P roducts 
It would seem that a minimum r equirement for t he parti cipation 
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of Australia and New Zealand in a free trade arrangement with 
Japan is that in return for their granting of concessions in trade in 
industrial products Japan should respond by liberalising imports of 
agricultural products in general and of meat and dairy products in 
particular. The last two categories of agricultural produce still 
account for approximately one sixth of Australia's export receipts 
and for about three fifths of New Zealand's export earnings. I am 
aware, of course, of the seemingly intractable nature of the agri-
cultural problem in Japan but I am also of the opinion that a number 
of developments are going to make a rethinking of agricultural policy 
in Japan not only desirable but inevitable. 
Those factors which have made agriculture the most sensitive 
area of trade policy in Japan have both political, social and strategic 
overtones. Politically 1 all Governments in Japan in the post-war 
period have depended considerably upon the support of the rural 
electrorate and although the proportion of the workforce engaged in 
agriculture has fallen dramatically from 40 % in the mid 1 950 's to 
23 % in 1 967 this political factor remains important. Socially, 
many Japanese contend that the maintenance of the rural way of life 
makes for stability at time of rapid change in the other sectors of 
the economy. Strategically, Japan is concerned lest she becomes 
too dependent upon imported foodstuffs - she already imports about 
one fifth of her total food requirements. 
To preserve the rural way of life a number of policies have 
been adopted. \Vhile encouragement is being given to modernisation 
by means of research expenditure, by the teaching and demonstration 
of better farming techiques, by fostering the use of fertilisers and 
by urging farmers to concentrate their small farm holdings into larger 
units, the industry is also protected from the effects of competition 
by a combination of policies such as import quota, tariffs, produc-
tion subsidies and price support schemes. The result has been 
not only high but rising food prices. For instance, the price of 
rice is more than double the world price and its retail price has 
risen by over 80 % since 1 960. Prices of meat and dairy products, 
the per capita consumption of which has been rising very rapidly, 
are also extremely high. Ivlilk is approximately $ 0. 30 U.S. a pint 
and beef prices range from $ 1 • 25 U.S. a lb to around g 7. 00 U.S. 
a lb for prime quality beef. 
Despite the high pric.es of foodstuffs various import demand 
projections that have been made by the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation and by other Japanese organisations indicate a steady 
rise in consumer demand and in import requirements. In the case 
of meat and dairy products these projections indicated that by 1975 
226 I. A. McDOUGALL 
Japan will be importing 2 .1 million tons of raw milk equivalent in 
dairy products and approximately 480, 000 metric t ons of meat (which 
compares with import demands in 1966 of 0 .4 million tons of raw 
milk equivalent in dairy products and of 140, 000 tons of meat). If 
anything these projections are excessively conservative in that they 
have accepted national production plans which, particularly in the 
case of dairy products, show no likelihood of being realised. F or 
instance, to achieve the 1 970 production target the rate of increase 
in production of dairy products in Japan would need be trebled. 
There are good grounds for arguing that it would be in the long-
term interests of Japan if she were to revise her present agricultural 
policies. Short and long-term projections for the development of 
the Japanese economy (6) stress the importance of attaining a high 
rate of export expansion if the planned increases in per capita in-
comes are to be achieved. The long-range plan indicates among 
other things that exports will need to expand at 9. 2 % per annum if 
a per capita increase in real incomes of 7 .1 % per annum is to be 
attained. 
In part this continued export expansion must continue to depend 
upon the diversion of labour from low-productivity agriculture to 
the export industries and upon the ability of Japanese industries to 
retain a competitive edge in export markets. In the period 1 960 to 
1965 the single major contributory factor to the rise in the cost of 
living of 6 .2 % per annum was the persistent rise in food prices (8) 
(whose sub-group within the index rose at 8 .4 % per annum). It 
would appear, therefore, that Japan is pursuing policies which are 
inconsistent. On the one hand, a rapidly expanding level of per 
capita incomes is dependent upon a high rate of increase of export 
receipts which is in turn dependent upon a continuing flow of labour 
from the agricultural to the industrial sector and upon price stability 
in the domestic market. On the other hand, a policy of agricultural 
self-sufficiency, with supply held back by low productivity and a 
declining agricultural labour supply and with demand for high protein 
foodstuffs increasing at around 10 '{~ per annum, must result in further 
substantial price increases. 
While Japan is most unlikely to expose her farmers to the full 
blast of international competition there are grounds for arguing that 
the negotiation of a limited free trade agreement in agricultural 
products with Australia and New Zealand could be in her best inter-
ests. Such an agreement could guarantee Japanese meat and dairy 
producers a minimum share of the domestic market. They could be 
assisted, for instance, by a system of subsidy payments similar to 
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those made to British farmers by the United Kingdom Government . 
In this event, tariffs and import quotas on Australasian farm prod-
ucts being removed, the prices of meat and dairy products would 
fall and the consumption of them increase cosiderably. An alterna-
tive scheme, which would be less attractive to the Japanese consum-
er and to the New Zealand producers but which would be more attrac-
tive to the Japanese Government, would be to retain a tariff on im-
ports of meat and dairy produce (but to abolish all quotas) and to 
make use of the tariff revenue to assist in subsidising the Japanese 
producer. That New Zealand and Australian farmers would receive 
no margin of preference over third party producers would not matter 
providing the tariff levels set made for an increase consumption of 
meat and dairy products and providing provisions were made to 
prevent the dumping of surpluses. 
The advantage of such schemes from the viewpoint of Australia 
and New Zealand is obvious. From Japan's point of view the suc-
cess of these schemes would depend upon who subsidised the 
Japanese farmers and upon the share of the market it was felt ex-
pedient to reserve for them. As a political force the influence of 
the rural electorate will continue to decline. By 1 985, for instance, 
less than 10 % of the total workforce is expected to remain in agri-
culture. 
In the meantime if the Japanese Goverment were to finance the 
subsidy scheme this would be a further charge upon the taxpayer. 
But cheaper food prices would appeal to an increasingly influential 
urban electorate and the contribution of rising food prices to the 
overall rate of inflation would be checked. If anyting, the diminish-
ing importance of the rural electorate and the higher taxes required 
to finance farm subsidies would increase the urgency of the pro-
gramme to modernise farming. It is also possible that Australia 
and New Zealand could be called upon to contribute financial and 
technical assistance to accelerate the increase in productivity in 
the farming sector. 
Conclusion 
In the absence of detailed quantitative investigations it is 
difficult to reach any firm conclusions about whether it would be 
worthwhile to proceed on a sectoral basis to free trade between 
J apan, Australia and New Zealand. Unfortunately, the more limited 
is an agreement to extend trading relations the more protracted and 
costly can be the negotiations and the administering of the agreement 
reached. However, the more likely are such limited measures to 
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lead to more liberal steps being taken to remove the barriers to 
trade, the stronger becomes the argument in favour of them . 
It appears that the best way to institute trade arrangements of 
this sort between the three countries would be for Japan to become 
a member of the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Area Agreement 
which has been in force since 1 965. The stated purpose of tho 
Agreement is to promote "a sustained and mutually beneficial expan-
sion of trade •••• under conditions of fair competition" . 
The Agreement stipulates that there will be a progressive re-
duction and elimination of duties on all the commodities listed in 
Schedule A of the Agreement. The general requirement is that once 
goods have been included in the schedule they will immediately be-
come free of duty if subject to a prior tariff of less than 5 % , that 
they will become free of duty in two years if subject to prior duties 
of 5 - 10 % and that if subject to prior duties in excess of 10 % 
goods will become free of duty over eight years . 
There is nothing, however, which is autom~tic about the iriclu-
sion of goods on the Schedule and specifically excluded are those 
"goods the inclusion of which would be seriously detrimental to an 
industry in •••• either Member State •••• " Further safeguards exist 
which permit action to be taken against dumped and subsidized im-
ports and which allow for the temporary withdrawal of concessions 
if serious injury could be done to domestic producers, if a balance 
of payments crisis confronts one of the members or if the Member 
State decides to encourage a new enterprise. To date, therefore, 
the effect of these safeguards has been to develop the freeing of 
trade on a sectoral basis. 
Whatever one might like to say as an economist about the desir-
ability of these safeguard clauses the fact is that an institutional 
framework exists within which a freeing of trade on a sectoral or 
other basis could take place if the Member States are of serious 
intent. Furthermore, there is provision within the Agreement for 
the inclusion of other countries. Thus, at a point in time when 
there are not many commodities included on the Schedule to the 
Agreement , it should not prove difficult to negotiate Japan's entry. 
T o surmount those difficulties which would arise and to provide 
the information upon which policy decisions could be based, the 
three countries should establish an advisory committee . This com-
mittee should make detailed reports upon those industries which 
might be profitably included on Schedule A to the Agreement. It 
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could also investigate the possibility of extending preferences to 
some of the underdeveloped countries and the possibility of the three 
countries co-operating in a foreigh aid programme. Its reports on 
these and related matters could provide the basis for further discus-
sion of the issues involved at the diplomatic and business level. 
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COMMENTS ON P. D. DRYSDALES'S AND I. A. McDOUGALL'S 
PAPERS BY HISAO KANAMORI 
Dr. Drysdale' s paper shows clearly that trade among Japan, 
Australia, and New Zealand is highly intensive, either because of 
high degrees of complementarity in trade or because of the geo-
graphical, political, and historical closeness among them. His 
analysis of the structure of trade among these advanced western 
Pacific countries seems to suggest that policies designed to promote 
closer integration between Japan on the one side, and Australia and 
New Zealand, on the other side, would be beneficial. 
Several factors have to be taken into account in assessing the 
desirability of integration among these three countries. Drysdale' s 
paper and lV:cDougall' s paper both deal with these factors. Among 
them, three questions are of particular interest. 
First, is the establishment of a complete free trade area among 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand desirable and practicable? 
Drysdale 's conclusion is that it is "extremely doubtful that partici-
pation in a limited free trade area would bring about economic bene -
fit. The costs of trade diversion within JANFTA are likely to be 
high." He suggests that it would be more useful to undertake limit-
ed integration and develop a negotiating bloc for obtaining conces-
sions on a broader front, especially from the United States. 
Whether the establishment of a complete free trade area among 
the three countries is desirable remains unclear to me, largely 
because the dynamic effects of such an arrangement have yet to be 
analysed fully. Whilst Drysdale' s analysis of the static effects is 
plausible, his interesting analysis of the dynamic effects is still in 
progress. Whatever the results may be, a complete free trade area 
is unlikely to be feasi ble . lVicDougall draws attention to the extrem-
ely sensitive problem of Japanese agriculture, and there is the 
equally sensitive problem of protected manufacturing industry in 
Australia and New Zealand. Drysdale draws attention to other 
problems. I agree with their conclusion. 
Second, is sectoral integration desirable and practicable? 
Drysdale discusses the possibilities for sectoral integration in three 
industries - motor vehicles, iron and steel, and non ferrous metals -
and he appears to come out in favour of the sectoral approach towards 
integration. As far as his analysis of pig iron production and 
aluminum production is concerned, I agree that sectoral integration 
is not only desirable but possible . Benefits from the minimization 
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of transport costs and intensive use of high quality resources specific to 
one part of the western Pacific region cannot be denied . Drysdale' s 
suggestion that the realization of these benefits will be facilitated by 
joint ventures and business tie-ups is particularly interesting. The 
fact that this kind of joint-venture arrangement has already been nego-
tiated within the aluminum industry confirms its practicability. But 
with respect to motor car production, the prospect for agreed special-
ization seems doubtful. Drysdale suggests that it would be rational for 
Japan to specialize in the production and export of small and small - medium 
sized passenger cars, and for Australia to specialize in the production 
and export of medium sized cars. I admit that economies of scale are 
important in the motor vehicle industry. But I do not think that it will 
be possible to agree on specialization. The effect of economies of scale 
seems too uncertain to persuade businessmen in Japan to abandon medium 
sized car production . McDougall's view that "whatever the conomic 
benefits are alleged to be it is unlikely that either Australia or New 
Zealand would accept a proposal for the complete, if gradual, removal 
of barriers to trade in motor vehicles," seems correct . 
McDougall urges sectoral integration or rather the removal of 
Japanese restrictions , in the meat and dairy industries. Contrary to 
opinions generally expressed, he seems rather optimistic about the pros-
pects for freer access to Japanese primary commodity markets, arguing 
that "while Japan is most unlikely to expose her farmers to the full blast 
of international competition, there are grounds for believing that the 
negotiation of a limited free trade agreement in agricultural products 
with Australia and New Z ealand could be in her best interests. I am of 
the opinion that a number of developments are going to make a rethinking 
of agricultural policy in Japan not only desirable but inevitable. 11 I am 
in agreement with McDougall on this point . Agricultural protectionism 
in Japan is losing ground not only from an economic viewpoint but also 
from a political viewpoint. Increased consumer prices due to agricul-
tural import restrictions and the higher taxes required to finance farm 
subsidies, as well as the growing strength of the urban over the rural 
electorate, suggest the inevitability of modification to Japan's agricul-
tural protectionism. 
Third, what should be the relationship between Japan-Australia-New 
Zealand and the Asian developing countries? Drysdale points out that 
"there is a strong case for coupling any policy initiatives by advanced 
countries with the extention or adoption of trade policies specifically 
designed to accommodate the needs of developing countries in the Asian-
Pacific region." Since the Asian developing countries are shown to have 
high complementarity and high special country bias in their trade with 
both Japan and Australia, this point assumes special significance . 
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Moreover, it seems to me that triangular trade among Japan, 
Australia, and Asian developing countries may become more impor-
tant than direct trade between Japan and Australia, because of the 
growing labor shortage in Japan, the development of labor intensive 
industry in Asian countries, and the growth of capital and resource 
intensive industries in Australia and New Zealand. 
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COMMENTS ON P. D. DRYSDALE'S AND I. A. McDOUGALL'S 
P A PERS BY H. W. A RNDT 
The theme of this session is "JANFT A and Asian Developing 
Countries" but the Asian Developing Countries have hardly figured 
in the two papers except for Dr . Drysdale' s interesting extension 
of his trade intensity analysis to selected Asian developing countries 
and his comments on a possible widening of the Australian less 
developed country preferences scheme . I wonder, incidentally, 
would Dr. Drysdale reconsider his judgement that Australia's trade 
intensities and special country biases in trade are generally high 
with Asian developing countries? It seems that, in her import 
trade with Asia, special country bias is high with Indonesia alone, 
and that is due entirely to the special nature of trade in oil. 
I should like to focus the discussion more on the Asian develop-
ing countries and begin by asking again Dr. Kitamura 1 s question: 
is P AFT A going to be a rich men's club, an OECD of the Pacific? 
Does it have any significance for the Asian developing countries 
except (like the OECD) in relation to aid? 
Let me begin by referring back to a point raised earlier by 
Professor Lockwood: What contribution can trade liberalization make 
to the economic development of the Asian developing countries? 
Clearly we cannot generalize , The Asian developi ng countries 
differ greatly from one another in their stage of industrialisation. 
Some, like Hong Kong, Taiwan and recently Korea, have shown that 
spectacular expansion of exports of manufactures are possible with-
out any preferences , Others, like Indonesia and Burma could not 
take any advantage of freer access for exports of manufactures for 
many years to come . F or Indonesia industrialisation, when it once 
again gets under way, will for years to come concentrate on import 
substitution . For others, like India, preferences may be crucial 
in the next few years. 
Trade liberalization and "free trade areas," moreover, seem 
to mean very different things to different people round the table . 
Professor Kojima 1 s P AFT A has almost nothing in common wi th Dr. 
Kitamura' s free trade area for the developing countries of ECAFE. 
The former is thinking of freer trade between the advanced coun-
tries, the latter between developing countries. More important, 
while Kojima is interested primarily in trade liberalization and 
envisages "planned structural adjustment" mainly as an aid to this 
process , Kitamura dismissE.s trade liberalization as of marginal 
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significance and thinks primarily in terms of planned industrial 
development in which "agreed specialization" is part of a regional 
strategy of import substitution. It merely confuses the discussion 
to sweep these differences under the carpet. 
Again, even among the supporters of P AFT A there would seem 
to be a marked difference of emphasis between those who assume that, 
given time, structural adjustment will come spontaneously as the 
response of market forces to opening up of new trade opportunities 
in a free trade area, and those who think a good deal of govern-
ment planning will be necessary. Clearly, if the latter view is 
right, P AFT A will be a much more difficult proposition for coun-
tries like Australia, or the U.S.A. for that matter, which gener-
ally eschew direct government planning and control of the private 
sector than, for example, for Japan. This is another difference 
that might be worth some discussion. 
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DISCUSSION OF PAPERS PRESBNTED BY L. V. CASTLE, 
P. :C. DRYSDALE .AND I.A. McDOUGALL 
In reply to comments on his paper, Professor Castle said that 
he had not meant to over- emphasize the importance of the British 
connection in preventing Australia and New Z ealand from participat-
ing in Pacific area trade arrangements . It was one factor which had, 
however, to be reckoned in the benefits and costs . Certainly for 
Australia it would be quite wrong to suggest that it was a very im-
portant factor. As Dr. Drysdale has shown in his paper, there has 
been a remarkable shift in the whole pattern of Australia's trade 
away from Britain. Australia has also gone very much further in 
the reorientation of attitudes of mind. New Zealand has proceeded 
in the same direction, but more slowly. Professor Castle agreed 
with Professor Chough that the tendency in New Zealand to want to 
wait-and-see whether the United Kingdom gained admission to the 
EEC had a negative effect on New Zealand ' s trade policy. In fact, 
it was largely responsible for her failure to take up promising op-
portunities elsewhere, especially in J apan. 
Professor Castle also envisaged the growth of a stronger 
export-oriented manufacturing sector in New Zealand. He pointed 
out that there had been an 80% growth in manufactured exports since 
devaluation, with heavy concentration of that growth in Asian-
Pacific markets • 
Finally, Professor Castle said that he had not meant t o imply 
that global free trade should be the major focus of OPT AD. Like 
its original proponent, he understood that the major focus would be 
on trade relations between ·Japan, Australia, and.New Zealand, and 
on trade relations between those countries and countries such as 
Taiwan and K orea, which might well be welcomed to membership when 
they de sired it. Its main interest would be in the P acific, and, for 
that reason, an expanded OECD would not serve as an adequate sub-
stitute . 
In reply to comments on his paper, Dr. Drysdale said that he 
had pointed out in his paper that there were very few circumstances 
under which integration among the motor vehicle industries in ad-
vanced western Pacific countries might prove feasible. However, 
should the American industry 1 s attempt to enter directly into pro-
duction in Japan be re buffed, it is just possible that a basis for 
negotiating more effective western Pacific specialization might emerge . 
T he big American producers in the Australian industry might, under 
those circumstances, become receptive to the idea of pushing c.k . d . 
or fully built- up exports to Japan from their Australian base , and 
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the Japanese industry might find this preferable to American pro-
duction in Japan. Dr. Drysdale suggested that it was worth think-
ing about this particular set of circumstances right now. He added 
that he did not think that it would be necessary to negotiate agreed 
specialization in the sense Mr. Kanamori had in mind - involving 
the agreed cessation of medium-large car production in Japan and 
small car production in Australia. That would not be necessary to 
the success of an arrangement of the kind suggested. The aim was 
to -eliminate the inefficient tails of each country's industryi but 
firms which had achieved volume in small car production in Japan 
and medium-large car production in Australia would undoubtedly be 
able to maintain less efficient production of large cars in the former 
case , and smaller cars in the latter case , at the same time • There 
would be substantial real income gains for large proportions of the 
population in both countries and for the whole region for which they 
are dominant suppliers of motor vehicles. 
Dr. Drysdale suggested that a large part of his paper had 
been devoted to a detailed analysis of Australia rs economic rela-
tions and trade policy towards Asian developing countries. His 
analysis of the static effects of trade liberalization also included 
an assessment of the effect of non-reciprocated trade concessions 
towards Asian developing countries. As to the question of the 
closeness of Australia's trade relations with E CAFE countries, 
and particularly those selected for close analysis, he stressed 
that his comments on the generally high degrees of intensity were 
relevant principally to export trade with the region. Care needs 
to be taken in the interpretation of the analysis . T he fact is that 
seven out of the nine countries selected reveal high special country 
biases in this export trade, and six reveal high intensities. The 
selection is not biased: 16 percent of Australia's total exports 
went to the whole ECAFE region plus New Guinea in 1 968, a region 
which only accounted for around 6 per cent of total world imports 
in the same year. T hat implies high trade intensities, and special 
country biases since complementari ty can be taken as reasonably 
low, with the region as a whole. 
Dr. Drysdale agreed that the provision of trading opportunities 
for developing countries was only one of the problems to be tackled. 
But recognition of that is no excuse for not trying to devise policies 
aimed at providing more trading opportunitie s for the important 
group of developing countries which require them. In this matter, 
something can be done unilaterally , as the Australian example has 
shown, and a whole lot more could probably be done regionally. 
Negotiations among the interested advanced countries and between 
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them and developing countries on trade matters might encourage 
more generous direct economic assistance for those that need it as 
well. He concluded that, if the theory implicit in what was said 
in the paper about the effect of trade preferences turns out to be 
generally relevant, then there is a strong case for linking the two 
activities together. 
Discussion of the three papers revolved around questions 
about the nature of JANOTAD or OPT AD and the role they might 
play in regional development; the importance of Japanese agricul-
tural protectionism on the one hand, and Australian and New 
Zealand manufacturing protectionism on the other; and the GA TT 
constraint on limited integration of the kind suggested by Dr. Drysdale 
for western Pacific motor vehicle industries and by Professor 
McDougall for other sectors. 
Participants from J apan, Australia, and New Zealand em-
phasized the importance of an identification of interest in the 
Asian-Pacific region. It w_as argued that an organization such as 
OPT AD could provide the framework for a move towards freer trade 
and economic relations among the advanced countries in the region 
in the same way as the OECD did for Europe in its time . However 
an important difference was noted - the development problem looms 
much larger in the Pacific a.nd Asia. It was felt in consequence 
that there would be much greater stress on the development problem 
in the evolution of institutional arrangements within the P acific. 
Participants from developing countries and developed countries 
alike urged the importance of providing a framework for a dialogue 
between the advanced and developing countries on matters of aid 
and trade policy within any such organization, T here were some 
who then wondered whether a duplication of the functi on of E CAFE 
might result . Others pointed out that the principal initiatives and 
concerns in the organization proposed would derive from the three 
or five advanced Pacific countries - they would have certain de-
finite policy goals in mind, such as the negotiation of trade conces-
sions among themselves , the extension of trade preferences, and 
co-operation in aid-giving, and t hose would bear little relation to 
the work of ECAFE. It was felt that regional endevours in this 
direction would yield more than unilateral or ·bilateral endeavours. 
One participant argued that the formation of a three-coantry 
organization, with developing country participation might have an 
added, immediate advantage as a strategy for holding the line 
against growing American protec tionism. Whilst it seemed unlikely, 
as Mr. Lea suggested in an earlier paper, that the United States 
w ould become involved in the general imposition of quotas , equally 
I 
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it seemed possible that she could become involved in directing 
quotas against particular suppliers. Austral ia had already suf-
fered. Of the quota requests before Congress, more than one 
third were levelled at J apan. United States quotas against Japan 
would directly affect the economic welfare of Australia, New 
Zealand, and Asian developing countries . 
Questions were also raised about the extent to which modifica-
tion of J apanese agricultural protectionism might prove possible in 
the negotiation of trade concessions among Japan, Australia and 
New Zealand. A J a p a nese participant observed that whilst the 
economic benefits of r educed protection were clear, their realiza-
tion might require some basic reform of the J apanese electoral 
system in which one rural vote counted for about three or four urban 
votes. Some participants thought that economic and political pres-
sure would weigh more and more heavily against J apanese agricultural 
protectionism and that, in any case , income growth would provide a 
substantial market for Australia's and New Zealand's agricultural 
exports. Others stressed the important residual problems of 
escalating effective protection with increasing differentials between 
domestic and international policies, and the adverse substitution 
effects of these price differentials. As for the possibility of modify-
ing manufacturing protectionism in Australia and New Zealand, a 
:New Zealand participant saw promise in the development of a specia-
lized manufactur ing sector in each country with substantial manu-
factured exports. For New Z ealand, forest products, pulp, paper, 
carpets, and engineering products were ciied as viable export 
ind us tries. There did not appear much promise, on the other hand, 
for competitive production of the standar dized, run- of-the-mill 
manufactured commodity which usually required prior production for 
large d omestic markets . An Australian participant said that there 
had already been some pressure towards modification of Australian 
protectionism and the development of a more efficient, export-
oriented manufac turing sector. T o date, this pressure had not 
focussed on the ne gotiati on of reciprocal consessions but had been 
reflected in call s fo r the closer scrutiny of Australian tariffs alone. 
F inally, an American participant suggested that it migh"(. not 
be so easy t o obtain a waiver from GATT for sectoral integration 
of a discriminatory kind . He pointed out that political considera-
tions had d ominated the granting of a waiver for the European Coal 
a nd Steel Community in 1 952 - the i mportance of welding former 
U. S . allies and enemies together - and t hat , whilst the Canadian-
United S tates Automobile Agreement offended against the letter of 
GAT T law , it did not offend against i ts s pirit . Others felt that the 
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New Zealand-Australian Free Trade Area, which in practice allows 
for the freeing of trade by sectors, provided a contra precedent. 
In any case, some of the important proposals contained in the papers 
involved m .f .n. tariff concessions, and it was thought that in other 
cases it might be possible to organise quid quo pros. Moreover, 
some felt that political considerations might not prove entirely ir-
relevant. 
Part N 
COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO MONEY 
AND CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
Chapter 9 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION 
IN AS~ AND THE FAR EAST 
Robert Triffin 
Introduction 
My only claim for distinction at this conference is my utter in-
competence as an area specialist on the problems of Asia and the Far 
East. This incompetence limits severely the contribution which I can 
realistically hope to bring to your discussions . It bars me from rais -
ing and exploring the most concrete problems of intra-Asian economic 
and monetary relations as such, and forces me to confine myself to a 
different set of problems which are nevertheless of crucial importance 
to this area and with which I can claim a modicum of familiarity, i . e . 
the impact of broader, worldwide trends on Asian and Far Eastern 
international monetary developments , and the consequent need for an 
"agonizing reappraisal" and "aggiornamento" of international monetary 
policies and institutions more and more divorced from the current and 
prospective realities of economic and political life in this area of the 
world . 
I shall, first, outline briefly two such worldwide trends, of 
enormous importance to these, as well as to other, countries in the 
days and years ahead: 
1. The accelerating disintegration of the so- called "gold- exchange" 
standard; and 
2 . The rewarding postwar development of closer regional co-
operation, or even integration, of monetary and economic 
policies and institutions in various parts of the world. 
I shall then turn to two of the specific policy responses that 
Asian and Far Eastern countries might develop to adjust to these 
developments: 
1. The gradual shaping-up of an Asian or ECAFE Reserve 
System; and 
2. The opportunities which such a system would offer for a 
mutually profitable expansion of trade relations and for the 
acceleration of economic development in the area . 
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I. The Disintegration of the Gold-Exqhange Standard 
Recurrent sterling, dollar and gold crises have amply and 
dangerously confirmed, in recent years and months, the diagnosis 
presented, many years ago, by a few isolated academic economi sts, 
regarding the increasing instability and ultimate unviability of the 
gold-exchange standard. 
Needed reserve creation was fed--increasingly haphazardly--
under this system, from two sources, neither of which bore any re-
lation to the economic requirements for reserve increases necessary 
to sustain feasible and non-inflationary rates of growth in world 
trade and production . The first of these sources was monetary gold, 
i.e. the amounts of gold which central banks could, and did, buy from 
the market at $35 an ounce, to absorb the excess of current gold 
production and unpredictable Soviet sales over and above the amounts 
absorbed by dentists, jewelers, industrial users, hoarders and 
speculators. The second was the " gold-convertible" foreign-ex-
change balances-- primarily dollars and sterling--which became 
available to central banks as a result of American and British 
balance-of-payments deficits, and which these central banks would 
prefer to retain in the same form--in order to earn interest-rather 
than to convert them--for safety sake--into sterile gold metal. 
Both of these traditional sources of reserve increases have not 
only dried up. Their flow has even reversed itself, destroying--
rather than creating--reserves through the drain of gold from reserves 
into private channels and the liquidation of sterling and dolla:r 
reserves previously accumulated by central banks. The traditional 
gold-exchange standard is therefore dead, and beyond any realistic 
hope of being revived by the international monetary doctors. 
Gold 
Gold reserves accounted for about 91 percent of world reserves at 
the end of 1937, but only for 42 percent of reserve increases over the 
years 1938-1949, 26 percent in 1950-64, and minus 51 percent from 
January 1 , 1 965 through June l968 (see first line of Table 1). 
The central banks of the former gold pool have reluctantly and 
belatedly confirmed the death of gold as a major source of future 
reserve increases. France having defected already from the gold 
pool in the previous summer, its seven remaining members terminated 
and buried the pool at their March 16-17, 1968, meeting in Washington. 
They decided to hoard their remaining gold stocks by stopping sales 
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Table 1 
Sow:·ces of Reserve Creation: 1938-June 1968 
II. Credit-Reserves 
A. Negotiated 
1. Reserves in IMF 
2. Foreign Exchange 
B. Other Foreign Ex-
change 
1. £ Balances of £ 
Area 
2. Other 
Total Gross Reserves 
Sources and Notes: 
.Annual rates, in millions 
of U. S • dollars 
1938-49 1950-64 1965-
June 1968 
573 
776 
1:A§ 
148 
~ 
1349 
589 
1676 
d2Q 
181 
249 
1246 
2265 
-641 
1891 
1fil 
703 
1773 
=.2.§2. 
-536 
-49 
1250 
Percentages of Total 
Reserve Creation 
Before 1938-49 1950-64 1965-
1938 June 1968 
91 
9 
100 
42 
58 
11 
11 
100 
26 
74 
12. 
8 
11 
100 
-51 
151 
12.§. 
56 
142 
.::il 
-43 
-4 
100 
1 , These estimates are uniformly derived from the International Financial 
Statistics (October 1968 and annual Supplements) Tables on "International Liquidity" 
and U.S. and U.K. "External Liabilities" and from Federal Reserve Bulletin March and 
September articles on "Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations ." 
2. "Negotiated Foreign Exchange" (line II A 2) is a minimum estimate, including 
only (a) outstanding U.S. swap liabilities and "nonliquid" liabilities to foreign 
official agencies and (b) post-1963 sterling reserves of the U. S., Canada and Western 
Europe (except Iceland and Ireland), minus a rough estimate of sterling reserves of 
these countries not linked with the so-called Basle agreements on special central 
bank assistance to the U.K. 
3. "Other Foreign Exchange" (line II B) also includes, however, balances af-
fected by negotiations and informal agreements, particularly as concerns the sterling 
balances of the sterling area (line II B 2) on which more formal agreements were 
negotiated in the summer of 1968. 
Brief Comments: 
Note the declining role of Gold (line I), the fast increasing role of credit-
reserves (line II), and particularly of "negotiated" credit-reserves (line II A), and 
the decreasing pace of Gross Reserves increases after 1964. 
Robert Triffin 
November 1968 
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, to the private market and to any central bank that would continue 
to sell gold to the private market . They also agreed , however, 
that they saw no need to buy gold in the future either from the 
market or from current gold production. 
If adhered to in the future, this double-barrelled decision 
would therefore block any further increase, as well as decline , 
of the monetary gold stocks. I would venture the guess, how-
ever, that the short-term policies forced upon central banks by 
the March panic cannot in fact--and indeed should not--be 
indefinitely enshrined as a sensible and viable long-term solu-
tion of the problem . 
The minimum shift of policy that can confidently be pre-
dicted at this time i s that central banks and/ or the interna-
tional Monetary Fund will resume gold purchases if and when-
ever the price falls perceptibly below $35 an ounce. The 
amounts of such purchases, however, are unlikely to be very 
large . Available supplies from current production ($1 . 4 billion 
to $1 . 5 billion a year) are now, it is true, well in excess of 
"legitimate" industrial and artistic demand (estimated at about 
$800 million a year in 1967) and traditional, nonspeculative, 
"hoarding" demand (which I would put around $300 million a 
year, i.e. the lowest amount of private purchases recorded 
in any of the last twenty years but tw o and not accounted for 
by indus trial and artistic demand). Barring new gold dis-
coveries, h owever, gold production is likely to decline gradual-
ly over the years if the gold price does not rise, while indus-
trial and artistic demand is currently increasing by more than 
10 percent a year. Industrial, artistic and traditional hoard-
ing demand might thus be expected to catch up with--and later 
exceed--current production within a span of three to four years 
from 1967, i.e. by about 1971. 
Speculators are well aware of these projections and are 
therefore unlikely to unload their own hoards--large as they 
are now-- on the market at any price lower than ~D 5 an ounce . 
They might even continue to push the pric e up either in anti-
cipation of its unavoidable increase in the long run, or because 
of their obstinate expectation that repeated governmental asser-
tions that the official gold price will not be changed are a 
clear indication that such a change is---actively contemplated 
and migh indeed be decided in the very near future. 
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The March 17, 1 968 decisions are indeed a manifestation 
of deep- seated differences, rather t han agreement , among major 
gold holders regarding its future rol e in the i nternational 
monetary syst em . It would be impossible to expla i n rational-
ly otherwise the contrary mot ivations that might justify this 
simultaneous refusal to buy gold , even at less than $35 an 
ounce , and to sell it, even at prices widely in excess of $3 5 . 
It is hard to believe that central banks could remain totally 
indifferent to the price of a commodity of which they hold $40 
billion of i dle s t ocks and which is sti ll strongly viewed in 
many countries -- no matt er how mis takenly -- as the i ndispens -
abl e backing for public confidence i n the nat ional paper cur-
rencies i ssued by t he same centra l banks . 
If s pecula tors we re ne verthe less d e t e r red by the March 
17 deci s i ons t o s eek for s ecurity in gold, the y would c ontinue 
to s witch assets from the more e xpos ed currencies of de ficit 
countr i es t o the "stronger" curre ncies of surplus countrie s, 
suc h a s Germany . Gold spe culation would then abate only to 
b e cha nne l e d instead into cur r e ncy speculation, a s or more 
dangerous t o the s tability of the international monetary s yste m. 
Viable long-te rm policies regarding the role of gold in 
the interna tiona l monetary system will thus have to be defined 
within the very near future . Protracted inability to reach 
joint a greement in this respect, at least among the major 
reser ve-holding countries, would be bound to lead, s ooner or 
later, to disparate, mutually defeating national decisions that 
might end up either in gold revaluation or in a breakdown of 
the international monetary system between a gold bloc and a 
dollar bloc. Fortunately, the growing awarene s s and fear of 
such an outcome are now stimulating more promis ing efforts 
than have eve n been elicited in the past to reach a sensible 
agreement acceptable to all participating countrie s . Before 
discussing the possible shape of such an agreement, however, 
I must now turn to the second source of traditional reserve 
creation, i.e. the accumulation of foreign exchange balances 
--primarilJr -dollars and sterling-- as a normal component of 
inte rnational reserves . 
Fore ign Exchange 
Under the gold- exchange standard, the accumulation of 
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foreign-exchange as international reserves was left to the 
spontaneous decisions of central banks, influenced by the earn-
ings available on this type of reserve component--but not on 
gold-- and by the firm expectation that any balances so accumu-
lated could easily and readily be converted at any time into gold-
metal, at an established and fixed official price, upon simple 
request to the debtor of such balances. 
The death of this system has become increasingly, and dis-
turbingly, evident to central bankers, and even to interested 
laymen; all over the world. It can be read in the increasing 
proportions of foreign exchange now held only as the result of 
bilateral, or multilateral, pressures or negotiations. The exact 
figures are difficult to quantify in view of the secrecy surround-
ing some at least of these transactions. Yet, a broad order of 
minimum magnitude can be guessed at, with reasonable certainty, 
by using the technjques described in the Note accompanying 
Table 1 above and expanded in the Note to Appendix Table 3. 
In brief, we can certainly regard as "negotiated" holdings : 
1 • the reserve claims accumulated on the IMF; 
2. the reserve claims expressed in the so-called outstand-
ing "swap" commitments of the Federal Reserve System; 
3. the other dollar reserves accumulated in the form of 
"Roosa bonds" and other so-called "nonliquid" obligations of 
the United States to foreign central banks; 
4. the sterling reserves accumulated in the course of 
the rescue operations repeatedly negotiated ever since 1 964 
through the various "Basle agreements ." 
A cursory glance at Appendix Table 3 shows that the 
"negotiated reserves" of the North Atlantic area (i.e Western 
Europe, the United States and Canada) have more than tripled 
in the last four and a half years (1964-June 1968) while their 
"traditional" foreign-exchange holdings dwindled at an accelerat-
ing pace over the same period. The former have increased by 
$8. 8 billion, while the latter have declined by $3. 5 billion 
(2nd column of Table 3) . 
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The estimates given in the same Table for the "rest of 
the World" are less clear and reliable. The large increase 
in "unrecorded" foreign exchange -- i.e. the difference reported 
in International Financial Statistics between reported assets 
and reported U. S. and U. K. liabilities -- is difficult to explain 
and throws serious doubts on the reliability of the estimates. 
Secondly, foreign exchange holdings listed as "traditional" 
have certainly been subject also to various, more or less 
formal, agreements, especially for the sterling holdings of the 
sterling area. In any case, the new sterling agreement 
announced at Basle last September now make most of these 
holdings "negotiated" holdings and clearly reflect the intention 
of all parties to reduce drastically-- if not to eliminate complete-
ly -- the reserve currency role of sterling. 1 
A Negotiated Credit-Reserve Standard 
The broad conclusions that emerge from this brief factual 
review are that 
1 • Gold is most unlikely to feed any substantial portion 
of future reserve increases, unless its price is -- contrary to 
rational expectations and official pronouncements -- sharply in-
creased as an accidental result of some new crisis; 
2. Barring such an "accident" future reserve increases 
will continue to be fed primarily by the expansion of credit-
reserves which already account today for 47 percent of global 
reserves, as against 9 percent in 1 937, and for more than 1 50 
percent of the reserve increases of the last three and a half 
year. 
3. The growth of credit-reserves, however, is no longer 
It should also be noted that the dollar as well as the 
sterling reserve holdings of most undeveloped countries 
are largely held with the New York and London banks 
which extend to these countries 1 residents credits whose 
amounts are linked to the willingness of the central banks 
to retain their own reserves with the lending banks. 
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taking place under the spontaneous -- and always reversible at 
any time -- decisions of central banks implied in the theory of 
the "gold-exchange" standard. "Unnegotiated" foreign - exchange 
reserves have been decreasing at a fast pace in recent years, 
their place being taken by "negotiated" foregin exchange holdings 
and reserve claims on the Fund under a new emerging "negotiated 
credit- reserves" standard . (See Table 1, above, and Appendix 
Table 3.) 
The continuation of this evolution is dependent on a vast 
expansion of the IMF lending power over future years, such as 
is now contemplated and organized in the proposed Amendments 
of the International Monetary Fund Charter and the deliberate 
creation of Special Drawing Rights as a normal component of 
wbrld reserve increases . 
The agreement reached so far in this respect, however, 
will have to be modified and supplemented, in order to be fully 
workable in the long run and even to ward off new and danger-
ous crises in the short run: 
1 • The automatic distribution of SDR 1 s among all Fund 
members pro rata of their Fund quotas is unlikely to prove 
workable in the long run, as it would: 
(a) allocate - - largely as gifts -- 36 percent of the new 
SDR 1 s to two of the richest countries in the world 
(the United States and the United Kingdom) , another 
36 percent to twenty - three other developed countries , 
and only 28 percent to the poorest eighty- six less 
developed countries of the world; 
(b) contradict the cardinal principle, so often proclaimed 
and reaffirmed by the international monet a ry negotia-
tors, that the deliberate creation of i nt e rnati onal 
reserves should be linked to a strengt heni n g of t he 
adjustment mechanism ; 
(c) expect prospective creditors to underwrit e blindly in ad-
vance--through quinquennial SDR a llocations--policies of 
prospective debt ors in which they have no voice a nd which 
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they may regard at times as totally contrary to their own, 
or to world, interests. 
Future decisions to activate the SDR system are most likely, 
therefore, to prove extremely difficult to negotiate if the allocation 
system is not amended to take account of these objections . The 
lending potential derived by the IMF from the prospective creditors 1 
commitments to accumulate SDR credit- reserves will have to be 
used for purposes internationally agreed by the participants, rather 
than for the blind underwriting of national--and potentially conflict-
ing--natiorial policies . Such internationally agreed policies would 
inc:,lude, for instance: 
(a) traditional IMF, stabilization loans; 
(b) compensatory financing of disequilibrating, but reversible 
capital movements between major money centers, as 
foreseen in the IMF "General Arrangements to Borrow." 
(c) IMF support for commodity stabilization schemes , such as 
foreseen in the second resolution unanimously adopted at 
Rio, in September 1967 ; 
(d) indirect financing--through the IBRD, IDA, etc .--of 
economic assistance to the developing countries as long 
advocated by UNCTAD and a number of academic, business 
and government economists, and by the Reuss Subcommittee 
on International Exchange and Payments (see, for instance, 
the Reuss and Ellsworth Report of December 1965, and the 
Subcommittee's Report of December 1967). 
The acceptance of such a "link" between reserve creation and 
development financing was opposed by the Group of Ten on the ground 
that short-term liabilities cannot be used properly for the financing 
of long-term investments. They were clearly wrong in extrapolat-
ing what is a correct taboo for commercial banks to a world institu-
tion whose need for liquidity would arise only, as sarcastically 
noted by Professor Machlup, from a still remote need for "inter-
planetary" settlements . The Group of Ten has now apparently 
accepted that view, since the Rio Agreement foresees that 70 percent 
of the SDR' s used need not impose any repayment obligations, and 
can thus be regarded as potential gifts . If short-term liabilities 
can now be used to finance permanent gifts, they should certainly 
be usable to finance long-term investments . 
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2. Actual needs for SDR creation cannot be gauged, particularly 
for advance five-year commitments, in the absence of agreement re-
garding the future role of gold and reserve currencies in the process 
of reserve creation and reserve destruction. Liquidity needs would 
be amply met--or even overmet--and bar therefore any requirement 
for supplementary SDR creation if foreign central banks resumed in 
the future large accumulation of dollar and/ or sterling balances 
arising from U.S. and U. K. deficits, or if a change in speculators' 
expectations prompted vast disgorging from the enormous gold hoards 
accumulated by them in recent years. Conversely, persistent U . S. 
and U. K. defictis--or political bickering between the U.S. and/ or 
the U.K., on the one hand, and the main dollar and/or sterling 
holders, on the other- -might trigger, at any time, massive liquida-
tion of dollar and/ or sterling balances and threaten a collapse of 
the present system. 
Academic and other proposals for the setting up of a so-called 
"Conversion Account" or "Reserve Settlement Account" are designed 
to meet these problems and avoid de-stabilizing switches between 
reserve-currencies and gold. These proposals were, until recently, 
regarded by a majority of the oficial negotiators as "unnegotiable" 
with the United Kingdom and particularly the United States, or at 
least as "premature." The climate of official opinion has now changed, 
however, partly as a consequence of the willingness- -and even eager-
ness--of the United Kingdom to relieve st8rling of its reserve 
currency role--now regarded as a "burden" rather than the "ex• 
orbitant privilege " denounced by de Gaulle--and of the unanimous 
support of the U.S. Joint Economic Subcommittee on International 
Exchange and Payments for such an approach to the current gold 
and reserve-currencies problems and recurrent crises (see the 
Subcommittee's Report of September 18, 1 968). 2 
The speeches of the Managing Director of the Fund and particu-
larly of Governor Colombo of Italy, at the October 1 968 annual meet-
ing of the Fund, confirm other indications that these problems and 
suggestions will be actively explored in the forthcoming monfas, 
both by the Group of Ten, and by the IMF Staff and Executive 
Directors . 
2 For my own version of these proposals, and their contribution 
to the implementation of any jointly agreed gold policy of members, 
see the Subcommittee's Hearing of September 9, 1 968, pp. 143-
14 7, and Our International Monetary System: Yesterday, To.9.?-Y 
and Tomorrow (Random House, ·1968) pp. 146-164. · -
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II. The Trend Toward Regional Monetary and Economic Integration 
. The evolution outlined above of the international monetary system 
from the former "gold-exchange" standard to an emerging "negotiated 
credit-reserves" standard would, however, place new and immense 
burdens upon the management and policy-making machinery of an 
otherwise unreformed IMF. These burdens might be lightened 
through the development of a more decentralized and better structured 
system of international monetary cooperation, building up on the 
growing trend toward regional monetary, financial and economic 
integration in evidence in Western Europe (the European Economic 
Community and the European Free Trade Area), in Latin America 
(the Central American Common Market, Central Banks r Clearing 
House, Central American Monetary Union Agreement, and Latin 
American Free Trade Area), in Soviet Europe (the Comecon, the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the International Bank 
for Economic Cooperation) and in recent discussions about trade 
and financial integration in the United Nations Economic Commissions 
for Africa and for Asia and the Far East. 
The spectacular success already achieved along these lines by 
the EEC and Central America (the near quadrupling of intra-EEC 
trade, for instance, since 1956 and the near sextupling of intra-
Central American trade since 1960) is understandably stimulating 
interest in other areas for similar policies. The acceptance and 
implementation of trade liberalization commitments, however, have 
also proved to be closely linked with, and dependent on, parallel 
agreements on mutual financial assistance and gradual harmoniza-
tion of internal, as well as external, monetary and economic 
policies. Such agreements can be negotiated more easily among 
small groups of neighboring countries than at the worldwide level, 
and are essential to the survival and success of long accepted goals 
of regional economic integration. 
It is increasingly realized in the EEC, for instance, that the 
mutual assistance provisions of the Rome Treaty (Article 108) are 
less formal and binding than the commitments already accepted by 
its member countries toward the IMF, even though the economic 
commitments that they are supposed to underpin are for more ambitious 
than those undertaken by them in the worldwide framework of the 
Fund. Various proposals for closer monetary integration, and even 
for an eventual merger of the EEF currencies into a signle currency, 
have received considerable attention and support, including even an 
affirmation, in September 1967, by the then Chancelor of the 
Exchequer, Mr. Callaghan, that Britain would consider sympathet-
ically such a merger of sterling itself within a common European 
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currency. 
Actual progress, however, has remained slower than anticipated. 
One of the reasons for this has been that the large and persistent 
deficits of the United States and the United Kingdom have, through-
out most of the young EEC1s lifetime and until a few months ago, 
relieved its .member countries from any serious pressures on their 
balance of payments. All of them were accumulating surpluses and 
reserves, obviating the need for closer ha.rmonization of policies 
within the Common Market itself, and diverting attention instead to 
recurrent sterling, dollar and gold crises and the reform of the 
international monetary system • . 
Such a reform may now be anticipated in the near future. There 
is little doubt that it wiH require a more decentralized and better 
structured world monetary system, easing the awesome management 
problems that it will impose upon world monetary cooperation and 
facilitating, incidentally, the eventual reintegration of the COMECON 
group into such a system. 
Bureaucrats and even policy makers, · however, are forever 
inclined, by tradition and profession , to resist institutional changes 
that disturb the routines and habits of mind to which they are 
accustomed, and whose consequences cannot be fully foreseen in 
advance. This is true in Asia today as it was in Europe and in 
Central America during the debates that preceded and accompanied 
earlier steps toward regional integration. 
It is pointed out, for instance, that most Asian countries carry 
more trade wit h countries outside the region than within the region 
itself, that some are far weaker than others economically and 
financially and would prove unworthy partners in any such arrange-
ments, that--conversely--the less developed countries of the area 
could not open up their markets without exposing their ''infant 
industries" to unbearable and unfair competition from the more 
developed participating countries, that political rifts between aligned 
and non-aligned countries, between India and Pakistan, etc. would 
bar in e ffect any real cooperation among them, etc. , etc. 
All this perfectly true, but it was equally true in Europe and 
Central America, and did not prevent the success of these two major 
precedents in regional integration. The proportion of intraregional 
trade to extraregional trade was hardly larger at the outset in EEC 
than in the ECAFE region and very much lower indeed in Central 
America. Objections were also raised in Europe about the mingling 
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of weaker countries--such as Greece and Turkey--with stronger 
countries--such as Belgium and Germany--in OEEC, EPU and the 
Association Treaties with the EEC. As for political obstacles, 
they were as great, or greater, in Europe and Central America as 
in Asia. Germany was deeply hated, in the late 1940 1 s and early 
1950 1 s, by the countries which had been invaded and occupied by 
it during the two world wars. Border porblems between Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica were exacerbated by the basically opposite racial 
and political structures of these two countries: one purely white 
and with a long democratic tradition, the other primarily Indian and 
ruled, for many years, by a militaristic and despotic plutocracy. 
Regional economic integration in Asia would indeed tend to make 
such hardcore problems more, rather than less, manageable. Members 
would, in time, become less dependent than they are today on divi-
sive alignments with rival ·powers outside the region. Fruitful 
forms of cooperation between Pakistan and India could be negotiated 
more easily as part and parcel of broader regional commitments than 
they ever could on a bilateral basis. 
Many of these arguments for a "do-nothing" approach to the 
Asian problems should indeed be viewed as strengthening the case 
for a positive approach seeking their solution, or at least their . 
alleviation, in the development of mutually beneficial economic and 
monetary cooperation among the countries of the area. 
III . An Asian or EC A FE Reserve System 
The ECAFE countries, like all other countries, must, and do, 
earmark substantial resources t o the maintenance of an adequat e 
level of international mone tar y reserves . These have increased 
steadily from a low of $5 . 3 billion at the end of 1958 to $8. 2 billion , 
as of last June, i. e . at an average rate of about $300 million per 
year (see Table 2). 
These reserves are by n o means ample . They correspond to 
about 25 percent of t he a r ea 1 s annua l imports , a s against 36 percent 
for t he non- Soviet world a t l arge and 40 percent for the non- ECAFE 
countries. The r eserves of Australia and New Z ealand are 
propor tionately higher (35 percent) , but those of Japan far lower 
(17 percent) t han those of the other ECAFE countries (28 percent ), 
a nd these , i n turn, a re lower t han those of the ot her less developed 
countri e s taken a s a group (34 percent ) . 3 The announced intenti on 
3 See Table 3 . 
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Table 2 
Com osition and Evolution of ECAFE Countries' Gross 
in millions of dollars 
End of 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
I. Gold ill ll07 1124 11.22. 11.41 1265 1312 1380 1122 14.?A 
Australia and 195 188 182 163 191 209 227 231 224 232 
Ne.w Zealand 
Japan 54 244 247 287 289 289 304 328 329 338 
Other Asia 686 675 695 705 764 767 781 821 780 854 
II. Reserves in IMF 80 :m ~ ill .m .lli .49.§. M2. .§22_ 242. 
Australia and 8 48 73 31 105 131 131 135 170 205 
N e.w Zealand 
Japan 62 125 125 180 180 180 220 253 321 239 
Other Asia 10 34 50 32 44 60 55 61 118 99 
III. ForeiB!); Excha~e ill ~ ~ .412.§. ~ .illl 5.2.41 22§2 22.Q 5910 
Australia and 1089 1231 824 1263 1234 1645 1714 1262 1269 1127 
Ne.w Zealand 
Japan 946 1077 1577 1199 1553 1589 1495 1569 1469 1454 
Other Asia 2238 2568 2528 2294 2182 2507 2438 2752 3203 3329 
IV. Global Reserves 5289 6185 6300 6156 6546 7374 7360 7411 7882 7873 
Australia and 1293 1466 1077 1457 1530 1985 2072 1628 1663 1563 
Ne.w Zealand 
Japan 1062 1447 1949 1666 2022 2058 2019 2152 2119 2030 
Other Asia 2934 3272 3274 3033 2994 3331 3269 3631 4100 4280 
Souxce: "International Liquidity" Tables of International Financial Statistics 
(November 1968, PP• 15-18). 
Notes: 
1. "Other Asia" includes here Iran, shown under "Middle East" in IFS. 
2. Slight discrepancies in totals are due to rounding-off of some IFS estimates to 
next $5 million. 
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of Japan to increase very substantially its own reserves over future 
months and years (they have already risen by nearly 20 percent in 
the third quarter of 1968) mi ght be expected to increase the reserves 
of the ECAFE group as a whole. 
External reserves unavoidably entail opportnity costs--measur-
able in terms of lower internal consumption and/ or investments for 
the reserve holders--and exchange risks . The latter have risen 
sharply with the undermining of confidence in the reserve currencies 
in which the area holds most, by far (73 percent), of its gross 
reserves. 4 The holding of one ' s reserves in national currencies 
inevitably exposes the holders to exchange risks--devaluation--as 
well as to other political risks--blocking--and subordination. Any 
massive switches from reserve currencies into gold would probably 
prove unfeasible at this juncture, in view of the reactions which could 
be expected from the reserve currency debtors--primarily the United 
States and United Kingdom--when confronted with any large gold drain 
from their already depleted gold reserves. In any case, the intensity 
of the present international monetary crisis and the possible reactions 
to it on the part of the United States and many other countries might 
undermine seriously the future role of gold as a safer and preferred 
reserve and settlement asset. 
Table 3 
Reserves, Imports (millions of $) and Reserve Ratios (in %) 
June 1968 1967 Reserve 
Reserves Imports Ratios 
Australia and New Zealand 1671 4818 35% 
Japan 2001 11664 17% 
Other Asia 4485 15826 28% 
ECAFE 8157 32308 25% 
Other Countries 64888 170000 38% 
Developed 55933 143900 39% 
Less Developed 8955 26100 34% 
World Total 73045 202300 36% 
Source: International Financial Statistics, November 1968, pp .1 6, 35 
and 37. 
The proposed SDR 1 s will, if and when created, offer, on the 
whole, the safest and most appropriate investment in which 
reserves should be held. Their supply, however, will be 
4 See Table 2, line III divided by line IV. 
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severely limited at first, and will grow only slowly over the years. 
The creation of an "International Conversion Account" or "Reserve 
Settlement Account" might accelerate the availability of international-
ly guaranteed reserve deposits, but agreement on such a system is 
still highly hypothetical at this stage. 
In any case, whether guaranteed or not, SDR or "conversion 
account" reserve holdings would still entail the investment of 
reserves outside the region itself, the extent to which they are 
reinvested in the region remaining dependent on outside decisions 
in which EC A FE reserve holders would have a voice, but only a 
minority one. 
It is possibl e to conceive of a different reserve mechanism that 
would reduce the risks involved in the present system of reserve 
holdings, decrease the present financial and political subordination 
of ECAFE reserve holders toward the reserve center countries, 
and, last but not least, enable them to divert toward the ECAFE 
area itself some of the resources now put entirely at the disposal 
of non-ECAFE reserve centers? 
I have prepared, at the request of the ECAFE, concrete pro-
posals that would meet these objectives , and which need not be 
rehashed here. 5 In brief, I suggested that a modest portion--to be 
increased, in the light of experience, over future years--of parti-
cipating countries 1 gross reserves be held in the form of interest-
earning and exchange- guaranteed deposits with a Central Reserve 
Fund. The Fund, in turn, would be directed by members--and by 
its charter itself--to retain in gold or appropriate investments in 
the major financial centers a portion of its total assets (equal to 
its deposit liabilities) sufficient to guarantee beyond any ques tion 
the ready availability and usability of its deposit liabilities for all 
balance-of-payments settlements outside as well as within the 
region. The balance of its deposits, however, could be invested 
within the region to support policies agreed by its members or 
defined in the Charter itself. (The latter would be confined, in 
my proposals to automatic, but modest and medium-term stabilization 
assistance to countries faced with deficits in their overall--rather 
than in their intraregional--transactions.) 
The rationale of these proposals is discussed at length in the 
5 See Report and Recommendations of the Seminar on Financial 
Aspects of Trade Expansion, ECAFE, Bangkok, 20 September 
1967, particularly pp . 127- 206 . 
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document referred to above, and only some salient points will be 
covered in the brief outline that follows. 
First of all, interest earnings on Reserve Fund deposits could 
clearly be larger than on alternative direct reserve investments in 
the present world reserve centers. The Fund 1 s earnings on the 
portion of its assets retained in such investments would be s lightly 
higher because some of them could and should be invested with 
maturities somewhat longer than those appropriate for reserve 
investments by anyone of its members countries (the reason being 
that the global balance-of-payments deficits of the group as a whole 
--and therefore the maximum size of withdrawals needed to finance 
them--are nearly inevitably far smaller than the sum of individual 
countries deficits, some--and usually most--of the latter being off-set, 
and often more than offset , by the surpluses of other members. 6 Earn-
ings would be even higher, of course, on that portion of the Rund's assets 
that would be invested within the area itself, since this would by-pass 
the intermediation profit s now derived by New York and London banks 
from the relending to area residents of deposits maintained with them by 
the same area's central banks. 
Secondly, legally accepted exchange risks could be decreased 
in relation to those now legally incurred on direct dollar and sterling 
investments. They might not be entirely eschewed on the portion of 
the Fund 1 s assets retained abroad, although the centralization of 
such operations might strengthen the bargaining power of the area 
in this respect . Loans and investments to area members, however, 
would obviously be denominated, not in the borrower' s national 
currency, but in a unit of account designed to provide exchange-
guarantees acceptable to members . 
Alternative definitions of such a unit of account should be 
carefully considered . A sterling or dollar definition would, of 
6 'The reserve losses of individual ECAFE countries over the 
period 19 59-66 totalled close to $2. 8 billion , the sum of annual 
reserve losses ranging from less than $100 million (in 1959 and 
1966) to nearly $750 million in 1961. The net reserves of the 
group as a whole, however , rose by more than $2.6 billion over 
the period as a whole, and by $400 to $900 million in four of those 
eitht years, global reserves losses occurring in only one·-of those 
years ( 1 961 ) and being confined in that year to $1 28 million only. 
See Table 3 and the ECAFE Report .•• mentioned above, Table 
10, pp. 172-173, lastthree lines. 
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course, be easier since it would conform to market habits and 
traditions and was, until recently, regarded by members as safe 
and acceptable. Sterling, however, has now lost this status, as 
recognized in the sterling area greements negotiated last summer 
and giving a dollar-value guarantee to the bulk of members 1 sterl-
ing holdings. A dollar-value guarantee may, however, appear 
itself questionable in view of the present international monetary 
turmoil. On the other hand, a gold-value guarantee might legiti-
mately be regarded as unacceptable by prospective borrowers, and 
its legal significance increasingly uncertain in view of the divorce 
now created between the official and the market gold price, and of 
the possibility that major countries might be forced, at some time, 
to suspend the gold convertibility of their currency, thus leaving 
only the private gold price as a criterion for a gold-value definition . 
The most logical solution to these problems and uncertainties 
would be the adoption of an international, or regional, unit of account 
similar to that which served , with outstanding success, the European 
Payments Union for more than eight years, and has been imitated 
in recent years for the flotation of "unit- of-account" obligations on 
the international capital market. 
It will be observeq, thirdly, that the legal rights and commitments 
of members might be put in jeopardy by any s ignificant default on 
the part of the Fund 1 s borrowers. The Fund 1 s Charter, however, 
could erect more powerful and effective barriers against such 
defaults than any ever conceived in intBrnational lending operations 
in the past. This could be achieved through a simple provision 
committing all members to channel any gross payments due to a 
defaulting member through that member 1 s deposit account with the 
Fund until the full amount of the default has been cleared. 7 
Of course, negotiations would probably, in practice, obviate actual 
7 In the course of the ECAFE discussions referred to above (p . 
15, footnote 1), the eventuality of full default by Indonesia, 
under the hypothesis that my proposals would have been put into 
operation, was raised by several of the participants. I looked 
at the data presented in my paper (penultimate line and column 
of Table 13, p. 182 and 5th column of "Indonesia" line of Table 
1, p. 160) and pointed out that the $5 million maximum default 
of Indon~sia would have been wiped out in less than a week if 
other members had channelled through the Fund their settlements 
of Indonesian exports to them, reported as $265. 6 million per 
year. 
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resort to such a clause, but it existence would strengthen consider-
ably the position of the creditors toward the defaulting country, and 
its observance would not be dependent on the word of the latter, but 
on that of all other members and their interest in safeguardin g the 
value of their own claims on the Fund. 
Fourth and foremost comes the ability of the Fund to guarantee 
the full availability of members' deposits for all balance-of-payments 
settlements, outside as well as within the region . 
Intra-regional settlements could not, of course, create any 
problem in this respect, since they would merely lead to a reshuffl-
ing of the Fund's deposit liabilities among members--debiting the 
account of the payer and crediting that of the payee--without affect-
ing in the least the total assets (= liabilities) of the Fund. 
Problems could arise only in connection with settlements outside 
the region, but would not necessarily arise even then. As long as 
the group of participating countries, taken as a whole, remained in 
equilibrium, or better still--as has been the case in all years but 
one over the period 1958-1967--in surplus with the outside world, 
any. withdrawals of foreign currencies by some members would be 
matched, or more than matched , by additional deposits of foreign 
currencies by other members. The Fund should be forced, however, 
to retain a sufficient portion of its t otal assets in foreign currencies 
--or gold--to finance any conceivable withdrawals even in the event 
t hat mer.J.bers, as a group, experience global deficits and reserve 
losses toward the outside world. 
As may be gauged from line IV of Table 2 above this happened 
only once over the las t ten years, in 1961, and was confined to a 
reserve drop of $144 million , or 2. 3 percent of members' global 
reserves totalling $6300 million a t the end of 1960 . If this were 
taken as adequate evidence of future risks, the Fund would not 
need to retain more than an insignificant fracti on of its assets in 
foreign i nvestment s, and could invest the bulk of t hem (97. 7 percent) 
within the region. This would , of course, be unadvisable, but it 
is clear that compulsory foreign reserves of 3/4, 2/3, or even 1 /2 
of its total deposit liabilities (= to global assets) would be ample to 
cover any conceivable risks, thus enabling the Fund to invest the 
remainder (up to 1/4, 1 /3, or even 1 /2) of its assets within the 
region itself . 
This is precisely one of the major objectives attainable only 
through the formation of such a regional Reserve Fund. No indivi-
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Table :J: 
Maximum Continuous Reserve Losses of ECAFE Countries, 1958-1967 
Reserve Level 
Period at End of Pre- Maximum Reserve Loss 
ceding Year 
($ millions) ($ millions) (% of Reserves) 
1965 4091 311 8'/o 
I . Develo~d ECAFE 1967 3593 189 5% 
New Zealand 1960-61 217 80 37% 
1965-66 166 71 43% 
Australia 1960 1249 360 29% 
1965 1906 375 20% 
Japan 1961 1949 283 14% 
II. DeveloEing ECAFE 1961-62 3274 280 9% 
1964 3331 62 2% 
India 1960-62 814 302 37% 
1964 607 109 18% 
Pakistan 1961 _317 40 13% 
1963-67 308 147 48'/o 
China (Taiwan) 1962 136 22 17% 
Vietnam 1961-62 216 63 29% 
Philippines 1961 127 73 57% 
Iran 1959-60 254 70 28'/o 
1964 246 47 19% 
Indonesia 1961-63 351 (300) (85%) 
Ceylon 1959-64 176 125 71% 
III. Total ECAFE 1961 6300 144 2% 
Sources: Table 2 and .International Financial Statistics . 
Note: Includes only major countries and significant reserve losses. 
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dual central bank could afford to reduce that drastically its own 
foreign reserves, since future deficits might always absorb a much 
larger proportion of its outstanding reserves, as shown in Table 4. 
This Table summa-rizes the maximum continuous loss of gross 
reserves experienced by individual ECAFE countries over a period 
of one, or,several years, in the decade 1958-1967. It can be seen 
that individual countries often experienced reserve losses of 10, 
20 percent, or more, up to 57 percent in the case of the Philippines, 
71 percent for Ceylon, and 85 percent for Indonesia, as compared 
with the single reserve loss of 2 . 3 percent for the ECAFE group as 
a whole in 1961. 
It is indeed obvious that the need to hold external reserves, 
i.e. in the form of credits to other countries, varies in inverse 
relation to the economic size of the reserve holder's economic area, 
since intra-area transactions do not require extra-area currencies 
for their settlement. Thailand now needs dollars or sterling or 
gold to settle its transactions with any foreign country, inside as 
well as outside Asia. It could not count on being able to settle such 
transactions in bahts. They could perfectly be settled, however, 
within the area itself, through transfers of adequately guaranteed 
deposits with a common Reserve Fund such as proposed above. 
Reserves in non-area currencies would remain necessary to settle 
net deficits of the region as a whole with countries outside the 
region, but not to effect settlements within the area itself. 
Taking account of traditional bureaucratic resistance to any 
new and untried change in existing institutions and operational 
habits, I suggested that the scheme be initiated on an extremely 
modest and conservative basis until all members had acquired 
sufficient familiarity with its advantages and safeguards to enlarge 
progressively its scope of operations, in the light of experience. 
Agreed reserve deposits of a mere 10 percent of each member 1 s 
gross reserves would endow an ECAFE Reserve Fund with more 
than $800 million of resources at the start. In order to safeguard 
beyond any question the full usability of members 1 deposits for 
deficit settlements--in the same proportion--outside as well as with-
in the region, I proposed that the Fund be enjoined from expanding 
its loans and investments within the region whenever its external 
assets fall below 50 percent of its deposit obligations. Such a 
rule would enable the Fund to meet withdrawals from these deposits, 
in foreign as well as in member currencies, as long as the inter-
national reserves of the group as a whole do not decline by more 
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than 50 percent (as against the maximum decline of 2 . 3 percent 
experienced over the last ten years). Such a reserve contraction 
for as large a group of countries would be without precedent in 
world history and would, if it could be imagined, entail of course a 
total collapse of the world monetary system, and particularly of the 
reserve currencies which were its pillars yesterday as well as of 
the currencies of the region itself. Alternative reserve investments 
in the traditional reserve currencies would not, in such a case, 
affor d any more security than intraregional investments. 
One would have expected that the main objections against such 
conservative proposals would come from prospective borrowers , 
disappointed at the limits imposed upon their access to the Fund 1 s 
credits. I would have agreed with them that far bolder and more 
expansionist rules might be advisable in theory. They would be self-
defeating, however, if they deterred prospective creditors from 
joining the agreement. The participation of prospective lenders 
is, of course, crucial to enable the Fund to meet the needs of 
prospective borrowers. Niggardly as they might be deemed at 
the start, the borrowing facilities of the system would, in any 
case, be better than n othing , and they could be expanded later 
when sufficient experience and familiarity with the system persuaded 
creditors of the possibility to exploit more fully its potentialities 
without exposing it to any real dangers of insolvency or illiquidity. 
Paradoxically, the main objections raised so far have come 
not from prospective debtors, but from prospective creditors . 
The first of these objections is that the claims accumulated 
on the Reserve Fund would constitute an additional credit burden 
for these countries, and that whatever loans they might be willing 
to extend might better be granted and negotiated bilaterally, in 
order to maximize the political and economic advantages of such 
lending. Such an objection clearly reflects a total misunderstand-
ing of the proposals. First of all, any accumulation of claims on 
the Fund would be linked to the overall balance-of- payments of 
the countries concerned, i.e. to their actual reserve increases. 
They would not constitute additional lending, but merely rechannel 
differently the foreign lending--primarily to London and New York 
today--inevitably entailed in the accumulation of external reserves, 
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in any form whatsoever. 8 Secondly, any direct bilateral lending 
would in fact decrease by an equivalent amount the accumulation of 
reserves and, therefore, the lenders' commitments to increase 
proportionately their deposits with the Fund. Fund deposits, 
moreover, would confer to the depositors a voice in their manage-
ment which they do not have, of course, in the management of the 
reserves alternatively kept today with New York or London banks, or 
in U.S. or U. K. Treasury obligations. 
The second, and somewhat more valid, objection is that any 
switch of reserves from London and New York to deposits in the 
Fund, might reduce the depositing country's access to London and 
New York credits. This would be made up, in part, by the direct 
access of members to the Fund credits themselves and by the greater 
bargaining power which the Fund would enjoy through the reinvest-
ment of half, at least, of its deposits in foreign monetary and 
financial centers. What remains true is that this institutional shift 
might affect differently the distribution of such credits among 
members, presumably to the benefit of the deficit, rather than the 
surplus, countries . 
On the other hand, the mechanism which is proposed here should 
also lead to a strengthening of confidence by foreign investors in the 
financial stability and economic development of the member countries 
in general. This should increase in time the overall inflow of 
foreign funds into the region, and benefit its stronger, as well as its 
weaker, members. This should offset, and indeed far more than 
offset, the implications of a moderate decline (50 percent, at most, 
of the 10 percent of reserves to be held in Fund deposits, i.e. 5 
percent) in the reserves now held in foreign financial centers. 
Let us now turn to these broader financial and economic opportu-
nities which the proposed system would offer to the countries of the 
8 Even gold accumulation--relatively insignificant for the 
countries of the region, and probably less and less available 
as a form of reserve increases in the future--should be 
economically interpreted as a form of lending to the gold pro-
ducers, secured by gold collateral. Any form of reserve 
accumulation entails an immediate transfer of real resources 
from the reserve holders to the reserve debtors or to the gold 
sellers, in exchange for reserve claims usable only for deficit 
financing in the future. 
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region. 
IV. Potential Use of Fund Lending for Monetary Stabilization, 
Trade Expansion and Economic Development in the ECAFE 
Region 
The participating countries should, in due time, decide for 
themselves how the resources contributed to a regional Reserve 
Fund should best be used in the collective interests of all, and 
every one, of the participating countries. They deprive themselves 
now of any such possibility, insofar as they abandon fully to foreign 
banks or Treasuries all management decisions regarding the use of 
the reserves held by them in foreign money markets. 
Rational management decisions should, when sufficient experience 
has been gained, encompass a wide variety of objectives, ranging from 
trade promotion to monetary stabilization and even the financing of 
promising development projects . Initially, however, maximum safe-
ty and liquidity considerations will probably confine the Fund ' s lend-
ing operations to short-term or medium-term investments, closely 
linked with trade liberalization and monetary stabilization objectives . 
My proposals to ECAFE are confined, for that reason , t o the 
financing of one half, at most, of the participating countries overall 
deficits and reserve losses, and envisage repayment obligations 
extending, at most, over a five-year period. Past experience, how-
ever, suggests that the overwhelming bulk of Fund loans could be 
amortized far more rapidly and painlessly from the subsequent sur-
pluses of the borrowing countries . If the system had been put into 
operation in 1958, $839 million of the $1095 million credits granted 
by the Fund over the years 1959-1966 would have been amortized, 
leaving only $256 million of gross credits outstanding (see p. 179 of 
the ECAFE Report) . The bulk of these credits, moreover, would 
have been covered, and indeed far more than covered, by the agreed 
deposits of the borrowers with the system . Only three countries 
would have been in net debt to the Fund: Pakistan ($ 24 1:1illion), 
New Zealand ($10 million) and Ceylon ($4 million) fo r a t otal amount 
of $58 million, or little more than 7 percent of the Fund ' s gross 
assets and deposit obligations (see text on p . 1 53, and Tables 1 2 and 
13 on pp. 180- 182 of the same Report . ) 
All these operations, by the way , would have arisen from auto-
!!!atic borrowing rights , rather than from discretionary lendi ng --
requiring difficult and unfamiliar negotiating and/ or management 
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decisions. Their modest scope and medium-term maturities should 
make such automatism acceptable at the start, to take into account 
the difficulties of organizing such negotiating and management 
techniques among countries largely unfamiliar with them, little pre-
pared to understand each other's problems, and even less to trust 
each other's policies. 
In the longer run, however, the hoped-for expansion of the 
system should, in my opinion, be based primarily on discretionary 
rather than automatic borrowings . Whenever such expansion can 
be agreed on, in the light of experience, the process of negotiation 
itself will inevitably determine, however, the relative shares to be 
assigned to discretionary and to automatic credit lines. 
The main objection raised against this proposed use of the 
Fund's resources is that credits related to the overall reserve 
position and balance-of-payments of members with the world at 
large--rather than with their intraregional surpluses and deficits--
would do nothing to promote preferential--i. e . discriminatory--trad-
ing arrangements within the region itself. This is perfectly true, 
and explains the support expressed for such proposals by the IMF 
representative at the ECAFE meeting which debated them (see pp. 
188-191 of the Report), in sharp contrast with previous IMF opposi-
tion to discriminatory payments arrangements, in Latin America 
for instance. The credits of the proposed Reserve Center would 
support.--rather than conflict with--the multilateral and non-dis-
criminatory stabilization objectives so often affirmed by the IMF 
and its members. 
This is also the reason why prospective creditors could accept 
participation in such a system without running the risk of seeing 
their reserve deposits frozen into regional credits and unavailable 
for balance-of-settlements outside the region itself. 
This does not mean, however, that mutual trade within the 
region would not benefit from such financial arrangements. On the 
contrary, trade liberalization commitments--whether preferential 
or not--would undoubtedly prove impossible to negotiate, and even 
more to implement, if countries experiencing temporary deficits 
could not count on some assistance from the countries in surplus, 
so as to enable them to honor their commitments and eschew a 
relapse into the trade and exchange restrictions which they would be 
required to renounce. 
Mutual trade commitments would, of course, expand by exactly 
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the same amounts the exports and imports of member countries as a 
group, and leave unaffected the net sum of their balance-of-payments 
surpluses and deficits. The impact of liberalization upon any one 
country's balance-of-payments, however, would be largely unpredict-
able, even though the resulting deterioration in some of the countries 1 
balance-of-payments and reserve position would be exactly matched 
by the improvement in the balance-of-payments and reserve position 
of others. 
The reserve mechanism proposed above should make acceptable 
to all members the acceptance of such risks, as it did in OEEC and 
EPU nearly twenty years ago, and in Central America ten years ago. 
The countries in surplus would extend temporary assistance to the 
countries in deficit, by diverting a minor portion of their actual 
reserve increases from foreign to regional investments, under con-
ditions endowing such regional investments with profitability, liquidity 
and safety guarantees superior to those available today on their 
reserve investments in foreign monetary centers. 
The preceding Sections of this paper have made clear the 
reasons why such a reform of the present reserve system of the 
ECAFE countries would be desirable in and by itself, irrespective 
of its link with parallel commitments regarding intraregional trade 
liberalization. There is no doubt, however, that the successful 
negotiation of such trade commitments would constitute an additional 
and major spur to the negotiation of an ECAFE reserve system. 
Rationally, the latter could proc3ed without waiting for the 
former, while the former would be bound to fail, if not accompanied 
or preceded by the latter. The final success of an ECAFE trading 
negotiation raises, however, a host of other and difficult problems 
which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
In any case, both of these proposed negotiations will be slow 
at best. The exact purposes and mechanisms of an ECAFE monetary 
arrangement are still only dimly understood by most policy-makers 
and even by official experts. Every effort should be made to 
accelerate the exploration and understanding of these proposals, and 
of possible alternative arrangments, even though their fhnl implemen-
tation may be further delayed by political and other obstacles to an 
actual agreement. 
Finally, and regretfully, it is possible, or even probable , that 
some countries may hesitate longer than others to accept full partici-
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pation in such a system. I do not think that the countries which 
are ready to move should resign themselves to wait until even the 
most laggard have been convinced. Even subregional arrangements 
should prove beneficial, as long as they enlist the participation of 
prospective lenders as well as of prospective borrowers. 
The EEC proceeded in this fashion, twelve years ago, and 
refused to be blocked by the refusal of Britain to join in their enter-
prise. The EEC countries have had no reason since then to 
deplore their haste, but Britain has certainly shown its regrets at 
having "missed the boat," and its determination to jump into it, or 
even to swim toward it, whenever it is allowed to do so. I hope, 
and trust, that this lesson will be pondered by all prospective 
members of ECAFE trade and payments arrangements. The niain 
danger against which bureaucrats, and even statesmen, should be 
on guard has always been to do "too little and too late" rather than 
"too much and too soon!" 
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Statistical Appendix on the Evolution of the International Reserve System 
Table 1 
Sources of Reserve Creation: 1 -June 1 68 
Annual rates, in billions of U.S. dollars 
I. Gross Reserves 
A. Monetary Gold 
1. Production 
2. Private Absorption (-) 
3, Net Soviet Sales 
B. Credit Reserves 
1. Reserve Currencies 
2. IMF Lending 
3. Minus IMF Surplus & 
EPU, EF & BIS Gold 
II. Net Reserves (IA+IB3) 
A. Reserve Centers 
1. United States 
2. United Kingdom 
3, Euro-Currencies and 
other 
B. Other Countries 
1, Gold 
Developed Counts. 
LDC 1 s 
2. Credit to: 
a/ Reserve Centers, 
by: 
Developed Counts, 
LDC 1s 
b/ IMF, by: 
Developed Counts. 
LDC 1s 
Annual Growth Rate of 
Gross Reserves 
Net Reserves 
Net Reserves of Countries 
other than Reserve Centers 
1938-49 
1.5 
M 
1.0 
-0.1 
0,8 
Qd 
0.9 
-0.6 
Q.& 
-0,1 
-0.2 
0.1 
0,6 
0,6 
0.2 
0.4 
1950-59 1960-64 1965-
Mar. 1968 
1.2 
~ 
0.9 
-0.5 
-0,1 
QJ_ 
o.6 
0.1 
0.5 
-bQ 
-1.2 
0.1 
0,1 
hl 
0,8 
0.8 
0.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
2. 3 
1.4 
6,4 
2.3 
Q.& 
1.3 
-1,1 
0.3. 
hl 
1. 5 
0.3 
-0.1 
0.5 
-bl 
-2.1 
-0.4 
-0,2 
hl 
1.5 
1.5 
1.8 
1.4 
1.4 
0,3 
0.4 
-0.1 
3.7 
1.2 
8,4 
1.2 
-0,8 
1.4 
-2.4 
0,1 
bQ 
1.6 
0,4 
-0.8 
-bi 
-1.4 
-0.5 
-0.7 
0.7 
0,6 
0,1 
1,0 
0,6 
1,8 
-2.0 
3.6 
Robert Triffin 
October 1968 
Apr,-June 
1968 
1.9 
bl 
1,5 
-0.4 
~ 
-4. 7 
5,7 
-0,1 
1.0 
-.9.!.2. 
6,7 
-1.9 
-5.2 
-1.8 
-3.6 
-3.4 
-0 , 2 
1,8 
1.9 
-0,1 
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Sources of Reserve 
I . In ~ of Gross Reserves Cha.n~s 
A. Monetar;z:: Gold 
1. Production 
2. Private Absorption (-) 
3. Net Soviet Sales 
B. Credit Reserves 
1 . Reserves Currencies 
2, IMF Lending 
3, Minus IMF Surplus and EPIT 
EF and BIS Gold 
II. In % of Changes in Net Reserves 
of Countries other than Reserve 
Centers : 
World Net Reserves 
A. Reserve Centers 
1 . United States 
2. United Kingdom 
3. Euro-Currencies and 
Other 
B, Other Countries 
1 . Gold 
Developed Countries 
LDC 1s 
2. Credit to : 
a/ Reserve Centers, by: 
Developed Countries 
LDC's 
b/ IMF, by: 
Developed Countries 
LDC ' s 
Table 2 
Creation : 1 38- June 1 68 
in 0 
Before 
1938 1938-49 
100 100 
.21 24. 
143 64 
- 53 -9 
1 -1 
2 ±§. 
9 45 
x 1 
236 140 
.12.§. Ml 
115 152 
22 -104 
-2 -7 
100 100 
78 -11 
67 -34 
24 
22 111 
22 110 
18 38 
4 72 
x 1 
x 1 
x 
1950-59 1969-64 
100 100 
M _g2_ 
79 57 
-46 - 47 
11 15 
2§. Ti 
49 66 
6 12 
1 -2 
35 16 
-.§2 -~ 
-79 -66 
9 - 11 
6 - 6 
100 100 
55 46 
55 47 
-1 
45 54 
40 44 
33 42 
8 1 
5 10 
6 12 
-1 - 2 
Robert Triffin 
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1965 Apr-
March June 
1968 1968 
100 100 
-11 22 
119 75 
- 199} 
8 -20 
ill i2 
137 - 243 
33 294 
1 4 
- 48 68 
-lli -E 
-79 458 
-29 -135 
-40 - 355 
100 100 
42 225 
35 174 
7 51 
58 -125 
34 - 248 
- 15 - 235 
50 -12 
24 123 
24 130 
- 7 
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Table A 
Inte ation of Reserve Statistics: 1 -June 1 68 
in millions of U.S. dollars 
I. Gross Reserves 
II. 
A. Gold 
1. IMF & BIS 
2. Countries 
a/ Reserve Centers 
b/ Other Counts. 
LDC 
Developed 
B. Credit Reserves 
1. Reserve Currencies 
a/ Reserve Center 
b/ Other Counts. 
LDC 
Developed 
2. IMF Lending to 
a/ Reserve Center 
b/ Other Counts. 
LDC 
Developed 
3. Other: IMF Surplus 
& EPU, EF & BIS gold 
Net Reserves (IA+IB3) 
A. Reserve Centers 
1. United States 
a/ Gold 
b/ Credit 
(i) Currencies 
(ii) to IMF 
2. United Kins:dom 
a/ Gold 
b/ Credit 
(i) Currencies 
(ii) to IMF 
3. Euro-Currencies 2 etc. 
B. Other Countries 
1. Gold 
2. Credit to: 
a/ Reserve Cent. 
b/ IMF 
March June 
1937 1949 1959 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1968 
27656 45518 57345 68670 70430 71870 73522 72578 73065 
£2.£2.Q. .2.&2..12. ~ A2.Q11. .ill.2Q. .42112. 41605 .4Ql2.§. 40506 
4 1505 2312 2172 1375 2279 2100 2408 1901 
25286 33470 37895 40840 41855 40900 39505 37830 38605 
16931 25884 22021 17607 16330 15175 13356 12196 12155 
8355 7586 15874 23233 25525 25725 26149 25634 26450 
1198 2845 2905 2715 2705 2555 2895 3110 3295 
7157 4741 12969 20518 22820 23170 23254 22524 23155 
2366 ~ .11..12§. ~ 21200 28691 m E.24.Q ..2l222 
2370 10390 16200 23675 23200 24640 28270 29030 27845 
431 222 611 1520 2480 3749 3975 3689 
2370 9959 15978 23064 21680 22160 24521 25055 24156 
385 5370 6500 6745 7965 8600 9070 9610 9565 
1985 4589 9478 16319 13715 13560 15451 15445 14591 
x 204 909 2236 3824 4075 3560 3527 4951 
x 58 500 1316 2707 2920 2091 2109 3507 
x 146 409 920 1117 1155 1469 1418 1444 
x 73 68 834 980 1027 1151 1106 1200 
x 73 341 86 137 128 318 312 244 
-4 -51 29 -253 176 -24 88 -217 -237 
25286 34924 40236 42759 43406 43156 41691 40021 40269 
14561 17328 7605 -6004 -1.422. -.2212. -12836 -14490 -14605 
12360 22828 10884 101 -1122. -lQ.2.4. -1.2.£1 -MJ:l -n..21 
12790 24563 19507 15471 14065 13235 12065 10703 10681 
430 -1735 -8623 -15370 -15264 -14329 -16586-15118-13432 
430 -3196 -10120 -15339 -15068-13644-15973 -14554-13305 
x 1461 1497 -31 -196 -685 -613 -564 -127 
~ -Alli -~ -5266 -~ -6311 -~ -~ -.li..S..2. 
4141 1321 2514 2136 2265 1940 1291 1493 1474 
1700 -6067 ~5938 -7402 -7913 -8251 -7140 -8425 -8897 
1700 -6009 -6003 -6886 -6006 -6342 -6082 -7358 -6420 
x -58 65 -516 -1907 -1909 -1058 -1067 -2477 
-~-~ lli-~-606-_mi-2466-.fil2-llil 
1072~ 17596 32631 48763 50859 52735 54527 54511 54874 
8355 7586 15874 23233 25525 25725 26149 25634 26450 
2370 10010 16757 25530 25334 27010 28378 28877 28424 
2370 9959 15978 23064 21680 22160 24521 25055 24156 
x 51 779 2466 3654 4850 3857 3822 4268 
Robert Triffin 
October 1968 
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Table B 
Sources of Reserve Creation: 1 8-June 1 68 
in millions of U.S . dollars 
Before 
1938-49 1950-59 1960-64 1938 
I. Gross Reserves: 27656 17862 11827 11325 
A. Monetar~ Gold ~ 
1. Production 39590 
2. Private Absorption (-) -14630 
3. Net Soviet Sales 330 
B. Credit Reserves 2366 
1. Reserves Currencies 2370 
2. IMF Lening x 
3. Minus IMF Surplus -4 
and EPU, EF & BIS gold 
II. Net Reserves (IA+IB3) 25286 
A. Reserve Centers 1.42.§1 
1. United States 12360 
2. United Kingdom 2441 
3. Euro-Currencies & other -240 
B. Other Countries .19ll2 
1. Gold 8355 
Developed Countries 7157 
LDC 1 s 1198 
2. Credit to: 2370 
a/ Reserve Centers, by 2370 
Developed Countries 1985 
LDC's 385 
b/ IMF, by x 
Developed Countries x 
LDC's x 
-2..§.§2 
11465 
-1640 
- 140 
!fill_ 
8020 
204 
-47 
9638 
n£l 
10468 
-7187 
-514 
6871 
-769 
-2416 
1647 
7640 
7589 
2604 
4985 
51 
62 
-11 
..21.21 2805 
9390 6455 
-5423 -5365 
1265 1715 
£222 8520 
5810 7475 
705 1327 
80 -282 
5312 2523 
-.ml -12.§Q2 
-11944 -10783 
1322 -1842 
899 -984 
12922 16132 
8288 7359 
8228 7549 
60 -190 
6747 8773 
6019 7086 
4889 6841 
1130 245 
728 1687 
923 2045 
-195 -358 
Robert Triffin 
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1965 Apr. March 
1968 June 1968 
3908 487 
.::11ll 268 
4655 365 
-7759 
330 
-97 
6682 m. 
5355 -1185 
1291 1424 
36 -20 
-2737 248 
-8486 -112 
-4516 1664 
-1666 -491 
-2304 -1288 
.2.lli. 2.§.2. 
2401 816 
2006 631 
395 185 
3348 -453 
1991 -899 
-874 -854 
2865 -45 
1357 446 
1368 472 
-11 -25 
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Sources, Method of Presentation and Brief Comments 
Sources: These tables are uniformly and exclusively based on the 
most recent statistics published in the International 
Financial Statistics (October 1968 and annual Supple-
ments) Tables on "International Reserves" and on 
"Members' Fund Positions" (pp. 14-18 and 4-5 of the 
October 1968 issue, for instance), with three exceptions: 
1. IFS gold estimates had to be supplemented, for the 
pre-1959 period, by other sources (particularly from 
the Bank for International Settlements) listed on p. 80 
of my Princeton study on The Evolution of the Inter-
national Monetary S stem: Historical Reappraisal and 
Future Perspectives Princeton, 1964 • 
2. The systematic integration of these reserve 
estimates brought to light some minor misprints in the 
IFS totals (in 1959 and June 1968, for instance). 
3. The IFS rounding-up of group estimates to the 
next $5 million introduces other apparent discrepancies 
in some totals. I have avoided such rounding-up 
wherever feasible, in order not to introduce further, 
but avoidable, rounding-up errors in my estimates of 
period changes, annual growth rates and percentage 
distribution of such changes. 
Tables B, 1 and 2 are all derived from the basic estimates 
of Table A, given in millions of dollars. Tables 1 and 
2, however, recast these estimates in simplified and 
more readable form, and Table 1 in billions of dollars 
with one decimal--rather than in $ millions--as befits 
the probable order of magnitude of unavoidable errors 
and omissions in such estimates (or "guesstimates"). 
Method of Presentation of Tables 1 and 2: 
1. I attach particular value to grouping such estimates in a way 
that stresses their integration and internal consistency and helps 
spot occasional errors--such as mentioned above--and puzzling 
movements in some residual estimates-- such as those in line II A 3 
of Table 1 , which are, however, largely explainable by the mislead-
ing method of reporting of U.S. liabilities arising from central banks 1 
investments in the Euro-dollar market. 
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Note that the discrepancy between monetary gold (line I A) and 
net reserves (line II) is due to the accounting of the IMF undistributed 
Surplus and of EPU, EF and BIS gold (line I B 3). 
2. The choice of chronological periods grouping together cumber-
some yearly estimates is determined--with some unavoidable 
arbitrariness- -by an attempt to bring out some major changes of 
trend, such as: 
a/ the "dollar shortage" of 1937-49 and the subsequent "dollar 
glut"; 
b/ the accentuation of the "dollar glut" after 1959; 
c/ the aggravation of the gold shortage and tapering off of 
dollar-reserves accumulation by developed countries 
after 1964; 
d/ the suspension of gold pool operations in March 1968, and 
the huge IMF financing of foreign-exchange reserves liquida-
tion in the following quarter. 
3. Changes in Gross Reserves (line I) are broken down by IFS 
(bottom of p . 1 6 of October 68 issue , for instance) in accordance 
with the "composition" of countries 1 reserves between gold, reserve 
positions in the Fund, and foreign exchange . My tables emphasize 
instead the sources of reserve growth, i. e . world monetary gold 
(I A)--rather than countries 1 gold--and credit reserves , (I B) 
broken down themselves between reserve currencies (I B 1) (i.e . 
direct credit to reserve centers), IMF lending (I B 2) (i.e . loans , 
and gold deposits and investments)--rather than reserve positions 
in the Fund , a portion of which represents a transfer of gold by 
members to the Fund--and the minor adjus tments (I B 3) mentioned 
under (1) above (last paragraph) . 
4 . Changes in Net Reserves (II =I A +I B 3) a r e broken down , by 
ownership, between reserve centers (II A) ahd other countries (II 
B), and the reserve changes of these subdivided between changes 
in gold reserves (II B 1) and in credit rese r ves (II B 2) . The 
di fferent--and changing-- propensities of developed and less 
developed countries respecting gold and foreign exchange assets 
are brought out in the further subdivi sion of these items . 
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Brief Comments 
1 • The last three lines of Table 1 highlight the sharp decline of 
net reserves growth over this period, partly masked for gross 
reserves by the growth of credit reserves' i.e. reserve claims 
on the reserve centers and the IMF. The last line, however, shows 
that the reserves of countries other than reserve centers grew at 
an increasing pace through 1964, but at a sharply declining one 
afterwards. A further regional breakdown would highlight even 
more dramatically the reasons why continental Europe--and 
particularly the EEC countri es-- considered their own reserve 
growth as excessive and contributing to inflationary pressures, 
while other countries complained more and more of the growing 
shortage of world liquidity . 
2. The drying-up of gold as a major source of reserve creation 
is best seen on Line I A of Table 2 . Its contribution practially 
ceased in 1 964 and became, of course, highly negative between 
September 1967 and the suspension of gold pool operations on March 
17, 1968. Line I A 3 also shows t he growing dependence of dec lin -
ing monetary gold accreti ons on net Soviet sales (up to two-thirds 
in 1960- 64) and the sharp decline of such sales afterwards. 
3. The expansion of credit reserves (line I B) compensated, or 
more than compensated, this drying- up of gold as a source of 
reserve-creation . This expansion centered first on the accumula-
tion of reserve currencies (more and more, however, through 
negotiated and exchange- guaranteed rescue operations in favor of 
sterling, swaps, Roosa bonds, etc . , r ather than traditional and un-
guaranteed dollar and sterling balances) . The breakdown of line 
II B 2 a shows, however, that in spite of such negotiated trans-
actions, the developed countries began in 1965 to reduce, rather 
than increase further, their foreign exchange holdings, and that 
even the LDC ' s began to follow the same course after March 1968. 
A further bre akdown of these estimates by years and by countries 
would show that liquidation of foreign exchange balances by develop-
ed countries was particularly massive in 1965 and by no means 
confined to Gaullist France. (A breakdown between sterling and 
dollar balances and between "negotiated" and "traditional" accumula-
tion would also be interesting.) 
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Line B 2 (particularly of Table 2) shows a rapid increase of 
IMF lending as a source of reserve creation, and a dramatic increase 
in such operations -in the second quarter of 1968 to compensate for 
--and permit--the liquidation of dollar and sterlinp.; balances. 
(Apparent changes in sterling balances after September 1967, how-
ever, should be corrected for the impact of devaluation losses upon 
their dollar valuation). 
4. Line II A of Table 2 shows the growing dependence of "other 
countries" reserve increases upon the reserve losses of the reserve 
centers, rather upon increases in net world reserves. This so-
called "cannibalizing" process could not, of course, continue 
indefinitely. 
Line II A 3 shows a spectacular increase in the discrepancy 
between the reserve liabilities reported by the U.S. and the U. K. 
and the reserve currency assets reported by other countries. 
This discrepancy is, of course, explainable in part by the accumu-
lation of reserve currencies other than dollars and pounds, --wrongly 
grouped here with U.S. and U . K. liabilities--but most of the recent 
and 2xceedingly large changes in this item are clearly related to 
central banks' investments in the Euro-dollar market ($3. 1 billion 
at the end of 1967) and to discrepancies in the reporting of dollar 
and sterling assets and liabilities resulting from so-called "swap" 
operations. 
5. Lines II B 1 and 2 show, in the last two columns, increasing 
switches from reserve currencies to gold and IMF assets, even by 
the LDC' s. 
Further analysis of lines II A 1 and 2 of Table A estimates 1 
supplemented by further chronological breakdowns between years and 
quarters, would also show how such switches can interfere with a 
smooth functioning of the adjustment mechanism from the reserve 
center countries: relieving pressures for correction of their de-
ficits for considerable periods, but aggravating them to crisis pro-
portions in others (see my article on "The Co-existence of Three 
Types of Reserve Assets," in the June 1967 Banco Nazionale del 
LavoroQuarterly Review, pp. 114-121and128-129). 
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6 . The trends and gyrations briefly summarized above highlight 
some of the basic wheaknesses and sources of instabi lity and ulti-
mate unviability of the past and present system of reserve creation . 
The SDR agreement opens the door to a more raticnal adjustment 
of overall reserves to legitimate needs, i n future years . Much 
remains to be done, however, to improve the working of the adjust-
ment mechanism--particularly for the reserve center countries--and 
reduce de-stabilizing switches between the different types of reserve 
assets. 
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Table 3 
"Traditional" and "Ne otiated" Reserve Holdin s : 1 63- June 1 68 
in billions o"f U. S. dollars 
Changes 
Jan . - Oct . Apr . End 1964- 1967 
1963 June 1968 1964 1965 
1966 Sept. Mar . June 
1967 1968 1968 
I . Non-Soviet World 66 . 4 6.7 2. 3 1.8 1.4 o . 6 0 . 1 0 . 5 
.A . Traditional 61.8 -2 . 8 h2. 0.4 -hl -Qd -b.2 -2.!.2 
1. Gold 40 . 2 -1:6 0 , 6 1.0 -1.0 -0.3 -2 . 8 0. 8 
2. Fore . Exchange 21.6 -1 . 2 0 . 9 -0 . 6 -0.5 -0 . 2 0 . 3 -1.1 
a) Sterling 6,5 -2 . 4 -0 . 1 - 0 . 5 -0,2 -0.2 -0 . 8 -0 . 6 
b ~ Dollars 14.0 -2.2 1.2 0.1 -1 . 9 0 . 5 - 0 . 3 -1.8 
c U=ecorded 1.1 3, 4 -0 . 2 -0,2 1.6 -0 . 4 1 •. 4 1.3 
B. Negotiated .4.!i. hl. 0 . 8 1.4 2.8 1.0 2. 6 0.8 
1. Fore • Exchange 0,6 6.8 0.6 0.2 1.9 1.5 2. 8 -'0:1 
a) Sterling 3. 5 o. 6 0,2 0 . 9 0. 2 1.9 -0 . 4 
b) Dollars 0,6 3,4 1. 0 1.3 0. 9 0. 2 
2. Reserves in IMF 3. 9 2. 7 0. 2 1,2 1.0 -0 . 4 -0 . 2 0. 9 
II. North .Atlantic .Area 52 . 0 2. 7 2 .• 1 0 . 9 o. 6 0 . 1 -1.0 
.A. Traditional ~ - 6. 1 1-d -0 . 4 - 2. 0 -~ -~ -0 . 6 
1. Gold 36.3 -2 . 6 0.7 1.1 -1.0 -0 . 2 -3.5 0.3 
2. Fore . Exchange 11.7 -3 · 5 0. 7 -1.5 -1.0 -0 , 7 -0 . 1 -0 . 9 
a) Sterling 1.0 -0.4 -0,1 -0 . 1 -0 . 1 -0 . 1 
b) Dollars 9 , 9 -2. 5 o. 6 -0 , 5 - 1.6 0 . 7 -0 . 1 - 1. 6 
c) U=ecorded 0 . 8 - 0. 6 - 0.9 0 . 6 -1 . 3 0. 1 0. 8 
B. Negotiated A.& 8, 8 0.8 bl. £:..§. 1.0 2.6 Q:2 
1. Fore • Exchange o . 6 6.8 0.6 0 , 2 1.9 1.5 2. 8 -0,1 
a) Sterling 3. 5 0,6 0.2 0,9 0 . 2 1.9 -0 , 4 
b) Dollars Q. 6 3. 4 1.0 1.3 0.9 0,2 
2. Reserves in IMF 3, 4 2, 0 0.1 1.1 0 , 7 -0 . 4 -0 . 2 0,7 
III. Rest of World 14. 4 4.0 0. 2 0 , 8 0.9 0 . 5 1. 1 0,5 
A. Traditional ~ hl 0. 1 ~ Q.& Q:2 1.1 5h.2 
1 . Gold 3. 9 1.0 -'0:1 - 0 . 1 0 . 1 - 0. 1 0:7 0, 5 
2. Fore, Exchange 9.9 2. 3 0 , 1 0. 9 0,4 0, 5 0. 3 -0 . 2 
a) Sterling 5, 5 -1.9 -0.1 - 0 . 4 -0, 2 -0 .1 - 0, 6 - 0. 5 
b) Dollars 4 . 1 0.3 0. 5 0 , 6 ~0 . 3 - 0. 2 -0 . 2 - 0, 2 
c) U=ecorded 0.3 4, 0 -0. 2 o.6 1,0 0 , 8 1, 2 0. 5 
B. Negotiated o . 6 hl Qd 0 , 1 5h.2 9.!2 
1 . Fore , Exchange 
2. Reserves i n IMF o . 6 0 . 7 0 . 1 0.1 0 . 3 0. 2 
Robert Triffin 
November 1968 
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Note on Table 3 
"Traditional" and "Negotiated" Reserve Holdings 
This Table is designed to illustrate and quantify--as far as 
feasible on the basis of inadequate reporting--the evolution of the 
international monetary system from the former so-called "gold-
exchange standard" toward a "negotiated credit-reserve standard." 
The traditional sources of reserve creation of the gold-exchange 
standard were: 
1 • gold 
2. spontaneous holdings of gold-convertible foreign exchange. 
Both of these sources have not only dried up in recent years; 
they are, in fact, contracting at an accelarated pace, expecially 
among the largest reserve holders of the North Atlantic Area. 
This group of countries shows (lines II A 1 and 2) a total contrac-
tion of $6.1 billion in such reserve assets over the period 1964-
June 1968: $2. 6 billion for gold and $3. 5 billion for traditional 
forms of foreign-exchange reserves. 
The relatively modest increase in the gross reserves of this 
area (line II) is more than accounted for by the increase in "negotiated" 
reserve holdings ( $8. 8 billion, on line II B), of which $6. 8 billion 
in negotiated foreign-exchange holdings (line II B 1) and $2. 0 billion 
in reserve positions in the Fund. 
"Traditional " forms of reserve holdings still dominate the 
substantially larger reserve increases ($4.0 billion) of other countries 
(primarily the less developed countries.) One should note, however, 
the declining role of foreign-exchange reserves in these increases 
since the end of September 1967 ($240 million at an annual rate, 
as against $7 40 million a year, on the average, in the period 1 963-
September 1 967) and the sharp increase in their accumulation of 
gold r eserves (more than $1, 600 million at an annual rate, as 
against minus $1 0 million a year in the previous period). 
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Sources and Notes: 
1. Basic estimates are uniformly derived from the October 
1968 issues of International Financial Statistics ("International 
Reserves" Tables and items 4 of the United Kingdom pages) and the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin (Table 7). 
2. The calculation of "negotiated" reserves in the IMF does 
not, of course, raise any difficulty, but "negotiated" foreign-exchange 
reserves can only be approximated. I have classified as negotiated: 
a/ dollar reserves: the sum of outstanding U.S. swap 
commitments (calculated from Table 2 , p. 1 520 of the September 
1967 Federal Reserve Bulletin, and later semestical reports 
of Charles A. Coombs on "Treasury and Federal Reserve 
Foreign Exchange Operations"; unreported estimates for the 
end of September 1967 and March 1968 are entered as the reported 
estimate for September 1, 1967 and average of reported estimates 
for March 8 and April 26, 1968) and of "illiquid" U.S. liabili-
ties to central banks and governments (Roosa bonds, etc ., 
entered here as the excess of the U.S. liabilities reported at 
the bottom of the "Foreign Exchange" Table of IFS over the 
"liquid" liabilities to foreign official institutions reported in 
the first column of Table 7 of the Federal Reserve Bulletin). 
b/ sterling reserves: none through 1963; and, afterwards, 
all external sterling liabilities to central monetary institutions 
of non-sterling area countries of North America and Western 
Europe, as reported on lines 4 a a and 4 a b of the United 
Kingdom page of IFS, plus $202 million of foreign currency 
deposits at the e nd of 1964 and $39 million at the end of 1966 
(= excess of estimated U. K. liabilities reported at the bottom 
of the Foreign Exchange Table of IFS over line 4 a of the 
United Kingdom page), minus $600 million in 1964, $500 
million in 1965, $400 million in 1966, and $300 million after-
wards. The rationale for this admittedly rough assumption is 
derived from the fact that "central bank assistance" to the 
United Kingdom was negotiated repeatedly, beginning in 1 964, 
only with non-sterling area countries of North America and 
Western Europe and that the excess of reported liabilities to 
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the central monetary institutions of these countries over the 
"special assistance credits 11 from these countries--as reported 
in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin--was about $595 
million in December 1964, $510 million in March 1965, $530 
million in June 1965, and $490 million in September 1965. The 
amounts of "special central bank assistance" were no longer 
reported subsequently, but may be roughly approximated by 
assuming that "unnegotiated" sterling holdings of these countries 
continued to decline afterwards to, let us say, about $400 
million by .the end of 1 966 and $300 million by the latter part of 
1967. The error of this estimate can hardly exceed $200 or 
$300 million out of the $6500 million to $8 500 million of official 
sterling liabilities reported over the period 1963-June 1 968. 
3. The remainder of dollar, sterling and unallocated ("difference" 
line of the Foreign Exchange Table of IFS) is classified as "tradi-
tional." It should be noted, however, that much of the sterling 
holdings of the sterling area was only influenced by formal, or 
informal, arrangements between the United Kingdom and the holding 
countries . 
4 . All these forms of reserve holdings are then broken down 
regionally between the North Atlantic Area (i . e . , the United States , 
Canada and Western Europe) and the Rest of the World (Japan, Aus -
tralia, New Zealand, South Africa,. and the less developed areas), 
on the basis of the breakdown available from !I§, the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, and the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. It 
will be noted that "negotiated" dollar and sterling reserves, as 
defined above, involve only the foreign exchange holdings of the 
North Atlantic Area group of countries. 
Note also that Iceland's and Ireland's foreign-exchange reserves 
are included in this group (as "traditional," unnegotiated holdings) 
and assumed to be held only in sterling, even though a few millions 
may be held in dollars or other currencies . 
5 . Part of the large decline in "traditional" sterling holdings 
expressed in dollars between September and December 1967 are due 
to the devaluation of sterling . This may be roughly estimated at 
about $800 million, by recalculating the September estimate on the 
basis of the new exchange rate ( $ 2. 40 per pound) or the December 
estimate on the basis of the previous exchange rate ($2 . 80 per pound) . . 
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6 . A most puzzling fact revealed by these calculations is that 
the bulk of the large increase in the excess of reported reserve 
assets over the reported reserve liabilities of the United States and 
the United Kingdom ("difference" line of the Foreign Exchange Table 
of IFS) over the period 1966-June 1968 (from $606 million to $4431 
million) appears in the "other" holdings of the "Rest of the World" 
(which rise from about $680 million to about $4, 235 million) rather 
than in those of the North Atlantic countries (up from minus $75 
million to plus $1 90 million) . 
This fits neither with the IFS comments (e . g . p . 105 of the 
October 1968 issue) on this discrepancy, which stress the impact 
of the liquidation of the U . K . portfolio of dollar securities and its 
inclusion in U . K. reserves ( $88 5 million in 1 966 and $490 million in 
the last quarter of 1967) and differences in the reporting of swap 
assets and liabilities, nor with the BIS estimate (p . 1 54 of 1968 
Annual Report) of $3. 1 billion of Euro- dollar investments by European 
official monetary institutions at the end of 1967 (holdings rep0rted 
as liabilities to foreign commercial banks in U.S . statistics) . All 
three of these possible sources of discrepancy should bear primarily 
on reserve estimates for the North Atlantic Area group rather than 
for the Rest of the World . 
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COMMENT ON HOBERT TRIFFIN' S PAPER BY HARRY G. 
~J~O~H""""N~S~O~N~-~~----~~~~--------------------~--~--~-
Robert Triffin introduces his comprehensive and very interest-
ing paper with customary but unnecessary modesty. It has been 
evident in our discussions so far that many of the problems of trade 
and development, both in the Pacific region and in the North-South 
context as a whole, are rooted ultimately in the inadequacies of the 
present international monetary system and the policies of restric-
tionism that those inadequacies force on the mombors of the system, 
particularly the United States; and that the problems really cannot 
be satisfactorily solved until the international monetary system has 
been fundamentally reformed. Triffin was the first to call to aca-
demic and official attention the inherent inconsistencies of the gold 
exchange standard, and has kept up a running commentary on the 
logical development of successive crises. It is an extremely val-
uable contribution to our deliberations to have his views on the 
current crisis situation in international monetary affairs at our 
disposal . 
Triffin' s paper falls into two parts, a general analysis of the 
death of the gold exchange standard and of the parallel rise of re -
gional economic operations, and discussion of a specific proposal 
for an ECAFE Reserve System. For convenience, I shall discuss 
these separately. 
Triffin begins the general analysis by discerning two important 
world-wide trends, the accelerating disintegration of the gold ex-
change standard and the "rewarding" postwar development of close 
regional cooperation and in some cases integration. The use of 
the adjective "rewarding" and the presentation in general, suggest 
that in some broad way regional integration is a way out of interna-
tional monetary difficulties. I should like to begin by remarking 
that, insofar as European economic integration is concerned, that 
trend has undeniably contributed to the exacerbation of the interna-
tional monetary pr oblem, the discrimination against U.S. trade 
inherent in it having been an important causal element in the wors-
ening of t he U.S. current and capital accounts. Our discussion 
yesterday showed that JANFT A would encounter U.S. opposition 
for essentially the same reasons. 
With respect to the death of the gold exchange standard, I agree 
with most of what Triffin says, up to his criticisms of the S .D.R. 
scheme. I agree specifically that the establishment of the two-
tier gold price system embodied a contradiction between the desire 
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of some to retain gold and of others to demonetize it; and I would 
report that his minimal prediction that gold purchases would be 
resumed at the $35 .00 an ounce price has been confirmed by recent 
newspaper reports of an international agreement to that effect. I 
was particularly intrigued by his analysis of and statistical exercise 
on the change from voluntary to "negotiated" holdings of reserve 
currencies, which call attention to a rather neglected aspect of 
recent developments. I would myself fit the deaths of gold and of 
voluntary reserve currency holding into a broader theoretical frame-
work, in which the gold standard brings about its own demise in con-
sequence of the inherent inefficiency of a commodity money, the 
attractions of substituting interest-bearing paper money for gold, 
the effects of this substitution in permitting inflation and so gradual-
ly reducing the profitability of gold production and increasing private 
demands for gold, and the effects of increasing gold shortage in 
attenuating the voluntary acceptability of paper substitutes for gold. 
One way out, which Triffin and I both regard with horror but which 
I feel more strongly than he may be the ultimate last resort, is to 
increase the monetary price of gold; this might be done deliberately, 
or be the outcome of an experiment with floating exchange rates . 
The other alternative is to move to a regulated credit reserve stand-
ardi this is the purpose of the Special Drawing Rights scheme. 
It is with respect to Triffin' s criticisms of the SDR scheme 
that we part company, for I find these criticisms in general both 
unconvincing, and not logically pointing towards the reforms Triffin 
advocates in place of the SDR. First, Triffin makes great play 
with the notion of a "gift" to the rich, thus catering to the popular 
belief that in the creation of credit someone gets something for 
nothing. On the contrary, creation of credit by mutual agreement 
is an equal exchange of assets for liabilities; it is the insistence that 
the assets should be given to the poor that introduces a technically un-
necessary and politically controversial element of international redis-
tribution into what could be a purely financial arrangement. Second, 
Triffin adduces the principle of strengthening the adjustment mech-
anism and the concept of "blind underwriting of deficits" in his 
criticism; but any arbitrary rule for distributing new reserves , 
provided it is adhered to, leaves the need for adjustment policies 
intact except insofar as under the present system shortage of inter-
national liquidity manifests itself in pseudo- adjustment problems ; 
Triffin' s proposal to use the lending power of new credit reserves 
for financing various kinds of deficit will tend to weaken 
rather than strengt hen the adjustment mechanism, and 
discipline over debtors; and the proposed "reserve settlement ac-
count" is concerned with solving the so- called "confidence problem" 
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and contributes nothing whatsoever to strengthening the adjustment 
mechanism. I agree, however, that without a resolution of the 
status of gold and the reserve currencies, the need for SDR may 
fluctuate erratically; though it could be argued that international 
central bank collaboration could handle the problem if SDRs were 
once firmly established. My own criticisms of the SDR scheme are 
that the distribution of voting rights is likely to make the amount of 
SD Rs provided too niggardly, and that the gold guarantee is likely 
to result in SDRs being frozen into central bank reserve asset 
portfolios so long as uncertainty remains about the future price of 
gold. 
T urning to the trend towards regional cooperation, Triffin 
argues that a negotiated credit reserve system would impose severe 
burdens on IMF management, which would be relieved by the re-
gional evolution of international monetary cooperation, since neigh-
bors can exercise surveillance over each other more easily and 
effectively than can the nembers of a global arrangement . The 
Bonn crisis of November 1968 raises some awkward questions about 
this proposition. More generally, I found Triffin' s argument in 
this section difficult to pin down; it" seems to me that for the purpose 
of his ECAFE reserve system proposal he needs and wants to argue 
that monetary cooperation must precede trade liberalization, but 
is confronted by contrary facts of history, and has to resolve the issue 
dubious contention that the accident of dollar glut has enabled Europe 
to escape the laws of logical necessity. An alternative view is that 
monetary co- operation and particularly integration offers too little 
prospect of direct benefits to justify the sacrifice of soverei gnty 
entailed in it. 
I come now to the specific proposal for an ECAFE Heserve 
System. This is technically a complex subject, which I lack time 
to discuss in detail. I shall make only a few brief general remarks 
on it. 
First, it is probably true that by pooling their reserves the 
countries of the region could raise earnings on their reserve assets, 
through lengthening the average maturity of the aggregate portfolio 
in response to the reduced risk of reserve loses. But Triffin adds 
to that argument the idea of gain from eliminating intermediation 
profits now enjoyed by New York and London. The belief that 
middleman's margins represent an uneconomic and avoidable waste 
is a fallacy more commonly encountered in relation to farming than 
to finance; they are, in fact , payments for services which are 
typically difficult to provide more cheaply by co-operative effort, 
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as indeed, much of the history of consumers and producers coopera-
tives in poor countries tends to confirm. It may be that Triffin 1 s 
new Asian bankers would be more efficient than New York and London 
bankers in financial intermediation to serve Asia's needs, but this 
needs to be demonstrated and not simply assumed. 
Second, I am somewhat mystified by Triffin' s discussion of the 
unit of account. He implies that somehow a unit of account can be 
found that will involve less exchange risk than sterling or dollars; 
but the examples of success he cites involve the use of the dollar 
as the unit of account, though not as the reserve asset itself. 
Third, I find Triffin' s rebuttals of the criticisms of the proposal 
well-argued, and convincingly in favor of at least starting an 
exploration of it. I am, however, somewhat skeptical about the 
desirability of moving very far from the initial automatic basis for 
borrowing towards a discretionary lending scheme. There is always, 
in relation to development, a strong temptation to believe in the 
catalytic value of some modest institutional change or financial 
manipulation, and faith in the power of monetary magic, on the one 
hand, and in the entrepreneurial powers of central bankers, on the 
other, is particularly hard to restrain within the bounds of common 
sense. This motif emerges indirectly, but nevertheless definitely, 
in Triffin' s contention that regional trade liberalization, would be 
bound to fail if it were not preceded by negotiation of an ECAFE 
Reserve System . There is no evidence for this contention, as 
opposed to the contrary view that regional trade liberalization with-
out regional monetary cooperation is perfectly possible provided 
that the international monetary system is functining well and countries 
are prepared to play the rules of the international monetary game. 
I suspect that Triffin is implicitly envisaging a continuing situation 
of international monetary crisis, which, as Sperry Lea has remark-
ed, has already been turning commercial policy into a tool of balance-
of-payments policy, and would indeed require regional trade coopera-
tion to be backed up by regional monetary cooperation. But con-
tinuing crises apart, it seems to me that the case for an ECAFE 
reserve system should rest on its direct financial advantages in 
economizing on reserves and raising the yield on reserve assets, 
not on a presumed prerequisiteness to regional trade liberalization . 
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COMMENTS ON ROBERT TRIFFIN' S PAPER BY ARTHUR PAUL 
In September, 1967, I had the privilege of being present when 
Professor Triffin presented his earlier paper on this subject at an 
ECAFE meeting in Bangkok. His present paper relates the pro-
posals that he made at that time to today 1 s global monetary problems 
and answers a number of the objections that have been made to the 
plan described in the earlier paper. When Professor Triffin first 
presented his plan to the representatives of most of the Asian coun-
tries, a number of those who were present felt that he was many 
years ahead of his time in making the proposals contained in the 
plan. Therefore, it is interesting to take a look at what has 
happened since then. 
The decision made at the ECAFE meeting which first examined 
the plan was a sensible one . Most of the representatives and 
experts of the various countries present felt that the plan war-
ranted consideration, and that, as a first step, ECAFE 's staff 
should examine the benefits to the region of the establishment of a 
simple and voluntary clearing mechanism among those Asian coun-
tries that might wish to join it. This was not an unanimous deci-
sion. The Japanese group opposed the plan and the Thai repre-
sentatives expressed strong reservations. But the group as a 
whole did request ECAFE to ask the Il\liF to make a survey of the 
existing clearing facilities in Asia and to comment on the possible 
benefits and the general desirability of the creation of supplementary 
and more direct clearing facilities. IMF has nearly completed its 
report on this matter, and it will be interesting to see what it dis-
closes. In the meantime, the British exchange banks, which now 
provide many of the existing facilities, have been restricted in 
their operations by the monetary difficulties of the U .K. They are 
no longer permitted to use sterling to finance non-sterling area 
transactions, so that the clearing facilities in the region are today 
less satisfactory than they were a year ago. 
The next steps taken by ECAFE as a result of further consid-
eration of the Triffin plan were based on recommendations rr.ade at 
a meeting of ECAFE 's Committee on Trade held in January, 1967. 
At that time a number of Asian delegates brought out the close 
relationship between trade liberalization measures and the pro-
posals for payments arrangements. There was much discussion 
of which should come first: trade liberalization or payments plans. 
Again the approach adopted by ECAFE seems to be a sensible one . 
It is that plans for payments arrangements and trade liberalization 
measures should proceed simultaneously . 
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It is interesting that some rre,-,1ber countries of ECAFE are now 
asking for the preparation of what might be called "a minimum set 
of standards for trade practice" which each country must adopt in 
order to qualify for membership in a clearing mechanism or some 
other form of trade payments arrangements . This is an important 
step in an important field . It has arisen out of the discussions of 
the Triffin proposals, and it is the subject of much current discus-
sion and study throughout the area. Furthermore, for many Asian 
trade officials not familiar with monetary matters, the study of the 
Triffin Plan has been an educational experience which in itself i s 
of importance • 
At a recent gatheri ng of the chief officials of a number of the 
Central Banks of Asia, the subject of payments arrangements was 
an important item on the agenda . They examined the Triffin plan, 
and it is reported that there was a considerable degree of support 
voiced in favor of it, or something like it, as an objective toward 
which to move . 
Originally the countries that supported the plan were only those 
who were debtors in terms of trade balances with their neighbors; 
almost all of the creditor countries objected to the plan or were 
non-committal. This seems now to be changing . The new Triffin 
paper points out some very good reasons for this change in attitude 
and shows how it may be to the advantage of creditor countries to 
support the proposal . 
Another event of interest is a formal decision on the part of the 
ASEAN countries to consider the establishment of some form of pay-
ments arrangements among themselves, without waiting for the 
entire region to act. These countries have authorized the making 
of a separate study for their area alone . This parallels the posi-
tion recently taken by the ANDEAN group of Latin American coun-
tries . 
It has been equally interesting to watch the changing attit udes 
of Japanese and American representatives at meetings at which 
these matters are discussed . Although some Japanese spokesmen 
have at times expressed mild interest, the official Japanese position 
has been definitely negative . The American position appears to 
have shifted from one of indifference to support expressed in very 
general terms and related t o the U.S. p olicy of fostering regional 
co-operation. 
From this brief description of events that have taken pl ace 
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since September 1967, it is clear that Professor Triffin' s propo-
sals have caused a good many things to happen . The Asian coun-
tries are still far from serious consideration of a plan for pooling 
a percentage of their reserves and making loans to each other to 
ease balance of payments difficulties; nevertheless , there have 
been some first steps taken, and there are plans for other steps to 
follow . It is too early to worry very much about the more sophis-
ticated aspects of the plan and its relationship to global monetary 
problems . The first steps, especially those that call for trade 
liberalization, will become part of an evolving plan desi gned to help 
to make trade among neighboring countries somewhat easier to 
transact within the Asian region . Whether the plan takes the exact 
form proposed by Triffin, or some variation of it, is not too impor-
tant today . The existence of the plan, alone , has been a useful 
stimulus that has helped the preliminary steps that ECAFE is tak-
ing in this field . 
Chapter 10 
THE ROLE OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 
IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA 
Masaru Fukuda 
1 • Introduction 
The present paper is designed to focus on some of the funda-
mental problems which we have experienced over the past two years 
since the inauguration of out Bank . The problems are indeed of the 
nature that the satisfactory solution for them will be very difficult 
and they will continue to be the existing challenge for the attention 
from the academic professionals in political science, economics, 
and social sciences for exploration of the better solution . In other 
words, I firmly believe that identification of the problem areas will 
be more important rather than the presentation of hastily made sug-
gestions for the solution. 
2 . The Problem Concerning Regionalism 
First of all, Asian Development Bank (ADB) is created as a 
regional international bank similar to the Inter- American Develop-
ment Bank or the African Development Bank . That is, ADB is re-
sponsible for the overall development of Asia which is the vast area 
spreading from Pakistan through Indian Ocean, also following the 
Himalayan border i . e . Afghanistan, Nepal to Laos, and then to 
Southern Pacific 'Western Samoa and then up to Northern Pacific 
Korea. We might call it as the complex of different religions, 
cultural backgrounds, economic situations and socio-political sit-
uations . In short, ADB is responsible for the development of not 
only Pacific countries but also of non-Pacific countries . This 
fact does mean that ADB will not be conveniently placed in the posi-
tion to take the clear cut policy direction for the Pacific regional-
ism. But we cannot also deny the fact that most of the Pacific 
countries, both developed and developing, are the member coun-
tries of ADB and they are naturally interested in the promotion of 
the development of Pacific areas. This conflicting factor which is 
innate in the constitutional character of ADB will be the first ex-
ample of the type of the problem we must deal with carefully and , 
certainly it will make the job of ADB management more delicate . 
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Secondly, another important point is the salient feature of the 
ADB membership which includes many non-regional countries in-
cluding the United States, Canada and most of Western Europe. 
'vVe are very proud of this fact. It is certainly the great strength 
that ADB is equipped with in comparison with other sister regional 
banks. This also means that ADB should always keep some appre-
ciation of the Western climate and where possible, try to reflect 
their interest and wishes on our own performance. Vlfe should not 
also forget to appreciate the historical background where quite a 
number of regional developing countries used to have the very deep 
relationship with the West in cultural, religious, economic and 
other various asp~cts. · 
Thirdly, these days the so-called S .outheast Asia is closing 
up on the scene on various occasions, like regional conferences, 
as a kind of the inner region within the broad region of Asia. This 
recognition of the particular sub-region will be somewhat natural 
development in various policy directions. But it also involves 
inherent danger towards some emotional friction, irritation or dis-
appointments among non-sub-regional areas. This will be another 
area that ADB management will find itself in a very awkward situa-
tion for the impressive emphasis .on certain priority direction. 
After all, we must start from full recognition of the inherent 
difficulty inseparable from regional approach. Regional institu-
tions are always creat~d by the aspiration for certain regional em-
phasis together with some frustration from Jess recognition of that 
emphasis. However, after they are born, they will find themselves 
immediately in an uncmrifortable situation where clear cut recogni-
tion of regionalism will often tend to lead them towards frustration 
by emotional explosion or gradual deterioration of keen interest 
within themselves. · 
. . ' . 
3 • . Approach to Development - Three Factors 
Perhaps everyone will agree, in the l:tght of history, that 
breakthrough for development will be possible by the mobilization 
of three factors for their activation. Firstly, we must activate 
the passionate enthusiasm in the mind and heart of the people 
towards the so-called Development. Secondly, some access to 
modern technical know-how must be made available. This is the 
important area for education and technical assistance. Thirdly, on 
the basis of passion plus brain, monetary resources for develop-
ment will be the last important factor for development. The inter-
esting thing is we will never be blessed with the ideal combination 
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of those three factors in the practical realities of development. 
The different variety of combination among those three factors will 
produce very interesting varieties in the pattern of development 
process. 
(a) The first factor, the passion for Development, or the de-
termination even on self-help basis toward development, is in my 
view the most important one. But it belongs outside of the function 
of any international institution. It might be something beyond the 
deliberate creation by human efforts. It just happens by the unique 
combination of historical developments in various aspects of certain 
society. 
(b) Technical Assistance 
Accordingly, we will start from the second factor, that is, 
technological know-how. This area is certainly the proper function 
by international development institution. International institution 
is indeed equipped with the powerful tactical advantage in compari-
son with bilateral aid agency. Through the multilateral member-
ship construction, international institution will be able to mobilize 
all the different kinds of technical skills available from the wide 
sources. ADB is determined to be active particularly on this area 
and we hope we will be able to produce at least the performance not 
inferior to other sister institutions. I personally feel there will 
be reasonable hope even for better performance. Since the begin-
ning of the ADB activity in December 1966, we have tried to respond 
to the many requests for technical assistance not only on loan re-
lated project like feasibility test but also on the advisory mission 
for broad area, for example, assisting the improved policy direc-
tion for agriculture, improved banking practice and others. Here, 
I would like to mention the major achievement of ADB' s activity in 
1 967 - the Asian Agricultural Survey. Fortunately, this survey 
already drew substantial attention from wide academic sources in 
the United States and others . vVe will also start the Regional 
Transport Survey in the near future • Perhaps we can expect that 
more active cooperation with international institutions including 
research institute will be activated in the future by AD B. However, 
we should not overlook one problem we will face in this particular 
area of our function. The problem is "whether ADB is a bank or 
a broader development agency?" . We will be exposed always to two 
different schools of thoughts on this question. The traditional or-
thodoxy will draw a certain limit to the liberal application of our 
resources to the active approach toward research cooperation or 
non-loan related technical assistance. Another school of thought 
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will favour and endorse the positive response to the requests of 
cooperation from other institutions or the requests of help from 
developing member countries on advisory technical assistance in 
the wide area outside of loan activities. The former school will 
argue unless caution is taken, ADB will transform itself into a 
subsidy providing agency and precious resources will be wasted 
under pressures from many sources. The latter school will say 
the success as a bank of course is important but it is not enough, 
ADB is a development bank and, as such, take a broader function 
to help developing members improve or acquire whatever required 
technological skill or promote regional research cooperation . 
As long as any international financial institution depends on 
world capital market for bond issues to get major loan resources, 
the management of the institution will be concerned about the recep-
tion by the investment community and the conservative orthodox 
banking image will tend to count. But it is also recognized that 
expectations on the part of regional members strongly favour and 
highly evaluate the broader approach. 
(c) Mobilization of Monetary Resources 
We now come to the third factor, that is, the mobilization of 
monetary development resources. Here we naturally face at 
present the great disadvantage in comparison with other sister in-
stitutions . We just started two years ago and our available re-
sources are still limited particularly in relation to tremendous 
potential demands. However, let us examine the present situation 
and potential outlook. The first type of available resources will 
be naturally the ordinary capital resources of ADB. We have ap-
proximately one billion dollars ordinary capital, half of which 
should be struck out as call<1.ble capital because of its limited use 
for security in case we issue bonds in the future. Then the re.,. 
maining half is the so- called paid-in capital, half of which is the 
local currency and the remaining half is the convertible currency 
portion. In other words, this convertible currency portion of the 
paid-in capital makes it immediately usable ordinary re sources . 
As for the local currency portion, there will be the very difficult 
problem how to use it if the currency concerned is still inconvert-
ible currency . There are two probiems. One difficulty lies in 
rare opportunities to use it in settlement of foreign trade. The 
other is the fact that in most cases the local currency is held by 
the Bank not in -::he form of cash but in the form of notes arid to use 
it will necessitate additional budgetary action for the country con-
cerned, that is, leading to additional burden to the developing 
THE ROLE OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 295 
country. Of course, the Bank is examining and exploring the var-
ious possibilities for the use of this portion in the future. However, 
it is quite clear that the area for its use will be limited because of 
its nature. The portion of the local currency subscription by con-
vertible currency countries will be activated in due course of time 
in accordance with certain limitations. But anyway our basic re-
sources for development activities will depend on this convertible 
portion, that is, the one quarter of the capital which will be paid in 
over five years. We have l:l.lready received the three installments. 
But it is quite clear that ADB must expand its resources by other 
means and the Charter of ADB already anticipated and worked out 
the availability of the two other additional resources, that is, the 
borrowed resources from bond issue in the international capital 
markets and the special fund contributions . 
4. Problem Concerning Bond Issue 
From the beginning of the Bank activities, the top management 
of ADB kept the great appreciation of the need for additional re-
sources through bond issues in international capital markets and 
already established some solid base to the access to New York and 
to the centers in European capital markets. F or the market in the 
United States, ADB is already engaged in the process of qualifica-
tion for future ADB bonds in various States in the United States . 
Several States including New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, 
California, and others gave the qualified status for ADB. F or 
Europe , the top management of ADB has been in close contact with 
the influential banking sources in preparation for the future possible 
access to the European capital markets. We look forward to suc-
cessful performance on the bond issue activities similar to the very 
active successful performance on the part of sister institutions, 
IBRD and IDB. However, the tendency of world capital markets 
under the present critical developments in the major currencies 
of the United States and Europe has produced certain difficulties 
in two points. One is the high interest rates prevailing in recent 
years. Anyway, although we have seen slight improvements in 
German market this year, the level of interest rate, we cannot deny, 
will be undesirably high to meet the needs of developing countries . 
The other difficulty will be the constant exposure of the capital 
markets to the present worldwide currency turmoil particularly 
since last year's Sterling devaluation. Nhen we look back to the 
situation which prevailed in the 1940 's and 1950 's, one cannot help 
but feel the basic situation is changing to the extent that we should 
give more thought on the traditional approach by international insti-
tutions to recruit additional resources from private capital markets . 
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Things are getting more and more difficult. Of course, we do ap-
preciate the impressive vigorous borrowing activities on the part of 
IBRD since the spring of 1 968 . Nevertheless, theoretically speak-
ing, there .is no logical relationship between the private capital 
markets and the development needs. The resources which will be 
mobilized through private capital markets could be activated but 
only to the extent that the private investors or banking communities 
in the private sector will find the investment in international insti-
tutions to be reasonably attractive and safe . Of course, the bond 
issues by international institutions are guaranteed by the paying 
capacity of member countries. More than that, in the case of IBR D , 
it will actually be supported more safely by IBR D practice to l imit 
the amount of bond issue within the ceiling of callable capital sub-
scription by the United States . In the case of IDB, it will be le-
gally supported by similar arrangement . In the case of ADB, future 
bond issues will be supported by the callable capital subscription 
of convertible currency member countries. However, the climate 
of the so- called investment community is such that sometimes they 
are not fully satisfied with government guarantees and shift the 
money into portfolios which are more attractive in their eyes . But 
also it is a fact that in the foreseeable future, bond issues will 
remain to be the major method for funds recruitment for international 
institutions • 
At this point, I must make special reference to the problem of 
future possibility or potential of the Pacific advanced countries for 
the role of capital market through private bond i ssues, because 
this conference is gi ving some focus on the position of advanced 
P acific countries. T he fact is except the United S tates, we do not 
have any real capital market in advanced P acific countries. 
Canada , Australia and Japan are the main borrowing countries on 
the world international capital markets. One might expect the 
future development in Tok yo Market might make Japan as one of the majo1 
internati onal bond market . However, in my view, it will take quite 
a long time to materialize this sort of dream . The stat us of the 
bond market in T okyo is not yet developed and even t he dome stic 
bond issues in Japan incl uding governme nt bonds are acti vated 
through the type of private placement a mong the major f inancial 
institutions. Of cour se, one cannot say categorically any definite 
prophecy on t his matter . But it needs some s t ructural change i n 
the J apanese financial systems and pattern of acti vities . In other 
words, AD B will have to recr uit resources through New York and 
European financial centers for the t ime bei ng . 
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5. Mobilization of ADB Special Fund Resources 
Next, let us examine another type of additional resources for 
ADB, that is, the special fund resources. Under the Charter of 
ADB, we have two different types of special fund resources. One 
type is the special fund resources created by our own action. That 
is, under the Charter , up to 10 % of the paid-in capital, ADB Board 
of Governors will be able to create its own special fund for the pur-
pose of low interest rate and/ or with longer maturity of loan. 
Here we have the very limited resources but with the complete free -
dom from any restraint for procurement or suggestions for its use 
from donor countries. ADB will be able to operate on the basis of 
this limited type of special fund as it wishes to do . The only type 
of activity that ADB cannot operate on the basis of these set aside 
resources is the non-reimbursable grant. Anyway, ADB set 
aside special fund will be something like the very small scale IDA 
in the IBRD family in its function. 
The second type of special fund resources will be the so-called 
contributory resources . In theory, we will be able to have the 
substantial future prospect of this potential additional r esources if 
the developed member countries of ADB will respond in due course 
of time to the need of ADB for low interest rate, longer maturity 
loan activities. But in this area, we face some fundamental prob-
lems involved. It is quite understandable to expect that in human 
life, any donor will take action for contribution because he is inter-
ested in certain ideas or he is responsive to certain requests or 
he foels the same way with the organizer of the recruitment of do-
nation for certain purpose. It is rather unrealistic to expect the 
donors to be responsive to any kind of donation activities. The 
Charter of ADB rightly appreciated this point - the initiative taken 
by outsiders (whether they are members or non-members of ADB 
to identify the priority purpose for recruitment of special fund re-
sources and used carefully the language "accept the administration 
of special funds which are designed to serve the purpose and come 
within the functions of the bank", whereas the Charter used a 
different language for the set aside resources. In other words, 
for set aside resources, the Charter used the language " set aside 
•••• and establish therewith one or more Special Funds"* instead 
* Article 1 9 "Special Funds" 
1 • The Bank may: 
(i) set aside, by a vote of two-thirds of the total number of Gover-
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of "accept the administration of Special Funds". The Charter did 
not say for the contributory resources "Who will take the action or 
initiative to design". It clearly means the Charter did foresee the 
likelihood for the initiative to be taken by someone outside the Bank 
itself. It is quite conceivable that certain country or countries or 
other international agency will take the initiative to design some 
special fund which is expected to be accepted by ADB for its admin-
istration after it was designed and established as some kind of in-
ternational pool resources for certain purposes of development. 
In this case, the natural conclusion will be to expect ADB to act as 
a kind of trustee for the administration of pre-established fund 
somewhere else outside of ADB. To some extent, in this case, the 
function of ADB will be passive as trustee and it is expected to 
administer faithfully the contributed fund according to the basic 
agreement which was worked out by the contributors. 
There will also be the variety of difference in the modes of 
trust agreement. In some case, the expectation by the contribu-
tors to ADB for its administration might be close to the role of ex-
ecuting agency, in other words, the agency which will render the 
technical service to provide the accounting and paying services 
without taking over the policy decisions. IBRD 's relationship with 
Nam Ngum Dam project might be one example similar to this tyre. 
In other cases, major objectives might be outlined in the trust 
agreement and within that framework, ADB might be delegated to 
function as implementing trustee taking over the policy directions 
within that guideline. It appears very workable and understandable • 
However, in reality, it is not so simple. Here I must give some 
substantial explanation and so let us take it as a separate paragraph. 
6. Operational Problems Concerning Special Fund Contributions 
A . Problems Arising From Different Initiatives 
(* cont'd) nors, representing at least three-fourths of the total 
voting power of the members, not more than ten (10) per cent 
each of the portion of the unimpaired paid-in capital of the Bank 
paid by members pursuant to paragraph 2 (a) of Article 6 and of the 
portion thereof paid pursuant to paragraph 2 (b) of Article 6, and 
establish therewith with one or more Special Funds; and 
(ii) accept the administration of Special Funds which are designed 
to serve the purpose and come within the functions of the Bank . 
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If the initiative is taken by outsiders for recruitment of special 
fund contributions, there will be always some danger for ADB to be 
exposed to the competing outside initiatives to creat the special 
funds for the various separate objectives which will be enthusiasti-
cally supported by certain countries but looked at with skepticism 
or reservation or indifference by other countries. Sometimes, 
initiatives will be taken by advanced countries. In others, initia-
tives will be taken by developing countries. ADB will be exposed 
constantly to the pressure from various different sources. Sec-
ondly, an international institution itself is after all a living animal 
and does have its own taste for likes and dislikes, It always likes 
its own initiative, its own freedom, dislikes outside interference 
or suggestions and naturally, it is not in an enthusiastic mood to 
put itself into the modest function as faithful trustee particularly 
such as executing agency without any substantial say. In short, 
international institution's heart does not lie in that kind of activity 
even if its Charter writes about such function. Thirdly, even 
among advanced countries which are expected to be potential donors, 
there will be quite a different varieties of interests, sometimes con-
flicting each other, in the identification of the major objectives. 
Suppose the agricultural development is agreed upon as one of the 
important priorities, there will still exist quite different attitudes 
towards certain types of agricultural development activities. 
Certain advanced countries will be more enthusiastic and interest-
ed to help the family-type agriculture so that it will be made more 
efficient. Other donor countries might take the view that better 
way to modernize agriculture will be to encourage the big capitalis-
tic plantation type of agriculture. In addition to that, if initiatives 
are taken by developing countries, they might be less interested in 
agriculture and more attracted towards the immediate industriali-
zation skipping agriculture. Those circumstances do exist. 
Accordingly, we will return back to the importance of the approach 
by international institution to take the initiative for identifying the 
objective and recruit resources. However, an international insti-
tution itself is composed of various members and always the iden-
tification of priority objective will tend to be, after all, the pro-
duct of ambiguous compromise among different views. On this 
point, H the identification of the priority objective could be work-
ed out as a result of the scientific research done by the staff of 
the international institution, the situation might be simple • However, 
in my view, I regret to add that the present status of social sciences 
is neither persuasive nor objective enough to be unchallengeable, 
Any kind of theoretical presentation will be subject to some basic 
assumptions and those assumptions will invite easily some critical 
challenges from certain practical interests. After all, it will be 
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most safe approach for international institution to take the position 
that priority will be decided according to each case by case applica-
tion without declaring any clear-cut direction, or if it dares to 
declare, the policy declaration should be broad enough to be inter-
preted to suit the various different views. 
Since the beginning of ADB, there were two outside initiatives. 
The United States took the initiative to send the bill to Congress 
for her contribution to the ADB Special Fund up to 200 million 
dollars and it was designed for four purposes, namely, agriculture, 
transport and communication, Mekong Development Program and 
educational facilities, with primary emphasis on Southeast Asia. 
Japan also took the initiative, through the Ministerial Conference 
for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia, to establish a 
special fund for the agricultural development in Southeast Asia. 
Canada also took the initiative at the Inaugural Meeting of ADB to 
stress the importance of concessionary financing. Netherland re-
sponded with the interest in agriculture together with its expression 
of strong belief on untied procurement. Denmark also responded 
for agriculture • 
Taking into account all those conflicting difficulties which 
will be involved in the special fund operations, ADB Board of 
Directors, after lengthy discussion over the past year and a half, 
finally adopted the framework for our special operation, and we 
adopted it as the rules and regulations of Consolidated Special 
Funds. The main idea of this framework was to keep the balance 
between initiative taken by the contributors and initiative taken by 
the Bank. For example, the Bank established the Agricultural 
Special Fund, the Multi-Purpose Special Fund, Technical Assist-
ance Special Fund and such other special funds as may be needed 
in the future within this consolidated framework. It was so ar-
ranged that those separate special funds will be under some com-
mon regulations which will be desirable from the Bank's standpoint. 
Also, in principle, repayments and interest accruals were allocat-
ed to the mult-purpose special fund unless the contributor requests 
to keep them in the original special fund to which they contributed. 
Also, repayments and interest accruals were expected to be free 
from tied procurement restrictions. 
B. Three Different Approaches to Concessionary Financing 
F or international institution's financing on the concessionary 
terms namely the so-called soft loan, there will be two or three 
different types of approach . One is the traditional approach which 
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prevailed over the past i n the philosophy and operation kept by the 
IBRD-IDA. The other approach is something which might be pos-
sible for ADB' s Special Fund operations . But I am not certain for 
the future direction of ADB 's Special Fund operations because it 
is still subject to the conflicting arguments . 
(i) The Approach on Balance of Payment Basis (IDA) 
Even for the soft loan operation, it is clearly emphasized that 
the loan project itself should be of the equally sound quality and 
nature from the banking standpoint . The crucial difference exists 
only in the different status of the borrowing country in its balance 
of payment difficulty or in its extreme poverty in national income. 
Mr, Eugene Black clearly explained this philosophy when he re-
cently visited ADB. If that is so , the next logical sequence will 
be that the real benefit of the soft term will not necessarily be re-
flected or felt at the project level, because the borrowing country 
will not be criticized even if it imposes the high interest rate on the 
project, whereas getting the soft term from the international insti-
tution, In short, the benefit of the soft term will accrue at the 
country level for the alleviation of its balance of payment difficulty . 
However, the people working at the project will not grasp or feel 
any impact from the great help from the international institution in 
the terms of lending. Another logical sequence will be that only 
limited number of countries will benefit from the available conces-
sionary financing. For other cuntries, there will be no hope to 
have access to the soft term lending, because they are denied the 
benefit of access on the excuse that they are above certain level of 
national income or they are not in the hopeless balance of payment 
difficulty. 
This approach will cause more problem if the excessive soft 
term is provided, using the extremely severe test for qualification, 
for example, free or 1 % interest rate with 40 or 50 years maturity 
only for countries ridden with extreme poverty or balance of pay-
ment difficulties. On the other hand, if the normal hard term loan 
is subject to the current high interest rate tendency of international 
capital market, the difference in terms will become wider and wider 
between the IBRD and IDA operations. It means something must be 
done for countries which do not qualify for IDA, Those problems 
might be less important for the worldwide responsible institution like 
IBRD. However, in the case of a regional bank like ADB, this will 
cause quite a sensitive problem among regional developing members. 
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(ii) The Approach on Combined Basis of Balance of Payment 
and Type of Project 
There will be another type of approach which will be better 
suited to a regional bank. After all, a regional bank is responsible 
for all developing members regardless of the different extent of 
their balance of payment difficulties. In that sense, the need for 
the concessionary terms financing will be tested not only on the 
balance of payment situation, but also on the nature of the projects 
or programs. In other words, 3 % or 3. 5 % intermediate interest 
rate with 20 to 25 years maturity will be quite reasonable and help-
ful particularly in view of current capital market situation which will 
cause close to 7 % loan rate to be necessary to keep the sound image 
of the international bank in the eyes of the international investment 
community. If the international institution faces the conflicting re -
quirements, that is, it must keep the interest rate low enough to 
meet the developing countries' need, the. answer will be naturally 
the blending of the hard term financing with concessionary one for 
all the developing member countries . This will be the logical se-
quence. In that case, not only the balance of payment position, 
but also the particular need from the certain type of project or area 
or problems will be the justification to apply concessionary terms. 
It will be convenient for the bank to keep politically the mild satis-
saction among all the member countries. This will be possible 
because every member will be able to hold at least some hope for 
access to concessionary resources . The weakness inherent under 
this approach will be, however, lack of systematic program or 
planned outlook, because everyting depends on case by case judg-
ment after the Bank receives application. It was also noteworthy 
on this regard that strong reservation existed in the minds of the 
management of the Bank toward the idea to have a separate organ-
izational unit within the Bank for Special Fund operation because 
they felt once such separate soft loan window is opened, every ap-
plicant will rush to it and normal loan window will be lonesome by 
lack of loan applicants. Under the circumstances, the Bank strong-
ly favored the same staffs will be responsible both for normal loan 
operation and soft loan operation. The staff will enjoy, under this 
set up, a sort of commanding position toward the borrowers to tell 
them what portion from normal operation and what r e maining portion 
from soft operation . The borrower will have to oblige "this blend-
ing" - the secret weapon held by the proud international institution . 
(iii) Approach on Systematic Program Basis 
If we could identify by some consensus prevailing among cuntries 
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concerned the real priority for a certain sub- regional development 
program e.g. agricultural breakthrough in Southeast Asia to settle 
the food shortage problem or Mekong program, theoretically we could 
say that we should concentrate in systematic application of conces-
sionary resources on the execution of this program without any re-
gard to balance of payment positions of the borrowing countries con-
cerned. Even if one of the developing country is currently blessed 
with temporary influx of U.S. dollar from military and/ or other 
factors, it should not be denied the access to concessionary re-
sources for that reason. In this approach, intermediate interest 
rate or maturity will be more adequate for practical reason. After 
all, if the country blessed with current foreign exchange fortune 
gets free interest rate with 50 years maturity, it does not make 
sense. The philosophy of this al'.)proach exists in foe need of con-
cessionary term not for the country but for the urgency of a certain 
development program which must be pushed systematically as a 
priority. 
The original idea of Agricultural Special Fund for Southeast 
Asia belonged in this category of approach - this is my interpreta-
tion. 
C . Problems of Procurement 
(Relationship of International Liquidity and Development) 
Originally, it has been taken for granted that multilateral aid 
through international institution should be operated on united pro-
curement basis . Under our Charter , the procurement under 
ordinary operations is operated on t he united procurement basis 
with the limitation that competitive bidding should be open only among 
memebrs, although there are certain exceptions. Also , the set 
aside resources of Special Funds will be required to be used on 
untied procurement basis. But for operations from special fund 
contributions, untied procurement requirement is not applied . 
United States made it clear already that the famous 200 million pro-
posal for ADB Special Fund by U.S. contribution will be subject 
to balance of payment safeguards . Japan and other potential con-
tributors might contribute on the tied procurement basis under the 
circumstances. Here we have some difficult problem . Interna-
tional institution itself i s inclined to keep the untied procurement 
for its own operations, and i s not naturally keen on the tied formula . 
E veryone will be familiar with the great controversy for the recent 
IDA replenishment with regard to this problem. But Special Fund 
contribution has its own more difficult problem, because contribu-
tion is made on totally voluntary ad hoc basis • It is quite different 
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from IDA i n this regard. If e verybody contributes to S pecial Fund 
on certain impartial formula, there mi ght be no problem . 
S ince 1 960 , international key currencies and other major con-
vertible currencies have been exposed to the unprecedented mone-
tary crisis. The problem of international liquidity and possibl e 
improvement of international monetary system has been taken up 
through Group of Ten leading to the recent adoption of SDR . I 
generally feel there is the tendency for development experts to live 
and think in the separate dreamy world from the reality where the 
monetary experts are struggling to arrest the present turmoil of 
major currencies under heavy speculative attack. Of course there 
were some ideas from Maxwell Stamp or the Prime Minister /Jillson 
to establish a bridge between the two problems but this line of 
thought did not win the support among responsible experts. In this 
regard, the following statement by the Italian Governor Colombo at 
the IMF Annual l\1eeting last September, is quite interesting and 
noteworthy: 
"The main deficiency, according to some, is the lack of a 
link between reserve creation and the provision of re-
sources for development needs, a link which , on the con-
trary, exists in the present system. An improvement which 
could be carefully studied and eventually made, without 
modifying the text of the Amendment, could consist of a 
pledge by the main industrial countries to use the part of 
their reserves corresponding to a portion of their Special 
Drawing Rights allocations for the replenishment of IDA or 
for subscription to World Bank bonds". 
Certainly we should explore the possibility for SDR to be used not 
only for IDA or IBRD but also for ADB special funds or ADB bonds 
subscription. 
Recently, former Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, 
Hon. Trued, wrote in The Times of London (October 17, 1968) as 
follows: 
"On the economic aid front it would be tragic if 
the flow or rescources to the developing countries 
in the non-communist world were to be reduced from what 
are already inadequate levels. The gap between the 
"have" and "have not" nations continues t o widen and as-
suredly provides grounds at some stage for serious upheaval 
and disorder. 
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Yet it is fruitless to try to extricate these operations 
from any general consideration of balance of payments posi-
tions. The flows of these resources have a significant 
payments impact. There is no way to eliminate their impor-
tance in these terms, at least as the financial system oper-
ates today. 
The World Bank, and other international 
institutions, should be expected to recognize clearly the 
crucial nature of this factor so that an enlarged part of 
total assistance can properly be channeled through those 
organizations • " 
"The key features of the United States payments position 
now include (a) only a very modest trade surplus, (b) a 
heavy build up of liabilities abroad as essentially American 
corporate debt is sold to foreigners, (c) the application of 
extensive layers of restraints and controls and (d) a con-
tinuing overall deficit . The large trade surplus and a re-
latively non-inflationary economy, for long t he bulwark off 
confidence in the dollar, have disappeared over the past 
three years • n 
Indeed, Mr. Trued made a unique point in reminding us what was 
the real economic basis over the past 20 years since Bretton \T\Toods, 
only on which the so-called development experts could operate on 
the existing philosophy. If we replace his words "for long the bul-
wark of confidence in the dollarn with "for long the strong base for 
providing liberal aid without balance of payment safeguards", we 
will have the real insight into the present difficulty. One might 
think the traditional position by the U. S • might be taken over by 
other industrial countries like Germany and other s who happen to 
be on a strong balance of payment position, with the result that 
there will not be essential difference between the past and the future . 
I think this is wrong because the situation among the industrialized 
nations other than the United States will be subject to constant 
fluctuation and they will be placed naturally in a position to give 
a close watch to safeguard their positions. It is quite different 
from the perennial stable structure after 1945 through 1960 where 
the world economy assured easily the built-in trade surplus sub-
stantially for the United States. This basic change in the pattern 
of performance of world economy needs to be reflected in the change 
of policies even on the development aid area. 
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Secondly, the stereo- typed recourse to "the so-called burden 
sharing among developed countries" will not necessarily be the easy 
soultion as it appears to be. As the burden is shared, leadership 
will also be shared . It means multiple leadership which is less 
obvious, more fragile, less stable than strong single leadership . 
International institution also needs leadership - not for the prestige 
of leading member, but for the efficient, effective direction of policies . 
This problem should be a challenge to political scientists to think 
over. ADB is one example of the new test case where the United 
States keeps far less voting power than her case with IBRD. 
7. Outlook for ADB Role in Some of the New Trial Approaches 
As I have explained in the foregoing paragraphs, we have come 
through, over the past two years, those difficult problems which are 
reflections of the present development of the international monetary 
situations. Indeed ADB came into existence at the difficult timing. 
We must also appreciate some weaknesses inherent in the type of an 
international institution like ADB which is designed to take care of 
general development objectives without having the pre-determined 
clear-cut target which will be identified in the type of set- up such 
as the Mekong River Development Program. 
However, there is already reasonable hope for the bright out-
look for regional activities in the future. One example might be 
the loan application from Republic of China for D .IV. T. Plant on 
the basis of the joint sub-regional agreement with Republic of Korea 
on petro-chemical marketing and development. Another future 
possibility might be the regional joint venture for certain type of 
factory development which will be owned by regional developing 
member countries. This idea has been proposed by Prof. 
Rosenstein-Rodan of M .I. T. with quite an enthusiasm . Also, the 
ADB is already successfully getting loan participations from com-
merical banks in developed member countries. Last, but not least, 
the recent establishment of Private Investment Company for Asia 
S .A. (PICA) is indeed significant and it could not have been con-
ceivable without the creation of ADB, although the cooperation be-
tween ADB and PICA is something which must be still explored in 
the future. 
In terms of available resources, it might take still long time 
to project the strong image for ADB in the region compared with 
other sister institutions. But perhaps ADB will be able to perform 
the valuable function in the following ways: 
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(a) To keep the torch high to draw the worldwide attention 
to the importance of development needs of Asia, 
(b) To pay more thorough and careful attention to the diffi-
culties of the regional developing countries and extend 
encouraging understanding to their efforts through tech-
nical assistance . 
(c) To attract the private business interests and their par-
ticipation and mobilization of the resources to the direc-
tion of development led by ADB, 
(d) To provide the solid base through ADB loan and other 
activities for the excecution of projects, 
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COMMEN~ ON MASARU FUKUD:, ' S Pl.PER BY HUGH T. PATRICK 
I have found this to be both an interesting and useful paper. 
Essentially this is because Mr. Fukuda, rather than simply provid-
ing a descriptive history of the Asian Development Bank and its 
activities to date - information which is after all available in ADB 
publications - has taken the approach of focussing on some of the 
major problems the ADB has been facing and will face. He skillful-
ly delineates the nature of the problems and major alternatives. 
He points out that the resolution of these problems in many instances 
will be an "ambiguous compromise among different views" (taking 
him somewhat out of context but in the right spirit, I believe, from 
page 299). 
What I miss in the paper is Mr. Fukuda' s own unofficial clear-
cut views as to how these problems should be resolved, though he 
provides us with some hints. I appreciate that he is in an official 
position which may preclude him putting his own views on paper, I 
do hope that in this session he can feel free to speak privately and 
off the record; our rapporteurs should be careful not to identify 
him in any recording of the discussion. 
The problems which Mr, Fukuda discusses can be summed up 
in the very name of the institution - Asian Development Bank. I 
will not repeat his discussion of regionalism, of what "Asian" 
means • One point on which I regretted lack of discussion was how 
the ADB is to be differentiated from the IBRD - in its rationale for 
being, in its objectives, functions, and operations, I· suppose the 
rationale for being lies first in the pride of Asians in having their 
own institution and in the power to run it; and second, in expanding 
the market as it were for aid donors and bond holders. Probably 
the U.S. total aid commitment is slightly larger than it would have 
been otherwise in commiting U, S . $200 million to the ADB capital, 
though it has not come through yet on the agricultural special fund, 
I think almost certainly Japan's U, S , $200 capital subscription and 
agricultural contribution are real increases in its effective aid 
commitment. In terms of overall objectives and functions the ADB 
seems very cfose to the IBRD in other than its regional limitation; 
I hope this will not r esult in duplication of effort and higher overall 
costs of operation of the combined sum of IBRD plus ADB. ADB 1 s 
initial loans suggest there may be some informal segmentation of 
the market between the IBRD and the ADB, with the ADB concen-
trati ng on small loans • Or is this simply a coincidence? I would 
like to hear Mr. Fukuda explain the relationship in lending opera-
tions between the IBRD and the ADB. 
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The main problem is the extent to which the ADB is a Develop-
ment institution as distinct from being a long-term financing Bank-
i. e. how broadly or narrowly the ADB defines its role· In principle, 
for development, it should try to adopt a broad role; engaging ac-
tively in certain kinds of technical assistance and in concessionary 
financing (40-50 year maturity loans at negligible interest rates). 
But this, if pushed strongly, runs up against a financial constraint: 
potential lenders to the ADB - purchasers of its bonds - will not 
regard it as credit-worthy and this source of funds will dry up. 
Since a main purpose of a development bank is to tap such market 
funds to intermediate between market investors and development 
projects - then loss of credit-worthiness is a serious problem eco- . 
nomically, aside from the loss of prestige to the institution's 
bureaucrats (an important factor I suspect). 
From my outsider's point of view the ADB has moved ahead 
rather skillfully on both fronts • As a bank it has taken an appro-
priately cautious and conservative approach in an effort to develop 
credit-worthiness. As of October 1968, it had made only four 
loan commitments, all fairly small, totaling U.S. $21 millions. 
The terms were not soft: interest rate 63/4 % (including commis-
sion) and term 12-20 years. The loans themselves are imaginative 
and probably very good developmentally. The first market test of 
ADB 's credit-worthiness will come this spring when it expects to 
float its first bonds in European capital markets. 
A future problem will be how to raise additional funds which 
normally are channelled through international financial markets • 
The ADB has moved ahead well on one function of a bank: the 
pooling of the risk of default, and the absorption of risk by its own 
capital • However, it has not yet very much taken advantage of 
another function of a bank: the pooling of risks of liquidity i.e. 
borrowing shorter-term and lending somewhat longer term. Thus 
far it has taken advantage of this opportunity only by selling the 
near-term maturities of its loans to private commerial banks. 
More can and should be done in this sphere. Two possibili-
ties, not necessarily mutually exclusive, occurred to me. First, 
if Professor Triffin 1 s regional reserve system is put into effect, 
as he points out a fair proportion of those reserves could be in-
vested for development purposes in the region. The ADB is the 
obvious institution for such a program. It could sell bonds of 
short to intermediate maturity to the reserve system, the amount 
increasing or decreasing automatically with changes in the 
region' s ( and hence the system 1 s ) total reserves. The 
amount would depend on the proportion or reserve deposited 
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in the system, and the proportion of those funds available 
for these purposes. The system ratio of 5% suggested by Profes-
sor Triffin and a developmental proportion of 40% would imply ADB 
bond issue to the system of roughly U, S . $1 50 millions, a substan-
tial amount. 
A second alternative, which could be put into effect regardless 
of (and prior to) decisions concerning a payments and/ or reserve 
system, would be to have the ADB regional members (and perhaps 
others) hold some proportion - say 10% - of their foreign exchange 
reserves in the form of short-term, convertible-currency denom-
inated, ADB bonds or notes. The bonds could be of one-year 
maturity ', issued quarterly. so that a country's ADB bond holdings 
of this type would have an average maturity of six months . An . 
individual country 1 s ADB bond holdings would increase or decrease 
automatically as reserves increased or decreased . To provide 
additional safeguards, a country losing substantial proportions of 
its reserves (in, say, a crisis) could demand automatic accelera-
tion of liquidation on a previously developed schedule . For exam-
ple, if reserves decreased by 20% , one- half of ADB bonds could 
be repaid, and if by an additional 20% all of its holdings • 
For the area as a whole, the advantages of pooling would mean 
a much smaller fluctuation in region country total reserves and 
ADB bond holdings than for individual countries. Professor 
Triffin estimates that while individual ECAFE countries have had 
reserve losses up to 85%, the ECAFE region as a whole has had 
in any year a reserve loss at maximum of only 2% t This advantage 
of pooling is great indeed and should not be neglected. If 1 0% of 
member country foreign exchange reserves were held in such bonds, 
the ADB would have additional lendable resources of more than 
U.S . $800 million . These probably should not be used to finance 
the entire portion of its long-term loans, but could well be used 
for near and intermediate portions of the maturity structure of the 
loans not sold to private financial institutions. 
As a developmental institution the ADB has also moved ahead. 
Its technical assistance so far has been modest, it can and should 
be expanded . I suspect that so far the problem is more of human 
than financial resources. On the financial side the ADB should 
actively solicit funds for technical assistance projects from the 
UN, individual aid donors , etc • 
The special funds are similar to IDA' s role in the IBRD. Mr. 
Fukuda 1 s opinion comes through quite clearly that the ADB has no 
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intention of simply being the handmaiden of the special interests of 
donor countries. Nonetheless, the ADB should take an energetic, 
entrepreneurial role in developing good uses for such special funds 
and persuading aid donor countries to provide financial support. 
This would provide an opportunity to multilateralize bilateral donor 
aids. It might well appeal especially to smaller country donors as 
well as Canada, Japan, and the United States. 
One issue Mr. Fukuda brings up in the matter of special fund 
concessionary loans is whether the criteria for countries to receive 
this form of aid should be balance of payments and poverty, or a 
sharing among all borrowers from the A. D. B. This is primarily a 
political rather than economic issue. It should be separated from 
the issue of low interest rates on loans to projects as distinguished 
to countries. The shadow price interest rate of capital in all un-
derdeveloped countries is high, certainly more than 10%. It is 
very dangerous to make low interest rate loans for projects; it 
distorts selection of the appropriate project and capital/labor ratio 
technology. Where external economies exist (and they frequently 
are used as an excuse for low-priority projects) they will probably 
be undertaken by governments anyway. 
I have found Mr. Fukuda' s paper most stimulating and l look 
forward to his discussion. 
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COMMENT ON MASARU FUKUDA' S PAPER BY J. ENCARNACION 
As Mr. Fukuda remarked at the beginning of his paper, it is a 
summary of some problems faced by the Asian Development Bank 
since the Bank started business in December 1 966 . The paper ac-
tually says very little about the role of ADB in economic develop-
ment in Asia . It would have been interesting to know for instance, 
what relations might be expected between ADB and national develop-
ment banks in the region . 
There are two related problems noted by Mr. Fukuda which 
particularly interest me . First is the group decision problem - the 
fact that ADB has many member countries and therefore its deci-
sions are group decisions. Second is the fact that it has multiple 
objectives and interests to consider in arriving at its decisions 
regarding possible loans for investment projects - criteria like effects 
on the balance of payments, growth, and employment. There is here 
a double problem of (a) aggregating the the individual preference 
systems, and (b) aggregating the multiple criteria, in such a way 
that the resulting decision is an " acceptable" one, or better, that 
it is "optimal" . 
I am curious as to how the Board of Directors of ADB arrives 
at its decisions regarding loan applications, for I have a theoretical 
hypothesis about group decisions involving multiple objectives .which 
needs eµipirical testing. I would like Mr. Fukuda to tell us some-
thing about their decision-making in the ADB Board of Directors, 
and I should like to allocate any remaining time I may have to Mr. 
Fukuda for this purpose • 
DI SCUSSI ON OF PAPERS PRE SENTE D BY R. T RIFFIN AND 
M. FUKUDA 
In reply to comments on his paper, Professor Tr i ffin made the 
following points . He said that he quite agreed with P rofessor 
Johnson that his criticisms of the S DR scheme had been put too 
strongly. He said that the system would not necessarily weake n 
the present adjustment mechani sm but that he fe lt that he woul d 
probably not strenghten it either . On the other hand , a Reserve 
Settlement Account could strengthen the system t o the extent that 
support for adjustment policies would depend on whether those po-
licies were acceptable to the group as a whole . Such a system 
would introduce some link between the iendi ng by the IMF, or by 
the Conversion Account, and agreement on the polic ies which are 
being financed . Insofar as the adjustment mechani sm depends on 
compatible views about the policies which have to be pursued that 
would be an a dvantage . 
Professor Triffin di d not share P rofessor J ohnson's view that 
swap arrangements among central bank s provided a very satisfac-
tory alternative solution to recurrent monetary crises . These 
arrangements are sometimes very precari ous , of a short term na-
ture, and there a re additional complications introduced by their 
bilateral character . 
Professor Triffin suggested that the eliminat ion of financial 
intermediation not only economized the minor costs which Professor 
Johnson rightly mentioned, but also had the political advantage of 
direct regional rather than remote international surveillance . For 
example, when some Latin American country has to seek assistance 
from the IMF, the conditions of finance are imposed by a group 
which is not necessarily very familiar with the particular problems 
of Latin America . If somethi ng goes wr ong , or the conditions are 
unacceptable, then the Fund is s ubject to crit icism by the regi on 
as a whole . This sort of problem coul d be avoided i f members of 
the region were involved more directly in the fo r mulation of policy 
conditions • 
Professor Triffin agreed completely that hi s basic assumption 
was that there would be continued monetary crises . He argued 
that the assumption that countries would always be wise and l u cky 
in the development of their financial policies was unrealisti c . 
He added that he did not think it was possible to move very far in 
the direction of trade liberalization without having ' some counterpart 
agreement on the whole range of financial policies . 
Finally, Professor Triffin said that he was very much in-
terested in Mr . Paul 's account of what had happened to his proposal s 
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since he left Bangkok. He said that he was completely baffled by 
the fact that it was, on the whole, the prospective creditors, such 
as Japan, which were cool towards the scheme initially. As 
Keynes pointed out, the value of an international clearing system 
was to generalise the advantages of a national banking system to the 
international economy. However, Professor Triffin said that he 
objected to Keynes' conclusion from this observation . An individ-
ual would not put his money into a bank which adopted the following 
rule: that it will lend to any Tom, Dick, and Harry on the simple 
demonstration that the Tom, Dick, or Harry is spending more than 
he is earning, and that therefore he needs money, and that he can 
get it automatically. There should be generous arrangements for 
debtors. But it is also important not to scare away the creditors. 
This is why Professor Triffin said that he had biased his whole 
scheme towards the interests of the creditor nations. 
In reply to comments on his paper, Mr. Fukuda said that the 
relationship between the Asian Development Bank and the IBRD 
still had to be clarified but it was true that the ADB had so far con-
centrated on small or medium scale loans • He said that he was 
very interested in Professor Patrick 1 s suggestions for pooling the 
risk of liquidity and that he would see that they were discussed 
thoroughly when he returned to Manila. 
Mr. Fukuda said that there was very active co-operation with 
the various national development banks and already loans had been 
made to these banks in Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines • 
He concluded that the ADB was still in a formative stage, that 
criteria and objectives in loan-making were still being worked out, 
and that no clear-cut formulae had yet emerged. 
Discussion of Professor Triffin 1 s paper centered on the default 
procedures to be imposed under his scheme and responsibility for 
bearing the burden of adjustment. It was suggested that the default 
procedures under Triffin' s plan might be too severe, and might 
discourage countries with large debt repayments from joining the 
system. Professor Triffin pointed out that, if the plan had been 
operating over the last ten years, Indonesia would have ended up 
with a $US 5 million debt to the clearing union. Repayment would 
have required one week of exports from Indonesia to the rest of the 
region. Obviously, in practice, export earnings would not be 
channelled off as allowed within the provisions of the scheme -
various kinds of standstill agreements and lengthenings of the re-
payment period could be negotiated. But the position of the creditor 
nations with respect to Indonesia would be stronger. The mere 
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existence of the clear ing uni on i tself woul d make it possible to in-
stitute much stronger guar antees against default than there could be in 
the absence of the union . P rofessor Triffi n added that it also might 
be possible to institute guarantees for some l oans from outside the 
region. 
Another participant indicated important differences between the 
EPU system and the proposed ECAFE reserve system . He said that 
he supported the Keynesian principle implicit i n t he EPU that surplus 
countries should be required to carry the major part of the adjust-
ment burden through increased purchases from other memebrs of 
the region. Professor Triffin pointed out that whether a country 
was in surplus within the region was not a relevant criterion for 
deciding how to distribute the burden of adjustments . T he poorest 
countries might well be in surplus within the region - witness the 
Latin American and Eruopean cases - and they should not be forced 
to carry all the burdens of adjustment . 
Participants from Asian countries and elsewher e discussed the 
role of the ADB in financing specific devel opment projects through-
out the region . They also drew attention to its potential for en-
couraging more effective regional specialisation , as between 
Korea and Taiwan, for fostering the moderniza tion of e xport indus -
tries, as in Indonesia and Ceylon, and its potential for acting as 
the managerial agency through which something like the Triffin plan 
might be initiated . 
Part V 
EVALUATION OF AID AND TRADE POLICIES OF THE 
PACIFIC ADVANCED COUNTRIES TOW ARDS ASIAN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Chapter 11 
AID, TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
THE EXPERIENCE OF TAIWAN AND KOREA 
Kuo-shu Liang 
1 • Introduction 
During the period from 1952 to 1967, the real gross national 
product of Taiwan grew rapidly, at a cumulative annual growth 
rate of 8. 4 per cent. The record has made Taiwan one of the 
relatively few developing countries with highly sustained growth 
since the 1950 1 s . Table 1 shows the absolute levels and the 
annual growth rates of real gross national product of Taiwan. The 
relatively low growth rate s in 1956 and 1960 were mainly attributable 
to the typhoon and drought damages. However, the economic growth 
during the period under review was on the whole exceptionally 
steady and free from setback. 
Needless to say, Taiwan has encountered certain formidable 
problems in the course of its development, namely, a small island 
economy and limited natural resources, more than three per cent 
per annum of the natural increase in its population, and the heavy 
burden of military expenditures which formed around ten per cent 
of GNP. But as pointed out by Professor Jacoby, there were six 
strategic conditions which contributed to Taiwan 1 s rapid growth in 
recent years. 1 They were: (a) the native talents and industry of 
the literate local people, (b) the infrastructure and human resource 
foundation laid by Japan, (c) the administrative and professional 
cadres filled by emigrants from Mainland China , (d) a stable govern-
ment, (e) policies favorable to private enterprises, including rela-
tive monetary stability, and (f) U . S . economic aid. 
When the foundation of infrastructure, human resources, 
stable political institutions, and constructive economic policies 
have been laid, the final element necessary to make the country grow 
rapidly will be an ample supply of material resources and new tech-
nology. In the course of Taiwan's economic development, the last 
factor was supplied at the critical time by U.S. aid. 
N. H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, 
Self-Help, and Development, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1966), p . 240. 
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Year 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
. 1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
Source: 
K. LIANG 
Table 1 
Real Gross National Product of Taiwan 
(at constant prices of 1964) 
Amount 
(NT$ million) 
Growth Rate 
40,698 
44,472 
47,776 
51,745 
54,189 
58,155 
62,327 
66,952 
71 , 177 
76,736 
82,272 
90,314 
102,492 
115,228 
126,007 
137,184 
(%) 
9.3 
7 .4 
8 .3 
4.7 
7.3 
7.2 
7.4 
6.3 
7.8 
7.2 
9.8 
13.5 
12.4 
9.4 
8.9 
Directorate-General of Budgets, Accounts & 
Statistics, Executive Yuan, National Income of the 
Republic of China, (Taipei, Taiwan). 
In this paper, I will first examine the contributions of U.S. aid 
program to Taiwan's economic development. I then portray some 
of the structural characteristics of Taiwan's foreign trade so as 
to see how successful the Republic of China has been in offsetting 
its disadvantages of small size through the expansion of foreign 
trade. Finally, a brief contrast is made between the economic 
performances of Taiwan and Korea in recent years. 
II. U . S . Aid and Taiwan 1 s Economic Development 
During the postwar period, especially years 1949-51, the prewar 
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production level was restored, and there was the timely resumption 
of U.S. economic aid to the Republic of China in the later part of 
1950 after the outbreak of the Korean war . Taiwan was the 
beneficiary of a "rich" aid program . A total of US$1 , 473. 6 million 
had been appropriated over the fifteen fiscal years, 1951-65, 
amounting to an average of almost US$100 million a year. Conse-
quently, aid obligations averaged about 7 . 5 per cent of Taiwan's 
GNP over the entire period, 2 and was equivalent to about US$10 
per capita per year. Table 2 shows the annual breakdown of 
obligation and arrival amounts. 
Year 
FY 1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Total 
Table 2 
Obligation and Arrival Amounts of U. S . Aid 
(unit: US$ million) 
Obligation Amount 
83 .4 
82.9 
100.6 
108.3 
132.0 
101. 6 
108. 1 
81.6 
128. 9 
102. 9 
94.8 
67.9 
120.1 
100.4 
60 .1 
1,473.6 
Arrival Amount 
375.2 
132 . 0 
101. 6 
108. 1 
81. 6 
128. 9 
100. 1 
94 . 2 
63 .7 
114. 2 
57.3 
45.9 
1 '402. 8 
Source: Council for International Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Executive Yuan, Taiwan Statistical Data 
Book, 1967, (Taipei, Taiwan), pp. 133-4, Tables 11-3-4. 
2 GNP was measured in NT dollars at 1964 prices as shown in 
Table 1, and then converted at the official exchange rate of 
NT$40 to US$1. 
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U.S. aid not only reduced inflationary pressure, but also 
filled the gap between capital requirements for plan target and 
domestic capacity to save and invest. Financial sources of gross 
domestic capital formation are presented in Table 3. Gross domestic 
capital formation had depended on inflow of foreign funds (most of 
which were U.S. aid) to a very high degree before 1962. In addi-
tion, aid recipient firms were required to invest their own funds in 
projects, so that aid dollars had a direct multiplier effect. Without 
massive assistance from the United States which formed the major 
part of inflow of foreign funds, the economy of Taiwan would not be 
able to grow so rapidly as it experienced. 
In this connection, the contribution of the aid generated local 
currency fund is worth while mentioning. The Local Currency 
Program was used to support military budget as well as to finance 
local development projects. Since the aid generated local currency 
fund functioned in the same way as an additional tax revenues to the 
government, the fund made it possible for the government to carry on 
an ambitious program of public investment without raising the tax 
level. The fund also enabled the government to offer tax reduction 
in 1960 as an incentive to business investment, and raised the level 
of domestic capital formation. 3 There was definite advantages in 
the generation of local currency funds through aid imports. After 
the termination of U.S. aid, the unallocated local currency fund was 
paid into a newly established Sino-American Fund for Economic and 
Social Development to be administrated by the Chinese government. 
Viewed in relation to Taiwan 1 s international trade, the defbits 
on the total trade balance were more or less covered by transfer 
payments, most of which were U.S. aid in the form of grant befor~ 
1 96 2. However, U. S. aid diminished in importance in the balance 
of payments of Taiwan toward the end of the period under review, 
and that the inflow of foreign capital begun to play a greater part. 
The Balance of Payments of the Republic of China is shown stability/ 
security-oriented. As shown in Table 6, U.S. aid commodities 
that arrived during this period were mostly composed of industrial 
and agricultural raw materials, namely, raw cotton, wheat, soybea1, 
petroleum, fertilizer, and pesticide. These imported raw materiah 
were used to support domestic production, and had a stronger and 
more immediate anti-inflationary impact than capital projects would 
have had. 
3 Jacoby, op. cit. , p. 211. 
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Year 
1951 -55 
1956 - 60 
1961 - 65 
Total 
Source: 
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Table 6 
Composition of U.S. Aid Commodities Arrived 
Capital Raw Consumption 
Goods Materials Goods 
14.0% 81 .8% 4.2% 
27.7 64.8 7.5 
21. 0 71.9 7. 1 
21.1 72.6 6.3 
CIECD: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1 967, p. 140, 
Table 11-4 . 
. In 1953, the Chinese government launched its First Four-Year 
Economic Plan, the objective of aid also gradually shifted from 
stability/security-oriented to development-oriented. As a result, 
the middle aid period of years 1956-60 was marked by heavy commit-
ments to infrastructure (electric power and transportation), human 
resources, and industrial projects as shown in Tables 7 and 8. 
Much aid to industry went to the public enterprises. But aid was 
also a catalytic financial element in such private industries as glass, 
synthetic fibres, polyvinyl plastics, hardboard, soda ash, and cast 
iron pipe. It can also be observed from Table 6 above that there 
was a considerable increase in the percentage of capital goods 
imports during this period. 
Finally, with the industrialization process gained momentum, 
the late aid period of years 1961-65 was marked by an increasing 
emphasis upon the aims of fostering private enterprises, promoting 
exports, and terminating U.S. aid. 
The establishment of the Industrial Development and Invest-
ment Center and of the China Development Corporation in 1959 
reflected the shift in the aid policy which put more emphasis on 
private enterprises. 5 
5 Public enterprises are actually hardly likely to be at its best 
in selling exportables in the world market. These enterprises 
are difficult to attain initiative, flexibility, and risk taking. 
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The Third Four-Year Plan for "accelerated economic development" 
during 1961-64 was announced by the Chinese government in January, 
1960. Laws and regulations governing investment were liberalized, 
the multiple exchange rate system was unified and stabilized in 
1961 at the rate of 40 NT dollars to 1 US dollar. Since Taiwan 
possessed abundant efficient labor and has a strategic location, 
U.S. aid and the constructive government policies helped to create 
a favorable investment climate and booming private sector. Table 9 
shows private and public output as percentage of industrial produc-
tion. Industry in Taiwan underwent a startling diversification, 
foreign trade was expanded especially after 1963 as shown in Table 
4 above, and at the same time, the Republic of China succeeded in 
attracting foreign investments and technical assistance from the 
United Nations and other broader sources. By 1965, Taiwan was 
in a position to move forward without any substantial concessinal 
assistance from the United States . 
The above mentioned change in emphasis on the aid policy 
was basically sound and in a correct sequence. In the following 
section, I will discuss the major trends and changes in the composi-
tion of Taiwan's foreign trade. 
Year 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
Table 9 
Private and Public Output as Per-
centage of Industrial Production 
Private Output 
42. 7% 
43.0 
48.7 
49.5 
49.9 
49.2 
51.8 
53 . 0 
54.2 
60. 1 
61.1 
61.9 
64.3 
65 . 6 
68.2 
Public Output 
57. 3% 
57.0 
51. 3 
50.5 
50. 1 
50.8 
48.2 
47.0 
45.8 
39.9 
38.9 
38. 1 
35.7 
34.4 
31. 8 
Source: CIEOD: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1967, p. 44, 
Table 5-4 . 
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III. MAJOR TRENDS AND CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION 
OF TAIWAN'S FOREIGN TRADE 
The foreign trade sector has played an important role in Taiwan , 
Table 10 shows the ratios of exports and of imports to gross 
domestic product at current prices . The ratio of exports to GDP 
increased steadily, and both ratios exceeded twenty per cent in 1966 , 
Taiwan is certainly a trade-limited economy . 
In absolute terms, real exports recorded six t i mes increase 
and real imports more than three times duri ng the period of years 
1952-66 as shown in Table 11 . In other words, real exports grew 
very rapidly at a cumulative annual growth rate of 1 2 . 5 per cent 
during the period. This rate far exceeded that of GDP, i.e . , 8.4 
per cent per annum. On ther other hand, real imports grew at a 
cumulative annual growth rate of 8 . 7 per cent which was very clos e 
to that of GDP . We can say that real imports and GDP showed a 
parallel increase . 
Table 10 
Exports and Imports as Percentage of GDP 
(in NT$ million at current prices) 
Exports of Goods Imports of Goods 
Year 
GDP and Services and Services 
(Y) (x) (X)/(Y) M M 
1952 17' 251 1 '385 8 . 0 0 2,438 14 . 1 0 
1953 22,992 1'977 8.6 3,163 13 . 8 
1954 25,229 1 '631 6 . 5 3,738 14 . 8 
1955 30,091 2,469 8.2 3,764 12 . 5 
1956 34,550 3,097 9 . 0 5,456 15.8 
1957 40,346 3 , 823 9 . 5 5,879 14 . 6 
1958 44 , 778 5 ' 185 11. 6 8 , 646 19 . 3 
1959 51,749 6,429 12 . 4 10 , 880 21. 0 
1960 62,566 7,033 11. 2 11 '726 18 . 7 
1961 69,867 8' 991 12 . 8 13 , 868 19 . 8 
1962 76,595 10,064 13 . 1 14,990 19 . 6 
1963 87,482 15,444 17.7 15,919 18 . 2 
1964 102' 649 19,202 18 . 7 18 , 812 18 . 3 
1965 113 ' 441 20 , 806 18.3 24 , 493 21. 6 
1966 1 25 , 825 26 , 065 20 . 7 27,035 21. 5 
Source: DGBAS: op. cit. 
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In order to get a clearer idea about the recent expansion in 
exports and imports, we have to go further to look into their respec-
tive composition. As shown in Table 12, the percentage of export 
value of industrial products to total exports rose from 3. 6 per cent 
in 1952 to 49.2 per cent in 1966. 
Table 11 
GDP, Exports, and Imports 
(in NT$ million at constant prices of 1964) 
GDP 
Exports of Goods Imports of Goods 
and Services and Services 
Year Amount Index Amount Index Amount Index 
Number Number Number 
1952 40,712 100.0 4,784 100.0 7,655 100.0 
1953 44,483 109.3 5,753 120. 3 8, 181 106.9 
1954 47,786 117. 4 4,320 90 .• 3 8,619 112. 6 
1955 51,752 127.1 5,333 111.5 7,246 94.7 
1956 54,202 133.1 5,768 120. 6 9,011 117. 7 
1957 58,255 143. 1 6,545 136.8 9,397 122.8 
1958 62,364 153.2 7,968 166.5 11,288 147.5 
1959 66,976 164. 5 8,327 174.1 11 , 5 50 150. 9 
1960 71 '182 174.8 9,588 200.4 12, 372 161. 6 
1961 76,810 188.7 1o,947 228.8 13,642 178.2 
1962 82,394 202.4 11 '838 247.4 15,121 197.5 
1963 90,460 222.2 15,740 329.0 15,606 203.9 
1964 102,649 252.1 19,202 401.4 18,812 245.7 
1965 115,557 283.8 24,038 554.5 23,830 311. 3 
1966 126,336 310.3 28,579 597.4 24,793 323.9 
Source: DGBAS: op. cit. 
Table 1 3 below shows that the percentage contribution of the 
manufacturing industry to net domestic product increased steadily at 
the expense of that of agriculture, while the position of the mining 
and other industries remained more or less unchanged. The Taiwan 
economy had undergone transformation toward industrialization in 
the course of its economic development during the period under 
review, and the transformation had a direct bearing on the changes 
in the structure of Taiwan's exports. 
Many factors are responsible for this expansion in manufac-
turing sector and exports of manufactured goods. Of which the most 
important is the extension of the process of import substitution to 
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Year 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
K. LIANG 
Table 13 
Percentage Distribution of New Domestic 
Product by Industrial Origin 
(at current prices) 
Agricul- Mining 
Manufac -
Others 
Less: 
ture turing 
35. 7% 2.1 % 10.8% 51. 7% 
38.0 1. 7 11. 2 49.4 
31. 5 1.8 14 . 4 52.6 
32.5 1. 7 13 . 7 52.6 
31. 2 2.2 14.4 52.8 
31.3 2.6 1 5. 5 51 • 2 
31.0 2.9 15 .4 51. 5 
30.3 2.5 17. 6 50.2 
32.5 2.3 16. 7 49. 1 
31. 3 2. 1 16. 9 50.0 
29.2 2.6 17. 1 51.4 
26.7 2. 1 19.6 51.9 
27.7 1.8 20.2 50.6 
26.9 2. 1 18.7 52 . 7 
25.8 2.2 19. 1 53.3 
24.4 2.3 20 . 1 53.5 
Source: DGBAS : op. cit . 
Adjustment for 
Imputed Interest 
0.3% 
o. 3 
0.3 
0.5 
0 . 6 
0 . 6 
0.8 
0.6 
0.6 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
o. 3 
export promotion , particularly for textiles and clothing, plywood, 
plastics and manufactures thereof , iron and steel, cement, fertilizer , 
plate glass , monos odi um glutamate, and wheat flour. 
T he process of import substitution to export promotion is 
to a considerable extent a matter of economic environments and 
policies . Direct steps were taken by the government to protect and 
foster domestic industry . The land reform resulted in the increase 
in rural income , and thus expanded the exte~t of the home market. 
Even because of the overvalued exchange rate in 1950 1 s, industrial 
i nvestments became more attractive . With the industry in Taiwan 
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underwent a startling expansion and diversification, measures were 
then taken to encourage import substituting industries to export 
their products under a relative monetary stability. The timely 
unification and simplification of foreign exchange rates effected 
between 1958 and 1961 has assured the exporters of stable and 
reasonable earnings . Tax incentives including exemption from 
business tax for all export transactions and from import duties on 
raw materials to be processed for exports, as well as special low 
interest loans applicable only to export manufacturers have 
strengthened the competitive capacity of Taiwan 1 s products in the 
world market. Specific measures have also been adopted to 
encourage the manufacturers of cement, textiles, papers, and 
monos odium glutamate to make joint efforts t o expand exports. In the 
case of textile industries, 20 per cent of C. I. F. prices of imported 
raw cotton has been collected as the cooperative fund to be refunded 
after the textile products are exported. In addition, a 5 per cent 
bounty is paid on exports. Such measures have stimulated the 
manufacturers concerned to be more export-oriented. 
At the same time, the erection of a tax-and-duty-free 
industrial processing zone in 1965 and the liberalization of exchange 
control have encouraged foreign investments and joint-ventures in 
export- oriented industries, such as electronic products, stainless 
curtley, c lathing, and toys. The favorable investment policies 
combined with an ample supply of cheap and efficient labor have made 
Taiwan an attractive site for footloose labor-intensive manufacturing 
industries. 
As for the exports of processed agricultural products and 
agricultural products, there were the emergence of new export-
oriented products such as canned mashroom, canned asparagus, 
as well as the increase in traditional exports such as canned pine-
apple, canned bamboo shoots, citronella oil, and banana. However, 
the weight of the exports of both products taken together showed a 
substantial decrease during the period. It is particularly noteworthy 
that the exports of the two major tranditional products - sugar and 
rice - had decreased in relative importance. As shown in Table 
14, the exports of other products had enjoyed a continual expansion, 
their total value in 1966 was 17. 8 times as large as that of 1952. 
It is also apparent that the export values of sugar and rice had 
undergone violent fluctuations. These fluctuations reflect the well-
known facts that the sugar price had been subject to erratic changes 
in the world market, while the exportable surplus of rice was highly 
sensitive to variation in ha:rvest. Increase in domestic consumption 
due to rapid increase in population may reduce the exportable surplus 
of rice in future. 
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The expansion of industrial production necessarily led to 
the substitution for some imported goods on the one hand, and gave 
rise to increase in the demand for some other imported goods on 
the other, thus caused changes in the composition of imports. As 
shown in Table 1 5, consumption goods as well as agricultural and 
industrial raw materials fell in the first category where import 
substitution had taken place. Chemical fertilizers afford a striking 
example. Their import value was about thirty , six million US dollars 
in 1 952, but decreased to less than fifteen million US dollars in 1 966 
as a result of government's efforts to increase their production. 
In fact, some urea has been exported recently . In contrast, both 
the value and the share of capital goods in total imports r egistered 
considerable increase during the period under review. The 
development of import substituting industries in itself has set up 
additional demands for imports of capital goods. 
Year 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
Table 16 
Net Barter and Income Terms of Trade 
(Monthly Average of 1 961 = 1 00) 
Net Barter Terms 
of Trade 
( 1 ) 
114.18 
111. 92 
108 .43 
111. 33 
110.95 
117.61 
105. 31 
102.21 
95.43 
100.00 
99.45 
120.1 2 
126 . 80 
96.87 
91. 14 
96.67 
Export Quantum 
Index 
(2) 
59.35 
88.95 
61 • 51 
76.42 
73.87 
86.03 
104. 95 
98.94 
97.09 
1oo.00 
113.81 
141. 04 
185.37 
211.21 
253 . 84 
256.50 
Income Terms 
of Trade 
(1) x (2) 
67 .76 
99.55 
66.70 
85. 51 
81.96 
1 01 • 1 8 
110.52 
1 01 • 1 3 
92.28 
100.00 
113.18 
169.42 
235.05 
204.26 
231. 35 
248.00 
Source: Department of Statistics, Ministry of Finance, 
Taiwan Bi-monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, 
(Taipei, Taiwan). 
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Finally as regards the terms of trade, we can see from Table 
16 that the net barter terms did not show any definite trend during 
the period under review . It is to our satisfaction that the income 
terms showed a significant improvement especially after 1962. 
The increase in physical exports caused a roughly parallel increase 
in export-based capacity to import. 
IV. THE CONTRAST BETWEEN TAIWAN AND KOREA 
From the above analysis, it is obvious that, contrary to the 
widely held pessimistic view about the prospect of small overpopu-
lated island economies, Taiwan recorded a substantial domestic 
growth and a substantial degree of expansion of exports during the 
period under review. Another notable successful case of the 
relatively few developing countries that have embarked upon a phase 
of sustained growth in recent years is the Korean economy. 
It is interesting to note that the two economies have much in 
common. 6 Both possess intelligent and industrious population. 
Neither are favored with abundant natural resources. Both under-
went a lengthy developmental process under the colonial rule of 
Japan, during which they acquired considerable investments in 
infrastructure and education . Both were confronted by overt 
military threats . Therefore, both countries received huge amounts 
of U.S. assistance. During the period of years 1953-66, the 
United States extended aid to Korea in the amounts of 6, 538. 8 
million US dollars. 7 The share of aid-financed imports in total 
imports of Korea had been kept above fifty per cent before 1962 as 
shown in Table 17. 
Despite these similarities, some factors can be identified to 
account for Taiwan 1 s earlier shift from the stability/ security-
oriented aid as well as economic policies to the development-
oriented ones.8 They are : 
(1) Taiwan benefited from five years of additional peace. 
Whereas Taiwan enjoyed internal peace .after 1 949, Korea suffered 
from the split in Agricultural South and Industrial North and the 
destructivo warfare during 1950-53. 
6 Jacoby, op. cit., p. 158. 
7 G. Ranis, "U.S. Aid Policies in Asia," in K. Kojima (ed.), 
Pacific Trade and Development, (Tokyo: The Japan Economic 
Research Center, 1958), p. 336 and p. 340. 
8 Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 159 - 60. 
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Table 17 
Total Imports and Aid-Financed Imports in Korea 
(unit: US$ million) 
Aid-Financed Imports 
Year Total Imports Amount Percentage 
( 1 ) (2) (2) I (1) 
1953 345.4 191 • 8 55 . 5% 
1954 243.3 149.4 61.4 
1955 341 .4 232.8 68 . 2 
1956 386. 1 319.9 82 . 9 
1957 442.2 374.0 84.6 
1958 378.2 311.0 82.2 
1959 303.8 210.7 69 . 4 
1960 343.5 231.9 67.5 
1961 316. 1 196. 8 62.3 
1962 421.8 218.5 51. 8 
1963 560.3 232.6 41. 5 
1964 404.4 142. 6 35.3 
1965 463.4 135.5 29.2 
1966 716.4 1 51 • 2 21.1 
Source: United Nations; Yearbook of International Statistics, 
1966, p. 452. 
(2) South Korea has a much less favorable climate for agricul-
ture than Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan 1 s farmers had demonstrated 
a high responsiveness to changes in supply and demand conditions . 
They shifted quickly from less to more profitable crops. 
(3) . Other than the catalylic effects of U. S , aid, Taiwan 1 s 
economic development was fostered by political stability, a skilled 
government administration, and policies that curbed inflation and 
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encouraged private enterprises. It was not until 1961 that the 
Republic of Korea was given a capable and stable leadership under 
General Park's revolutionary government . Without political 
stability, planned investment and the establishment of priorities 
will become impossible . The Republic of Korea launched its First 
Five-Year Development Plan in 1962. 
Some macroeconomic indicators are presented in Table 18 for 
comparison. There were notable improvements in economic perform-
ance of both countries in the 1960 1 s as compared with that in the 
1950 1 s. These improvements in economic performance were to a 
considerable extent the consequence of sizeable U.S. aid programs, 
coupled with major revision in policies . Major steps taken by the 
Chinese government are as previously mentioned. As for step 
taken by the Korean government, major revisions in its public policy 
include devaluation of the Korean Won in 1964, easing of import 
controls, the launching of a stabilization program, a firm commitment 
to the policy of fostering private enterprises, and the restoration 
of the normal relation with Japan . 
Table 18 
Comparison of Growth of GDP 
in Taiwan and Korea 
Average Annual Growth 
Rate (per cent) 
Gross Domestic Product 
Total 
Per Capita 
Gross Domestic Capital 
Formation 
Exports of Goods and 
Services 
Imports of Goods and 
Services 
Taiwan 
1951 - 60 1960-66 
7.8 
4. 1 
12 . 9 
9 . 2 
8.9 
10.0 
6 . 7 
14. 7 
20 . 0 
12. 3 
Korea 
1953-60 1960- 66 
5. 0 
2.7 
8.3 
7. 1 
1.0 
7.6 
4.7 
20.7 
28 . 3 
1 2. 5 
Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1967, pp . 569-70. 
Therefore, it is concluded by Professor Ranis that: 
"what happened in both Taiwan and Korea was that once minimal 
342 K. LL\.NG 
security had been assured and markets activated as a result of a 
successful government stabilization and liberalization effort, the 
interplay of individual profit maximizing decision-makers could move 
the system forward, with foreign aid providing the buffer for addi-
tional import requirements and assuaging the fears of policy makers 
as to the "drain of resources" which might accompany such change. 
Once markets are activated and substantial new domestic resources 
come into play as domestic enterpreneurs begin to spend their efforts 
on productive tasks rather than on trying to outguess and outsmart 
the control system, foreign capital is likely to follow. 11 9 
Table 19 
Trade Pattern of Taiwan: 1961-66 
(in US$ million) 
Trade with Exeorts lmEorts 
Trade 
Value % Value % Balance 
Developed Areas 1 '320. 7 61. 5 2,140.0 82.6 -803.3 
Less Developed 
Areas* 823. 1 38.3 419.5 16. 3 403.6 
Unclassified 3.4 0.2 29.2 1. 1 - 25.8 
Total 2,147.2 100.0 2,572.7 100.0 -425.5 
Source: IMF and IBRD, Direction of Trade. 
Note: *Export trade with the Asian less developed countries 
amounted US$751. 5 million which was 35. 0 per cent of 
total exports. 
Finally turning to the patterns of trade of both countries, Tables 
19 and 20 indicate that both countries traded mainly with the developed 
areas. While Taiwan's trade balance recorded deficits in its trade 
with developed areas, the trade with less developed areas was in 
surplus. On the other hand, Korea 1 s trade balances resulted in 
deficits for its trade both with developed areas as well as with less 
developed areas. 
Needless to say, both countries had widened their trade connec-
9 Ranis, op . cit., p. 342. 
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tion when they succeeded in diversifying the commodity composition 
of their exports. However, the percentage composition of the 
exports to and the imports from the United States and Japan in total 
exports and total imports remained dominant as shown in Tables 21 
and 22. The increase in the weight of exports to Viet-Nam was the 
overt effects of the hostilities in Viet-Nam. In addition, Taiwan 
and Korea are increasingly engaged in a processing trade with 
Japan which reflects the impacts of the hostilities in Viet-Nam on 
the Japanese economy. Thus a cessation of hostilities may raise 
problems of external as well as internal balances in Taiwan and 
Korea. 
It is also worth while noticing that both countries succeeded 
in extending the process of import substitution to export promotion 
particularly for those highly standarized products, such as textiles 
(grey goods, cotton sheeting, and men 1 s shirts), plywood, plastics 
and manufactures thereof, plate glass, cement, fertilizer, auto-
mobile tires and tubes, sports shoes, and wheat flour. These 
products do require neither expensive advertisement expenses nor 
any special adaptation to foreign tastes and conditions, hence tend 
to have easily accessible foreign markets and to sell largely on the 
basis of prices. Low labor costs have contributed to the successful 
Year 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1961-66 
Table 21 
Selected Country Percentage Composition 
of Exports and Imports of Taiwan 
Exports to Imports from 
us Japan Viet-Nam us Japan 
22.4 28.9 5.5 40.7 31. 0 
24.8 24.4 9.9 38.7 34.9 
16.5 32.1 9.7 42.3 30. 1 
18.8 31.1 7.9 32.7 35. 1 
22.0 31.1 9.8 32. 1 40.2 
22.3 24.4 16. 3 26.7 41.1 
20.9 28.7 12. 5 34.2 36.4 
Source: IMF and IBRD, op. cit. 
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Table 22 
Selected Country Percentage Composition 
of Exports and Imports of Korea 
Year Exports to Imports from us Japan Viet-Nam us Japan 
1961 18. 1 50.9 47.4 23.0 
1962 21.9 42.8 52.3 25 . 9 
1963 28. 1 28.6 1.4 50 . 3 28 . 8 
1964 29 . 8 32.0 5.3 50 . 0 27.2 
1965 35.2 25.1 8.5 39 . 4 36 .0 
1966 38.4 26.3 5.6 35.4 41.0 
1961-66 32.7 29.8 5 . 0 44.8 31. 7 
Source: IMF and IBRD, op. cit. 
competition of the Taiwan and the Korean products with those of 
other exporting countries . 10 Converted at the official exchange 
rates, monthly earnings in manufacturing in t he United States , Japan, 
Taiwan , and Korea in 1966 are presented in Table 23 . Taiwan 
has been facing the competing exports in a wider range of commodities 
from Korea with even cheaper labor . 
V. THE FUTURE 
Taiwan and Korea have had remarkable success in their devel op-
ment efforts so far. Continued progress will require a continual 
expansion in export s . There are several reasons for this. 
First, through exports both countries will overcome whatever 
obstacles of domestic market size which limit their furhter growth. 
Second, it will be necessary to generate income-elastic supply of 
imports through expanded exports . Finally , by competing in the 
10 R. Vernon, "International Investment and International Trade 
in the Product Cycle," Quarterly Journal of Economics , Vol. 
LXXX, No . 2 , (May 1966), pp . 202-3 . 
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Table 23 
Monthly Earnings in Manufacturing in 1966 
(in U . S. dollars) 
Country 
The United States 
Japan 
Taiwan 
Korea 
Monthly Earnings 
$499.36 
112.52 
38.16 
20.30 
345 
Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1967, pp. 525-26. 
world market, industries would be forced to attain and maintain 
high standards of efficiency and product quality. Trade would be 
the most effective antimonopoly policy, and the industrialists would 
gain considerable influence by virtue of being exporters. 
Although the expansion of exports is an essential condition of 
sustained growth, it is not an easy task to develop a few lines of 
production with comparative advantage and high income elasticity 
so as to compete successfully with other countries in the world 
market. Opportunities based mainly on low labor costs will 
gradually be exhausted. Adequate export promotion policies have 
to pay a scrupulous regard for efficiency and standards and make 
vigorous market promotion. Successful export promotion also 
depends on the willingness of importing countries to purchase a 
growing volume of the commodities concerned which directly compete 
with their own industries. Some difficulties have already been 
encountered in exporting cotton textile products, rubber shoes, and 
canned mashroom and asparagus. Developed countries should buy 
more products from Taiwan and Korea, especially under the situa-
tion that the trade of both countries with developed areas has been 
in deficits as shown in Tables 19 and 20 above. 
Although further industrialization will result in the setting up 
of new industries based on backward linkage, it is unlikely that 
Taiwan and Korea will individually be able to produce a variety of 
capital goods in view of the size of their economies. In this 
connection, it is imperative to find a framework for regional coordina 
tion of development plans and to reach what could be called "agreed 
specialization . 11 11 The industrial cooperation between Taiwan and 
Korea, though still at the initial stage, will certainly benefit both 
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countries. An agreement in principle was reached to construct two 
petro-chemical plants to supply the demand for both countries, name-
ly, Korea to provide caprolactum, and Taiwan DMT . To carry out 
the agreement will promote exports as well as the competitive capa-
city of both countries . Finally, Taiwan 1 s small scale but success-
ful technical assistance program in developing countries in South-
East Asia, Africa, and Latin America has been not only a means of 
passing on Taiwan 1 s own experiences, but also a promising way to 
widen its trade connection with less developed countries. 
11 S.B. Linder, Trade and Trade Polic for Develo ment, (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957 ., p. 130. 
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COMMENT ON KUO- SHU L L\NG ' S PAPER BY SOON CHOUGH 
My comments on Professor Liang' s paper are of two kinds: one 
i s a small analytical matter, and the other is a supplement to Profes-
Liang' s discussion on comparison of the economy of Taiwan with 
that of Korea. 
First, what I referr ed to as an analytical matter is his discus-
sion on aid- generated local currency fund- what is generally known 
as counterpart fund. Professor Liang discusses the allocation of 
counterpart funds into various uses and his discussion reads as if 
the meant that they formed a part of foreign aid . How, U . S • aid 
undoubtedly has been a decis·ive factor in economic development of 
Taiwan - certainly this has been true for Korea . But in evaluating 
or measuring the impact of aid on economic development of aid re-
cipient countries, I would tend to exclude the spillover effects of 
aid (such as industries or projects financed by the counterpart fund) , 
to the extent that the real resources put i nto these projects are of 
the local origin . The important thing to consider is real resources 
rather than funds or money . The way in which these resources are 
mobilized can be profoundly affected, as they certainly have been, 
by foreign aid, but then capital created by domestic resources can-
not be considered as aid as such, even though it may have been 
financed by counterpart funds . 
Let me turn to the second part of my comments . Korea's eco-
nomy experienced in 1968 another great leap forward - over 13% 
growth of real GNP . Aside from this figure - I do not want t o engage 
in a number game - the Korean peopl e are engaging in their develop-
ment effort in a purposeful way . I quite agree with P r ofessor Liang 
that Taiwan and Korea share the same pattern of development, and 
that the factors which gave rise t o this kind of development are also 
simila r - a re lative ly i ntelli gent and ener getic popula tion , t he existenc 
of infrastr ucture , U . S . economi c aid, etc . I also agree with Pro-
fessor Liang that Taiwan has so far been better situated than Korea 
in such matters as the relatively favorable agricultural climate of 
T aiwan which provided Taiwan with two important agricultural export 
items , namely, sugar and r ice, and the fact that Taiwan was an 
earlier starter in he r ascent for wards economi c development . 
But there seems to be one great difference between T aiwan 1 s 
economy and Korea's economy at the present t i me . This is the fact 
that Taiwan has been able to achieve a kind of internal and external 
equili bria , while Korea has yet to achieve them . In Taiwan, i nfla-
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tion has all but been eliminated since 1 963, but in Korea the rate of 
increase of consumer prices is about 10 % per year. It is also re-
markable that Taiwan's unfavorable trade balance is very small, 
but Korea still has a sizable excess of imports over exports as is 
shown by Tables 1 9 and 20. Incidentally , both Korea's inflati on 
and her great trade imbalance result from her development effort. 
However, K orea 's experience in the past is a testimony that many 
difficult situations can be overcome, and I am not at all pessimistic 
about her future prospects in this regard. 
My last comment is about the trade relations between Korea and 
advanced countries; I would like t o join Professor Liang in urging 
the United States and Japan to buy more Korean and Taiwan products. 
Korea's imports from Japan in 1967 amounted to $US 443 million 
while Japanese imports from Korea were less than $US 85 million. 
A much less pronounced but similar disparity exists as regards trade 
between K orea and the United States. I would like to urge Japan 
and the United States to take as liberal a stand as possible in im-
porting Korea's and Taiwan's products. Japan in particular has 
not only a comparative advantage in so many areas but also she has 
an absolute advantage in most industries, so that trade liberaliza-
tion toward Korea would not bring about any dramatic change in the 
pattern of trade, at least for the next few years. Japan can afford 
trade liberalization torwards Korea and Taiwan. 
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COMMENT ON K UO-SHO LIANG'S P AP ER BY ARTHU R P A UL 
T he report on the economies of T aiwan and of K or ea that P rof . 
Liang has given us in this paper is indeed impressi ve . T he factual 
informat ion, whi ch is well presented, speaks for itself, and there 
are no special comments on i t that I want t o add to t hose that he and 
P rof . Chough have already made . \iVhat i s of mor e inte r est to me 
are several points i n the pa pe r tha t are related to the changing 
patterns of aid that apply t o countries which have achieved self-
sustaining economic growth . Economic aid , in the sense that it is 
ordinarily used, is no longer granted to T aiwan by the U.S . , and 
this may soon be true of Korea as well . T his does not mean that 
the U . S . interest in the economic development of these countries 
has ceased, but it does mean a different pattern of assistance, one 
in which investment and trade by private businesses, help from 
foundations and institutions and from some branches of the U . S . 
Government other than AID may play larger roles . 
One aspect of the present stage of development in Taiwan is of 
special interest . The paper shows how important the development 
of some new processing businesses (canned mu shrooms and canned 
asparagus) have been to Taiwan's economy . These are good ex-
amples of the application of modern technology to indigenous re -
sources and to the use of indigenous skills to create new enterprises . 
This is related, of course, to the whole field of the transfer of 
technology, a field in which interest is rapidly increasing in Asia 
and in 'Western countries. There have been the dramatic examples 
of the success achieved in transferring Mexican wheat to India and 
in creating, by modern research methods, the new strains of rice 
at IRRI in the Philippines. 
In this connection, it is interesting that one of the first non-
AID assistance steps joined in by other U.S . organizations and 
branches of Government in respect to Taiwan was the sponsoring 
of a scientific seminar held there last spring at which the resources 
of the country were examined by local and visiting scientists with 
a view to identifying important areas for the transfer of technology. 
This is an indication of a trend of assistance for countries that no 
longer receive conventional economic aid . 
A second point of great interest in Prof. Liang' s paper is 
the reference to the first specific steps toward industrial integration 
with Korea, the agreement to construct two petrochemical plants 
to supply the demand for both countries . It is interesting that the 
ADB has been helpful in connection with these plans. 'Nhat happens 
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next will be watched with the greatest of interest by people who have 
been talking for years about regional integration and now have some-
thing concrete and specific to observe. Certainly these steps de-
serve outside support and encouragement. 
There is one aspect of Taiwan's economy on which I would have 
liked to have seen some comment in Prof. Liang' s report. I refer 
to the question of tax reform and the steps which the Government of 
T aiwan is now taking to tackle that matter. The efforts under way 
to improve financial and fiscal discipline and thereby to combat 
inflationary pressures are very important and deserve a place in a 
current description of Taiwan's economy. 
Chapter 12 
AID, TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
EXPERIENCE OF INDONESIA 
Subroto 
Introduction 
Indonesia is today on the threshold of developing its economy, 
having almost completed rehabilitation and stabilisation measures, 
the first steps of which were taken in October 1966. 
There are many factors determining the speed of development 
of an economy. Although these factors can be distinguished analytica: 
ly, it is difficult to separate them, let alone to list them in their order 
of importance. It is also difficult to learn from comparisions with 
other countries , because of the differences in social institutions, the 
structures of their societies and their level of political stability. 
Attempts to compare the rate of economic growth of developing 
countries appear to show that in most of the developing countries, 
economic growth depends crucially upon the extent of the availability 
of foreign exchange, from export or, in excess of the export based 
capacity to import, by foreign aid, to meet the increased demand for 
imports. The inter-relationship between trade gap, investment-
savings gap and economic growth thus provide an important key to 
the assessment of past and future growth trends and prospect. 
Inve s tigations made by UNCT AD in fifty four developing coun-
tries from 1960 to 1 965 showed that eighteen developing countries, 
which were able to increase their Gross Domestic Product by 6% 
or more, increased their exports by 8% or more. In contrast, 
fifteen developing countries which grow only by 4% or less, 
increased their exports only by 3% or less. 
The study also indicated that developing countries with a 6% 
ore more growth rate, received foreign aid amounting to $5 . 70 
per capita. On the ; other hand, countries with a growth rate of 
4% or less, received only $2. 10 per capita. Private capital is 
automatically attracted to developing countries with a high growth 
rate, while low growth rate developing countries received only 
$0 · 23. The conclusion which can be drawn from the above mentioned 
study is that developing countries can grow sufficiently, if exports 
351 
352 SUBROTO 
can be increased and enough foreign aid is received . If exports 
are stagnant and foreign aid is not received adequately, developing 
countries will only grow very slowly . 
Another factor that is very strategic in the growth of develop-
ing countries, is the ability of these countries to increase their 
agricultural production substantially . For developing countries, 
the agricultural sector is the prime earner of foreign exchange and 
the source of foodstuffs . A decline in the production of the 
agricultural sector means less foreign exchange earned, resulting 
in a reduction of imports needed for investment. Inadequate produc-
tion of foodstuffs means increased imports of food, at the cost of 
import of capital goods and raw materials for production . 
The strategy that Indonesia is following for her First Five 
Year Development Plan , to be launched on the first of April 1 969, 
put stress upon modernization of the agricultural sector and setting 
up agro-allied industries around this sector. All important foreign 
exchange is acquired through increased exports, foreign aid , private 
foreign investment and a rescheduling of debt. 
This paper will consider the role of foreign aid during the 
period of economic rehabilitation and stabilization, covering the 
period of October 1 966 to end 1 968 . 
The Setting 
Before starting to discuss rehabilitation and stabilization 
policy, it may be useful to present first some basic data about the 
Indonesian economy . Indonesia covers an area of 735,381 square 
miles, and as percentage of the total area, 1 • 4% is used for estate 
farming, while 13 .1 0% is small- holder farming. Cultivation for 
foodcrops uses 9 . 30% of the total land area, and 3 . 80% of the total 
land area is used for cash crops. 
Taken as a whole, Indonesia belongs to the group of Asian 
countries with a relatively low population density, with 1 57 persons · 
p~r square mile in 1 968, against 41 5 in India and 337 in Pakistan in 
tl\e same year . The concentration of two-thirds of the population 
of Indonesia on two islands, Java and Madura, with only 7% of th-e 
land area, creates extreme density in the main population center . 
In 1968, the total population of Indonesia was estimat ed at 11 5 
nflillion, with a population growth of 2. 5% per annum, increasing 
slightly over time. The relatively large numbers in the age- groups 
which are now approaching marriage age will probably cause a 
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further rise of the birth rate, and combined with declining mortality, 
push up the population growth rate . It would not seem at all un-
realistic to project an annual increase of population of around 3% by 
the middle of the seventies . 
The Gross Domestic Product for 1968 is estimated by the World 
Bank Report at RP 2, 920 billion. Real rate of growth from 1961 to 
1967 has been 2% per annum, but to 1968 the rate of growth is 
estimated at 4% . The per capita GDP in 1 968 is estimated at $83.00. 
In percentage terms, agriculture contributed 47% to the Net Domestic 
Product at factor cost for 1967, while for manufacturing and trade 
it was 28%. Public administration's share in the NDP was 5%, min-
ing 3%, for other sectors, 17% . 
Gross savings is estimated as 3 . 1 % of the Gross Demos tic 
Product at Market Prices in 1968, while the gross investment is at 
the level of 6% of GDP. 
Exports depend heavily on two commodities, rubber and oil, 
and commodity concentration of these two commodities is 51 % for 
1968. 
Prior to 1 967, Indonesia was borrowing abroad large amounts 
on unfavorable terms for undertakings, most of which were of very 
low or negative productivity. This resulted in a very heavy 
accumulation of debt service payments through the 1970' s. The 
debt ratio in the 1 970' s will probably be around 30% of export 
earnings on any reasonable assumptions regarding future gross 
capital inflows and export growth . 
In 1967, Indonesia received aid from donor countries, known 
as Inter-governmental Group for Indonesia, totalling $US 200 
million in the form of commodity aid . In 1968, the amount of aid 
has been increased to $US325 million for commodity aid and project 
aid. In addition, the United States later in the year agreed to 
provide a substantial additional amount of wheat , in conjunction with 
other countries, to meet the very clear emergency situation, that 
had arisen with respect to shortage of rice. 
As to the terms of aid received in 1967 and 1 968, they corres-
pond to the DAC terms, namely repayment 20- 25 years, with a 
period of 7 to 10 years gr ace , and interest rates not higher than 3% 
a year. For food a i d the terms are softer , with up to 40 years 
repayment, 2% interest during a 10 year grace period, with 2t % 
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interest during the period after the grace period. 
The Economic Situation from 1959 to 1966. 
When President Suharto came into power in July 1966, he in-
herited from the previous regime a mi s-managed and deteriorating 
economy. A look at the cost of living index of Djakarta, gives an 
idea of the state of the economy . 
Table 
Cost of Living Index in Djakarta, 1959-1966. 
(1957 == 100) 
End of Year 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
Index 
166.0 
215.0 
380.0 
976.0 
2,226.0 
5,234 . 0 
36,347.0 
267,279.0 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics 
% of Increase 
19.4 
29.5 
76.7 
l56.8 
128.1 
135 . 1 
.594.4 
635.4 
The movement of prices since 1960 marked Indonesia as a textbook 
case of a hyper-inflation in a less developed economy. The hyper-
inflation resulted from an increasingly severe shortage of most 
essential domestically produced and imported consumer goods, 
accompanied by a rapid expansion of money supply. 
Government rice policy was a major factor generating the 
inflation. Although the price control system was liberalized in 
1963, the government continued to purchase domestic rice at market 
prices through the Rice Purchasing Board (BPUP). In 1964 the 
purchase program was enlarged to include corn and tapioca . How-
ever, the imposition of price controls in April, 1964 on a number of 
necessities, together with rather inefficient government procure-
ment practices, contributed to a continuous dependence of rice 
deficit urban areas on imported rice. Between 1961 and 1964, rice 
imports fluctuated around 0 . 96 million and 1. 07 million of tons . 
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Under these conditions the -Government decision in August 1964 not 
to sign any new contracts for the import of rice, was an important 
factor generating a sharp inflationary stimulus. In 1 965 rice 
imports amounted to only 1 90, 000 tons, less than 20% of the previous 
year' s imports. 
The inflationary pressures were fed by continuous and sharply 
rising budget defict, generally financed with new money. 
Year 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
Table 2 
Central Government Finance, 1959-1 966. 
(in millions of repiahs) 
Gross Revenue Gross Expenditure 
30 44 
50 58 
62 88 
74 122 
162 330 
283 681 
923 2,526 
13,680 29,010 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Deficit 
-14 
- 8 
-26 
-48 
-126 
-398 
-1,603 
-15,330 
Government fiscal operations have resulted in budget deficits 
continuously since 1952. Commencing in 1964, the cash deficit 
even exceeded total revenue . In 1 965, it amounted to 1 56% of 
total revenue, compared with 125% in 1964 and 18% in 1960. In 
real terms (i.e. deflated by cost of living index for Djakarta) 
expenditures and receipts were 27% and 69% respectively lower 
in 1965 than in 1960. During the same period, 1960-1965, the 
ratio of government expenditures to national income (at constant 
prices) declined almost from 1 5% to 10%, while the ratio of govern-
ment revenue to national income fell even more sharply from 
approximately 1 3% to only 3. 6%. 
As in previous years, the cash deficit in 1965 was financed by 
resort to central bank credit . The sharp rise in expenditures was 
attributable ma inly to the increase in civilian and military salaries, 
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including rice allowance, the price of which rose by as much as 
660% during the year, as well as to the higher cost of domestic 
and imported goods procured by the Government and the further 
rise in military outlays in connection with the policy of Confronta-
tion. Thus, expenditures on the security sector and related 
special expenditures increased from 40% of total expenditure in 
1964 to 49% in 1965 , while expenditures on the economic sector 
declined from 49% to about 42%. 
The rate of increase in money supply accelerated during 1965 
and the first half of 1966. The cumulative rise was 626% between 
December 1 965 and December 1 966. 
Table 3 
Money Supply and Its Percenta e Change 
in million of rupiahs 
Year Total Money Supply 
35 
% Increase 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
49 
68 
136 
263 
675 
2,688 
19,510 
Source: Central Bank . 
19 
37 
41 
100 
93 
157 
297 
626 
The sharp expansion of money supply in 1965 and 1966 was mainly 
for financing the rising budget deficit. It was also caused by the 
extension of bank credit to state enterprises and the private sector. 
Currency in circulation was the main vehicle of monetary expansion, 
while demand deposits showed a smaller total increase over the 
period. 
A currency reform launched in December 1965, which introduced 
a new rupiah equivalent to 1, 000 old rupiahs, was not successful in 
stemming the rise in money supply . 
As could be expected during the period of acceleration of infla-
tion, since 1960 real cash balances (i.e . the money supply index 
deflated by consumer price index) followed in general a downward 
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trend. At the end of 1966, they were equal to only one third of their 
1960 value. This was to a large extent a reflection of sharply in-
creasing prices, which caused money to cease to serve as an accept-
able store of value, even in the short run; and hence, led to an 
increase in the velocity of circulation . The velocity of money almost 
doubled between 1961 and 1965. 
The Rehabilitation and Stabilization Program Since October 1 966 . 
Recognizing that development of the economy will be hard to carry 
out as long as the country is still suffering from inflation, the Govern-
ment has adopted stabilization measures, which are chiefly aimed at 
eliminating the cause of inflation in all sectors . The principle elements 
of the country's stabilization program have been launched in three 
waves. 
The first wave was introduced on October 3, 1966 and some of 
the more important measures are briefly described below. 
In the fiscal field, the Suharto Government has issued instructions 
aimed at augmenting government revenue through intensification of 
tax collections and an austerity drive in respect of government 
expenditures. Under the tax intensification program, the Minister 
of Finance has been asked to chalk out an immediate course of 
action, to collect all overdue taxes and set up a new system to 
facilitate future tax collection . He also has been authorized to 
recruit the necessary additional personnel for tax collection, and 
other government departments, including the Armed Forces, have 
been directed to lend the services of their personnel , to assist in 
tax collection when necessary . 
The instruction relating to the austerity measures contains some 
basic as well as detailed directives . Under the basic directives, 
each government department is instructed to practice maximum 
possible economy without hindering the efficiency of its operations . 
All new purchases have to be based solely on t he urgency of carry-
ing out the main tasks of each government department. 
T he detailed directives call for , inter alia, maximum econ omies 
in foreign travel expenditures by government officials on s tate busi -
ness and strict screening of all such travel plans; prohibition against 
spending government money for parti~s , celebrations; the refund of 
unutilized appropriations by all departments at the end of each year 
to t he Treasury. 
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On monetary measures, instructions have been issued, aimed 
at the tightening of credit control generally and at insuring that the 
bulk of new bank credits (about 90%) would go hereafter only to 
finance exports and various productive sectors of the economy. 
The principal features of the new credit control regulations were 
among others: 
a. In granting credits, all the banks have been instructed to 
observe no discriminaticn whatsoever as between state and private 
enterprises. In particular, banks have been prohibited from 
extending the so-called "command credits" to state enterprises, 
which were previously extended without regard to the purpose 
or the credit worthiness of state enterprises. 
b. No credit may be extended without specific agreement between 
participants. The banks have been instructed to limit their 
credit only for the financing of most urgent expenditures of 
enterprises. Expressly forbidden are long term credit (exceed-
ing 3 years) and credits for financing of taxes to the govern-
ment. The banks are requested to refrain from extending 
overdraft facilities on current account or loans in excess of 
credit ceilings fixed in the contract. 
c. Import credit can only be granted in some urgent cases related 
t o production. Provisions have been made to require importers 
to make advance deposits against imports and other import 
charges, as well as an advance payment of 50% of duties, due 
at the time of submitting an import declaration. 
d. Export credit cannot exceed 40% of the value of export contract. 
Furthermore, credit can only be granted to those exporters 
who provide proof of actual physical possession of goods to be 
exported and of the export exchange contract already contracted 
with the buyer abroad. 
e. The directives of 3rd October also included revisions of the 
bank rs interest rate structure. Commercial banks were 
instructed to charge 6% per month interest for credit extended 
for food production, 7!% for export and textile production, and 
for all other credits, including credits for the trade and dis-
tribution sectors , 9% per month. Overdue credits bear a 
penalty rate that is 50% higher than the normal interest rate. 
The new pricing policy of the October regulations aimed at 
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gradual elimination of government subsidies of the state enterprises, 
and the resulting price distortions . The government instructions 
provide for the possibilities of smoothing out internal price adjust-
ments. Subsidies may also be granted if necessary, to certain 
categories of the most essential imported goods and materials, such 
as rice, fertilizers, newsprint, medicine and textbooks . Price 
control of domestic products and services was limited to petroleum 
products, electric power, city transportation and drinking water . 
According to the instruction, market forces should determine 
the prices of the goods and services sold by the state enterprises' 
not subject to price control . The ministries concerned were 
instructed to coordinate and supervise this process of transi t i on 
towards market economy in the state sector . 
Liberalization of the foreign trade sector through the introduc-
tion of the Bonus Export System was also initi ated i n October 1966 . 
The B . E . System was adopted i n order to simplify the exchange 
rate structure, which enabled a free trade in foreign exchange 
earnings from exports in t he open market. The floating exchang.e 
rate, as a part of this system, makes i t possi ble to maintain a true 
exchange rate between the rupiah and the foreign currency . The 
B. E . System relies on t he operation of the market forces in the 
allocation of foreign exchange, thus abolishing the old practice of 
foreign exchange allocation by the government . The method is also 
aimed at removing one of ten main sources of illegal manipulation 
and corruption. 
With respect to import policies, the initially narrow Bonus 
Export-Import list has been broadened , to enable more widespread 
imports of essential commodities . In essence, Indonesia is moving 
towards a single fluctuating exchange rate for most import trans-
actions and greater reliance on free market forces to determi ne 
import priorities. 
On the export side, the Bonus Export Syst em is meant to give 
greater incentive to exporters, by giving more share of foreign 
exchange retained , by providing automatic foreign exchange a lloca-
tions t o the provinces, and by awardi ng premiums for exports in 
excess of annual targets as incentive for the regions . To encourage 
exports, the government also simplified administrative procedures 
and reduced i ts direct involvement in foreign trade . 
To October measur es also laid down rules for contracting and 
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use of foreign credits. The amounts of credit outstanding at any 
one time for the import of general commodities (not capital goods), 
whether received by government or by private enterpreneurs or by 
banks (acceptance credits) must not exceed $US60 million in value 
or 180 days in duration, except in the case of government to 
government credit, which must be for not less than five years. 
Credits for projects (capital goods) can be accepted only from 
foreign government or semi-governmental bodies, or an international 
organization, and only if the grace period for such credit is at 
least five years. Short term and medium term credits must not be 
accepted. For supervising the implementation of guide lines for 
contracting or use of foreign credits, a Ministerial Committee and 
Technical Committee were established. All government agencies 
were directed to indicate to the Technical Committee any foreign 
credit offers from any source, private or governmental. All 
government departments and regional authorities were forbidden 
from concluding foreign credits prior to the consent of the 
Committee. Foreign credit offers received by branches of the 
Armed Forces are also subject to the requirements mentioned above. 
In January 1 967, the Indonesian Government promulgated a 
Foreign Capital Investment Law, welcoming full participation of 
foreign capital in all economic activities, except in public utilities, 
atomic energy development, defense production and other fields to 
be stipulated by the government on an ad hoc basis. Among others, 
the new law offers liberal exemptions or deductions from various 
taxes and other levies for a stipulated period of years. It also 
guarantees liberal facilities for remittance of profit after deducting 
taxes and other financial obligations in Indonesia . Further, the 
law permits the employment of foreign workers and gives the owners 
of foreign capital full authority in appointing the managers of their 
enterprises in Indonesia. A guarantee against wholesale nationaliza-
tion is provided for and stipulates equitable and mutually satisfactory 
arrangements in any specific case. The law welcomes the forma-
tion of joint ventures and requires foreign capital to provide suit-
able oppotunities for active participation by domestic capital, in 
some proportion, and after a period, to be determined by the govern-
ment. Partly to supplement the adoption of the Foreign Investment 
Law and partly to facilitate the full utilization of the productive 
capacities of various former foreign-owned estat es and other enter-
prises now under government control, negotiations were opened 
to return them to the foreign owners . 
Since Indonesia was unable to service her debts, because of 
the serious shortage of foreign exchange, the Indonesian government 
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entered into negotiations with her credit countries, to obtain 
rescheduling of the debt repayment. This request led to multilateral 
negotiations with creditor countries in Tokyo and Paris. Bilateral 
negotiations were held with Yugoslavia, the USSR and other East 
European countries. Meetings with interested donor countries were 
also held to discuss the prospect of aid, to alleviate balance of pay-
ments difficulty and to support its most essential import needs . 
The second wave of stabilization measures was launched in 
February 1967, when price adjustments on wider scale were executed. 
Prices and service rates of state enterprises were adjusted to the 
free market level on a cost accounting basis . In the past, prices of 
commodities produced and services offered by state enterprises were 
artificially determined by the government at unrealistically low levels, 
thus forcing the State Treasury to make up for the losses incurred, 
by paying substantial amounts of subsidy . The new measures not 
only discontinued subsidies to many of the state enterprises, and 
thus released the Treasury from bearing a heavy burden but allowed 
state enterprises to operate more economically and compete on an 
equal footing with private enterprises, by charging realistic prices . 
The third wave of stabilization measures came in July 1967. 
Export taxes were reduced, and export procedures were further 
simplified . Non traditional export products received more incentive 
through larger overprices . Steps were taken to improve road 
transportation and harbor facilitie s and to improve the efficiency 
of shipping, which are essential requirements for export expansion 
and domestic distribution. 'Vhile efforts are being made to curb 
inflation, salaries of government officials were raised in an attempt 
to increase their standard of living and their efficiency. 
Results of the Stabilization Measures. 
Since the basic aim of the government with the stabilization 
measures is to control inflation, it seems quite natural to use the 
rate of inflation as the basic criteria to evaluate the results of the 
policy . For the whole year 1968, the inflation rate is 84. 8% as 
compared to 171 • 05 for 1 967 . For the last 6 months in 1 968, the 
period since the Development Cabinet comes into power, the monthly 
inflation rate is only 2. 6% . Clearly, the all important battle against 
inflation is showing some success. The crisis that was triggered 
toward the end of 1967 and the early months of 1968 from shortage 
of food and sharp depreciation of the rupiah, was overcome by swift 
imports of expensive rice, intervention in the exchange market and 
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Table 4 
Consumer Price Index for Djakarta 
(September 1966 = 100) 
Year General Index Monthly Change Yearly Change 
1966 76 
1967 206 171.05 
January 145 9.02 
February 174 20.00 
March 180 3.45 
April 181 0.56 
May 181 o. 
June 187 3. 31 
July 191 2. 14 
August 201 5.24 
September 222 10.45 
October 238 7. 21 
November 287 20.59 
December 283 -1.39 
1968 84.8 
January 395 39.58 
February 432 9.37 
March 445 3. 01 
April 419 -5.84 
May 444 5.97 
June 455 2.47 
July 475 4.40 
August 492 3.58 
September 493 0.20 
October 487 -1.22 
November 505 3.70 
December 523 3.56 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics. 
sharp curtailments in the planned routine budget expenditures for 
government personnel. The upward surge of prices could finally be 
checked, thanks to satisfactory increases in rice production and well 
timed arrival of food aid shipments. These steps, combined with 
carefully planned fiscal and monetary policies, have contributed in 
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a very high degree to the favorable price movements . The stabiliza-
tion policy initiated toward the end of 1966 has finally caught hold. 
Thanks to the stable prices of basic commodities during 1968 
and relatively favorable world market prices for the export commo-
dities, export, including oil, increased by 14.9% to $US881 million, 
as compared to 1967. This satisfac tory increase in exports i s 
primarily caused by a 20% increase of exports of oil and oil products . 
For the year 1968 , the budget is in balance at RP 183 billion, 
which is a major achievement. The improvement in the budget 
during the second half of the year has been achieved primarily by 
increasing government revenues , which resulted from a sharp rise 
in revenue from income and corporation taxes, because of improved 
collection. 
While there is reason to hope that the Indonesian economy is 
now set on a steadier course than it has followed for many years, 
its management will continue to demand the unremitting efforts of 
the entire administration . In particular, the gradual transition 
from preoccupation with stabilization objectives to the pursuit of 
economic growth, will call for dexterity in timing, flexibility in 
decision making, and courage in executing decisions. Any due 
haste in moving away from cautious financial policies may upset 
the confidence which i s slowly r eturning and yet any unnecessary 
delay in meeting the legitimate financial needs of domestic industry 
and agriculture can only slow down the recovery of domestic 
production. In the meantime, balance of payments support clearly 
remains a critical element in the success of Indonesia 1 s efforts to 
restore itself. 
External Assistance, 1 966 to 1969. 
Although the success of the stabilization policy can be explained 
by the untiring effort of the Indonesian government under the leader-
ship of President Suharto, foreign aid has played a very important 
role in speeding up the stabilization of the economy . During 1966, 
Indonesia received emergency financial assistance to support its 
most essential import needs and to alleviate its balance of payments 
difficulties. Financial assistance authorized during 1966 amounted 
to $US133 million, of which $US15 million was in the form of grants 
and the remaining SUS118 consisted of commodity loans. The 
interest charges on the loans varied from country to country. The 
United States charged 2!% to 3!%; the Netherlands and Germany 3%; 
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and India and Japan and Pakistan, st%. 
In addition to the amount mentioned France authorized project 
credits amounting to $US 19. 5 million; the Netherlands authorized 
export credits of $US7 million and Japan provided credits of $US 
14. 1 million in connection with certain production sharing arrange-
ments. 
At the invitation of the Netherlands Government, an Inter-Govern-
mental Group met in Amsterdam in February 1967, to exchange views 
of the possibility of assisting Indonesia 1 s effort in implementing 
stablization and rehabilitation programs in 1 967. 
Following the discussion of the Indonesian policy for 
combating inflation, improving production and strengthening the 
country 1 s balance of payments, the Group estimated the foreign 
exchange gap for 1967 in the rough order of magnitude of $US200 
million and that the estimated gap would need to be met by credits, 
loan and grant agreements. 
With regard to the mechanism of aid, the Group stated its will-
ingness to channel a .id through the Bonus Export market mechanism. 
Thi s procedure assured the fullest possible integration of aid into 
the present import regime. 
As regards the question of terms of assistance, which was 
closely related to the burden of indebtedness, it was generally 
recognized that Indonesia 1 s debt situation was very serious. - It 
was agreed that donor countries , subject to limitations of practic-
ability and legislative authorization, would take into account t he 
desirability of extending as much new assistance as possibl e in the 
form of grants and soft loans. The element of softness would apply 
particularly to grace periods, due to the fact that projections show 
that repayment obligations will be particularly very heavy during 
the 1970 1 s. Softness relates also to interest rates, in view of 
the recognition that Indonesia should have an opportunity in the long 
run to start reducing the level of its indebtedness. 
The Indonesian Government has requested commodity loans for 
1968 to the amount of $US250 !llillion and $US75 million for project 
loans in disbursement terms. It is gratifying to note that in the 
course of 1968, new commitments for commodity aid and PL 480 aid 
and PL 480 aid has reached $US254 million while additional food 
aid has been made available to the amount of $US58 million. Thus, 
non-project assistance has reached a committed level of $US304 
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million. Taking into account the amount of carry over from 1967 
of $US26 million and an estimated pipeline into 1969 of $US32 
million, the toal utilization of program aid for 1968 is $US298 
million. 
Apart from the export earnings and the net foreign exchange 
contribution of the oil sector, this amount of foreign assistance 
must be appraised as the crucial additional source, which has made 
possible a commodity supply, and contributed greatly to the improved 
stability of the economy in 1 968. 
However, one important development in the balance of payments 
in 1968 must not be overlooked, namely that it ended up with a net 
increase of short term indebtedness of almost $US50 million. This 
fact is the more important since the debt incurred has been used to 
import rice and fertilizer. It thus becomes clear that the achieve-
ment of stabilization of the economy in 1 968 was .possible not only 
through utilizing program assistance of $US298 million, but also 
by a net increase of short term liabilities by $US50 million. 
The emphasis on growth, in conjunction with further price 
stability during the year 1 969 calls for adequate and timely program 
aid. Bearing in mind the amount of carry over from 1968 of 
approximately $US32 million and about equal pipeline into 1970 , the 
Indonesian Government has put its requirements and requests for 
a new program aid at $US320 million for the calendar year 1969. 
Total import requirements are estimated to reach $US850 
milli on for the non- oil sector , or about 1 • 8% higher than 1 968 . 
Non-oil export is estimated to increase by approximately 6. 5% in 
1969 . On the other hand, service payments will increase by about 
$US13 million, resulting in a current deficit of $US340 million in 
the oil sector . 
As for project assistance, Indonesia has s ubmitted a require-
ment of $US180 milli on . This amount is based on a commitment 
basis and not on a disbursement basis, as was the case for 1968. 
In entering the rehabilitation and development phase it is obvious 
that project assistance must play a more important role. 
The Problem of Debt Burden and the Terms of Aid . 
The problem of debt servicing will form a heavy burden for 
Indonesia in the 1970 1 s . According to the study made by IMF, 
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which has made several projections, the debt-service ratios in the 
seventies will exceed 20% . Assuming certain amounts of gross 
capital inflow on DAC terms, debt-service ratio in the seventies 
would rise as high as 40%, according to the study made by the 
World Bank . 
In order not to neutralize the benefit of economic growth which 
will be achieved during the coming years by virtue of the implemen-
tation of the Five Year Development P1an, better conditions and 
terms for aid for Indonesia has to be extended . It was considered 
that countries not yet offering DAC average terms should try to do 
so as early as possibl e and that other countries should investigate 
the possibilities of improving terms of aid, where possible. 
During the debt rescheduling conference of Indonesia's 
creditors, held in Paris in October of 1968, the conference 
had decided that besides a rescheduling of the 1969 debts, that 
a study be made of lndone sia' s balance of payments prospects 
and of the problems caused by the debt burden. 
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COMMENT ON SUBROT0 1 S PAPER BY H. W. ARNDT 
Professor Subroto should be congratulated on a clear and con-
cise account of the stabilization of the Indonesian economy during 
the past two years. VVhat he and his economist colleagues have 
achieved in the two years of the Suharto regime is remarkable . 
After years of gros s mis management, Indonesia has at last a gov-
ernment which gives priority to the country 1 s appalling economic 
problems and tackles them energetically and sensibly. But he would 
be the first to agree that only the first steps towards recovery have 
been taken. 
Even on a short- run view the achievements are still only par-
tial. The relative price stability achieved in 1 968 was greatly 
aided by the luck of a good rice harvest; money supply is still ris-
ing rapidly and it remains to be seen whether stability can be main-
tained. The balance of payments is still heavily in deficit, depend-
ent on external support. Industry is still operating well below 
capacity; industrial and infrastructure capital is probably still de -
teriorating (i .e. improvements here and there as yet do not match 
disinvestment elsewhere). Disguised unemployment includes 3 
million civilian and 0. 7 million military government employees; paid 
absurdly low salaries, they are virtually forced into 'job infllation' 
and corruption; yet large-scale dismissals are politically impos-
sible and adequate salary increases would completely disrupt the 
budget. Rehabilitation of export industries (except oil) is slow, 
almost imperceptible, while foreign investment is unlikely to make 
much impact for another 2-3 years. 
The long-run prospects are overshadowed by population growth 
on Java, adding every year 2- 3 millions needing food and jobs . 
The outlook for food production to which great efforts are being 
devoted is relatively promising. But the employment problem is 
threatening to become overwhelming. In the short run rehabilita-
tion of existing industry and perhaps labour-intensive new agricul-
tural technology offer the best hope of relief . In the long run , 
industrialization is essential but is unlikely to match the growth of 
the workforce for years to come. Above all, the country still lacks 
most of the basic requirements of economic development, adminis-
trative, managerial, professional, entrepreneurial skills and at-
titudes. Yet, unless effective economic development gets under 
way , one cannot be optimistic about continued political stability . 
How can the developed countries help Indonesia? 
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Trade liberalisation has very little to offer Indonesia a t this stage . 
Preferences to exports, the problem is production rather than mar kets . 
/\That Indonesia needs is aid on an enormous scale, in four main forms: 
(a) continuing balance of payments support, probably for at least another 
five years; (b) bilateral and multilateral project aid for infrastr ucture 
and industrial projects (preferably on a "turn- key" basis)i (c) private 
direct investment for the development of mineral and other natural re -
sources and industry and (d) perhaps debt remission. There is also 
need for technical assistance, although absorptive capacity for training 
abroad and experts is limited; in any case technical assistance can 
develop skills but not the even more important attitudes . 
The problem of Indonesia dwarfs all other economic problem of SE 
Asia. Compared with the contribution the advanced countries could 
make to human welfare here, the 9ontribution of P AFT A would seem 
trifling . 
,, 
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COMMENT ON SUBROTO' S PAPER BY M/\.SARU FUKUDA 
The author presents a very lucid picture of the remarkable 
achievements the new Suharto regime has made to arrest the infla-
tionary trends in Indonesian economy . I feel particularly the merit 
of the presentation derives from the fact that the author has written 
with the eyes and minds of Indonesian people because he happens to 
be one of them. Not only that, tho author has the superb talent of 
covering only the essential aspects of major policies in a comprehen-
sive way leaving the inessentials untouched . This compliment is my 
frank feeling in the light of many excellent reports, Asian Develop-
ment Bank staff papers, and mission reports which I have naturally 
had opportunities to read--in other words, the author 1 s presentation 
produced a unique and lucid picture, the product of a deep under-
standing of the situation, which is possible perhaps only in an 
Indonesian heart and mind. 
The important point in my mind is the transition from stabiliza-
tion towards rehabilitation of production and expansion--the author 
writes about this crucial problem in an excellent few lines ; brief 
but so superbly well described, to wit, "Any due haste in moving 
away from cautious financial policies may upset the confidence which 
is slowly returning and yet any unnecessary delay in meeting the 
legitimate financial needs of domestic industry and agriculture can 
only slow down the recovery of domestic production." 
In this regard, as the author writes, "In the meantime, balance 
of payments support clearly remains a critical element in the success 
of Indonesia's efforts to restore itself . " Substantial external aid 
from the Indonesia Club arranged by AID for 1966, 1 967, and 1968, 
has made a significant contribution. The problem is the respective 
outlook in the immediate future. How long will balance of payment 
support on this substantial scale by external AID recruitment go on? 
Much will depend on the determination and spirit on the part of the 
people of Indonesia to make Indonesia a new self- supporting economy. 
It would appear to me unreasonable to be optimistic, particularly 
in view of the tremendous natural resources with which Indonesia 
is blessed. Hope must be given in the minds of the people so that 
they will tread the' difficult path towards the light at the end of the 
tunnel which might not yet even be seen, but might suddenly reveal 
itself if the people continue their sound efforts at self- help. 
Chapter 13 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL 
CO-OPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Hiroshi KITAMURA 1 
I. The rationale of economic regionalism 
Economic regionalism appears today as one of the major goals of 
economic policy in the c ountries of Southeast Asia. The growing 
emphasis being given to the concept of regional co-operation and 
integration implies the belief that more efficient solutions to some of 
the economic problems in this area can be found through a regional 
approach rather than through approaches on a national or global 
scale. This belief in the efficiency, and even the necessity , of 
such a regional approach is closely related t o the recent world 
trends, partly of economic policy, partly of technology, and partly of 
historical and political developments of the human society. 
There is a consensus of views that any solution t o the important 
economic problems of the contemporary world, be it in the field of 
trade and development or international monetary crises, involves 
continuous negotiation among governments and reconciliation of 
divergent interests and points of view. We have travelled a long 
way, indeed, from the world in which solutions could be entrusted 
to the "invisible hand" . Corresponding to the broadening of 
horizons of the economic policy of states, the basic tasks have now 
to be performed by negotiated rather than spontaneous policy 
harmonization among independent governments. But there are 
reasons for assuming that success in these efforts is more likely to 
be reached by regional, rather than by universal, organizations 
and institutions . The difficulties involved in w orld-wide negotiation 
have been amply brought out by the recent experience of UNCTAD; 
the depth and comprehensiveness of feasible co-operation and 
commitments are generally in inverse relation to the number and 
heterogeneity of t he participants. Obviously, the regional approach 
provides greater potentialities than the global one for more intimate 
forms of integration and harmonization of policies among a limited 
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number of countries highly interdependent, keenly conscious of this 
interdependence, and relatively well prepared for such co-ordinated 
action by geographical proximity, a common historical and cultural 
background, and a relatively homogeneous stage of economic 
development. 
It is not only public economic policy which requires a regional 
outlook for effective implementation; the business decision-makers 
in the private sector have also increasingly become conscious of 
the necessity to plan for a larger regional market. The voices of 
the leaders of the Southeast Asia business community are even 
louder than those of the government leaders in demanding "regional 
planning". 1 Basically, the trend towards regionalism is due to 
the fact that recent technological changes have greatly broadened 
the scope of economies of scale, creating a need for a large and 
stable market, larger than a national one. Regardless of the 
extent to which we accept the basic tenet of the materialistic 
interpretation of history, there is no denying that changes in 
economic and social institutions are often conditioned by the evolu-
tion of technology . In this sense, indeed, "regional arrangements 
are no longer a matter of choice. They are imposed by the 
requirements of technology, science and economies" 2 of the 
contemporary world. 
In a broader context, regionalism is a necessary phase of 
historical evolution; it is a pattern of thinking and action that is 
deeply rooted in the transition from nationalism to universalism. 
Economists of the Nee-Historical School in Germany used to see 
the successive stages of economic development as a movement , 
starting from economies of villages and cities, to ever larger 
units, namely to territorial and national economies, and from there 
to a world economy. What they may have failed to see , however, 
is that there is bound to be an intermediate phase of regional institu-
tions between nation states and world organization. It was the 
"Zollverein" of the nineteenth century that brought various cities, 
counties and dukedoms in Central Europe together into the nation 
1 "Regional planning" was the leitmotiv adopted for the Singapore 
meeting of the Southeast Asia Business Committee sponsored 
by the Stanford Research Institute International, 13-15 May, 
1968. 
2 Foreign Economic Policy for the Twentieth Century, Report of 
the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Special Studies Project 
Report III, New York 1958, p. 30. 
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state of Germany . It is no accident that the same word, "customs 
uniOn" in English, is now being used to define one of the institu-
tional forms of regional integration ; the contemporary trend towards 
regionalism is nothing but a continuation of the historical movement 
connected with the formation of modern nation states. Now, nation 
states themselves are gradually being merged into larger economic , 
and even political, units under the dictate of modern technology 
which requires a certain minimum s-::ale of market and production 
as an effici ency criterion . 
The significance of this progress towards regionalism is likely 
to be obscured to contemporary observers by its being so gradual. 
In Asia, in particular, where national independence is generally of 
a recent data, emphasis still continues to be placed on the construc -
tive role that nationalism can play in promoting economic and social 
development ; there is a legi timate scope for national l.dentify to 
form a consolidated basi s for development. And t he growing recogni-
tion of the need for regional co- operation tends to be subject to the 
dominant considerations of national sovereignty . But maturing 
nationalism in many countries is increasingly capable of recognizing 
that enlightened self-interest demands that t hey look beyond national 
boundaries , and a slowly emerging sense of regional identity is 
being superimposed on the national consciousness . The two decades 
since the end of the Second World War have , in fact, brought about 
decisive changes in this respect: while Asia in the immediate post-
war period could still be characterized as a conglomeration of 
territories without the unifying i dea of a region, today no leader of 
a Southeast As ian nation can be indifferent to what happens in the 
neighbouring countries . The Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) is a living symbol of the growing sense of regional 
i dentity . It is increasingly recognized that economic interdependence 
is bound to become a reality i n this region, too, or more important , 
t hat economic interdependence must become an imperative goal if the 
economic growth of the region is to be accelerated . 
The last viewpoint is important, because the objective of economi c 
growth adds a new dimension to the problem of economi c regionalism 
in Southeast Asia . When the discussion turns around the benefits 
of regional co-operation in this region , it is mainly related to 
economic co- operation or integration among developing countries of 
Southeast Asia, that is, among countries at similar levels of economic 
development. This implies that inter- sectoral or intra- sectoral 
specialization should be organized on the basis of a similar pattern 
of factor endowment. It will readily be recognized that this type of 
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horizontal specialization is fundamentally different from the classic 
pattern of international division of labour between primary producers 
and manufacturers. In terms of economic theory, it means that the 
technological factors of economies of scale have to take precedence 
over the factors of differential natural endowment as the explanatory 
principle of the pattern of specialization . This interpretation a l so 
affords much greater scope for mutual negotiation and agreement 
on specialization than for the market mechanism of free trade to 
determine the most desirable pattern of international division of 
labour. The need for re-interpreting the trade pattern arises from 
the observation that a recent trend in world trade is for trade 
relations between countries at similar levels of economic development 
to grow at the expense of interchanges between developed and 
developing countries . 
The tendency of exports from the developing countries to the 
developed countries to lag considerably behind export trade among 
the developed countries has created enormous problems for the 
developing countries of the present day . As a long-time student 
of international trade, I am deeply impressed by the difficulties the 
developing countries are now facing in trying to develop on the basis 
of their traditional primary exports. Nor, unless there is a 
radical change in the trade policy of developed countries, are 
prospects bright for a considerable expansion of extra- regional 
exports of goods other than the traditional export commodities . 
The onl y solution remaining is for the developing countries to aim 
at diversified output expansion for home markets by substituting 
domestic production for as many lines of imports as possible . But , 
insofar as import substitution is organized on a limited national 
scale , this cannot be a desirable solution ; unless accompanied by 
a sufficient increase in produ::tivity , a persistent substitution 
policy may impair efficiency and entail a reduction of exports . For 
certain lines of manufacturing activity , the home markets of many 
developing countries in Asia may be far too narrow to support the 
minimum size of plant needed for efficiency . The only way out, 
therefore, is to conceive the policy of import ·substituti on on a 
broader and more rational basis . In economic terms , this is the 
essential contribution that regionalism can make to the goal of 
economic development . In short, regional economic integration 
provides the only framework in which economic development can be 
accelerated on the basis of an import-substitution policy without 
detriment to the efficiency and advantages of specialization in 
production . 
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II. Operational approaches to Southeast Asia integration 
The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), to which 
reference was made earlier, is a unique body among a number of inter-
national organizations that exist today in the region with the objective 
of achieving some degree of economic co-operation on a limited 
regional scale, such as the Asian and Pacific Council (ASP AC) and 
the Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast 
Asia. It is unique in the sense that it is composed of the developing 
countries in the compact sub-region only, being formed on their 
own initiative, and has thus achieved a vary high degree of home-
geneity in political and economic outlook . Soon, a population of 
200 million and gross product of $25 billion will easlly provide a 
market large enough to support a highly diversified and efficient 
economic structure on the basis of the rich variety of resources 
available within the area. As it is constituted at present, therefore, 
ASEAN appears to be relatively of great potential to develop into 
a viable economic grouping, reflecting the aspirations and the 
capacity to act collectively of the member countries. There are, 
of course, several political clouds darkoning the horizon in the 
short run, but recent experience shows that these frictions might 
even prove the possibility of "long-term, supra-national economic 
considerations taking precedence over short-term political 
interests". 4 
Despite all the favourable prospects for collective decisions 
and actions, however, the achievements of ASEAN so far appear to 
have been rather limited. It is understandable that in a young 
institution greater emphasis has to be placed on preparatory studies · 
rather than on the execution of projects. But a cursory examination 
of the list of projects selected for implementation or study suggests 
that preference has been given to subjects of technical or research 
co-operation, such as exchange of information and experts, or 
activities relating to international traffic that do not involve any 
economic policy issues, such as tourism, transport, communications 
and visa practices. Even the problems of food production and 
supply have mainly been approached in terms of exchange of informa-
tion and research co-operation. In contrast, there has been an 
apparent reluctance to take up for discussion problems in which the 
consideration of economic policy as such would inevitably be involved . 
4 Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LXII, No.52, 26 December 
1968, p. 711 • The reference is to the diplomatic talks at the 
Thai resort of Bang Saen during the second weekend of December 
1968. 
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The notable exception has been the project of trade liberalization, 
but it is not yet known how the recent Manila conference of represen-
tatives of ministries of commerce and industry defined the approach 
to the policy issues involved. At this juncture it is worth noting 
that the possibility and implic ations of a limited free trade area have 
been selected by the ASEAN Standing Committee for further study. 
If taken up seriously, the study may possibly mark the beginning of 
an attempt to co- ordinate policy within the ASEAN framework. 
With that exception, it is fair to observe that, while subscribing 
to the ideal of regional co- operation, the ASEAN countries appear 
at the present juncture extremely hesitant to undertake anything 
more than technical co- operation. Countries in the region are 
still too sensitive about any scheme of commitments that might touch 
upon national sovereignty to the slightest degree. Serious co-opera-
tion in terms of economic policy --co-ordination or harmonization of 
economic policy as a whole-- is therefore looked upon with incompar-
ably greater suspicion than technical co-operation with regard to 
isolated projec t s. 
This limited frame for co-operation is also reflected in the 
institutional arrangements which are characteristic of ASEAN as 
much as of its predecessor, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). 
The decision-making bodies such as the Ministerial Meeting and the 
Standing Committee are in the nature of diplomatic gatherings, and 
in general the economic experts available in the planning or other 
economic departments of governments have seldom been drawn into 
the preparatory activities of the national ASEAN secretariats which 
are located in the respective ministries of external affairs . Compare 
this with the pattern adopted by the Regional Co-operation for 
Development (RCD)5 in which, under the highest authority of the 
Ministerial Council, the Regional Planning Council composed of the 
heads of the respective planning agencies is charged with the planning 
and execution of co-operative schemes. Irhe RCD Regional Plann-
ing Council is effectively assisted by a well-organized staff secre-
tariat, including economic experts . In the case of ASEAN, the 
question of establishing a central secretariat could not be decided on 
by the Standing Committee and has been further referred to the 
member governments. It stands to reason that, while RCD can name 
a number of co-operative market-sharing projects to its credit, ASA 
and ASEAN have been rather slow in organizing such co-operative 
schemes as would directly affect the national structure of production 
5 The member countries are Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. 
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and trade. 
In these circumstances, the only approach to regional co-opera-
tion and integration that is politically feasible is probably to explore 
and consolidate possible areas of co-operation on a commodity-by-
commodity or project-by-project basis. This partial approach has 
both its own advantages and disadvantages. The ground may be pre-
pared for full-scale economic regionalism by starting with some 
decis ions governing a limited field of economic activity. The extreme 
to which this approach may be carried is integration by sector, as 
exemplified by a commodity common market i n the form of the European 
Coal and Steel Community. The potentiality of the sectoral approach 
is rooted in the logic of economic interdependence between individual 
sectors; in the case of commodity integration, the policy maker will 
sooner or later be confronted with the need for co- ordination of 
economic policy concerning the interrelated field of activity or for 
closer integration of the economies on a wider scale . If the integra-
tion movement is subject to such a self- reinforcing tendency, it may 
not greatly matter, indeed , at what point and in what field of 
economic activity it is initiated . 
However, an economist who is trained t o think primarily in t erms 
of mutual interdependence among economic variables will be the first 
to see the narrow limitations to which such a partial approach is 
subject. Without a comprehensive view of the economic process , 
how can the purposes and directions of projects relating to indivi-
dual commodities be defined and pri orities among them be properly 
established? It is also obvious that the potential benefits of 
closer economi c integration can only be identified within the frame-
work of long- term perspectives , which necessarily encompasses the 
totality of national economic development. At present, the economies 
of the constituent countries of A SEAN lack complementarity, each of 
them exporting roughly the same commodities. Their trade is mainly 
directe d to e xtra-regional sources and destinations; less than 21 
per cent of the member countries ' trade is intra -regional. If 
S ingapore's entr epot trade is excluded, the share of intra-regional 
trade falls to a mere 6 t o 10 per cent. This is a factor which makes 
the probable immediate effects of trade liberalization in the ASEAN 
countries appea r extremely limited. 
In general, there are strong reasons for arguing that the free 
trade approach to regional integration , as applied in western Europe, 
will be less efficient in the developing regions. Within the frame-
work of the Eucopean Economic Community, integration was to be 
rea lized through a progressive and automatic system of linea r tariff 
REGIONAL CO-OPERATION 377 
reduction. If applied mechanically to the developing regions, the 
introduction of a free trade regime of this type would be fraught 
with difficulties. Firstly, in almost all countries, planning is 
recognized as the main instrument of development policy; and, where 
national plans are not geared deliberately to the requirements of 
the new situation, trade liberalization is bound to give rise t o 
certain disturbances and disruptions in the national production and 
consumption programmes. Secondly, the market mechanism tends 
to favour investment in countries where the initial conditions are 
favourable and the profit prospects are bright; hence free trade 
might lead to undue concentration of investment in some specially 
favoured countries. Thirdly, the existing pattern of production 
and trade in the ECAFE region is not such that the mere lifting of 
trade barriers among the countries in the region would considerably 
increase the intra-regional trade flow. Fourthly , even assuming 
that mutual trade liberalization can expand the volume of intra-
regional trade to some extent , in view of the prevailing supply 
rigidities it is rather doubtful whether this approach could have much 
impact on the economic growth of the developing countries . The 
primary task of economic policy will not be so much to expand 
commodity exchanges along traditional lines as to create a new 
complementary pattern of production which would open up improved 
prospects for accelerated growth. 
These observations seem to have been confirmed to some extent 
by the experience of the Latin American Free Trade Association 
(LAFTA). Although in Latin America there was at the outset 
general agreement about the ultimate goal of regional integration, the 
method chosen, namely the es tablishment of a free trade area through 
gradual liberalization of traditional exports and imports on the basis 
of selective negotiation, did not ensure a speedy realization of the 
far-reaching targets of integration. No other method would have 
been acceptable to the developing countries, which inevitably 
encounter great difficulties in abandoning their restrictive trade 
practices; yet, this procedure evidently invoved the risk that each 
country would agree to free only those items in the production of which 
it had no interest. In the view of the ECLA secretariat, the experi-
ence in Latin America has shown that "the aims of economic integration 
cannot be achieved through the mere liberalization of trade, which 
must be accompanied by other agreements that constitute a real pro-
gramme for the achievement of a series of major common objectives. n6 
-- that is, by a regional investment policy . 
6 ECLA, "A Contribution to Economic Integration Policy in Latin 
America", (E/CN. 12/728), p.51 
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Such regional investment planning can be conceived of either as 
a necessary complement or as an alternative to the regional scheme 
of trade liberalization. As an alternative to the free trade approach , 
the plan harmonization approach seems to hold special appeal for the 
developing countries in Southeast Asia, particularly now that all of 
them have adopted national planning to guide the development process . 
Being defined as a partial or comprehensive extension of national 
planning to the regional plane, the plan harmonization approach will 
sooner or later lead to the formulation of an investment and produc-
tion programme and policy from the point of view of the region as a 
whole. In the absence of a supra-national authority, however, it 
will aim at a deliberate co-ordination of national production efforts 
and investment policies and involve inter-governmental agreements on 
specialization and joint e fforts preceded by an exchange of informa-
tion, consultation and negotiations. 
The effectiveness of the plan harmonization approach may be 
exemplified with reference to the principal requirements of agricul-
tural and industrial planning in S outheast Asia. It is well known 
that, in the face of the declining price trend of the major export 
commodities, export-dependent plantation economies of the type of 
Malaysia are confronted with the need for agricultural diversification. 
But the regional study of F AO' s Indicative World Plan comes to the 
conclusion that "given their restricted land resources and the limited 
possibilities of substituting annual crops for plantation, they may 
not be able to increase sufficiently internal production of other major 
crops and of livestock products to fulfil domestic demand" . 7 Thus, 
despite the imminent agriculturel breakthrough in Asia, the prospects 
of self- suffi ciency in food in some countries are not reassuring. 
On the other hand, some countries, including Thailand, might build 
up such a huge cereal surplus in the long run that "the problem of 
disposal could well prove insoluble", 8 If the economic projections, 
extending even to 1985, point to such an incongruity of supply and 
demand, there is obviously a case for harmonizing the food produc-
tion and agricultural plans of the member countries of ASEAN right 
now; the inevitable loss in r esource allocation involved in the ex-
cessive policy of self-s ufficiency in food may be reduced to the 
minimum . 
7 F AO, "Main Conclusions and Policy Implications of the I. W. P. Re-
gional Study for Asia" (FERC/68/3, 7 October 1968), pp . 25-26 . 
8 F AO, "l\'ia.in Conclusions and Policy Implications of the I. V'v. P. Re-
gional Study for Asia" (FERC/68/3, 7 October 1 968), p. 23. 
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In the industrial field, reference is often made to the inefficiency 
of the forced import-substitution policy based on a narrow national 
market. We should avoid being dogmatic in this respect; for a 
respectable number of production processes, each of the ASEAN 
countries, except for Singapore, constitutes a sizable enough market 
to support efficient production. 9 This means that the legitimate 
scope for successful industrialization through import substitution 
should not be underrated even for relatively small and poor countries 
in Southeast Asia. But the list of light consumer goods industries 
to be established to replace imports will soon be exhausted in many 
relatively small countries. The weakness of the traditional indus-
trialization strategy is rather reflected in the shallow vertical 
structure of the manufacturing sector in which the forward and back-
ward linkage effects of individual sub-sectors are extremely limited . 
The industrial structure thus lacks the ability to generate self-
sustaining growth impetus by inducing investment in interrelated sub-
sectors directly or indirectly. The member countries of ASEAN 
can now be considered to have generally reached the turning point 
in the process of their industrialization at which the structure has 
to be deepened considerably in order to qualify industries to become 
11 the leading sector" to self-generating growth. 
The need is therefore for vertically integrated industrialization, 
but at this stage where a number of basic and intermediate industries 
have to be created, the national markets of many developing countries 
in Southeast Asia may prove too narrow. For instance, most 
countries of the area have started to establish an automobile industry 
in the form of assembly plants which mainly rely on imported 
materials and parts. In most cases there are too great a number of 
assemblers and types of vehicles produced to be economically justi-
fied. But, the most important drawback of this policy is that the 
possibility of integrating the industry backward is almost completely 
lacking, for integrated industrialization is not possible without some 
sort of supra-national market planning or harmonization of national 
investment and production programmes. It is therefore only logical 
that a co-operative plan for a steel industry in Singapore and Thai-
9 "Outside of a fow exceptional industries most technical economies 
are exhausted by firms of quite moderate size. Even relative-
ly small and poor countries can have a number of firms of the 
minimum size to give full, or almost full, technical efficiency" 
E. A.G. Robinson, "Introduction", Economic Consequences of 
the Size of Nations, Proceedings of a Conference held by the 
International Economic Association, London 1960, xvii. 
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land seems now to be under active consideration .10 Ensuring that 
full advantage is taken of the potential benefits of the broad regional 
market is of cardinal importance for the industrial development of 
the region, and agreed specialization is an effective means of reap-
ing these benefits. Where modern technology dictates a minimum 
size of productive facilities far exceeding the limit of national mar-
kets, or where the investment requirements in certain lines of pro-
duction surpass the financial cap::wity of a single country, some 
forms of joint project planning may be the solution. 
Although the conditions for fruitful application of a scheme of 
automatic and complete trade liberalization are not present in South-
east Asia, less far- reaching measures of trade liberalization are 
practicable and would benefit the participating countries by increas-
ing the intra-regional trade flow. To the extent that the actual 
trade volume is limited by some artifi9ial barriers , tariff or non-
tariff, it will be of great importance to try to eliminate these trade 
barriers . For instance, some degree of preference for imports 
from within the ASEAN a r ea may be established by means of regional 
quotas for selected commodities. 11 The ASEAN countries may be 
willing to agree on some system of preferential tariff rates which 
may be a t tained by annual reductions on the agreed basis of the duties 
applicable to imports from within the region, while the tariffs ap-
plicable to imports from outside the region remain constant. Again, 
the scheme of a free list which was suggested by the ECAFE Expert 
Group on Trade Expansion in 1 964 may deserve active attention as 
a possible subject of practical inter-governmental negotiations with-
in the ASE AN area. 
The advantage of trade liberalization on a limited scale is that 
a certain degree of regional outlook and discipline is imposed upon 
economic decisions with respect to new investments and national 
planning efforts. This is important because the continued neglect 
of regional possibilities tends to create vested interests which may 
hamper progress t owards an integrated regional market at some 
stages in the future . The risk of creating vested interests may 
even arise in a wide r developi ng r egion in which the formation of 
sub- regional gr oupings , such as ASEAN, is promoted as a stop 
10. Bangkok P ost, 24 October 1968. 
11 . Thailand's Foreign Minister, Mr . Thanat Khoman is reported to 
have proposed such a soheme as "a first step towards a South-
east Aisan common market". See Bangkok Post, 5 December 
1968. 
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towards wider regional integration. It is true that substantial com-
mitments with regard to harmonization of investment and production 
programmes may be made more easily by a small number of countries 
in a sub-region than by a large number of countries comprising an 
entire region. If at the same time the sub-region or the constituent 
countries were to agree with other sub-regions or individual coun-
tries within the region to establish, for instance, a minimum degree 
of preference for imports from one another, or an upper limit to 
protective measures against one another, then the sub-regional mar-
kets would be embedded in a viable regional framework. The trade 
commitments at the regional level, though less far-reaching in nature, 
would effectively support the plan harmonization commitments at 
the sub-regional level and underscore the determination of the sub-
regional groups to reap the benefits of trade liberalization in the 
geographically wider framework. 
g Insofar as payments restrictions prevent the full potential of 
intra-area trade from being realized in this region--and we know 
that payments restrictions are effective in the form of trade controls 
discriminating against intra-regional trade, there is no doubt that 
the establishment of some type of payments mechanism would be an 
important step forward towards the expansion of regional trade 
among the developing countries and thus towards regional integra-
tion. The main contribution of a payments arrangement in this re-
gional context would not be so much to remove restrictions on cur-
rency convertibility, or to aim at a somewhat more smoothly func-
tioning monetary system, as to facilitate the intensification of 
intra-regional trade on the basis of changes in the direction as well 
as the level of trade and production . As a matter of practical pol-
itics, the most promising basis for formation of such a constructive 
payments arrangements will be some sort of narrower sub-region 
with more intensive commitments for policy and plan harmonization . 
The ASEAN countries may agree with profit to follow the example 
of RCD which has already established a payments mechanism. 
The operational approaches to economic regionalism can thus 
be made through various channels: agreed specialization and har-
monization of investment and production programmes, trade liberal-
ization on a selective and preferential basis, or some types of re-
gional payments arrangement. Especially at the stage where the 
scope for successful import substitution on the basis of narrow 
national markets seems largely to have been exhausted, economic 
regionalism is a challenge to economic policy which Asian developing 
countries must face if they want to accelerate their pace of development . 
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III. Economic analysis in the service of policy making1 2 
It has often been observed that there is today among the leaders 
of Southeast Asia a sense of urgency for regional economic co-oper-
ation as a principal means of promoting accelerated economic growth. 
Yet, those in authority appear rather reluctant to set out along an 
untrodden path and undertake anything beyond the limit of exchanges 
of information and purely tochnical co- operation. How can the reluc-
tance to act be overcome, and the basis be laid for far-sighted ac-
tion? What is required is, of course , political leadership. Such 
a leader is already born and will presume bly emerge at the right 
time among the new leaders of Southeast Asia. The first genera-
tion of leaders in post-war Asia were inescapably committed to 
emerging nationalism, and their achievements were inseparably 
bound up with the rise of nationalistic spirit. In contrast to them, 
the new leaders of the second generation have the great advantage 
of being able to look a little beyond nationalism and to act in ac-
cordance with broader ideals. But, let us also recall the decisive 
role that was played by Jean ~·llonnet in the successful formation of 
the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic 
Community. Jean .Monnet, personifying economic research and 
planning, prepared the blueprint for E urope's future and became 
thus the real architect of what was called the Schuman Plan. In 
Southeast Asia, too, it will be the task of economists and experts 
to lay a solid groundwork for regional economic integration. Such 
a blueprint is more than an instrument; it can forge courage and 
change deficient political will into determined policy. Southeast 
Asia is in urgent need of its own regional lVionnet Plan. 
The scope and elements of a strategy of regional co-operation 
and integration in Southeast Asia can only be defined through objec-
tive studies by experts of all the existing and potential possibilities 
of the region. Economic analysis will identify the likely conse-
quences of various forms and levels of regional co-operation in 
some detail and will thus enable the policy makers in the relevant 
countries to form a more informed judgment regarding the desirable 
level of integration . The necessary institutional and administra-
tive arra ngements that should accompany a particular form of 
economic co-operation can then be worked out in greater detail to 
examine the practical feasibility of the co-operative programmes. 
It is hoped that .economic studies will thus provide the basis for 
12. For many lines of arguments in this f3ection, the author is 
greatly indebted to Dr. Amit Bhaduri, Delhi School of Economics. 
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facilitating policy decisions by indicating the probable consequences 
of alternative forms of regional cooperation. The purpose of the 
studies is not to arrive at a decision as to the particular form of 
co-operation to aim at. That, after all, is a question that cannot be 
settled on economic grounds alone. 
Since the likely economic effects of integration depend crucial-
ly on the intensity level of co-operation achieved among the coun-
tries concerned, it will be necessary to start with several economic 
"models" or stylized pictures of regional integration as points of 
reference, in order to examine the possible implications of integra-
tion at various hypothetical levels. In the short run, the existing 
structure of production may be assumed as given; the only relevant 
instrument of action will be the commercial trade policies of the 
countries concerned. On this basis, it will be possible to examine 
the possible impacts of trade liberalization which can be carried 
out in varying degrees. For instance, assuming the logical extreme 
of free trade among the participating countries, it will be possible--
under certain restrictive assumptions-- to work out the quantitative 
order of magnitude of the gains from complete trade liberalization. 
Such exercises as have actually been undertaken in respect of 
European trade liberalization schemes have indicated that pure trade 
gains cannot be of great significance . Since there are good reasons 
for expecting that the gains from trade liberalization would be much 
less substantial in the underdeveloped countries than in the industri-
ally advanced economies, it is to be anticipated that the short-term 
gains from trade liberalization will be but marginal in the countries 
of Southeast Asia. From the analytical point view, however, the 
short-term model of trade liberalization will serve to indicate what 
types of positive co-operative measures would be required to com-
plement even the maximum degree of trade liberalization in order 
to accelerate the pace of regional development. 
Complete trade liberalization may be a good theoretical point 
of departure for analyzing short-term commerical policy, but may 
not be the most relevant assumption to make. It is therefore neces-
sary to modify the previous theoretical scheme of ascertaining the 
"gains from free trade" by assuming that the scope of trade liberal-
ization is partial rather than complete. Clearly a large number of 
integration models with partially liberalized trade can be construct-
ed, depending on the precise nature of trade agreements . In the 
present context, it appears more relevant to assume that trade lib-
eralization is achieved only with respect to a clearly defined sub-
set of tradable commodities, as illustrated by the proposal of the 
Foreign Minister of Thailand referred to above. Theoretically, · 
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this problem can be tackled quite easily in terms of a partial equi-
librium framework, if we assume that the incremental volumes of . 
trade in commodities included in the partial liberalization scheme 
do not affect the volume of other commodities being traded. This 
means that the problem of substitutabilities as well as complemen-
tarities among commodities, either in consumption or in production, 
is ignored. While this may be an assumption that is not compatible 
with the general equilibrium formulation of the problem, it may 
appear more useful to proceed on this assumption because its re-
laxation will confront us with difficult problems in terms of both 
data requirements and theoretkal complications. Partial equilib-
rium analysis may rather be extended in a different direction with 
greater benefit; it will enable chains of dynamic effects over time 
to be analyzed within a limited area of production and trade, as 
exemplified by the tradition of Marshallian analysis. 
While in the short run the impact of trade liberalization in the 
integrated area is the focus of attention, the emphasis shifts con-
siderably in the long-term context. For, in the long run, the 
structure of regional production, far from being assumed as given, 
should be treated as a variable to be optimally adjusted to the re-
quirements of integration, and instrument variables to be considered 
have to include not only commercial trade policy, but also invest-
ment and other changes in the use of production factors. The set-
ting up of a long-term model of economic integration, therefore, 
presupposes the specification of two sets of economic conditions. 
First, the extent to which the structure of regional production can 
be manipulated is assumed as agreed upon by the countries concern-
ed, and secondly, the exact nature of the trade liberalization policy 
adopted by the countries concerned is assumed to be known. There 
are also alternative ways of specifying the relationships between 
the two sets of policy instruments; either the decisions about trade 
liberalization are taken autonomously and the structure of produc-
tion is optimally adjusted to the pattern of trade, or conversely, 
the trade policy is assumed to be dictated by the optimum pattern 
of intra-regional division of labour, as reflected in the structure 
of production of the countries concerned. 
In the long run, too, it appears meaningful to distinguish two 
sets of economic integration models according to the varying scope 
and level of regional integration: the restricted or partial long-
term integration model and the unrestricted long-term integration 
model. More specifically, the restricted or partial long-term 
integration model assumes (a) free movement of capital across national 
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frontiers only on the basis of intra-regional agreements relating 
to specific projects, and (b) only partially liberalized trade in the 
sense of free trade in respect of some commodities, in particular 
those related to the project agreements mentioned under (a) above, 
but not all tradable commodities. The scope of economic integra-
tion is restricted as the model does not assume either complete trade 
liberalization or free movement of all factors; even in respect of 
capital, it does not assume free movement of capital for investment 
in all lines of production, but only in those industries where inter-
governmental agreements can be reached on a project basis • In 
passing, it should be noted that in the light of the project- by-project 
approach which has generally been accepted so far by the govern-
ments in Southeast Asia as the only feasible method of regional co-
operation, this restricted long-term integration model is endowed 
with a high degree of realism. 
In contrast, the unrestricted long-term integration model is the 
logical extreme of regional economic co-operation. For this model, 
the underlying assumptions can be specified as (a) conditions of 
completely liberalized trade and (b) perfect mobility of all "factors 
of production" , except those that are physically immobile (e • g. land). 
While this model cannot claim a great deal of relevance to the prob-
lems of reality, it should be able at least to serve as a frame of 
reference. 
The analysis of the short-term effects of both trade liberaliza-
tion and economic integration is usually based on the height of the 
original tariff rates, changes in these rates (in the form of reduc-
tion or complete abolition) and the responsiveness of the demand 
for and supply of traded commodities to price changes in the member 
countries. This, in turn, requires a study of the elasticities of 
import demand and export supply which will depend on the underly-
ing elasticities of domestic demand and supply, the share of imports 
in domestic consumption, the share of exports in domestic produc-
tion, the substitutability of domestic and foreign goods and the length 
of the period of adjustment. Indirect and feedback effects of inte-
gration are best examined in the framework of a model involving a 
set of simultaneous equations. What is important is the explicit 
articulation of the constraints depending on the nature and scope of 
integration. Econometric methods can be used with some benefit 
for an analysis of the short-term effects or of the long-term effects 
under very restrictive assumption .13 If the participating countries 
13. See, for instance, P .J. Verdoorn, "The intra-block trade of 
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formulate a set of well-defined and ·consistent objectives, then the 
effects of economic integration can be analysed in terms of a linear 
programming framework with linearized constraints. 
The limitations involved in the nature and the reliability of ex--
isting data in Southeast Asia are overwhelming, indeed. However , 
even if reliable economic and te chnological data were available, there 
are several practical as well as theoretical reasons to feel somewhat 
sceptical about the usefulness of the programming exercise in guid-
ing economic policy towards regional integration. The basic reason 
is related to the dynamic changes in t he economies which are the 
most important elements in the potential benefits of integration , In 
order to identify the real scope for economic integration in Southeast 
Asia, it is necessary to examine alternative development strategies 
open to the countrie s concerned over time and to assess carefully 
the potential for structural change of the economies, especially for 
industrialization, on the basis of their resources, prospective 
demand structure and production and transportation costs, Such 
changes are not immediately visible along the lines of extrapolation 
of whatever trends exist today; they mean introduction of new struc-
tural elements. While some structural parameters may be some-
what modified on the basis of the agreed intentions for changes , 
such long-term structural c hanges cannot be derived from model 
analysis. This means that, if the programming exercise is to make 
any positive contribution to the solution of dynamic problems, it will 
have to be preceded by an independent discussion of development 
strategies on the basis of extensive techno-economic studie s . The 
programming models developed so far, for instance, still find it dif-
ficult to deal mathematically with the question of increasing returns 
to scale, whereas in fact benefits from the scale effect are one of 
the important advantages which an integration model should examine. 
In the programming approach, recommendations regarding a 
certain s tructure of intra-regional production will be derived on the 
basis of an optimal criterion or an "objective function". But it 
would appear extremely difficult for ali the countries concerned to 
arrive at a common agreement on this point . The main problem 
which is faced he re is the question of distribution of economic bene-
fits among the co-operating countries. If the programming model 
(1'3. cont'd) Benelux" in Economic Consequences of the Size of 
Nations. Proceedings of a Conference held by the International 
Economic Association. E dited by E .A. G . Robinson, London 1 960. 
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analysis is guided exclusively by an efficiency criterion, the "ag-
glomeration factor" would tend to concentrate investment in the form 
of industrial complexes in most favourable locations. This may 
ensure the optimum allocation of resources over the area, but may 
make the pattern of distribution of industrial activities among the 
countries less equitable. A sort of "compensation principle" can 
be incorporated in the model that no -country should be worse off in 
terms of income after the integration agreement than before, but it 
is not at all clear that this will be a sufficient condition for equitable 
distribution of benefits for the countries concerned. 
What the policy makers need as a guideline to strategic deci-
sions regarding the problem of regional integration is probably not 
a picture of the final goal representing the ideal structure of intra-
regional production and trade alone. They want to know also the 
path which leads to that goal. In this respect, the programming 
models do not do full justice to the demand, because such models 
involving total or Utopian planning do not allow us to formulate a 
piecemeal approach. It cannot be said, for example, that we shall 
satisfy marginal conditions in some industries, but not in others, 
as that statement will be logically invalid due to the "second-best" 
type of arguments in economic theory. However, a real problem 
awaiting solution in concrete terms is posed to the economists by 
a piecemeal approach on a project-by-project or commodity-by-
commodity basis which has been endorsed by the governments of 
Southeast Asia. 
Models of economic integration, in the long-term context, are 
particularly useful in providing a necessary frame of reference for 
any meaningful projections over time. But, if all the considerations 
relevant to dynamic integration policy are to be taken seriously, 
this would mean that a great deal of techno-economic research 
should be undertaken first outside the models. The more pedestrian 
approach to the questions such as choice of locations, effects of 
scale and agglomeration and distribution of benefits from integration 
may require, in fact, a higher degree of economic expertise than 
the setting up of formal programming models. It can be hoped that 
important building blocks for the workable strategy of regional in-
tegration will be assembled this way. This is not to say, however, 
that the analytical importance of models should be minimized; if suf-
ficiently equipped with these building blocks, a formal programm-
ing model will be transformed into an effective decision-making 
model with realistic contents • 
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COMMENT ON HIROSHI KITAMURA' S P1\PER BY ROBERT TRIFFIN 
I would like, first of all, to express our common debt to Dr . 
Kitamura for his lucid and forceful summary of the basic rationale 
of economic regionalism . Academic economists persisted much too 
long in damning regional organization as an inferior alternative t o 
worldwide organization. I view it myself, on the contrary, not 
only as a step toward this broader objective, but as part and parcel 
of a "structured" world organization, relieving worldwide institu-
tions such as the IMF, of whatever tasks can be solved just as effi-
ciently, .and often more efficiently indeed among a smaller number 
of countries, better prepared to understand and trust each other . 
There is much that I would like to add, but time is short . Let 
me merely mention that the death of "laissez faire" as epitome of 
national domestic policies could not leave unaffected the external 
"laissez passer policy which was its logical complement . As pointed 
out by Dr. Kitamura, progress toward trade liberalization, in an 
age of economic interventionism, requires for its success cooper a 
tion and commitments 2xf2nding far beyond the field of trade policy 
proper, and extremely difficult to negotiate among more than a hun-
dred independent sovereign countries (no matter how theoretical and 
illusory the sovereignty is in practice) . 
The broad arguments are reinforced, in most underdeveloped 
areas, by the fact that the present trade pattern--and particularly 
the low level of intraregional trade often mentioned as an argument 
against integration--is by no means a reflecti on of the natural patter n 
of endowment of resources, but has been deeply distorted by histor-
ical accidents, such as: 
An economic infrastructure inherited from colonial days , and 
tending to promote trade with the "mother country" rather than with 
neighboring countries : 
The erection of non-discriminating tariff walls protecting the 
"infant industries" of each country against the infant industries of 
its neighbors as well as against the adult industries of the more 
advanced countries . Insofar as imports could still be able to jump 
over the barriers, this type of protection, while theoretically non-
discriminatory, discriminated against de facto in favor of the adult 
industries of the developed countries' and against the infant indust-
ries of neighboring, underdeveloped countries . 
Regional preferences need not then uniformly lead to an unecon-
omic distortior.. of "natural 11 production and trade patterns . They 
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may, indeed, be necessary to help correct the distortion inherited 
from those historical developments . 
I agree therefore, with Dr . Kitamura' s general approach, 
and particularly with the broadening of the objective of regional 
economic cooperation beyond the mere removal of the trade barriers. 
In a world of national economic interventionism and planning, the 
objective of regional cooperation, must be, as he suggests, to 
improve planning through more sophisticated research, through the 
enlargement of inappropriately narrow economic areas, through the 
harmonization of national plans aiming at making them compatible 
and mutually supporting rather than incompatible and mutually defeat-
ing, 
I agree with all this, even though I might be somewhat less op-
timistic as to the ease and wisdom with which this may be achieved 
and implemented in practice. The market itself may help solve some 
of the national susceptibilities that are often an obstacle in this 
respect . · Anonymous market disciplines may be accepted more eas-
ily than the decisions of a supranational or even international plan-
ning board. 
My main qualm, however, is not about this broadening of the 
objectives of regional economic cooperation, but about its narrow-
ing down to "import substitution" as one of major objectives to be 
pursued . Surely, this is a counsel of despair, and I would put 
instead the main emphasis on "outward-looking" integration, all the 
more so if and when such integration may have to be confined initial-
ly--as suggested by Dr . Kitamura- -to sub- regional , rather than 
regional, groupings . 
I applaud, for this point-of-view, Dr . Kitamura' s remarks on 
the general equilibrium appr oach and the dynamic, as well as the 
static, aspects of regional liberalization . Let us not forget that 
such liberalization will necessarily be trade-creating insofar as 
previous protection was effecti ve, i.e. promoted artificially unecon-
omic national production in substitution of imports . Such trade 
creation should lower production costs and improve the overall 
competitiveness of members, not only within the region, but outside 
the region itself . Thi s explains , to my mind, why intra- OEEC liberal-
i zation , for instance , could soon be followed by liberalization of 
trade toward non-members . 
Secondly, regional liberalization may, of course, on the contrary , 
be trade-diverting insofar as protection was ineffective--as it always 
is to a large extent-- and did not stop imports from the outside. 
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But, again, the dynamics of such trade-diversion may bring sorr:e 
partial corrections to it. Insofar as the members of the region now 
import from each other goods which they used to import from outside 
the area, their balance-of-payments should improve for the area as 
a whole and enable them to increase imports from outside the region, 
to lower their levels of restriction. Indeed, they may be induced 
to do so by the fact that they do not wish to build up indefinitely their 
foreign exchange reserves, i.e. to grant low-earning credits to 
non-members • 
Finally, I would definitely differ with Dr. Kitamura in his sug-
gestion that regional payments mechanisms should be directed at a 
systematic modification of trade and production patterns. What he 
has in mind, if I am not mistaken, is that meme brs in surplus within 
the region should be forced to finance members in deficit within the 
region. In practice, this might force poorer countries, with overall 
balance-of-payments deficits, to finance richer countries with over-
all balance-of-payments surpluses, simply because the first may be 
in surplus within the region, and the latter in deficit within the 
region. This would obviously be absurd. A country should not 
be penalized because it happen to be able to produce efficiently and 
economically export goods needed by neighbors which can themselves 
produce efficiently goods having a normal outlet outside the region 
rather than within the region. 
I have dwelt too much on the differences in emphasis, but wish 
to stress, in conclusion, that they do not detract from the basic 
similarity of our approaches and our support for regional integra-
tion. In brief, regional integration should itself be integrated with 
broader, worldwide, but decentralized, techniques of policy har-
monization in an interdependent world. 
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COMMENT ON HIROSHI KIT,\MURA' S P 1\ PER BY P . D. DRYSDt ,LE 
Like Professor Triffin , I believe that Dr. Kitamura has pre-
sented us with an extremely thoughtful paper which sets the evolu-
tion of the regional approach t o economic development problem in 
the Asian region in what seems to be its p:r-oper perspective . 
He stresses the technological necessity of the regional approach 
to industrial development among relatively small les s developed coun-
tries if their manufacturing sectors are to be reasonably efficient. 
There is some ambivalence in his judgment about this matter, how-
ever, but I think that it derives principally from his recognition 
of the distinction between the technological necessities for the 
efficient development of labour-intensive light manufacturing indus-
tries and those for the efficient development of capital-intensive 
heavy manufacturing industries. There is a related question-- which 
Professor Triffin has already rai::;cd--of Dr • .Kitamura 1 s focus on 
the process of import substitution rather than efficient, and hopeful-
ly, export- oriented manufacturing development as the rationale for 
economic regionalism. Of course, competitive export industries, 
at some earlier stage, are frequently import-competing industries. 
But it is perhaps a real error to put too much stress upon the pro-
cess of import sunstitution: that only results in confusion in the · 
choice of priorities for manufacturing development . Australia and 
New Zealand provide evidence enough of that. 
Dr . Kitamura traced the limited progress towards economic 
regionalism in South East Asia through ASEAN. He is not discour-
aged by the lack of concrete achievement. On the contrary, he 
stresses the importance of what I call the corroborec approach 
towards effective economic co-operation. A corroboree is a ritual 
practiced by Australian aboriginals • Elders gather together, 
generally make a lot of noise and have a jolly good time, but the 
basic movement involves going round and round in c ircles. I wel-
come Dr. Kitamura' s tolerance of this kind of activity. It is a pre-
condition to effective economic co-operation; the preliminary iden-
tification of common interests i s as important a part of the business 
of regionalism as their realisation. 
Realistically, Dr. Kitamura draws attention to the barriers to 
comprehensive regionalism in South East Asia. But he i s optimistic 
about the possibilities of limited, or sectoral , economic co- opera-
tion within the area, and he rightly stresses the need for more fact-
gathering. 
With what Dr. Kitamura has written then, I am largely in agree-
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ment. There is, however, an interesting and important omission 
from his paper. There do the developed countries, for example, 
of the ECAFE region itself, fit into his kind of regionalism? I 
assume that they should be excluded from direct participation in 
the kind of arrangement he has in mind since their participation 
would offend the principle_£!:. equal!.!Y_ which nowadays has general 
acceptance • 
Some discussion of the desirable relationship between the trade 
and economic policies of the advanced countries among themselves 
and towards developing countries within ECAFE would be useful. 
If Dr. Kitamura accepts the principle of non-reciprocity in trade 
and economic policies between advanced and developing countries, 
for example, would he agree that advanced countries are likely to 
be able to provide more in the way of trade concessions for develop-
ing countries if they combine the negotiation of reciprocated con-
cessions, however limited, amongst themselves with the extension 
of trade preferences and economic assistance? I have been argu-
ing in the course of our discussion that they would. Althernative 
views have been expressed. Dr. Kitamura himself questioned the 
wisdom of a two-directional approach yesterday. He wanted to 
know who came first within OPT AD--the advanced Pacific countries 
or the Asian developing countries? It seems clear to me that they 
should all come together, but it seems equally clear that the nature 
of the relationship among the former, and between the former and 
the latter, even within OPT AD, must be quite different. Earlier, 
Professor Lockwood questioned the two-directional approach because 
he felt that the extra squeeze on advanced country industries hurt 
by trade concessions in both directions would make the whole opera-
tion so much the more difficult. Professors Castle and Kojima 
made directly contra-assertions: whilst some adjustments are 
being made it appeared to them easier to engineer more. Professor 
Johnson came down on the side of Castle and Kojima, but for a 
rather different reason: the administrative and political effort 
of organizing the trade negotiations involved would, he has argued, 
be minimumized by a single two-directional operation. It seems 
to me that there is a much more important consideration in all this • 
The fact of political life is that trade concessions are easier for 
governments to make if there is some element of reciprocity, for 
the simple reason that the political groups who benefit from conces-
sions gained can be played off against those which lose from conces-
sions made. Thus, if reciprocated concessions among advanced 
countries--and they may be well short of a complete free trade area-
are coupled with non-reciprocated preferences for developing coun-
tries, the latter are more likely to be taken a whole lot further. 
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Moreover, there is the added advantage of the regional approach to 
preference- giving which this implies. The regional approach 
involves a kind of burden-sharing and moral pressure which are also 
likely to be helpful . 
I would very much like to hear what Dr. Kitamura feels about 
these questions which arise out of his paper . 
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DISCUSSION OF P/\_PERS PRESENTED BY K. LIANG, SUBROTO 
AND H. KITAMURA 
, In reply to comments on his paper, Professor Liang said he 
thoue-ht that aid-generated local currency funds contributed 
substantially to financing private investment and government ex-
penditure at a time when Taiwan did not have any well-organized 
monetary and capital markets . He also said that now that 
direct aid had ceased and there was greater reliance on bor-
rowings from international financial institutions, there should 
be more consciousness of productivity criteria and comparative 
advantage criteria in the choice of investment projects. 
In reply to comments on his paper, Professor Subroto 
made two additional points about the progress made under 
Indonesia's stabilization programme . First, he admitted that 
a good season had been partly responsible for increased rice 
production in 1 968 . However, the increased application of 
fertilizer and superior seed str ains had also made the*ir con-
tribution. Second, he said that there had been problems with 
the timing of aid inflow in 1 968 . Indonesia is receiving aid from 
all the advanced Pacific countries, with New Zealand as an ob-
server, as well as European nations . These countries met to 
assess needs and after about three months there was a second 
meeting to settle the amount of aid to be extended. In con-
sequence, there was a long gestation period, of about six 
months, during which time, Indonesia had to finance import 
requirements from external accounts . There is then some need 
for bridging the gap. Professor Subroto agreed that the basic 
problems in the fields of employment, production, and the 
effeiciency of the administrative apparatus were tremendous 
and that they would only be overcome slowly . 
In reply to comments on his paper, Dr . Kitamura said that 
whilst it was t rue that if the intra-regional balance of payments 
criterion for credit provision was adopted, the poorer members 
might be forced to lend to the richer members, the whole object 
of the exercise in economic regionalism was to correct the 
biases in trade and production structure which caused these 
perverse effects. That is why agreed specialisation and 
industrial harmonization, which encouraged adjustment in the 
structure of regional trade and production, would be helpful in 
the establishment of a successful uni on. He agreed that the 
advanced countries had an important role to play in regional 
development. He believed that the ideal approach would be 
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similar to that taken by Mexico towards Central American integ-
ration. Mexico looked sympathetically upon attempts at regional 
integration, and gave non-reciprocated tariff concessions. Dr. 
Kitamura also argued that if the advanced countries were not 
directly involved in integration among developing countries there 
would be less fear of dominance of developing country markets 
by multinational corporations ~ · 
In discussion of the Taiwanese and Korean cases, questions 
were raised about the role of land reform and taxation reform in 
economic development. Professor Liang said that he believed 
that land reform had been remarkably successful in stimulating 
agricultural productivity through improved farmer incentives. 
Agricultural development had provided the base for subsequent 
industrial development. Professor Chough indicated that taxadon 
reform rather than land reform had made the greatest contribution 
to agricultural development in Korea . He added that efforts towards 
the improvement of agricultural technology were also significant in 
raising agricultural productivity. The Korean Institute of Science 
and Technology had played an important role in this respect. 
Finally, both Professors Liang and Chough agreed that it was 
difficult to foresee what the exact effect of the conclusion of the Viet-
nam War would be on their countries 1 trade. They both stressed the 
crucial role of trade with Japan and the United States and the need 
for freer access to these markets, so that specialization in labour 
intensive exports might be further strengthened . 
Discussion of the Indonesian case led one participant to observe 
that although there had been a dramatic slowdown in the rate 
of inflation, from 626 percent to about 30 or 40 percent per annum, 
there was still a long way to go . The financial mechanism was 
unlikely to work effeciently where inflation remained so high. Pro 
fessor Subroto agreed that the rate of inflation woul d have to be 
checked further. Of course, there was always the danger that 
disruption to food supply, textile supply, or foreign exchange flows, 
would frustrate the objective of price stabilisation. 
Another participant asked where the major opportunities for 
growth and development lay, in view of the rather depressing view 
that emerged from earlier commentaries. Professor Subroto 
explained that the greatest potential was undoubtedly to be found in 
the extractive industries such as oil, nickel, copper, and forest 
products . There was also a very great need for replacement invest-
ment in agricultural industries, such as rubber and foodstuffs, which 
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had been allowed to run down in the past decade and a half . He 
estimated that development projects of this kind would require about 
$US 6 . 0-7. 5 millions in foreign exchange. The amount of private 
capital attracted to Indonesia in the past two years amounted to about 
$US 3 .O millions. 
Others still were concerned about the 3 percent rate of popula-
tion growth. There will be a population explosion in the middle 
'seventies and Professor Subruto said that emphasis was being 
given to development centers in less densely populated regions. 
He said there were no important religious objections to family plan-
ning but lack of knowledge and education was a major obstacle. 
In discussion of the need for Asian economic regionalism, 
questions were raised about whether Dr. Kitamura' s stress on the 
need for vertical integration was consistent with Professor 
Kojima' s concept of agreed specialisation. Dr. Kitamura thought 
that it was first important for developing countries to press for-
ward with dynamic industrialization and later to proceed toward 
horizontal specialization of the kind Professor Kojima had in mind. 
He suggested that import substitution was an important prior stage 
to effective export specialization. Others felt strongly that the 
emphasis on import substitution and vertical integration was likely 
to lead to wrong priorities in development policy. 
Chapter 14 
"8CONOMIC COOPERATION WITHIN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: 
A SUMMARY VIEV/ 
William W. LOCKWOOD 
Three days of lively discussion among scholars from ten na-
tions at this Second C onference on Pacific T rade and Development 
are not easily compressed into a brief summary. To simr lify mat-
ters, I have confined myself to broad issues and findings of fact, 
leaving aside matters of resear ch methodology and technical de -
tail, however valuable to the s~::- ec ialist. Also omitted are r:·erson-
al attributions. Much of the color and controversy of the dialogue 
thus t ends to disappear. What remains may serve, nevertheless, 
to integrate t he separate papers within the inclusive analytical 
structure of the Conference agenda. At least the general tenden-
c ie s of the discus s ion stand out, especially areas of broad agree-
ment. 
The Conference topic was set forth as "Trade and Aid Re-
lationshi~) S of the Developing Countries of A sia with the Advanced 
Countries of the P acific." Its distinctive value was the emphasis 
up on interplay , actual and potential, between international trade 
and aid policies, as related to economic development. This was 
highly rewarding . 
Its second organizi ng principle was its focus u p on the Asia-
Pacific region. Useful as this was, it gave us constant trouble . 
For many issues can only be tackled within a wider , global frame-
worlc. No consistent , exclusive relationship exists between the 
interests and commitments of the advanced nations of the Pacific 
in this region, and the i nterests and c ommitments here of the de -
veloping nations of Asia. For example, India has received sub-
stantial aid from Euro:re, e.g., $570 million from 1961 to 1966. 
And, on the other hand, the United States a nd Canada are certainly 
not less interested in the trade and develorment of Latin America 
than of Asia. These complications are inherent in any r egional 
a D'.'Toach to international economic policies in the Pacific , of 
course, except as a transitional step towards wider, global solu-
tions that are presently blocked for one reason or another. 
The Conference began with the general setting of world eco-
nomic policies as set forth in papers by Harry G. Johnson, Sperry 
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Lea, and H . Edward English. It then narrowed its focus to re-
gional tendencies and proposals, specifically the iC.ea of a Pacific 
Free Trade Association among the five advanced countries (Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the U . S,), and its implica-
tions for Asian trade and aid. (See papers by Bruce W. Wilkinson, 
L . V . Castle, and Kiyoshi Kojima-I. Yama z a wa). Next it nar-
rowed its d i scussion still further to the proposal for a Japan-
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Association, explored in pa-
pers byl. A . McDougall, P eter Drysdale and L . V. Castle. 
These discussions consumed the first day, retracing some of the 
ground covered in the 1967 Tokyo Conference on Pacific Trade and 
Development. 
With this beginning , the Conference turned more directly to 
the developing nations of Asia. It explored their needs and poten-
tials for structural adjustment with the Pacific advanced nations 
through trade and aid, as analyzed in several of the foregoing 
papers, especially the Kojima- Yamazawa study . This led into 
A sia's intra-regional needs and problems, especially those of the 
ECAFE region and Southeast Asia. (See paper by Hiroshi 
Kitamura) . Here considerable attention was paid to the promising 
new Asian Development Bank (ADB), as assessed by Masaru 
Fukuda, and to proposals for regional monetary cooperation devel-
oped by Robert Triffin. 
Finally, the discussion centered upon three concrete national 
experiences in aid, trade and development over the past decade: 
Taiwan and Korea (Kuo-shu Liang), and Indonesia (Subroto). 
Given more time, we might logically now have reversed our course, 
a pnlying specific country experiences to test earlier propositions 
regarding the region as a whole, then linking them back in turn to 
the higher wisdom of global strategy. It is precisely this kind of 
movement back and forth between broad conceptualizations and 
narticular case studies that is best calculated to yield sound judg-
ments of instituti onal design and policy . 
Next Steps i n T rade Policy: Universalism or Regionalism 
One ba sic p r inciple of trade strategy commanded agreement 
at the outset. The ultimate goal for the world must remai n that of 
a global system of multilateral freer trade. This should be a sys-
te:n open to all, a nd non- discriminatory except as generalized one-
way preferences might be built into it temporarily to enabl e devel-
oping nations to win new export markets in the developed countries 
and t hus more rapidly narrow the North-South gap. 
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Progress toward this global goal seems arrested for the pre -
sent, But this need n ot be cause for discouragement. The Kennedy 
Round reductions are a great achievement, leaving non-tariff bar-
riers as the chief remaining obstacle to be overcome . V\Then one re-
calls the era 1929-49, and compares it with 1949-69, it is clear 
that we have come a long way. 
In the matter of generalized preferences for developing coun-
tries, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has 
been a grievous disappointment to its sponsors . Just as aid levels 
are falling, indeed, the prospect for trade preferences now seems 
even less promising, at least on a global basis . Meanwhile, with 
the movement towards multilateral free trade among the developed 
nations also on dead center, the United States in 1968-69 is the 
scene of a protectionist resurgence that may erode somewhat --
though probably not greatly -- the gains of the Kennedy Round. 
Under these circumstances, the next step forward can best be 
made perhaps through various regional free - trade agreements 
modelling on (or perhaps enlarging) the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC). 
Here the discussion turned to the concept of a Pacific Area 
Free Trade Association (PAFTA) embracing Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada and the United States. The appraisal of 
PAFTA at the 1967 Tokyo Conference on Pacific Trade and Devel-
opment was continued at Honolulu, with fresh, workmanlike assess-
ments of its possible effects in trade creation and trade diversi on 
among these five advanced nations. 
For the present, clearly, PAFTA can hardly be regarded as 
a feasible alternative. The U.S . still clings to the hope of further 
non-disc r iminatory reducti on of trade barriers . And it attaches 
to Latin America and Europe an importance in trade certainly no 
less than to the Asia- Pacific region. Especially is this so when 
P AFT A would appear to imply a weakening of the U . S. trade bal-
ance, and, if extended to agriculture, to injure important sectors 
of American farming. Similar reservations on P AFT A prevail in 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand with their industrial protec-
tion, and in Japan with her sheltered agriculture. 
At best, then, PAFTA remains a matter for the future, and 
only then perhaps if Europe turns increasingly inward. Should it 
ever be attemr-ted, its terms of membership should be open-ended , 
making it a possible step towards a wider , eventually universal 
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free trade association. 
If not PAFTA, then, what about a more modest free trade 
arrangement embracing Japan, Australia and New Zealand 
(JANFTA)? Here economic complementarity is already high, and 
growing. In papers and discussions the Conference probed into 
the implications of JANFTA for these three countries in terms of 
trade balance, income, and employment, and also its implications 
for the developing nations of Asia. 
Again the realization of JANFTA seems blocked presently by 
Japan's import barriers on farm products , by industrial protec-
tion in Australia and New Zealand, and by reluctance to risk either 
discrimination against the U. S . on the one hand, or the sacrifice 
of Commonwealth preference on the other. Some sectoral integra-
tion may be possible even so. For example, it might prove mutual-
ly advantageous in specific industries such as autos, steel and 
aluminum, either on a preferential or a most-favored nation basis . 
Along with this could come also an expansion of triangular trade 
relations with countries of Asia. 
Clearly all such proposals require more study, more educa-
tional effort, and trial negotiations. What seems to be needed is a 
Japan-Australia-New Zealand Office of Trade and Development, or 
preferably an Office of Pacific Trade and Development (OPT AD) . 
A "Pacific OECD" could enlist the joint efforts of governments, 
business, academic and scientific agencies to explore next steps 
-- steps in trade, in aid , in the regulation of investment practices, 
shipping, and airlines, and in all the networks of contact that now 
crisscross the Pacific. 
While agreeing that an OPT AD would be a valuable, if modest, 
undertaking, the Conference was divided and uncertain over its 
precise terms of membership . Should it be confined to the five 
advanced Pacific nations? Or should it be open to any and all in 
the entire region? The answer depends on its precise functions, 
still to be worked out . Certainly its membership and functions 
should not be so broad as to duplicate or interfere with the ECAFE, 
the OECD, the ADB, or other such agencies already on the scene. 
Nor, on the other hand, should it be so restricted as to appear in 
Asian eyes to be merely an imperialist entente among affluent aid-
donor nations of the Pacific . 
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Trade and Aid: Asia's Needs and Policies 
Asia and PAFTA. The countries of developing Asia, broad-
ly speaking, face a sharp dilemma today. On the one hand is their 
continuing need for more effective cooperation from the advanced 
nations in support of their development . On the other are the poor 
prospects immediately ahead -- prospects either for greater trad-
ing opportunities in the V\Test, or for foreign aid sustained at even 
the level of the mid-60' s. All assessments of the ECAFE region 
as a whole emphasize the importance of new export markets to re-
lieve the foreign exchange constraint on growth as the long- term 
road to development. In the short-term, however, any rapid ex-
pansion of export capabilities, whether in food, raw materials, or 
light manufactures, will require substantial financial and technical 
assistance from outside. 
A grand design for just such structural adjustments in markets, 
especially with the advanced nations of the Pacific, is outlined in 
Kiyoshi Kojima' s paper "Asian Developing Countries and PAFTA." 
It calls for the allocati on of large sums of capital by the advanced 
nations to build up rapidly the export capabilities of Asia in both 
industry and agriculture. Other subsidies and regulatory adjust-
ments would be needed to handle dislocations in the advanced econ-
omies that would follow from the withdrawal of protection to high-
cost, labor-intensive trades and their displacement by imports from 
Asia. Large commitments would equally be necessary in the field 
of education and technical assistance in Asia, in order to provide 
the n eeded skills, both technological and managerial . The political 
and administrative burdens imposed on governments in all partici-
pating countries would likewise be formidable, to say the least. 
Spread out more slowly over time , the requirements of the 
Kojima proposal become more manageable. In fact, much progress 
is already underway in Asia in fields like new crop technology, 
family planning, education, and new industries and mining ventures 
oriented to overseas mar kets . Windfall gains from U . S . spending 
on the Vietnam war has lately provided a stimulus in ne i ghboring 
countries . fo the future new potentials for foreign aid , at least in 
Southeast Asia (e.g., the Mekong Valley), may appear if the end 
of the war brings a fre sh resurgence of political will among donor 
nations . If so , this may also bring with it fresh incentives and 
pressures towards regional cooperation among Asian developing 
countries. 
Regionalism Within Asia. What, then , is the promise of intra-
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regional cooperation in Asia, especially among countries that 
alone are too small to enjoy potential economies of scale? A s a 
transitional stage, at least, between a narrow nationalism and 
so 1n e wider grouping, does Asian regionalism offer hopeful pros-
pect s? 
The answer lies very much in the realm of political leader-
s hip, Recent developments suggest that the Association of South-
eas·t Asian Nations (A SEAN), with a populati on of 200 million and 
a GN P of $25 billion, may conceivably move towards constructive 
forms of regional cooperation . If so, this must go well beyond 
trade liberalization, for intra-regional trade among Southeast 
Asian nations is hardly 10-15% of their total trade. Along with 
some freeing of intra- regional trade, perhaps through selective 
preferences, the prime need i s for joint investment programs re-
gionally planned . These w oul d harmonize and integrate national 
development plans, with import substitution leading on progressive-
ly t o export development on a regional basis . 
Beyond consultation , and some technical cooperation, sup-
ported by foreign aid programs and by the Asian Development Bank, 
all this still lies mainly in the future . Thus far it remains in the 
realm of rhetoric more than reality. However, it is well to remem-
ber that the EEC was likewise many years in gestation. 
Monetary Cooperation. Meanwhile two major institutional 
developments may give a big boost to regional cooperation -- one 
under active consideration and the other already a reality . 
A Conference paper by R obert T riffin reviews his well known 
proposal of 1967. It calls for a negotiated credit reserve standard 
for the ECAFE region, to replace the gold and foreign exchange 
reserve system . The latter , he argues, is less and less adequate 
to meet the world's needs, or even to prevent recurrent financial 
c rises of i ncreasing frequency. By contra st, an Asia-Pacific 
c redit-rese r ve system, pooling reserves regionally and investing 
them partly within the regi on, would be more economical, and offer 
greater assur ances of liquidity, convertability, and protection 
against default. 
Details of the proposed monetary reform are open to debate, 
of course . Concerning relative costs and benefits there is some 
disagreement. But ECAFE thinking appears to be moving at least 
towards a regional clearing arrangement, with some pooling of 
reserves. Such a reform , say its sponsors , would foster trade 
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liberalization and economic stability . It is mostly the creditor na-
tion s that are still unpersuaded as to its security and feasibility . 
Another five years may well bring some such scheme to fruition. 
Asian Development Bank. Already in operation is one major 
new instrumentality for regional development -- the ADB. While 
it enjoys the backing of the developed nations , of the West, i t is 
importantly Asian in inspiration and management . 
The B ank's functions and modes of operation are still in the 
early stages of development. It is a bank; but it is also a devel-
opment agency. In the latter sphere it not only invests its own 
funds; it also provides technical assistance (e . g., in agriculture, 
highways, water resources), and serves as a trustee for special 
funds contributed by donor members. 
Many issues concerning the ADB remain to be worked out e.g., 
its distinction from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), its terms of concessionary financing (soft 
loans), and the balance of power among various groups within its 
Board, espec ially between donor and borrower nations. Basic to 
its whole conception is the fact that while its funds come mainly 
fro m affluent nations -- Japan and the West -- it was founded to 
assist developing Asia, and South Asia no less than E ast or Pacific 
Asia. Thus it is neither just a lenders' club, nor a borrowers' 
club, nor a Pacific bank, nor even completely a n Asian bank in its 
operations and its controls. 
Aid, Trade and Development: Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia 
l\l!oving first from global to regional issues, and then from the 
Pacific to the Asian region, the Conference came finally to three 
specific cases of national development in Asia -- each different 
from the others, but all of absorbing interest. 
Taiwan and South Korea. These two East Asian nations are 
fast becoming showcases of Asian development. The reasons are 
to be sought in the capacitie s of their people, their heritage of 
colonial development under Japanese rule, their security today be-
hind the shield of American military protection, and large inputs of 
foreign aid and investment . 
High-pitched growth set in later in South Korea than Taiwan 
because of bitter civil war and consequent political instabi lity . 
Since the early 60 1 s however, both have displayed similar charac-
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teristics growth rates of 6-9% over some years, r1s1ng savings 
and educational levels, and exports advancing rapidly in scale and 
in diversification of products and markets. 
Korea and Taiwan point to the need for accelerated adaptation 
of new technologies, especially with the phasing out of foreign aid 
as in Taiwan. Likewise they pose the question how long and on 
what scale must aid continue in order to achieve big pay-offs. A 
critical variable here, of course, is the will and capacity of nation-
building leadership, both government and business to evolve viable, 
dynamic forms of public and private enterprise in close cooperation. 
Meanwhile Indonesia offers a testing ground for aid and trade 
of a quite different order, and at an earlier stage of development. 
Vifith new leaders in p ower, after a decade of economic disorder 
and disintegration, Indonesia is now passing through the first 
phases of rehabilitation, aided by a 1 0-nation grouping of aid donor 
working with the IBRD, the IMF, the ADB and other international 
agencies. 
The worst ravages of inflation in Indonesia had been repaired 
by the end of 1968. More positive measures of stabilization --
internal and external -- are now going forward, preparatory to 
fresh programs of development. The new forms of multilateral aid 
cooperation being evolved in Indonesia, with Japan and the U . S . 
each furnishing one third of the total aid budget in 1 968, may set 
a precedent with wider implications for other nations of Asia in the 
future. The precedent is significant not only because of its eco-
nomic efficiency but also because its multi-national character 
assures the Indonesians that it is largely a-political in nature. 
CONCLUSION 
The Conference, it will be seen, ran the full gamut from 
global generalities of high policy to the concrete minutiae of recent 
experience in three A sian nations. In this regard it faithfully re-
flected the real world of the development economist as theorist and 
practitioner. Concepts of modernization at a high level of abstrac-
tion are of little practical value except as they help one reach 
policy judgments in particular situations . In both respects, the 
H onolulu Conference was fortunate in having a dozen papers of 
uniformly high caliber. Altogether, the fund of knowledge and ex-
perience assembled here in scholars from ten countries around the 
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Pacific is itself striking evidence of a growing Pacific community, 
sharing increasingly a consensus on the kind of world it wants and 
the requisites for progress in that direction. 
It remains only to close with a reminder, nonetheless, that 
the Asia-Pacific region in its totality embraces nations not only 
rich and poor, not only North and South, but also East and West --
split apart by a deep ideological gap and political antagonism. The 
Soviet Union is an advanced country of the Pacific, a donor of aid 
in the 50' s, and now a Eurasian nation seeking capital and technical 
enterprise from Japan to develop its Eastern regions. And domi- · 
nating the map of East Asia is another great nation -- the 700 mil-
lion people of China. The second great Communist power of the 
Asia-Pacific region, China is also the nation with one of the most 
disappointing records of development in the whole area over the 
past decade. 
Sooner or later, Communist and non-Communist Asia must be 
somehow brought within one orbit of peaceful negotiation and ex-
-change. Otherwise this cleavage through the heart of the Asia-
Pacific region will threaten us all with catastrophe. 
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Session Il Trade Cooperation Among the Advanced 
Pacific Countries in Relationship with 
Neighbourinl? Re1?ions 
Chairman: Malcolm MacNaughton 
"A RE-ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE 
FORMATION OF PACIFIC AREA FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT" 
Reporter : B. W. Wilkinson 
Discussants: I. A. McDougall and H. G. Johnson 
"ALTERNATIVE POLICIES IN TRADE COOPERATION 
OF THE ADVANCED P A CIFIC COUNTRIE S IN THE 
NEXT FIVE YEARS" 
Reporter : L. V . Castle 
Discussants: Soon Chough and Sperry Lea 
Chairman: Jose Encarnacion 
"JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, NEW Z E ALAND: THE PROS-
PECT FOR WESTERN PACIFIC E CONOMI C INTE-
GRATION" 
Reporter : Peter Drysdale 
SCHEDULE 
"JANFTA AND ASIAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
SECTORAL ANALYSIS" 
Reporter I. A. Mc Dougall 
Discussants: Hisao Kanamori and H. W. Arndt 
FRIDAY, January 10, 1969 
Session H (Continued) 
Chairman: H. W. Arndt 
"ASIAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND PAFTA: 
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DEVELOPMENT, AID AND TRADE PREFERENCES" 
Reporters Kiyoshi Kojima and I. Yamazawa 
Discussants: Subroto and William Lockwood 
Session ill Cooperation with Respect to Money and 
Capital Movements 
Chairman: Hung Wo Ching 
"INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION 
IN ASIA AND THE FAR EAST" 
Reporter : Robert Triffin 
Discussants: Harry G. Johnson and Arthur Paul 
"THE ROLE OF ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK IN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA" 
Reporter Masaru Fukuda 
Discussants: Jose Encarnacion and Hugh T. 
Patrick 
Session IV Evaluation of Aid and Trade Policies of 
the Pacific Advanced Countries Towards 
Asian Developing countries 
Chairman: Boyd MacNaughton 
"AID, TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
EXPERIENCE OF TAIWAN AND KOREA" 
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SCHEDULE 
Reporter : Kuo-shu Liang 
Discussants: Soon Chough and Arthur Paul 
SATURDAY, January 11, 1969 
Chairman: Shelley Mark 
"AID, TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
E XPERIENCE OF INDONESIA" 
Reporter : Subroto 
Discussants: H. W. Arndt and Masaru Fukuda 
"ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL 
COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA" 
Reporter Hiroshi Kitamura 
Discussants : Robert Triffin and Peter Drysdale 
Session V 
Chairman: Hugh T. Patrick and Kiyoshi Kojima 
Summary of Discussion: Sessions I - IV 
William Lockwood 
Free Discussion. 
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